IN THE NAME OF GOD, THE

MERCIFUL AND COMPASSIONATE

IN ORDER TO HAVE A SUCCINT INFORMATION REGARDING AFGHANISTAN AND GETTING FAMILIAR WITH THE EVENTS, EVEN AT A SUPERFICIAL LEVEL, IT IS DEEMED NECESSARY TO PRESENT SOME INFORMATIVE FACTS, BEYOND WHAT IS CONTAINED IN THE FACTS AND DOCUMENTS OF THE PRESENT BOOK. THE MOST ESSENTIAL OF THESE ARE GEROGRAPHIC DATA AND A GLIMPSE OF THE HISTORY OF THIS COUNTRY.

AS REGARDS THE POLITICAL CONOTATIONS OF THE EVENTS IN VIEW OF THE LIMITATIONS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE DOCUMENTS IT WOULD BE TRIED TO REFRAIN FROM GOING BEYOND THOSE LIMITATIONS AND CONCENTRATE ON THE DOCUMENTS THEMSELVES.

GEOGRAPHIC DATA ABOUT AFGHANISTAN:

AFGHANISTAN IS A COUNTRY IN CENTRAL ASIA WITH A POPULATION OF 22 MILLIONS BOUNDED IN THE NORTH BY THE SOVIET UNION AND THE WEST BY IRAN, ON THE EAST AND SOUTH BY PAKISTAN, AND ON THE NORTH EAST BY CHINA. ALTHOUG A LANDLOCKED COUNTRY BECAUSE OF COMMON BORDERS WITH PAKISTAN AND IRANIAN BALUCHESTAN, AFGHANISTAN CAN SERVE AS A MEANS OF ACCESS BY THE SOVIET UNION TO THE WARM WATERS OF THE SOUTH AND THE INDIAN OCEAN. THES ACCESS OF THE SOVIET TO THE INDIAN OCEAN CONSTITUTES ONE OF THE LONG TERM STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES OF THE SOVIET UNION SINCE THE CZARIST PERIOD. TODAY, BECAUSE OF THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, THIS QUESTION HAS ACQUIRED A CERTAIN SIGNIFICANCE.

AFGHANISTAN'S ECONOMY IS MOSTLY DEPENDENT UPON AGRICULTURE AND LIVESTOCK BREEDING. THERE ARE ALSO RESOURCES LIKE GAS, OIL, IRON, COPPER, COAL, URANIUM AND PRECIOUS STONES, WHICH, BECAUSE OF PENURY OF CAPITAL AND TECHNOL-

OGICAL KNOW-HOW, ARE NOT EXPLOITED. ONLY JACENTH AND NATURAL GAS ARE AMONG ITEMS OF AFGHANISTAN'S EXPORT.

85 PERCENT OF AFGHANISTAN'S POPULATION ARE PEASANTS AND LIVE IN POVERTY. THIS FACT, PLUS THE FEUDAL SYSTEM OF THE COUNTRY AND THE GROWTH OF THE POWER OF FEUDALS ARISING FROM THE COLONIAL POLICIES OF THE PAST, HAS DEPRIVED THE PEASANTS FROM THE MOST PRIMITIVE MEANS OF WELFARE.

BECAUSE OF THE ILLITERACY OF 98 PERCENT OF THE POPULATION AND THE LOW LEVEL OF CULTURE , AND LACK OF POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS CONSCIOUSNESS AS WELL AS THE HETEROGENEOUS NATURE OF THE ETHNIC STRUCTURE OF AFGHANISTAN PASHTUOS, TAGIKS,HAZAREIS, OUZBAKS, TURCOMANS, GHORISTANIS, BALUCHIES, ETC), TENDENCIES OF RACIAL AND ETHNIC SUPERIORITY HAVE DEVELOPED IN THE COUNTRY, BECAUSE OF WHICH THERE HAVE BEEN CONFILICTS IN VARIOUS PERIODS. THIS TENDENCY HAS VERY OFTEN SERVED AS A POWERFUL WEAPON IN THE HANDS OF COLONIALIST POWERS TO PENETRATE IN THE AFGHAN SOIL. THE SIGNING OF THE TREATY OF "GANDOMAK" BETWEEN THE AMIR OF PASHTOUS (EMIR MOHAMAD YAEGHOOB KHAN) AND THE BRITISH, OR THE SINISTER TREATY OF " DORAND" BETWEEN EMIR ABDUL RAHMAN KHAN AND THE BRITISH IN 1839, ARE IN THEMSELVES A CLEAR EVIDENCE OF THE MANY IN WHICH THE COLONIALISTS TOOK ADVANTAGE OF RACIAL CONFLICTS IN AFGHNISTAN. UNFORTUNATETY, DESPITE THE HEAVY BLOWS SUFFERED BY THE PEOPLE OF AFGHANISTAN AS A RESULT OF RACIAL AND ETHNIC DIFFERENCES, THE AFGHAN PEOPLE ARE STILL AFFLICTED BY THEESE DIFFERENCES AND EVEN THE FORMATION OF GROUPINGS AND ORGANIZATIONS HAVE RACIAL OR LANGUAGE AFFINITIES AS MOTIVE. THIS FACTOR APPEARS ALSO AMONG MARXIST GROUPINGS. FOR INSTANCE THE KHALG GROUP AND THE PARCHAM GROUP, WHICH ARE BOTH MARXIST AND ASSOCIATED WITH THE RUSSIANS, HAVE ALWAYS STOOD AGAINST EACH OTHER, AND EXTERMINATING EACH OTHER (MOST PASHTU SPEAKING MARXISTSARE IN THE KHALG PARTY AND MOST PERSIAN MARXISTS

HAVE BEEN IN THE PARCHAM PARTY). THE DOMINATION OF THE COLONIAL SYSTEMS HAS NOT ONLY DEVELOPED RACIALIST TENDENCIES EXPLOITING THEM IN THEIR OWN BENEFIT, BUT HAVE TRIED TO DISTORT AND DISCREDIT ISLAM AND RELIGIOUS BELEIFS AND HAVE ENCOURAGED THIS ISLAMIC NATION TO JUSTIFY THE CORRUPT REGIMES THAT HAVE ANTI-ISLAMIC TENDENCIES. HOWEVER, DESLITE ALL THESE EFFORTS OF THE COLONIALISTS TO DESTROY THEIR CULTURE AND HISTORY AND DISCREDIT AND DISTORT ISLAM, THE PEOPLE OF AFGHANISTAN HAVE PRESERVED THEIR RELIGIOUS ZEAL AND THEIR SPIRIT OF OPPOSITION AGAINST FOREIGN DOMINATION. THIS VERY VIRTUE OF THEIRS HAS CONTRIBUTED TO THE DEFEAT OF THE BRITISH IN THE YEARS 1829 AND 1879 AND WILL CONTRIBUTE TO THE FAILURE OF THE SOVIETS IN AFGHANISTAN.

THE RULING REGIMES OF AFGHANISTAN

FROM ZAHER SHAH TO AMIN

ON THE STRENGTH OF THE EXISTING DOCUMENTS IN THIS BOOK, ALTHOUGH WE DO NOT POSSESS ANY INDEPENDENT DOCUMENTS CONCERNING THE MANNER IN WHICH ZAHER SHAH RULED IN HIS COUNTRY FOR 20 YEARS, HOWEVER, ON THE EXPERIENCE OF OUR PEOPLE DURING THE FIFTY YEARS OF DICTATORIAL RULE OF THE PAHLAVI DYNASTY, AND ON THE BASIS OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PARAMETERS WHICH MOHAMAD REZA ENJOYED AND ZAHER SHAH LACKED THEM, IT CAN WELL BE SUPPOSED WHAT THE AFGHAN PEOPLE HAD SUFFERED DURING THIS PERIOD. 40 YEARS OF RULE BY ZAHER SHAH AND COLLABORATION WITH COLONIALISTIC POLICIES OF THE BRITISH AND THE U.S., HAS BROUGHT NOTHING BUT IGNORANCE, POVERTY AND THE PILLAYING OF AFGHANISTAN'S RECOURCES.

THE REPUBLICAN RULE:

THE INCREASE OF THE INFLUENCE OF THE WEST AND THE BLACKING OF THE MOVEMENTS OF THE MARXIST GROUPS AS A RESULT OF THE DEVELOPMENT AND

EXPANSION OF THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT IN MOST CENTERS AND SCIENTIFIC INSTITUTES, URGED THE RUSSIANS TO ELIMINATE ZAHER SHAH AND REPLACE HIM BY A PERSON WHO WOULD BE ABLE TO EMBRACE THE SOVIET INFLUENCE IN AFGHANISTAN.

THUS, IN THE BEGINING HOURS OF 17TH JULY, 1973(26TH TIR1354), SARDAR DAVOOD, FORMER PRIME MINISTER AND ZAHER SHAH'S BROTHER-IN-LAW AND A POTENTIAL DICTATOR CAME TO POWER THROUGH A MILITARY COUP, WITHOUT ANY BLOODSHED. NOW, AS TO WHETHER THE SOVIETS WERE INVOLVED IN THIS COUP, OR NOT, IT SHOULD BE MENTIONED THAT THERE WERE 200 TECHNICIANS AND MILITARY ADVISERS FROM THE SOVIET UNION, MANY OF WHOM WORKED WITH THE ARMY UNITS, THE BASES FOR THE COUP. ANY HOW, DAVOOD WENT INTO ACTION IN ORDER TO MODERNIZE THE COUNTRY AND IMPROVE THE ECONOMIC SITUATION AND MATERIALIZE THE SOVIET AMBITIONS. AMONG THE REFORMS INTRODUCED WAS THE ABROGATION OF THE NECCESSITY FOR WOMEN TO PUT ON VEILS, AND THAT OF SEEKING HELPS FROM THE RUSSIAN IN THE MILITARY AND ECONOMIC FIELDS. DAVOOD'S PURPOSE IN LIGHTING HIS AMERICAN CIGARETTE WITH SOVIET MATCHES(DAVOOD HAD SAID HE WOULD BE MORE DELIGHTED IF HE COULD LIGHT HIS AMERICAN CIGARETTE WITH RUSSIAN MATCHES) LED HIM TO LIGHTING AMERICAN CIGARETTE WITH AMERICAN MATCHES.

DAVOOD'S COURSE OF ACTION DROVE HIM MORE AND MORE TOWARDS THE AMERRICANS AND LED HIM AWAY FROM THE RUSSIANS. THIS TENDENCY ADVANCED TO A DEGREE THAT HE ACCEPTED PRESIDENT CARTER'S INVITATION TO VISIT U.S.A. IN THE SUMMER OF 1978. DOCUMENT NO.2 IS A CLEAR EVIDENCE OF DAVOOD'S ORIENTATIONS TOWARDS THE AMERICANS. DAVOOD'S POSTURE IN FOREIGN POLICY IN CONTINUING FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN AND IRAN, AND HIS DEXTEROUS APPROACH (NATURALLY AS SEEN BY THE AMERICANS) TOWARD THE RUSSIANS,

LED THE AMERICANS TO DECLARE: " PRESIDENT DAVOOD ALSO MADE SIGNIFICIANT CONTRIBUTIONS TO FULFILL ANOTHER PRINCIPAL U.S. OBJECTIVE..... IN ORDER TO SUPPORT AFGHANISTAN'S EFFORTS TO PRESERVE THE LARGEST POSSIBLE DEGREE OF INDEPENDANCE FROM SOVIET PRESSURES WHICH IS THE PRINCIPAL USPOLICY GOAL HERE, WE CONTINUE TO DEMONSTRATE OUR FRIENDLY AND TANGIBLE INTEREST THROUGH A VISIBLE AMERICAN PRESENCE IN THIS COUNTRY." (DOCUMENT NO.2)

OF COURSE IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THE STABILITY OF THE REGION, AS MENTIONED BY THE AMERICANS IS TO MEAN THE DEATHLY SILENCE OF THE REGION, UNDER WHICH THEY CAN COSILY PILLAGE THEIR RESOURCES OF THESE COUNTRIES AND SUBJUGATE THEM, AND NOT A STABILITY WHICH IS DIRECTED TOWARD THE INDEPENDENCE AND SELF-SUFFICIENCY OF THE COUNTRIES IN THE REGION.

DAVOOD CONTRIBUTED MUCH TOWARDS THE OBJECTIVES OF THE UNITED STATES THAT IS, THE STABILITY OF THE REGION(NAMELY: SILENCE IN THE FACE OF THE PILLAGING OF HTEIR RESOURCE), AND REDUCTION OF SOVIET INFLUENCE IN AFGHANISTAN, WHICH DID NOT PLEASE THE SOVIET. THUS THE COUP D,ETAT TOOK PLACE ON 27TH APRIL, 1978 WHICH MEANT THAT THE SOVIETS HAD ATTAINED THEIR OBJECTIVE IN BRINGING TO POWER OF THE DAVOOD'S REGIME AND THAT CONSISTED IN CARRYING THE KHALG PARTY TOWARDS POWER.

THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC:

THE SOVIETS, IN PURSUANCE OF THEIR POLICIES TO PROTECT THEIR INTERESTS AND DOMINATION IN AFGHANISTAN, CONSIDERED IT PROPER TO BRING A SYSTEM INTO POWER, WHICH WOULD BE ATTACHED TO THEM IN EVERY RESPECT AND NO OTHER GROUP BUT THE KHALG PARTY WAS IMAGINABLE FOR THIS PURPOSE. THUS, THE MOST SUBSERVIENT GROUP TO THE SOVIETS IN AFGHANISTAN CAME TO POWER EITHER WITH THE DIRECT OR INDIRECT INVOLVEMENT OF THE SOVIET UNION. TARAKI'S

MENTALITY AND RECORD AND THOSE OF HIS ADHERENTS AND THEIR ALLEGIANCE TO SOVIET POLICIES DURING THE RULE OF TARAKI OVER AFGHANISTAN, ON THE OTHER HAND, DEMONSTRATED THE EXTENT OF SOVIET INFLUENCE IN THE COUP OF 27TH APRIL.

THE NON-ALIGNMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN IN REFUSING AID FROM ANY COUNTRY WITH IMPERIALIST NATURE, OR ANY NON-IMPERIALIST COUNTRY, AND THE NUMEROUS CONTACTS WITH THE U.S. AMBASSADORS DURING TARAKI'S RULE OVER AFGHANISTAN IS A QUESTION THAT SHOULD BE EXPLAINED IN REVIEWING THE APPROACHES OF THE SOVIET AND AMERICANS WITH THIS COUNTRY, WHICH IS NOT DETACHED FROM THE POLICIES OF THIS COUNTRY.

TARAKI ENCOUNTERED MANY DIFFICULTIES ON THE PART OF THE MOSLEM MOVEMENTS IN IMPLEMENTING RUSSIA,S ORDERS, AS IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO ENSURE SOVIET INTERESTS UNDER SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES. THAT IS WHY HE PROCEEDED WITH IMPLEMENTING A SERIES OF POLITICAL ACTIONS TO PROTECT THEIR INTERESTS, ALL OF WHICH, WERE INTRODUCED UNDER THE COVER OF PRESERVING THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE REVOLUTION OF 7TH THAUR,(27TH APRIL) AND DEFENSE OF THE REVOLUTION. THE ADOPTION OF THESE POLITICAL MEASURES BY THE RUSSIANS, WHICH WOULD END IN THE ASSASSINATION OF AMIN, AND WOULD RESULT IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF DISSENSIONS IN THE VERY MIDST OF THE LEADERSHIP OF THE KHALG PARTY OVER THE ADOPTION OF MEASURES TO COPE WITH DIFFICULTIES, LED TO THE ASSASSINATION OF TARAKI (THE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT LED TO THE ASSASSINATION OF TARAKI, AND WHETHER THE RUSSIANS WERE INFORMED OF THE EVENTS IN THE LIGHT OF TARAKI'S VISIT TO THE SOVIET UNION TWO DAYS BEFORE THE COUP, AND HIS RECEIPT OF THE TITLE OF " FATHER OF REVOLUTION" FROM LEONID BREZHNEV ARE UNKNOWN TO US). AFTER THE ASSASSINATION OF TARAKI AND COMING TO POWER OF AMIN, THE SOVIET UNION CONTINUED SUPPORTING AMIN.

WHAT HAPPENED TO THE AFGHAN PEOPLE DURING THE RULE OF THE KHALG PARTY WAS NOTHING BUT UPHEAVALS, POVERTY, REPRESSION, MURDER AND TAKING REFUGE OF ABOUT ONE MILLION PEOPLE OF THE INHABITANTS OF THIS COUNTRY IN THE NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES AND THE DEPENDENCE OF AFGHANISTAN IN EVERY RESPECT ON THE SOVIET UNION. IN SHORT THE PEOPLE WERE MURDERED AND FORCED INTO WANDERING TO OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE NAME OF THE PEOPLE (KHALG MEANING PEOPLE), THE SOURCES AND INDEPENDENCE OF THE COUNTRY WERE LEFT TO BE SQUANDERED.

THE SOVIET AND AFGHANISTAN

OVERALL INTEREST OF RUSSIANS IN AFGHANISTAN:

IN THE LIGHT OF WHAT WAS SAID ABOVE IN DESCRIBING THE ECONOMIC SITUATION AND THE GEOGRAPHIC POSITION OF AFGHANISTAN SOVIET OVERALL INTERESTS IN AFGHANISTAN CAN BE SUMMED UP AS FOLLOWS:

A- OUTLET TOWARDS THE WARM WATERS OF THE SOUTH AND THE INDIAN OCEAN: THE CZAR OF RUSSIA HAD ONCE SAID THAT WHOEVER RULES OVER THESE WATERS, CAN RULE THE WHOLE WORLD. BY THE EXPRESSION "THESE" HE MEANT THE NORTHERN COASTS OF THE ARABIAN SEA AND THE INDIAN OCEAN. THIS POLITICAL OBJECTIVE HAS BEEN PURSUED TO THIS DAY. THE BOOSTING OF AMERICAN BASES WITHIN THESE LIMITS, IN PARTICULAR DURING THE REIGN OF THE SHAH, IN PAKISTAN, AND THE SHEIKHDOMS OF THE PERSIAN GULF HAS INTENSIFIED THE SOVIET PERSISTENCE IN PURSUING THIS POLICY. THE BRIDGE THAT CARRIES THE SOVIETS FROM AFGHANISTAN

TO THESE WATERS, IS BALUCHISTAN OF PAKISTAN AND BALUCHISTAN OF IRAN. THIS IS WHAT JUSTIFIES THE EXISTENCE OF PRO-SOVIET GROUPS IN IRANIAN BALUCHISTAN AND THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE QUESTION OF PASHTOONESTAN(THE GREAT BALUCHISTAN).

B- AFGHANISTAN IS RICH IN UNTAPPED RESOURCES, WHICH REMAIN UNEXPLOITED BECAUSE OF LAKE OF CAPITAL AND ABSENCE OF SPECIALISTS. THESE RESOURCES, IN VIEW OF SOVIET CAPABILITIES CAN BE FULLY EXPLOITED TO SATISFY THE NEEDS OF THE SOVIET INDUSTRIES, JUST AS NATURAL GAS IS AT PRESENT ONE OF THE EXPORT ITEMS OF AFGHANISTAN TO THE SOVIET UNION. LIKEWISE, SOVIET RULE OF AFGHANISTAN CAN FACILITATE ABSORPTION OF SOVIET LOW QUALITY COMMODITIES IN AFGHANISTAN.

C- DEFYING THE UNITED STATES: EXPANSIONISM AND WORLD DOMINATION IS ONE OF THE ROOTS OF THE STRUGGLE AND RIVALRY BETWEEN THE SUPER POWERS IN THE COLONIZATION OF DEPRIVED COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD. THE SOVIET UNION CAN NOT KEEP SILENT IN THE FACE OF THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN BASES AND PRO-AMERICAN REGIMES IN THE WORLD. ON THE BASES OF THIS ARGUMENT THE SOVIETS WILL RESORT TO EXPANSIONIST ACTIONS. THEREFORE JUST AS THE UNITED STATES STRIVED TO ATTAIN STRATEGIC POSITIONS AND LUCRATIVE RESOURCES, THE SOVIET UNION IN ITS TURN STRUGGLES FOR THE POSSESSION OF SUCH POSITIONS. ALTHOUGH SUCH RIVALRIES ARE IN THEIR ORIGIN FOR THE PURPOSE OF ENSURING THEIR PERMANENT INTERESTS AND CONTINUED DOMINATION OF POORER COUNTRIES, THEY AFFORD THE POSSIBILITY OF DIVERTING

ANY MOVEMENT TOWARDS INDEPENDENCE IN THE DIRECTION OF THEIR OWN INTERESTS, UNDER THE COVER OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF IDEOLOGY OF FREE ENTERPRISE AND CAPITALISM, OR OTHERWISE , SOCIALISM AND COMMUNISM. FURTHER EXPLANATION WILL BE GIVEN IN THIS RESPECT IN THE SECTION ON THE AMERICAN APPROACH TOWARDS AFGHANISTAN.

SOVIET PENETRATION IN AFGHANISTAN.

WHAT IS QUITE EVIDENT IS THE FACT THAT SOVIET MILITARY AND ECONOMIC PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN, COULD NEVER MATERIALIZE WITHOUT RELIANCE ON BASES WITHIN THE BORDERS OF THIS COUNTRY. IN GENERAL, INTERVENTION IN ANY COUNTRY AND PRESENCE OF A FOREIGN COUNTRY IN ANOTHER IS DEPENDENT UPON THE BASES ASSOCIATED WITH THAT FOREIGN COUNTRY WITHIN ITS BORDERS.

WHAT CAN BE CONCLUDED FROM THE DOCUMENTS CONTAINED IN THIS BOOK, IN CONNECTION WITH SOVIET INFLUENCE AND PERFORMANCE IN AFGHANISTAN ARE AS FOLLOWS:

A- FORMATION OF BASES AND POLITICAL PARTIES. IN ORDER TO CREATE POLITICAL BASES THE SOVIET UNION EMBARKED UPON CREATION AND ENCOURAGING CREATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES ASSOCIATED WITH IT IN AFGHANISTAN. THE TWO PARTIES " PARCHAM" AND " KHALG" WERE FORMED DURING THE REIGN OF ZAHER SHAH, WHOSE ACTIVITIES WERE STRENGTHENED IN THE PERIOD WHEN DAVOOD CAME TO POWER. THESE TWO PARTIES PREPARED THEMSELVES FOR ASSUMING RESPONSIBILITY BY THE SOVIETS. THESE TWO PARTIES SERVED IN GENERAL AS A BASES FOR ORGANIZING PERSONS INCLINED TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION

AND FOR THE UPBRINGING OF PERSONS WHO IN FUTURE WOULD PROVE THEIR ALLEGIANCE TOWARDS THEIR IDEOLOGICAL COMMITMENTS IN RESPECT OF THE SOVIET UNION. IT IS WORTHY OF ATTENTION THAT THE SOVIET UNION DID NOT GROUP ITS ADHERENTS IN ONE SINGLE ORGANIZATION, BUT GROUPED MARXIST PARTIES OF SOVIET INCLINATION INTO SEPARATE GROUPS, WHICH IN APPEARANCE WERE OF CONTRADICTORY TENDENCIES AGAINST EACH OTHER. BY ACTING IN THIS MANNER, THE SOVIET UNION PURSUED SUCH A POLICY THAT IF ONE OF THE PARTIES FAILED TO FULFIL SOVIET EXPECTATIONS, THE OTHER PARTY, WHICH IS ALSO INCLINED TOWARDS SOVIET DOMINATION, WOULD ENTER ARENA. THE OUTSTANDING EXAMPLE OF THIS POLICY CAN BE SEEN IN AFGHANISTAN IN RELATION WITH THE TWO PARTIES " PARCHAM" AND " KHALG". THE "KHALG" PARTY EMBARKED UPON THE GROUP " PARCHAMIST" ELEMENTS FROM ALL STATE ORGANS AND IN THIS CONNECTION BABRAK KARMAL, WAS NOT IMMUNE FROM THIS PERSECUTION, AND WAS EXILED TO PRAGUE. HOWEVER, WITH THE FAILURE OF THE " KHALGIS" IN CRUSHING ITS OPPONENTS AND ESTABLISHING STABILITY IN THE COUNTRY, IN OTHER WORDS, WITH THE FAILURE OF THE KHALGIS IN ESTABLISHING THE DOMINATION OF THE RUSSIANS IN AFGHANISTAN, AND FINALLY ASSASSINATION OF NUR MOHAMAD TARAKI, WHICH RESULTED IN UNFAVORABLE CONDITIONS FOR THE RUSSIANS, THE SOVIETS THOUGHT IT BETTER TO INTRODUCE OUTWARD CHANGES IN THE RULING PARTY AND PROTECT THEIR INTERESTS THROUGH THE INTERMEDIARY OF THEIR"PARCHAMIST"

MERCENARIES. PERHAPS THIS WAS THE INTERPRETATION OF LENIN'S STATEMENT WHICH HAS BEEN REPEATEDLY PRESENTED BY THE SOVIET MINISTER PLENIPOTENTIARY IN KABUL TO THE AMERICAN AUTHORITIES, NAMELY THAT " EVERY REVOLUTION SHOULD DEFEND ITSELF". IT IS INTERESTING TO NOTE THAT THE AFGHAN REVOLUTION SHOULD DEFEND THE STABILIZATION OF THE RUSSIAN DOMINATION OVER THE DESTINY OF AFGHANISTAN IN ANY CASE, THE EXISTENCE OF PARTIES ASSOCIATED WITH SUPERPOWERS SERVES AS BASES FOR THEIR PENETRATION IN THESE COUNTRIES. THE SOVIET UNION, IN JUSTIFYING ITS MILITARY AGGRESION AGAINST AFGHANISTAN, CLAIMS THAT THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN HAS BEEN CARRIED OUT AT THE REQUEST OF THE AFGHANISTAN'S GOVERNMENT AND IN CONFORMITY WITH THE TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP WITH AFGHANISTAN. BUT IN REALITHY THIS TREATY IS NONE BUT THE TREATY OF 5TH DECEMBER 1978 CONCLUDED BETWEEN TARAKI, WHO WAS BROUGHT UP BY THE RUSSIANS AS ONE PARTY, AND THE SOVIET UNION AS THE OTHER.

B- MILITARY DOMINATION: THE MILITARY FORCES IN DEPRIVED COUNTRIES HAVE ALWAYS BEEN AMONG THE MOST CRUCIAL BASES OF INFLUENCE FOR SUPERPOWERS . THE SIMILARITY OF THE METHODS USED BY THE AMERICAN IMPERIALISM AND THE SOVIET SOCIALISTS IS ITSELF A PROOF THAT BOTH SUPERPOWERS ARE OF THE SAME CHARACTER. 200 OFFICERS AND MILITARY COUNCELORS OF THE SOVIET UNION IN THE ARMING OF MOHAMAD ZAHER SHAH PLAYED AN

IMPORTANT RULE IN BRINGING DAVOOD TO POWER. AS A RESULT OF THE TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN THE RUSSIANS, WHICH WAS VALID FOR A PERIOD OF 12 YEARS, DURING THE LAST DAYS OF DAVOOD'S RULE IN AFGHANISTAN, THE NUMBER OF RUSSIAN MILITARY PERSONNEL IN AFGHANISTAN HAD RISEN TO 600 PERSONS. MOREVER, THIS NUMBER OF SOVIET OFFICERS PLUS THE AFGHAN ARMY, WHICH WAS ORGANIZED BY HAFIZULLAH AMIN, THE STOOGE OF THE RUSSIANS PLAYED AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN OVERTHROWING THE RULE OF DAVOOD AND BRINGING TARAKI TO POWER. WHEN TARAKI CAME TO POWER, THE RUSSIANS EMBARKED RAPIDLY UPON THE EXPANSION OF THEIR INFLUENCE IN AFGHANISTAN. THESE ACTIVITIES INCLUDED THE FOUNDING OF MILITARY BASES AND BRINGING THEM UNDER SOVIET CONTROL (SUCH AS THE BAGHRAM AIR BASE), THE FLOW OF ARMS AND AMMUNITION TO AFGHANISTAN, AND THE SIMULTANEOUS ARRIVAL OF MILITARY OFFICERS AND COUNSELORS TO THIS COUNTRY. IN THE INTERVAL BETWEEN DAVOOD'S RULE AND THAT OF AMIN, THE NUMBER OF SOVIET MILITARY OFFICERS AND ADVISERS INCREASED FROM 600 TO 7200. THE NUMBER OF SOVIET TANKS DELIVERED WAS SO LARGE THAT ONE OBSERVER HAD INFORMED THE U.S. EMBASSY THAT THERE ARE A NUMBEROF TANKS WITHOUT DRIVERS STATIONED IN A CAMP. HELICOPTER GUNSHIPS OF THE TYPE MI-24 AND LIGHT AIRCRAFT DELIVERED TO AFGHANISTAN, WERE AMONG WEAPONS THAT ARE EFFECTIVE IN FIGHTING THE MOSLEMS IN THIS COUNTRY. ALL THESE ARE IN AFGHANISTAN IN VIEW OF THE SOVIET PLANS THAT THEY CONSIDERED MILITARY INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN AS

THE LAST RESORT TO STABILIZE THEIR DOMINATION.

CULTURAL DOMINATION: THE DISTORTION OF THE CULTURE AND ALIENATION OF THE PEOPLE FROM THEIR ORIGINAL CULTURE CONSISTED THE POLICY ADOPTED BY THE IMPERIALISTS SINCE EARLIER CENTURIES IN ORDER TO PENETRATE OTHER COUNTRIES. THIS KIND OF CULTURE AND CONTROLLING THE MENTAL TRENDS AND EDUCATIONAL BASES, THROUGH THE DELIVERY OF MARXIST BOOKS AND EXPEDITION OF LOYAL IDEOLOGISTS TO AFGHANISTAN AND AFTER COMING TO POWER OF TARAKI, THE OVERALL CONTROL OF SECONDARY SCHOOLS AND COLLEGES, WAS THE POLICY EXERCISED BY THE RUSSIANS IN THIS COUNTRY. DOCUMENT NO.36, SPEAKS BY ITSELF OF THE SITUATION IN THE UNIVERSITIES IN THE TARAKI PERIOD AND THE PERFORMANCE OF THE RUSSIANS IN THIS CONNECTION.

D- ECONOMIC DOMINATION - BECAUSE OF ITS POVERTY AFGHANISTAN HAS ALWAYS BEEN RELYING ON FOREIGN AID. THIS AID HAS BEEN SERVING AS CHANNEL FOR RUSSIAN INFLUENCE BY EXTENSION OF THEIR LOANS IN ENORMOUS SUMS AND ACCEPTANCE OF DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS AND DELIVERY OF NECESSARY MATERIALS AND EQUIPMENT. THE RUSSIANS EVEN CLAIMED THESE METHODS TO BE QUITE LEGAL. THERE ARE NUMEROUS DOCUMENTS IN WHICH REFERENCES ARE MADE CONCERING THE AMOUNT OF SOVIET FINANCIAL

AIDS TO AFGHANISTAN. CONCESSIONS FOR EXPLOITATION OF NATURAL GAS, PURCHASE OF ORANGES GROWN IN AFGHANISTAN IN FIELDS PROJECTED BY THE SOVIETS, HAVE BROUGHT ABOUT CONDITIONS BY WHICH THE PRINCIPAL ITEMS OF AFGHANISTAN'S EXPORT GO EXCLUSIVELY TO THE SOVIET UNION. LIKEWISE, THE PRESENCE OF RUSSIAN CIVILIAN ADVISERS IN MOST MINISTRIES, HAS EVEN BROUGHT GOVERNMENT PROJECTS UNDER RUSSIAN CONTROL.

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN OR

AFGHANISTAN SOVIET REPUBLIC:

THIS CHAPTER DEALS WITH THE SOVIET PERFORMANCE UPON COMING TO POWER OF TARAKI TO THE TIME OF AMIN COUP. " GOROVOI (FIRST SECRETARY, USSSR EMBASSY) QOUTED LENIN ON THE NEED OF A REVOLUTION TO DEFEND ITSELF. HE RECALLED THAT LARGE NUMBERS OF RUSSIAN PEASANTS HAD OPPOSED THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION BECAUSE THEY WERE UNEDUCATED AND ILLITERATE AND DID NOT KNOW WHERE THEIR REAL INTERESTS LAY. HE SAW THE TASK OF THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT'S LEADERSHIP AS BEING THE EDUCATION OF THE MASSES REGARDING THEIR TRUE INTERESTS (DOCUMENT NO. 14) WHEN TARAKI CAME TO POWER, THIS WAS THE BEGINING OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PROJECTS IMBUED WITH MARXIST MOULDS IN AFGHANISTAN. THESE PROJECTS WERE COUCHED IN MERE MARXISTIC CLASS-INSPIRED IDEOLOGY, WITH NO REGARD TO THE CULTURE OF THE AFGHAN COMMUNITY, AND IN THE FIRST PLACE

FOR THE ANNIHILATION OF THIS CULTURE, OR AS GOROVY PUTS IT FOR THE EDUCATION OF THE MASSES TO TEACH THEM RECOGNIZE THEIR REAL INTERESTS. THEY BELIEVED THAT LAND REFORM AND THE ANNULMENT OF PRIVILEGES TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR WILL BE THE ONLY REMEDY OF ALL THE EVILS OF AFGHANISTAN. THEY DID NOT THINK ABOUT THE FACT THAT CIRCLES HAD SOLD AFHGANISTAN'S SPIRIT OF INDEPENDENCE TO THE RUSSIANS, OR BY ADVANCING SOCIALISM AND ATHEISM, HAVE MADE A MOCKERY OF THEIR RELIGIOUS BELIEFS. SO THEY EMBARKED UPON REFORMS.

THE MARXIST TRENDS AND MOVEMENTS, WHICH SINCE THE PERIOD OF ZAHER SHAH HAD ENCOUNTERED NEGATIVE REACTION ON THE PART OF AFGHANISTAN'S MOSLEMS, TOOK ABSOLUTE POWER. THE DRIVING FORCE BEHIND THIS SPIRIT OF OPPOSITION HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH THE REFORMS INTRODUCED BY THE REGIME. IT WAS THE COMPREHENSION OF THIS NATION THAT MARXISM IN PRINCIPLE WAS AGAINST ISLAM AND BESIDES, THAT THE KHALGIS HAD SOLD OUT THE SPIRIT OF AFGHANISTAN'S FREEDOM AND INDEPENDENCE TO THE RUSSIANS(THE REVIEW OF THE DOCUMENTS PROVES THE IDEA THAT THE DRIVING FORCE BEHIND THE OPPOSITION OF THE PEOPLE TO THE REGIME IS THE BELIEF IN ISLAM. THIS QUESTION HAS NOT ONLY BEEN REITERATED BY THE AMERICANS ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONS, BUT ALSO BY THE RUSSIANS AND THEIR COLLEAGUES, INCLUDING SAFRONCHUK (SOVIET MINISTER PLENIPOTENTIARY) AND THE EAST GERMAN AMBASSADOR SCHWIESAW. DOCUMENTS NUMBERS 59,44,40,28,27 AND 26 SPEAK FOR THEMSELVES. WHAT CAN BE CONCLUDED IS THAT THE GROWTH OF OPPOSITION AND THE EXPANSION OF ARMED STRUGGLE AND, THE INTERNAL

STRIFES AND THE INCOMPETENCE OF THE KHALGI REGIME, THE SLAUGHTERS AND REPRESIONS LED THE RUSSIANS TO BELIEVE THAT THEY NEED CERTAIN CHANGES IN ORDER TO STABILIZE THEIR RULE. FOR THIS PURPOSE THEY TOOK CERTAIN ACTIONS IN ORDER TO EXPAND THEIR POLITICAL BASES OF POWER TO INCLUDE THE MASSES. THESE REMEDIES WERE BASED ON THEIR VAIN BELIEFS AND THEIR OWN CONCLUSIONS IN FINDING OUT THE ROOTS OF THE PROBLEMS. ALL THESE WERE AIMED AT THE PROTECTION OF THEIR INTERESTS, AND THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT EVEN IF MOHAMAD ZAHER SHAH WOULD BE CAPABLE OF PROTECTING THESE INTERESTS, THEY WOULD NOT HESITATE IN BRINGING HIM TO POWER. WHAT THE SOVIETS ACTUALLY DID IN THIS PHASE WAS THE FOLLOWING:

A- ADJUSTMENT OF THE INTRODUCED REFORMS:

BELIEVING THAT THE LAND REFORMS AND OTHER REFORMS AND THEIR ERRONEOUS IMPLEMENTATION LAY AT THE ROOT OF THE PEOPLE'S REVOLT, THE RUSSIANS BEGAN ADJUSTING THE REFORMS AND PROCLAIMED THE SUCCESSFUL END OF THE REFORMS INCLUDING LAND REFORMS AND THE STRUGGLE AGAINST ILLITERACY. THEY ALLOWED CERTAIN CONCESSIONS TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN ORDER TO RESTRAIN THE PERSISTENCE OF THE REVOLT AND INSTABILITY. SCHWIESAW THE AMBASSADOR OF EAST GERMANY AND SAFORNCHUK THE SOVIET EMBASSY MINISTER PLENIPOTENTIARY, MENTION THE ADJUSTMENT OF THESE REFORMS IN A SERIES OF MEETINGS WITH THE AMERICAN EMBASSY (IN ANOTHER SECTION WE SHALL DISCUSS THE ROLES PLAYED BY SCHWIESAW

AND SAFRONCHUK IN AFGHANISTAN'S AFFAIRS), AND EVEN SCHWIESAW CALLS THE LAND REFORM A CALAMITY (DOCUMENT NO. 44) . THE AMERICAN'S COMMENT IN THIS RESPECTS IS WORTHY OF NOTE: " THE VARIOUS REFORM PROGRAMS DID INDEED CONTRIBUTE A GREAT DEAL TO THE GROWTH OF DOMESTIC HOSTITILY TOWARD THIS REGIME, BUT, NEVERTHELESS, THE OVERWHELMING MOTIVATION FOR MOST AFGHAN PEASANTS WHO HAVE TAKEN UP ARMS HAS BEEN THEIR PERCEPTION THAT THE KHALGIS ARE ATHEISTS, COMMUNISTS, AND SOVIET PUPPETS. " (DOCUMENT NO.4])

B- TAKING REFUGE IN ISLAM: WHEN THE AFGHAN REGIME AND THE RUSSIANS REALIZED WHERE THE MAIN ROOT OF THE REVOLT LIES, THEY TRIED TO HUSH-HUSH, OR MINIMIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF THE MARXIST ORIENTATION OF THE KHALG PARTY AND EVEN INDULGED IN GUIDANCE ADVANCING THE ARGUMENT THAT THE MOSLEMS BELIEVE THAT COMMUNISM IS AGAINST ISLAM. ON THE BASIS OF THIS ARGUMENT THE LEADERSHIP IN AFGHANISTAN LAUNCHED A SERIES OF PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES, IN THE COURSE OF WHICH AMIN AND TARAKI DECLARED IN THEIR ADDRESSES TO THE PEOPLE THAT THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN IS NOT AGAINST ISLAM. THERE WAS EVEN ISSUED A MANIFESTO SIGNEED BY OVER ONE HUNDRED SO CALLED " ULAMA" IN SUPPORT OF THE REGIME AND DECLARING THAT THE REGIME OF THE DEMOCRATIC

REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN ACTUALLY SUPPORTS ISLAM.
(SEE DOCUMENTS 26,27 AND 65. AS PROOF OF THIS ARGUMENTS, WE QUOTE THE COMMENTS OF SAFRONCHUK, THE SOUIET EMBASSY MINISTER PLENIPOTENTIARY: " HE BLAMED RELIGION(-ISLAM, IT IS A TERRIBLE RELIGION") AS THE SINGLE MOST I PORTANT REASON FOR THE INSURGENCY. THE POPULANCE, HE SAID, ASSUMES" COMMUNISTS ARE AGAINST ISLAM,"....."
(DOCUMENT NO. 26)

C- DECLARATION OF FRIENDSHIP WITH IMPERIALIST STATES:
THE KHALGI REGIME, IN ORDER TO ASSERT THE POLICY OF NON-ALIGNMENT ON ONE HAND, AND TO PRETEND THAT THEY ARE FRIENDLY NOT ONLY WITH THE RUSSIANS BUT ALSO WITH EVERY COUNTRY THAT SEEKS TO BE FRIENDLY WITH THEM, ON THE OTHER HAND, TRIED TO ESTABLISH PERMANENT DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS NOT ONLY WITH THE AMERICANS, BUT ALSO WITH THEIR SATELLITES. OF COURSE THESE CONTACTS WERE NOT ABSOLUTELY WITHIN THE LIMITS OF THE ABOVE MENTIONED ARGUMENTS, BUT ALSO IS A REFLECTION OF TARAKI'S AND AMIN'S APPROACHES AND CONCEPTS. THIS IS TRUER ABOUT AMIN, WHETHER THIS CONCEPTION EMANATED FROM NON-CONFIDENCE TOWARDS THE RUSSIANS, OR REAL SYMPATHY TOWARDS THE AMERICANS. HOWEVER, THE PRINCIPAL AIM IN THESE CONTACTS, WHICH CARRIED THE CONSENT OF THE IMPACT OF ANTI-REGIME PROPAGANDA, TO THE EFFECT THAT THE KHALGHIS ARE ABSOLUTELY DEPENDENT UPON THE RUSSIANS.

THE EAST GERMAN AMBASSADOR SCHWIESAW'S STATEMENTS REFLECT TO CERTAIN EXTENT THE SOVIET POLICY TOWARDS IMPERIALIST STATES: " SCHWIESAW STATED THAT HE HAS TOLD KHALGI POLITICAL EXTREMISTS THAT THEY ARE OUT OF STEP WITH THE MODERN SOCIALIST MOVEMENT WHEN THEY ATTEMPT TO SQUEEZE " IMPERIALIST" REPRESENTATION OUT OF KABUL. HE SAID THAT HE TOLD THEM HOW IT IS NECESSARY FOR ALL NATION TO WORK TOGETHER FOR PEACE AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS." (DOCUMENT NO.39)

THE MODERN SOCIALIST MOVEMENT MAKES IT NECESSARY FOR THE RUSSIANS TO JUSTIFY THEIR PRESENCE AGAINST THE PRESENCE OF OTHERS, SO THAT PEACE MAYBE ESTABLISHED IN THE WORLD. DOCUMENTS 7,95,96,98 AND 99 SPEAK OF THE EFFORTS EXERTED BY TARAKI AND IN PARTICULAR AMIN, TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE RELATIONS BETWEEN AFGHANISTAN AND U.S. ARE QUITE NORMAL. NATURALLY AMIN'S PERFORMANCE AFTER COMING TO POWER, AS REGARDS RELATIONS WITH THE U.S., EMANATED FROM HIS NON-CONFIDENCE TOWARDS THE RUSSIANS, ALTHOUGH HE ALSO PURSUED THE ABOVE MENTIONED OBJECTIVE BESIDE THIS.

D- KEEPING THE U.S. AND ITS SATELLITES INFORMED ABOUT FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS: IN PROTECTION OF THEIR INTERESTS AFTER TARAKI CAME TO POWER AND IN ORDER THAT THE REGIME COULD COPE WITH THE DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED WITH THEM, THE RUSSIANS CONSIDEREED IT EXPEDIENT TO COME TO THE AID OF

TARAKI IN FACING THESE DIFFICULTIES, AND IT WAS FOR THIS PURPOSE THAT THEY SENT ONE OF THEIR CLEVEREST DIPLOMATS CALLED SAFRONCHUK TO AFGHANISTAN. THE SOVIETS FROM THE VERY OUTSET DID NOT KEEP THE IDEA OF AGGRESSION AND MILITARY INTERVENTION OUT OF THEIR CONSIDERATION. HOWEVER, FOR CERTAIN CONSIDERATIONS, AMONG WHICH IT WAS TO EVADE FROM FALLING INTO THE SNARE LIKE THAT OF VIETNAM FOR THE AMERICANS, THE RUSSIANS TRIED TO SEEK, AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE, A POLITICAL SOLUTION FOR AFGHANISTAN AND THE KHALGI REGIME. SAFRONCHUK WAS GIVEN THIS MISSION. THIS MAN, TOGETHER WITH SCHWIESAW, THE EAST GERMAN AMBASSADOR, ESTABLISHED PERMANENT CONTACTS, EITHER DIRECT OR INDIRECT WITH THE U.S. EMBASSY AND WITH THE EMBASSIES OF U.S. SATELLITES IN ORDER TO EVALUATE THE LIKELY REACTIONS OF THE U.S. AND ITS SATELLITES CONCERNING THE OVERALL SOVIET POLICIES TOWARDS AFGHANISTAN. NATURALLY BY SUCH A CONDUCT THEY ALSO PURSUED ANOTHER OBJECTIVE AND IT WAS THAT IN CASE THEY LEFT NO OTHER WAY OUT BUT TO INTERVENE MILITARILY, THEY COULD PRETEND THAT THEY HAD PROBED ALL THE EXISTING POLITICAL CHNNELS TO SAVE THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN, OR AS THEY THEMSELVES DECLARE, THE REVOLUTION OF SEVENTH THOUR, AND SINCE THEY WERE NOT SUCCESSFUL, THEY HAD RESORTED TO MILITARY INTERVENTION.

THIS WAS A POINT THAT THE AMERICANS THEMSELVES HAD REALIZED: " THE PRIMARY MOTIVATION BEHIND THE SOVIET DECISION TO INFROM US, AND SEVERAL OTHER EMBASSIES HERE (WE ARE AWARE THAT THE AUSTRIANS, BANGLADESHIS , FRENCH INDIANS, AND PAKISTANIS HAVE BEEN APPROACHED), DIRECTLY BY VASILY SAFRONCHUK AND INDIRECTLY THROUGH GDR AMBASSADOR SCHWIESAW OF MOSCOW'S " NEGOTIATIONS " WITH THE AFGHANS TO BRING ABOUT A " BROADENED POLITICAL BASE " FOR THIS REGIME, AND, PERHAPS, COSMETIC ALTERATION IN THE MAKE-UP OF THE DRA LEADERSHIP, WAS PROBABLY A DESIRE TO " LEGITIMIZE" WHATEVER FUTURE ACTIONS AND POLICIES THE SOVIETS MAY PURSUE TOWARD AFGHANISTAN. .....; WHILE SIMULTANCEOUSLY UNDERSCORING MOSCOW'S EFFORTS TO FIND A POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THIS REVOLUTIONARY REGIME'S GROWING DOMESTIC DIFFICULTIES. BY DOING SO, MOSCOW POSSIBLLY BELIEVES THAT IT HAS " LEGITIMIZED " WHATEVER FUTURE POLITICS IT MAY PURSUE, AND HAS ALSO MADE A CASE FOR DEFLECTING ANY FOREIGN CRITICISM STEMMING FROM WHATEVER ACTIONS THE SOVIETS MIGHT EVENTUALLY DECIDE ARE NECESSARY." (DOCUMENT NO. 49)

E- CHANGES IN THE CABINET AND FORMING A NATIONAL FRONT TROUGH CHANGES IN THE COMPOSITION OF THE LEADERSHIP OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN: SOVIET EFFORTS

TO INTRODUCE CHANGES IN THE LEADERSHIP OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN, CAN BE SUMMARIZED IN THIS WAY: CHANGE OF CABINET AND INTEGRATION OF NEW INDIVIDUALS IN THE GOVERNMENT WHO HAVE MINIMAL INTERFERENCE IN THE KHALGI REGIME, AND WHO ARE LESS LIABLE TO THE SENSITIVITIES OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE. AFTER ALL, AS RUSSIANS PUT IT, FORMING OF A NATIONAL FRONT SIMILAR TO NATIONAL FRONTS IN OTHER COUNTRIES. THE COMPOSITION OF THE MEMBERS OF SUCH A FRONT IS NOT SO IMPORTANT. IT MAY INCLUDE ZAHER SHAH, AND ETEMADI THE FORMER PRIME MINISTER(THERE HAVE BEEN RUMORS OF CONTACT WITH E'TEMADI). THIS IS ON CONDITION THAT THE RUSSIAN INTERESTS ARE TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION. NATURALLY, IN THE CASE OF SUCH CHANGES AND NEW DEVELOPMENTS, PRIORITY WILL BE GIVEN TO THE PARCHAMISTS, KHALGIS AND THE MILITARY. SUCH A CHANGE AT ALL COSTS, HAS BEEN ACCEPTED BY THE RUSSIANS, AND EVEN THE ASSASSINATION OF TARAKI AND AMIN HAS BEEN INCLUDED IN THE SCHEME. NOTE CERTAIN PASSAGES OF THE DOCUMENTS CONCERNING THE CHANGES IN THE COMPOSITION OF THE LEADERSHIP. ".WHAT IS TRUE," SAFRONCHUK CONFIDED, " IS THAT WE HAVE BEEN URGING THE DRA LEADERSHIP TO BROADEN ITS BASE BY BRINGING IN NEW PEOPLE INTO THE GOVT,"..... CONTINUING, HE SAID, " ESTABLISHING A NATIONAL FRONT, LIKE OTHER COUNTRIES HAVE DONE, WOULD BE SENSIBLE FOR THEM." (DOCUMENT NO. 26.)

" SCHWIESAU SAID," WE ARE DETERMINED TO SAVE THE REVOLUTION "..... HE CONFIRMED THAT SOVIET MINISTER-COUNSELOR SAFRONCHUK HAS BEEN GIVEN THE TASK, BY MOSCOW, TO BRING ABOUT A " RADICAL CHANGE" IN THE GOVT..... AS TO WHAT IS LIKLY

TO HAPPEN, HE CLEARLY INDICATED THAT A MILITARY INTRAPARTY COUP, DEPOSING AMIN AND PERHAPS OTHERS, IS THAT THE SOVIETS INTEND..... WHEN I MENTIONED DEFENSE MINISTER WATANJAR AS A POSSIBILITY, HE ACTED AS IF I HAD COUGHT HIM IN A SECRET. AFTER A PAUSE, HE SAID WATANJAR IS " NOT POLITICIAN, BUT OF COURSE THE MILITARY IS KEY TO ANY CHANGE". (DOCUMENT NO . 43) . " IN THE CASE OF A FURTHER DETERIORATION IN TARAKI'S POSTITION, THE SOVIETS COULD HOWEVER PROCEED TO A RESHUFFLE OF THE AFGHAN MARXISTS, THUS TRYING TO RETAIN A SYMPATHETIC APPEARENCE.THIS SEEMS TO BE A STRONGER POSSIBLITY. THEY MAY, FOR INSTANCE, THINK ABOUT INSTALLING SOMEBODY ELSE BELONGING TO TARAKI'S PEOPLE PARTY (KHALGH PARTY), OR EVEN ABOUT SUBSTITUTING THE PERCEM PARTY, PREVIOUSLY OUSTED BY KHALG PARTY." (DOCUMENT NO.59)

OF COURSE THE MAIN POINT WOULD NEVER BE OVERLOOKED: "SCHWIESAW SAID THAT NO INTERNAL PARTY "RADICAL CHANGE" COULD ACCOUR HERE WITHOUT SOVIET SUPPORT, AND THAT SOVIET INTERESTS WOULD HAVE TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT BY ANY NEW AFGHAN GOVT." (DOCUMENT NO.46)

IT IS NOT INCONGROUS TO THIS STAGE TO STUDY THE MOVEMENTS THAT LED TO COUP, AND THE POSITIONS TAKEN BY THE SOVIETS WHEN AMIN TOOK POWER. AS WE HAD SAID THE RUSSIAN'S EFORTS TO BRING ABOUT CHANGES IN THE COMPOSTITION OF THE LEADERSHIP OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC IN THE DIRECTION OF REDUCING THE INCREASING INTERNAL UPHEAVALS, MADE THEM APPROACH THE

IDEA THAT AMIN WAS THE PRINCIPAL FACTOR IN CAUSING WIDE-SPREAD DISCONTENT, UPHEAVALS AND THROWING MANY PEOPLE TO PRISONS. IT CAN BE SAID THAT THE RUSSIANS REGARDED TARAKI AS PRESIDENT LACKING PERSONALITY, AND THE MAIN EVIL WAS AMIN, WHO WAS A RESPONSIBLE FOR THE OPPRESSIVE POLICIES OF ARREST, TORTURE AND EXECUTION. "... TARAKI IS INCREASINGLY VIEWED AS A FIGUREHEAD WHO SHOULD NOT BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY. THE REAL VILLAIN IS AMIN, WHO IS CONSIDERED RESPONSIBLE FOR, INTER ALIA, THE DRA'SOPPRESIVE POLICIES OF ARREST, TORTURE, AND EXECUTION, AS WELL AS THE DRIVING FORCE BEHIND THE GREATING DOMESTIC REFORM PROGRAMS, AND AFGHANISTAN'S ARDENT EMBRACE OF THE USSR. THEREFORE, ANY SINCERE ATTEMPT TO RECONCILE THE FORCE LOOSE IN AFGHANISTAN THROUGH A LEADERSHIP CHANGE WOULD PROBABLLY HAVE TO INCLUDE THE DEPARTURE, OR BETTER YET THE DEATH OF AMIN." (D. NO. 41)

THIS MENTALITY AND THE EFFORTS MADE IN THIS DIRECTION, DREW THE ATTENTION OF AMIN. HE HAD GUESSED THAT EVEN THE CHANGE OF THE CABINET AND FORMATION OF THE NATIONAL FRONT WOULD LEAD TO HIS DEATH. HE THEREFORE TOOK UP LIMITEL ENDEAVORS TO RESIST AGAINST BEING ASSASSINATED AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RUSSIAN PLANS. AS AN ILLUSTRATION OF AMIN'S EFFORTS CAN BE CITED THE IDEA OF THE NATIONAL ORGANIZATION AS AGAINST THAT OF THE NATIONAL

FRONT(DOCUMENTS NOS: 45AND 46). AMIN'S KNOWLEDGE ABOUT THESE EFFORTS (DOCUMENT NO. 47) AS WELL AS THE SEVERE INTERNAL STRIFES IN THE PARTY, THE SOVIET RELIANCE ON ELEMENTS LIKE WATANJAR, MOZDOORYAR AND GOLABZOOI OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN, ENABLED HIM TO RESTRAIN THE COUP AND PREEMPT THE ACTIONS. (OF COURSE, THERE IS AMBIGUITY CONCERNING HOW THE AMIN COUP WAS IMPLEMENTED AND WHAT WERE THE DRIVING FORCES BEHIND THEM, AND HOW FAR THE SOVIET UNION WAS INVOLVED. ONLY WHAT HAS BEEN DEAR IS THAT THE SOVIETS HAD NO INFO-RMATION ABOUT THE PROCESS OF THE COUP). HAVING BEEN FACED WITH AN ACCOMPLISHED FACT, THE SOVIETS HAD NO ALT-ERNATIVE BUT THE SUPPORT OF AMIN, IN APPEARANCE, BUT IN ACTUAL FACT FOLLOWING A SUBVERSIVE POLICY AGAINST HIM. HOWEVER,THIS WAS CERTAIN THAT IF IT WAS TRUE THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD SUDDENLY COME FACE TO FACE WITH A TROUBLE-SOME ACCOMPLISHED FACT, THEY HAD TO TRY THEIR UTMOST EFFORTS CONCERNING THE LEADERSHIPS OF THE KHALGH PARTY IN ORDER TO COVER THE UGLY IMAGE OF THE KHALGH PARTY , AT LEAST FOR THE SHORT TERM. THE STRATEGY OF THE RULE OF LAW(HAVING COME TO POWER HAD PROMISED TO THE NATION ABOUT THE DRAWING UP OF CONSTITUTION IN THE SHORTEST TERM FOR THE COUNTRY) WAS ONE OF THE SEVERAL STRATAGEMS LEFT IN THE GENEROUS SAKE OF SAFRONCHUK TO ENHANCE THE

CREDIBILITY OF AFGHANISTAN'S LEADERSHIP(SEE DOCUMENT NO. 42).

NATURALLY ALL THE POLITICAL METHODS ULTIMATELY CAME TO A DEAD-END, AND WHAT THE RUSSIANS HAD CONTEMPLATED AS LIKELY TO HAPPEN, ACTUALLY TOOK PLACE. AND IN SHORT, AT THE REQUEST AND INVITATION OF THE AFGHANISTAN (ONLY GOD KNOWS WHETHER IT IS MEANT THE AMIN'S GOVERNMENT OR THAT OF BABRAK KARMEL) LAUNCHED THE OPEN MILITARY AGGRESSION AGAINST THAT COUNTRY, AND NO VOICE OF SERIOUS PROTEST WAS RAISED BY ANYONE IN THE WORLD. PERHAPS THIS WAS A " DEAL" BEHIND THE SCENES, BETWEEN THE RUSSIANS AND THE AMERICANS, REACHED FOR THE PLUNDERING OF THE WORLD'S RESOURSES AT THE EXPENSE OF THE SACRIFICE OF AFGHANISTAN'S PEOPLE . IN SHORT THE PROTECTORS OF THE PEOPLE (KHALG) AND THE GOVERNMENTS SUPPORTING THE PEOPLE, WREAKED HAVOC ON THE PEOPLE. WHAT THE AFGHAN PEOPLE OBTAINED WAS TENS OF THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE KILLED OR THROWN INTO PRISON, MORE THAN TWO MILLION SOUGHT REFUGE IN OTHER COUNTRIES, AND HUNDREDS OF VILLAGES DEVASTATAED, AND IN SHORT, DISPLACED PERSONS EVERYWHERE AND WIDESPREAD POVERTY.....

THE WAY THE UNITED STATES APPROACHED THE AFGHANISTAN'S PROBLEM

IN THE DOCUMENTS BROUGHT TOGETHER IN THIS COLLECTION, THE AMERICANS ADVANCE THE PRINCIPAL REASON FOR THEIR -

SENSITIVITY CONCERNING THE QUESTION OF AFGHANISTAN AS THEIR PROTECTION OF THE STABILTY OF THE REGION(SEE DOCUMENTS NOS. 7, 10 AND25).THE PROTECTION OF STABILITY, HAS ALWAYS BEEN ONE OF THE SLOGANS OF THE U.S. IN JUSTIFYING THEIR PRESENCE IN VARIOUS COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD. NOBODY CAN DENY THAT THE ADVANCEMENT OF SUCH A SLOGAN, DOES NOT CONTRIBUTE TO BRING ABOUT A CONVENIENT ATMOSPHERE FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF ECONOMIC AND INDUSTRIAL POSSIBILITIES OF COUNTRIES OR THEIR INDEPENDENCE, THESE SLOGANS, ON THE CONTRARY, ARE MEANT FOR THE CREATION OF AN ATMOSPHERE WHEREIN THE UNITED STATES MAY PLUNDER THE RESOURCES AND RICHES OF THESE COUNTRIES, WITHOUT FACING ANY PROTESTS AND OPPOSITION. THE POSITION OF THE U.S. IN THE MIDDLE EAST, IN PARTICULAR IN RELATION WITH OUR NEIGHBORING COUNTRY AFGHANISTAN, PRECISELY SPEAKS OF THE ABSOLUTE PRESENCE OF THE U.S. IN THE REGION. PAKISTAN WITH ITS OPEN DEPENDENCE UPON THE UNITED STATES, IRAN(IN THE PERIOD OF THE SHAH), ACTING AS THE GENDARME OF THE REGION, THE OIL- PRODUCING COUNTRIES OF THE PERSIAN GULF REGION, ACTING AS THE SOURCE OF SUPPLYING ENERGY FOR THE UNITED STATES, IN PARTICULAR SAUDI ARABIA, SERVING AS THE RESERVOIR OF FUEL AND THE DEFENCE ATTORNEY OF THE UNITEED STATES IN THE REGION. IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE MENTIONED, THE PRESENCE OF THE SOVIET UNION IN AFGHANISTAN COULD BE A POTENTIAL DANGER, JEOPARDIZING THE UNITED STATES INTERESTS IN THESE COUNTRIES, AND THE AMERICAN PERSISTENT

EMPHASIS ON THE PRESERVATION OF STABILITY AND MAINTENANCE OF FRIENDLY RELATIONS BETWEEN AFGHANISTAN AND ITS NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES, ARISES FROM THIS PREOCCUPATION. IT IS NECESSARY TO MENTION AT THIS JUNCTURE THAT AFGHANISTAN IN ITSELF DOES NOT BEAR ANY SIGNIFICANT ECONOMIC INTEREST FOR THE UNITED STATES.

U.S. HAS HAD VARIOUS POSITIONS TOWARDS AFGHANISTAN BEGINNING WITH THE PENETRATION OF THE SOVIETS IN THIS COUNTRY AND THE LIKELIHOOD OF SOVIET MILITARY INERVENTION IN THIS COUNTRY BEFORE THE KARMEL COUP, AND FINALLY MILITARY INTERVENTION IN THIS COUNTRY. HOWEVER ALL THESE POSITIONS HAVE BEEN CONCENTRATED AROUND ONE SINGLE AXIS, THAT IS, THE MAINTENANCE OF THE U.S. PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN TO CHALLENGE THE SOVIET INFLUENCE, OR AS THEY THEMSELVES DECLARE TO SECURE THE STUBILITY OF THE REGION.

THE U.S. PRESENCE IN IRAN DURING THE REIGN OF THE SHAH, AND THE U.S. BASES OF INTELLIGENCE IN OUR COUNTRY, WAS A PARTICULAR PRIVILIGE IN THE HANDS OF THE U.S. IF THE U.S. COULD ABSORB THE AFGHANS IN ITS ORBIT, THIS PRIVILIGE COULD BE GIVEN BROADER DIMENSIONS. HOWEVER TARAKI'S COUP ON 27TH APRIL, 1978 FOLLOWED BY THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION AND THAT OF NICARAGUE, AND THE OCCUPATION OF THE U.S. EMBASSY IN TEHRAN, WERE AMONG THE SETBACKS SUFFERED BY THE U.S. WITHIN A RELATIVELY SHORT INTERVAL OF TIME.

AFTER TARAKI'S COUP, THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN CONSTITUTED ONE OF THE POTENTIAL DANGERS, THREATENING THE INTERESTS OF THE U.S. (THE MOST ADVERSE DEVELOPMENT IN TERMS OF OUR INTERESTS WOULD BE THE INTRODUCTION OF SOVIET COMBAT TROOPS IN AFGHANISTAN- DOCUMENT NO. 10) NEVER THELESS THE SOVIET AGGRESSION DID TAKE PLACE AND ALTHOUGH IT WAS PRESUMED THAT THE U.S. WOULD BE UNABLE TO LAUNCH A MANEUVRE BECAUSE OF THE CONDITION OF THE TIME, THIS DID NOT PREVENT THE U.S. TO LOSE INITIATIVE AND JUSTIFY ITS CRIMINAL ACTS ON THE PRETEXT OF THIS SOVIET OPERATION, AND LAUNCH ACTIVITIES BOTH IN AFGHANISTAN AND ON THE INTERNATIONAL SCALE, WHICH CANBE SUMMED UP AS FOLLOWS:

A- JUSTIFYING ITS CRIMINAL ACTS SERVING AS PRETEXT THE SOVIET MILITARY INTERVENTION. IN VIEW OF U.S. AND SOVIET RIVALRY OVER COLONIZING AND PLUNDERING OF THE RESOURCES OF WEAKER NATIONS, SOVIET MILITARY INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN LED THE U.S.TO JUSTIFY ITS CAMPAIGNS AND RUTHLESS MILITARY REPRESENTATION IN THE PERSIAN GULF AND DELIVERY OF SUBSTANTIAL MILITARY AID TO EL SALVADOR SERVING AS PRETEXT THE SOVIET MILITARY INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN, AND CRUSHING THE ANTI- IMPERIALIST MOVEMENTS OF THE NATIONS AGAINST THEIR SATELLITE REGIMES LABELLING THEM AS BEING ASSOCIATED WITH THE SOVIETS. ALTHOUGH SUCH LABELLINGS BY THE U.S. WERE ALSOPRACTICED BEFORE THE SOVIET MILITARY INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN, THEY WERE INTENSIFIED AFTER THAT.

B- ENDEA VORING TO DIVERT THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT OF AFGHANISTAN: WITH THE PROPATION OF THIS PRINCIPAL BY THE SUPER-POWERS, THAT EVERY ANTI-AMERICAN ACTIVITY IS A PRO-SOVIET MOVEMENT AND EVERY ANTI-RUSSIAN ACTIVITY IS PRO-AMERICAN MOVEMENT, THE AMERICANS ARE TRYING TO PRESENT THE MOVEMENT OF THE AFGHAN MOSLEM NATION IN VIEW OF THE ALL-OUT STRUGGLE AGAINST THE RED ARMY, AS PRO-AMERICAN STRUGGLE AND MOVEMENT. THE RESULT OBTAINED BY THIS METHOD OF PROPAGANDA, IN THE FIRST PLACE INTRODUCES THE PRO-WESTERN COUNTRIES AS THE SUPPORTERS OF THE ANTI-RUSSIAN MOVEMENT OF THE AFGHAN NATION. THIS, IN ITSELF SERVES AS A PRETEXT BY THE RUSSIANS TO INTENSIFY THE REPRESSION OF THE AFGHAN MOSLEM NATION. SECONDLY, IT LEADS TO CESSATION OF THE SUPPORT OF THE NON-ALIGNED LIBERATION MOVEMENTS FOR THE AFGHAN NATION. AS A RESULT THE BELIEF IS CREATED AMONG AFGHAN STRUGGLERS THAT THE U.S. AND ITS SATELLITES ARE THE SUPPORTERS OF THEIR FREEDOM AND INDEPENDENCE, AND EVEN AMERICAN AID IN CERTAIN CASES IS EXTENDED THROUGH CHANNELS OF COUNTRIES ATTACHED TO THE U.S., SUCH AS SAUDI ARABIA, EGYPT, PAKISTAN, ETC..... WHICH LEADS THE AFGHAN STRUGGLERS TO BELIEVE THAT THESE COUNTRIES ARE REAL MOSLEMS, AND WISH THE RULE OF MOSLEMS OVER AFGHANISTAN. ALTHOUGH THIS BELIEF HAS BEEN INSTILLED IN CERTAIN GROUPS AND THIS CONTITUTES ONE OF THE MOST DANGEROUS AND MOST DELICATE -

METHODS USED BY THE UNITED STATES TO PENETRATE THE MOVEMENTS OF THE AFGHAN NATION, AND THUS, NOT ONLY THE AMERICANS STABILIZE THEIR POSITIONS IN AFGHANISTAN, BUT THEY ALSO PROPAGATE THE ABOVE WAY OF THINKING AND HINDER THE DEVELOPMENT ANY AND EVERY NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT. THE PROPAGATION OF THIS MENTALITY PREPARES THE GENERAL OPINION TO CONSIDER THE OBJECTIVE PENETRATION OF THE AMERICAN ELEMENTS INTO THE COMBATING GROUPS OF AFGHANS AS ANORMAL AND NATURAL PHENOMENON.

C- THE PENETRATION OF THE PERSONS AND EVEN GROUPS ASSOCIATED WITH THE WEST IN THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT OF AFGHANISTAN: THE GROWTH OF THE MOVEMENT AND REVOLUTION OF THE AFGHAN NATION, AND THEIR FIRM RESISTANCE AGAINST THE AGGRESSIVE SOVIET ARMY HAS ENHANCED THE HOPES OF VICTORY OF THIS NATION IN THE WORLD PUBLIC OPINION. THIS PLUS THE EFFECTS OF THEIR PROPAGANDA IN DIVERTING THE THOUGHTS OF THE COMBATANTS AND THE LACK OF THE UNDERSTANDING OF THE DEPTH OF CRIMINALITY OF THE U.S. POLICY IN VIEW OF THE ABSENCE OF CONTACTS WITH THE U.S. AND THE ANTI-RUSSIAN AND ANTI-COMMUNIST CHARACTER OF THE STRUGGLE HAS PREPARED THE GROUND FOR THE PENETRATION OF THE AMERICAN AGENTS. THIS HAS ADVANCED TO SUCH AN EXTENT THAT THE EXISTENCE OF THESE AGENTS AND OF THE PRO-WESTERN GROUPS, HAS BECOME A NORMAL PHENOMENON. THERE IS NO QUESTION HERE OF THE NASTY NATURE OF THE WESTERN IMPERIALISM.

HOWEVER IT SHOULD BE STRESSED THAT THE RECOGNITION OF THE SORDID IMAGE OF THE AMERICAN IMPERIALISM AND THE STRUGGLE AGAINST IT, IS AN INTEGRAL PART OF AN ISLAMIC MOVEMENT, JUST AS THE STRUGGLE AGAINST, AND THE RECOGNITION OF THE SOVIET COMMUNISM. THIS POINT IS WORTHY OF BRINGING TO THE ATTENTION OF THE MOSLEM NATION OF AFGHANISTAN, IN ORDER TO PREVENT THEM FROM FALLING IN THE SNARE OF THE AMERICAN IMPERIALISM THAT ENDEAVORS TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE ANTI-RUSSIAN AND ANTI-COMMUNIST NATURE OF THE STRUGGLE, AND LEAD IT TO A PRO-WESTERN ORIENTATION.

THE PEOPLE OF AFGHANISTAN AND THE COMBATING GROUPS:

THE DOCUMENTS PRESENTED IN THIS BOOK DEPICT THE PRESENCE OF AMERICAN ELEMENTS AND PRESENCE OF GROUPS WITH WESTERN-ORIENTED TENDENCIES IN THE SCENE OF STRUGGLE AGAINST THE RUSSIAN AGGRESSORS. THE PRESENSE OF THESE GROUPS AND ELEMENTS WILL HAVE NEGATIVE EFFECTS UPON HTE TREND OF INTERNAL EVENTS IN THIS COUNTRY AFTER THE VICTORY OF THE AFGHAN NATION UPON

THE AGGRESSORS. HAVING BELIEF IN THE JUSTICE AND RIGHTFULNESS OF THE STRUGGLE OF THE AFGHAN NATION AND IN THE ISLAMIC INSPIRATION OF ITS MOVEMENT, AND DISTINGUISHING THE FOREIGN-INSPIRED GROUPS FROM THE HEROIC PEOPLE OF AFGHANISTAN, IT SEEMS TO BE INDISPENSABLE TO STUDY THE POTENTIAL DANGERS INHERENT IN THIS MOVEMENT. IN VIEW OF THIS FACT THAT IN EVERY REVOLUTION AND EVERY MOVEMENT OF THE PRINCIPAL MATTERS TO BE TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION, IS THE QUESTION OF LEADERSHIP, AND THAT THE MERE STRUGGLE AND THE MOBILIZATION OF THE MASSES WITHOUT A CORRECT LEADERSHIP, NOT ONLY LACKS A GUARANTEE FOR VICTORY BUT EVEN IN CASE OF DEFINITE VICTORY, CAUSES THE MOVEMENT TO FACE ABSENCE OF ORGANIZED STRUGGLE, WHICH ENDS IN DEFEAT. WHAT OCCURS IN AFGHANISTAN IS THE ABSENCE OF A LEADERSHIP, ACCEPTABLE BY ALL THE COMBATANTS, AND THE LACK OF ORGANIZATION BASED ON THIS LEADERSHIP. ALL IN ALL, PAYING DUE ATTENTION TO THE COMPOSITION OF THE MEMBERS OF THE LEADERSHIP, AND THE GROUPS ASSOCIATED THEREWITH , AND THE ROLE AND INFLUENCE OF EACH OF THEM IN THE MOVEMENT DURING THE FUTURE EVENTS OF THIS COUNTRY IS OF PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE. OF COURSE, IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO STUDY THESE IMPLICATIONS WITHIN THE LIMITS OF THE DOCUMENTS PRESENTED HEREIN. HOWEVER, WHATEVER IS INCLUDED THERE , REVEALS

THE METHODS OF ACTION ADOPTED BY A NUMBER OF THESE GROUPS AND THEIR NATURE OF BEING ASSOCIATED WITH ALIEN ELEMENTS. THE ROLE OF A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES ACTING AS LIAISON BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THESE GROUPS, IS AN IMPORTANT FACTOR. THEIR PRINCIPAL ROLES ARISE FROM THEIR POLITICAL POSITION AND THE BENEFITS THEY DERIVE IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES. MOST IMPORTANT OF ALL IN THE INCULCATION OF THE ISLAMIC BELIEF IN THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE.

AMONG THESE COUNTRIES ARE PAKISTAN, SAUDI ARABIA EGYPT,..... ETC. PAKISTAN ACTING AS A BULWARK BETWEEN AFGHANISTAN AND THE WATERS OF THE INDIAN OCEAN WHICH IS THE ULTIMATE GOAL OF THE RUSSIAN AGGRESSORS, CONSIDERS HER INTEREST IN THE FACT THAT IT SHOULD CONTINUE TO SUPPORT A NUMBER OF AFGHAN GROUPS. FURTHERMORE, PAKISTAN, BECAUSE OF THE PRESENCE OF A NUMBER OF AFGHAN GROUPS ON ITS SOIL, ACTS AS A BRIDGE, TRANSPORTING THE AID OF THE MOST OF REACTIONARY ARAB COUNTRIES AND THE UNITED STATES, AND THE UNITED NATIONS TO THE DESTINATION OF THE AFGHAN REFUGEES AND THE REBEL GROUPS. PAKISTAN AND ITS MILITARY GOVERNMENT, THROUGH A SERIES OF REFORMS OF OUTWARD APPEARANCE, SUCH AS CLOSURE OF NIGHT-CLUBS AND BROTHELS, AND BECAUSE OF ITS CLAIMS OF UPHOLDING ISLAM, WISHES TO MAKE THE PEOPLE BELIEVE ITS ISLAMIC NATURE. THIS REFUGE IN

ISLAM, PLUS THE MATERIAL AID AND THE ARMS REACHING PAKISTAN THROUGH VARIOUS CHANNELS FOR THE DESTINATION OF THE AFGHAN REFUGEES, AND THE AID SUPPLIED BY PAKISTAN HERSELF CAUSED PAKISTAN AND ITS MILITARY GOVERNMENT TO BENEFIT FROM THE REFUGEES AND THE GROUPS IN ESTABLISHING ITS DOMINATION AND CRUSHING OF THE ANTI-REGIME MOVEMENTS (DOCUMENTS 18,21,55,68,80 AND106 ARE MOSTLY CONNECTED WITH THE CONTACTS BETWEEN GROUPS AND INDIVIDUALS THAT ARE ASSOCIATED IN SOME WAY OR OTHER WITH THE UNITED STATES OR OTHER COUNTRIES ALLIED WITH IT).

SAUDI ARABIA, WITH ITS VAST FINANCIAL POSSIBILITIES TRIES TO MAKE THE PEOPLE OF AFGHANISTAN BELIEVE ITS ISLAMIC NATURE. IN ACTUAL FACT SAUDI ARABIA TRIES TO CONSOLIDATE THE POSITION OF ITS MASTER, THE UNITED STATES. SAUDI ARABIA IS ONE OF THE FINANCIAL SOURCES OF THE AFGHAN REFUGEES AND SOME OF THE COMBATING AFGHAN GROUPS.

WHAT IS WORTH ATTENTION IN THE OUTLOOK OF THESE GROUPS, IS THEIR OPPOSITION TO A REAL ISLAMIC MOVEMENT, AND THEIR FEAR FROM THE DEVELOPMENT OF SUCH A MOVEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN SIMILAR TO THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION IN IRAN. OF COURSE IN THIS CONTEXT THEY MANIFEST CONCURRENCE WITH THE UNITED STATES. PLEASE TAKE NOTE OF TWO DOCUMENTS, OF WHICH THE FIRST CONTAINS THE VIEWS OF THE AMERICAN AUTHORITIES, AND THE SECOND REPRESENTS THE STATEMENT OF ONE OF THE LEADERS OF THE PRESENT GROUPS IN AFGHANISTAN: " THE FALL OF A RADICAL LEFTIST AND SOVIET BACKED REGIME COULD WELL HAVE POSITIVE REPERCUSSIONS FOR US THROUGH-

OUT THE THIRD WORLD BY DEMONSTRATING THAT OUR ADVERSAIRES VIEW OF THE "INEVITABLE" COURSE OF HISTORY IS NOT NECESSARILY ACCURATE. LIKEWISE, DESPITE THE PAUCITY OF SPECIFIC INFORMATION, AN OPPOSITION LED REGIME MIGHT WELL BE MUCH MORE AMENABLE TO THE RETURN OF A U.S. PRESENCE IN THE DEVELOPMENTAL FIELD IN THIS COUNTRY. CONVERSELY, A REGIME BASED ESSENTIALLY ON THE " FUNDAMENTALIST" TENETS OF ISLAM WOULD PROBABLY NOT PLACE HIGHEST PRIORITY ON SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC REFORM." (DOCUMENT NO. 65)

" TARZI CLAIMED THAT, AT HIS URGING, THE " COALITION" CONSIDERED DRAFTING A SET OF BROAD POLICIES. THEY AGREED THAT SUCH A STEP WAS NECESSARY TO AVOID HAVING AFGHANISTAN END UP LIKE" OTHER PLACES" (IRAN),..... HE CONCEDED THAT RELIGIOUS LEADERS HAD A ROLE TO PLAY IN CHARTING AFGHANISTAN'S FUTURE BUT ARGUED THAT ONLY " MODERATES" SHOULD SERVE ON GOVERNING COUNCILS."(DOCUMENTS NO.80)

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC REFORMS AND DEVELOPMENT AIDS, ARE INSTRUMENTS USED BY THE IMPERIALISTS TO INFLUENCE IN COUNTRIES AND THE UNITED STATES, WITH THE COMING TO POWER OF A REGIME IN AFGHANISTAN LED BY THE PRESENT OPPONENTS OF THE RULERS WHO ARE NOT INSPIRED BY THE ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISTS (THE NAME GIVEN BY THEM TO THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION OF IRAN); HOPES TO RETURN TO BE PRESENT IN AFGHANISTAN. NATURALLY, THE REGIME DESIRED BY THE UNITED STATES SHOULD BE OF AN ISLAMIC TAINT AND HUE, AND FOR

THIS REASON MR TARZY DISCUSSES THE QUESTION OF THE MODERATE TO PREVENT THE TENDENCY OF AFGHANISTAN TOWARDS COUNTRIES LIKE IRAN.

ANY WAY, THE PERUSAL OF THESE DOCUMENTS COULD BE HELPFUL IN GETTING FAMILIAR WITH THE INTERNAL QUESTIONS OF AFGHANISTAN AND POSITION OCCUPIED BY THE GROUPS STRUGGLING AGAINST THE PRESENT RULERS THERE. HOPING THAT THE MOSLEM NATION OF AFGHANISTAN WILL BE VICTORIOUS AGAINST THE RUSSIAN AGGRESSORS AND DESTRUCTION OF THE AMERICAN IMPERIALISM, HOPING THAT THE MOSLEM NATION OF AFGHANISTAN ENRICHED WITH ALERTNEFS AND VIGILANCE WILL ELIMINATE THE RUSSIAN AGGRESSORS FROM HER SOIL AND WILL LAY THE FOUNDATION OF AN ISLAMIC STATE, AND WITH THE HOPE THAT WITH THE OUSTING OF THE PRO-WESTERN ELEMENTS FROM AFGHANISTAN WILL LEAD TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SLOGAN "NO EAST, NO WEST, BUT THE ISLAMIC GOVERNMENT".

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

Biographic Report

Mohammad DAUD
President of Afghanistan

Secret
BR 73-15
August 1973

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AFGHANISTAN

Mohammad DAUD

President; Prime Minister; Minister of Defense; Minister of Foreign Affairs

In the early hours of 17 July 1973 Sardar (Prince) Mohammad Daud (rhymes with loud), former Prime Minister and virtual dictator (1953-63), came to power through a well-executed and virtually bloodless military coup, ending the 40-year reign of his brother-in-law and cousin, King Mohammad Zahir. (The King, who was vacationing on the Neapolitan island of Ischia at the time, has remained in Italy, at the Embassy in Rome; his wife and family joined him on 27 July.)

It appears that the junior officers active in the coup included Daud in their plans only at the last moment, intending him to hold figurehead status. Since assuming office, however, Daud appears to have consolidated his position in Kabul and in the provinces. Returning to power after a hiatus of 10 years, he abolished the monarchy, abrogated the 1964 Constitution and declared a republic, naming himself President, Prime Minister, Minister of Defense and Minister of Foreign Affairs. Fourteen members of the royal family have been sent into exile. Sardars Shah Wali Khan and Abdul Wali, two of Daud's main enemies, are either held in detention in Kabul or dead. If they are still alive, their continued presence in the country may constitute a potential threat to the regime.

The new Cabinet, termed a "peculiar hodgepodge" by US Embassy officials in Kabul, represents a compromise between Daud and the junior officers,

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but a compromise that favors Daud. The President holds the top posts and is also expected to keep the portfolio of Economic Planning. The Deputy Prime Minister and several of the lesser Ministers are known to be close to Daud. The junior officers, and two civilians thought to be sympathetic to them, hold five portfolios, including those of Finance and Interior. Should the Cabinet prove ineffective or incapable of unified action, the politically astute Daud may be able to exploit the inexperience and disunity of his colleagues.

Daud the Man

A man of decisiveness and intelligence, Daud is also temperamental, stubborn, brutally frank and egotistical. He is a hard worker and was characterized in the late 1930's as a capable, honest and efficient administrator. During his 10 years as Prime Minister he carried out his policies with energy, self-assurance and independence. He was sincerely interested in promoting the modernization and economic betterment of his country. One example of his liberal reforms was his removal of the obligation for Afghan women to wear the *chadri*, a tentlike garment and veil designed to cover the wearer from head to foot. Daud commands a considerable following in the armed forces, among former government officials and with certain student elements. Groups such as the ultraconservative religious leaders have opposed his reformist inclinations.

Nonaligned Neutral?

Reports indicate that Daud is a strong nationalist who will seek aid wherever it is available. He claims to be a nonaligned neutral, but his determination to modernize Afghanistan resulted in a heavy reliance on the Soviet Union for assistance when he was Prime Minister. He listed US military aid to Pakistan and inadequate US support for Afghanistan as the precipitating factors in his turn to the USSR. He felt that there was little danger in relying on that country for economic and military supply. According to news accounts, Daud once said that he was happiest when he could light his American cigarettes with Soviet matches.

The Soviet position in Kabul may have been enhanced because of Daud's assumption of power, but only marginally. It is rumored that the Soviets had some forewarning of his plan to overthrow the King; more than 200 Soviet military technicians and advisers were in the country at the time, many of them working with the army units that provided the backbone of the coup. There is no evidence, however, that the Soviets either instigated or were actively involved in the coup.

Daud the President

In his first national broadcast, President Daud spoke harshly of the King's 10-year-old "experiment in democracy," claiming that it had degenerated into a regime of lies, betrayal, elitism and personal gain. He stated that the royal family had misused its powers and had caused economic, administrative and political paralysis. He said that the main priorities of his regime would be economic development and basic social reforms.

International Repercussions

Pledging to continue Afghanistan's policy of neutrality and nonalignment, Daud has nevertheless stressed his desire to find a "permanent solution" to the Pushtunistan issue with Pakistan. Pushtunistan is the name given to the Pushtu- and Baluchi-speaking areas of Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan, especially Pakistan's western frontier provinces. The Pushtuns are the dominant tribal group in Afghanistan, and many of them live astride the Afghan-Pakistani border. Advocates of Pushtunistan agree on neither its exact area nor their ultimate goal. Some merely want increased autonomy for the area; others want Pushtunistan to be an independent country. Daud is a longtime advocate of independence, and in 1962 US officials characterized him as emotional and irrational on this issue. When he was Prime Minister, the only public function he regularly attended was the annual celebration of Pushtunistan Day.

Before Daud staged his coup, relations between Islamabad and Kabul were already cooling, and further deterioration is likely. Mohammad Musa Shafiq,

Daud's immediate predecessor as Prime Minister, apparently wanted good relations with Pakistan and was not particularly interested in Pushtunistan. Popular sentiment nevertheless forced him to increase anti-Pakistani propaganda, and in May 1973 Pakistan accused the Afghans of blatant interference in Pakistan's domestic affairs. Daud--unlike Shafiq--is concerned about Pushtunistan, and when he was Prime Minister he sent tribesmen and some regular troops into Pakistan in an attempt to stir up a rebellion on the frontier. Tension peaked in the early 1960's, when the two countries appeared close to war, diplomatic relations were broken, and the border was closed.

Daud's efforts were almost a total failure. Pakistani tribesmen generally did not respond, the closure of the border (designed to hurt Pakistan) cut off the bulk of Afghanistan's foreign trade, and the result was an erosion of Daud's prestige, which contributed greatly to his dismissal as Prime Minister in 1963. Since that time, the Afghans have kept alive their propaganda but have gradually shifted their position from advocating independence for Pushtunistan to advocating increased autonomy for the Pakistani frontier provinces. Daud's present plans concerning Pushtunistan are not clear. Presumably, he is more aware now of the dangers to Afghanistan and to him of an activist Pushtunistan policy.

Daud's assumption of power threatens relations between Tehran and Kabul, which have been gradually improving in the recent past. Before the coup the Shah of Iran was already concerned about Soviet influence in Afghanistan. Daud's cordial relations with the USSR may jeopardize the ratification of a pending treaty on the apportionment of the waters of the Helmand River, as well as the access to road and port facilities that the Shah has promised to Afghanistan. The Shah is likely to view any threat to Pakistan's unity as a threat to Iran.

Early Life and Career

Mohammad Daud was born in Kabul in 1909. He attended the English-language Habibia School in Kabul and studied in France during 1921-30. He

later attended the Officers' Infantry School in Kabul. From 1932 to 1938 Daud was commanding general and Governor of the Eastern and Kandahar Provinces, where he was noted for having introduced educational and social reforms and improvements in agricultural methods. In 1939 he became commandant of the Kabul Military College, and in the early 1940's he served as commanding general of the Kabul Central Army Corps. Daud was Minister of National Defense during 1946-48 and then became Minister to France, Switzerland and Belgium. In 1949 he was reappointed Minister of National Defense and assumed the presidency of the First Group of Ministers of the High State Council.

In 1953 Daud was appointed Prime Minister, Minister of Defense and Minister of Planning. King Zahir removed him in 1963 because of the Prime Minister's uncompromising policy toward Pakistan. It has been suggested that Daud could have retained his position but chose to resign in order to preserve the solidarity of the royal family.

Waiting in the Wings

Daud's retirement destroyed neither his power nor the possibility that he might use that power in an attempt to return to office. Observers believed that the presence of this powerful figure waiting in the wings eroded the public confidence needed for the successful implementation of King Zahir's "experiment in democracy" and his 1964 reform Constitution.

In August 1968 Daud and the King attempted a reconciliation. Their negotiations were unsuccessful. According to an Afghan Government official, in 1971 Daud privately expressed his impatience with the King, who he felt was destroying the country by his lack of concern and by his tolerance of corruption and immorality among members of the royal family. Daud and his brother, Prince Mohammad Naim, felt that the Constitution encouraged the royal family to engage in corruption: Prevented from holding public office, members of the royal family attempted to influence those who did.

In a prophetic remark, Daud said that the King's heavy dependence on the army could result in the downfall of the monarchy. He accused the King of stifling ministerial initiative and maintained that his dismissal as Prime Minister in 1963 was the result of a campaign of innuendo and rumor. According to the above-mentioned Afghan official, Daud had urged the King to make necessary reforms.

Health

Daud received medical treatment in Switzerland in 1959 for what was tentatively identified as a slipped disc. Seeking additional medical aid in Vienna in 1960, he was found to be suffering from spondylolisthesis (maladjustment of the spinal column) and rheumatism, although he was reported to have appeared more spirited than sickly in pursuing a vigorous night life. Leaving Vienna in April 1960, he went to the Soviet Union Rest Center at Sochi for several weeks of rest and medical observation. In February 1961, while in Rome, Daud underwent an operation for a slipped disc. During a visit he made to England in July 1961, British officials commented on his physical fitness and mental alertness. Daud was confined to his home by an undisclosed illness for 2 weeks in August 1968. In 1972 he suffered from a bout of hepatitis, from which he recovered without complication.

Various observers have questioned Daud's mental health. In 1960 several members of the royal family referred to him as the "crazy Prince." They said that they lived in terror and dared not criticize Daud. The same sources claimed that Daud told King Zahir that the only reason he continued to be King was because he, as Prime Minister, wanted him there. Recently, a Pakistani Government official characterized Daud as "mad," literally, and claimed that the President had once had psychiatric treatment in the USSR.

A journalist recently described Daud as looking hunched and tired.

Travel

Daud headed the Afghan delegation to the Third Session of the UN General Assembly, in Paris, in 1948. In 1953 he represented the King at funeral services for Joseph Stalin in Moscow and at the coronation of Queen Elizabeth II in London. He participated in the Belgrade Conference of Nonaligned Nations in September 1961. In addition to countries previously mentioned, he has visited the People's Republic of China (1957), the United States (1958), India (1959), Iran (1960) and West Germany (1961).

"Demon of the Bazaars"

Since the coup Daud has sought to exhibit his populism--and his disdain for the royal family--by insisting on being addressed as "Mr. Daud" instead of as "President." Soft-spoken and informal by nature, the President usually maintains a calm exterior but sometimes exhibits a violent temper. He is said to be loyal to his friends but is depicted as being harsh--even cruel--to enemies. As Prime Minister he was fond of inspecting shops in disguise, with the idea of ensuring the honesty of shopkeepers. As a result, he acquired the sobriquet "demon of the bazaars." According to bazaar gossip, Daud punished a baker who was overcharging for bread by having him baked alive in his own oven; a more common punishment, according to rumor, was to have unscrupulous shopkeepers nailed to a wall by their ears.

The President is a moderate drinker and a heavy smoker. During his retirement he displayed some interest in agriculture. He speaks fluent Turkish, Farsi, Pushtu and French. He has some knowledge of English, although he does not feel at ease using it.

Family

In 1934 Daud married Zenab Jan, sister of King Zahir. They have at least three sons and four daughters. One of the daughters resided in Washington, D.C., as of 1961-62. One of the sons is studying in Moscow; Daud visits him once or twice a year.

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E. O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PEPR, AF
SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN IN 1977: AN EXTERNAL ASSESSMENT

1. SUMMARY: DURING 1977, AFGHANISTAN'S SECURITY AND INDEPENDENCE REMAINED UNDIMINISHED, THUS SATISFYING OUR FOREMOST POLICY GOAL HERE. PRESIDENT DAOUD ALSO MADE SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE IMPROVEMENT OF REGIONAL STABILITY -- THEREBY HELPING TO FULFILLS ANOTHER PRINCIPAL U.S. OBJECTIVE. AVOIDING THE TEMPTATION TO TAKE JEKACHAGE OF PAKISTAN'S DOMESTIC POLITICAL TURMOIL, DAOUD CONTINUED TO NURTURE THE RAPPROCHEMENT HE AND FORMER PAKISTANI PRIME MINISTER BHUTTO HAD LAUNCHED IN 1976. HE WAS ALSO ABLE TO REACH A MUTUALLY SATISFACTORY SETTLEMENT WITH IRAN OF THE AGE-OLD HELMAND WATERS DISPUTE.

2. THE HIGHLIGHTS OF U.S.-AFGHAN BILATERAL RELATIONS WERE : (A) ESTABLISHMENT OF A JOINT COMMISSION TO COMBAT NARCTICS; (B) AFGHAN SUPPORT IN THE UN ON THE GUAM AND PUERTO RICO ISSUES; AND (C) AN INVITATION FROM PRESIDENT CARTER TO DAOUD TO PAY A STATE VISIT TO THE U.S. END SUMMARY.

3. RELATIONS WITH THE US: U.S.-AFGHAN RELATIONS DURING 1977 WERE EXCELLENT. THE GOVERNMENT OF AFGHANISTAN (GOA) FULFILLED AN OBLIGATIONATO US TO ESTABLISH A JOINT COMMISSION TO CONTROL NARCOTICS PRODUCTION AND TRAFFICKING. UNLIKE 1976, WHEN THE GOA WENT BACK ON A COMMITMENT NOT TO OPPOSE US ON THE GUAM ISSUE, THE GOA GAVE US HELP IN THE 1977 UNGA ON BOTH GUAM AND PUERTO RICO ISSUES. DAOUD ACCEPTED AN INVITATIONHTO MAKE A STATE VISIT TO THE U.S. IN THE SUMMER OF 1978. FUNDING FOR THE U.S. MILITARY TRAINING PROGRAM FOR AFGHAN OFFICERS WAS DOUBLED IN AN EFFORT TO OFFSET -- ALBEIT TO A MODEST DEGREE -- THE MASSIVE SOVIET PREDOMINANCE IN THE AREA OF FOREIGN SUPPORT FOR THE AFGHAN ARMED FORCES.

4. AS USAID/AFGHANISTAN ENDEAVORED TO SHAPE ITS PROGRAMS TO MEET CONGRESSIONAL AND AID GUIDELINES, AFGHAN DISQUIETUDE WAS EXPRESSED OVER WHAT APPEARED TO THEM TO BE A RECEDING AMERICAN COMMITMENT IN THE DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE AREA. THE AFGHAN LEADERSHIP FREQUENTLY REMINDED LOCAL AND VISITING AMERICAN OFFICIALS THAT AFGHANISTAN WANTS A MORE VISIBLE AMERICAN AID PRESENCE TO OFFER SOME COUNTER BALANCE TO THE PREDOMINANT SOVIET PRESENCE IN THIS COUNTRY.

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5. AFGHAN OFFICIALS HAD TWO HIGH-LEVEL CONTACTS WITH THE US LEADERSHIP IN 1977. WHEN AMBASSADOR ABDUL WAHID KARIM PRESENTED HIS CREDENTIALS AT THE WHITE HOUSE ON JULY 29, PRESIDENT CARTER TOLD HIM: "THE UNITED STATES HAS FOLLOWED WITH INTEREST THE FORMATION OF YOUR NEW CONSTITUTION AND WE ARE PARTICULARLY AWARE OF ITS HUMAN RIGHTS PROVISIONS... WE ARE ALSO MUCH AWARE OF PRESIDENT DAOUD'S EFFORTS TO IMPROVE THE ECONOMIC WELL-BEING OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE. WE ARE READY TO HELP IN THIS EFFORT." THE PRESIDENT ALSO COMPLIMENTED THE GOVERNMENT OF AFGHANISTAN (GOA) ON THE ESTABLISHMENT TWO DAYS EARLIER OF THE NEW JOINT COMMISSION ON AFGHAN NARCOTICS MATTERS AND EXPRESSED HIS STRONG PERSONAL INTEREST IN NARCOTICS CONTROL.

6. SUBSEQUENTLY, ON OCTOBER 1, SHORTLY BEFORE THE UNGA SESSION, FOREIGN MINISTER WAHEED ABDULLAH MET WITH SECRETARY VANCE AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY ATHERTON. ABDULLAH WAS TOLD THAT THE USG REGARDS THE OPIUM-PRODUCTION PROBLEM IN AFGHANISTAN AS "A HIGH PRIORITY ISSUE." (THIS VIEW WAS ECHOED BY SENATOR WILLIAM L. SCOTT OF VIRGINIA DURING HIS NOVEMPER VISIT TO KABUL, WHEN HE BLUNTLY TOLD DAOUD THAT FUTURE AMERICAN AID WAS CONDITIONED ON AFGHAN PERFORMANCE IN THE NARCOTICS-CONTROL AREA.) THE AMERICAN SIDE WAS ASSURED BY ABDULLAH THAT PRESIDENT DAOUD STANDS PERSONALLY BEHIND THE EFFORTS OF TIO GOA IN THE OPIUM-CONTROL FIELD.

7. AT THAT SAME MEETING, ABDULLAH EXPLAINED THAT THE GOA WANTED A CLOSER RELATIONSHIP WITH THE NEW AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION AND A "VERY VISIBLE" U.S. PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN. THE SECRETARY REPLIED THAT THE U.S. SUPPORTS THE INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF AFGHANISTAN AND WILL CONTINUE ITS ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS. SECRETARY VANCE FURTHER OPINED THAT OUR TWO PRESIDENTS SHOULD GET TO KNOW EACH OTHER, AND, IN THIS CONNECTION, HE EXTENDED A PRESIDENTIAL INVITATION FOR DAOUD TO MAKE A STATE VISIT TO THE US DURING THE SUMMER OF 1978. THE AFGHAN PRESIDENT SUBSEQUENTLY ACCEPTED THE INVITATION.

8. RELATIONS WITH THE USSR: AFGHANISTAN'S MOST IMPORTANT BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP CONTINUED TO BE THE SENSITIVE, BUT LUCRATI E LINK WITH ITS HUGH NORTHERN NEIGHBOR. THE SOVIETS AVOIDED ANY APPEARANCE OF MEDDLING IN AFGHAN INTERNAL AFFAIRS -- AND MAINTAINED THEIR POSITION AS THE MAJOR AID DONORTYO AFGHANISTAN (MORE THAN ONE BILLION DOLLARS OVER THE PAST QUARTER CENTURY, COMPARED TO LESS THAN ONE-HALF BILLION FROM THE U.S.). ALTHOUGH NO SIGNIFICANT ADDITIONAL AID WAS COMMITTED BY THE SOVIETS IN 1977, THE TWO SIDES DID HOLD DISCUSSIONS IN APRIL ABOUT USES FOR THE OUTSTANDING $700 MILLION OF SOVIET CREDITS ALREADY COMMITTED TO AFGHANISTAN. SOVIET MILITARY DELIVERIES TO AFGHANISTAN IN 1977 INCLUDED A FEW SIGNIFICANT NEW WEAPONS, SUCH AS SA-3 AND SA-7 SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES.

9. FROM APRIL 12 TO 15, DAOUD PAID WHAT BOTH SIDES STYLED AS A "ROUTINE" VISIT TO THE SOVIET UNION (WHICH, INCIDENTALLY, WAS AMONG THE PRINCIPAL REASONS WHY DAOUD WAS SO EAGER TO GET AN INVVOATION FROM US -- IN
ORDER TO MAINTAIN WHAT THE GOA PERCEIVES

AS A OPTICAL BALANCE BETWEEN THE TWO GREATEST POWERS). DURING ITS MOSCOW SOJOURN, DAOUD'S PARTY SIGNED A NEW TWELVE-YEAR AGREEMENT TO DEVELOP AFGHAN-SOVIET ECONOMIC AND TRADE RELATIONS.

10. RELATIONS WITH CHINA: IN ORDER TO PROVIDE ANOTHER TYPE OF OPTICAL BALANCE TO DAOUD'S TRIP TO THE USSR, THE AFGHANS RECEIVED ON APRIL 9 A DELEGATION FROM THE PEOPLES' REPUBLIC OF CHINA, HEADED BY CHAI SHU FAN, VICE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN TRADE. THIS VISIT PRODUCED LITTLE OF SUBSTANCE, HOWEVER,

11. ALTHOUGH IN A LOYA JIRGAH SPEECH EARLIER IN THE YEAR DAOUD HAD EXPRESSED HIS HOPE FOR "EVER-EXPANDING RELATIONS" WITH CHINA, NOTHING DISCERNIBLE ALONG THESE LINES WAS ACCOMPLISHED DURING 1977. THE CHINESE BRIDGEHEAD HERE (WHICH INCLUDES SOME MINOR AID PROJECTS) REMAINS QUITE MODEST -- BUT IS SUFFICIENT TO SYMBOLIZE AFGHAN NEUTRALITY BETWEEN MOSCOW AND PEKING.

12. RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN: THE REMARKABLE RAPPROCHEMENT INITIATED THE PREVIOUS YEAR BY DAOUD AND FORMER PAKISTANI PRIME MINISTER BHUTTO CONTINUED THROUGHOUT PAKISTAN'S DOMESTIC POLITICAL UPHEAVAL OF 1977. BHUTTO RECEIVED A CORRECT, BUT RELATIVELY RESTRAINED AND COOL WELCOME DURING A BRIEF JUNE VISIT TO KABUL (SHORTLY BEFORE HIS DOWNFALL), AT WHICH TIME THE GOA SUGGESTED THAT FURTHER DETAILED TALKS ON THE PUSHTUNISTAN ISSUE (DESCRIBED BY THE GOA AS THE "SOLE DIFFERENCE" BETWEEN THE TWO STATES) BE DELAYED UNTIL AFTER THE THEN-EXPECTED PAKISTANI ELECTIONS. SIMILAR UNDERSTANDINGS WERE REACHED LATER WITH GENERAL ZIA-UL-HAQ, PAKISTAN'S CHIEF MARTIAL LAW ADMINISTRATOR, DURING HIS OCTOBER 10-11 VISIT TO KABUL. HAQ ASSURED THE AFGHANS -- APPARENTLY TO THEIR SATISFACTION -- THAT ALL ELEMENTS OF PAKISTANI SOCIETY NOW SUBSCRIBE TO THE DETENTE WITH AFGHANISTAN. FOR THEIR PART, THE AFGHANS HAVE SCRUPULOUSLY AVOIDED ANY SEMBLANCE OF INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF PAKISTAN, ALTHOUGH THEY EXPRESSED GREAT SATISFACTION WHEN WALI KHAN WAS RECENTLY RELEASED FROM PRISON AND ALLOWED TO REJOIN THE POLITICAL LISTS.

13. THE SOVIETS HAVE REMAINED OUTWARDLY PASSIVE ABOUT THE AFGHAN-PAKISTANI RAPPROCHEMENT THUS FAR. ON THE OTHER HAND, US OFFICIALS IN BOTH COUNTRIES HAVE MADE CLEAR WASHINGTON'S GREAT SATISFACTION OVER THIS DEVELOPMENT WHICH SATISFIES ONE OF OUR MOST IMPORTANT REGIONAL OBJECTIVES.

14. RELATIONS WITH IRAN: DAOUD ALSO BROUGHT ABOUT BETTER RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN'S CULTURAL COUSIN, IRAN, BY SETTLING -- AT LEAST FOR THE PRESENT -- A LONG-STANDING ISSUE BETWEEN THE TWO STATES: THE DIVISION OF THE WATERS OF THE HELMAND RIVER. AFTER SENDING HIS BROTHER AND SPECIAL ENVOY, MOHAMMAD NAIM, TO TEHRAN TO PAVE THE WAY, THE GOA EXCHANGED WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN AKBGOI INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION FOR THE 1973 HELMAND WATERS TREATY, WHICH HAD BEEN LEFT HANGING IN LIMBO AFTER THE ROYAL GOVERNMENT OF AFGHANISTAN, WHICH HAD NEGOTIATED IT, HAD BEEN DEPOSED BY THE

NEW REPUBLICAN REGIME. NAIM ALSO SECURED IRANIAN UNDERSTANDING TO WHAT UNTIL THEN HAD BEEN A CONTROVERSIAL FLOOD-CONTROL AND IRRIGATION PROJECT THE AFGHANS WANTED TO LAUNCH IN THE LOWER HELMAND (THIS PROJECT IS NOW IN THE DESIGN STAGE).

15. ON THE DEBIT SIDE, HOWEVER, THE AFGHANS CONTINUED TO RESENT WHAT THEY -- WITH SOME JUSTIFICATION -- VIEWED AS IRANIAN RENEGING ON PAST AID PROMISES. AS THE YEAR ENDED, MOREOVER, BOTH GOVERNMENTS WERE INTENSELY, BUT DISCREETLY TRYING TO RESOLVE A SQUABBLE OVER A SMALL DISPUTED SEGMENT OF BORDER NEAR ISLAM QALA ON THE MESHED-HERAT ROAD. IRRITATED BY REPEATED EXPRESSIONS OF CONCERN BY THE SHAH OVER SOVIET INFLUENCE IN AFGHANISTAN AND THE LACK OF AN ASSURED PLAN OF SUCCESSION FOR DAOUD, THE AFGHAN LEADERSHIP COUNTERED AT EVERY APPROPRIATE OPPORTUNITY BY CITING THEIR OWN WORRIES OVER THE SUCCESSION QUESTION IN IRAN.

16. RELATIONS WITH OTHER STATES: DURING THE FALL, GHE GOA RECEIVED A RAPID SUCCESSION OF FOREIGN DIGNITARIES, WHOSE VISITS PRODUCED LITTLE OF REAL SUBSTANCE: CUBAN DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER PELEGRIN TORRAS (SEPTEMBER 19-23), HUNGARIAN PRESIDENT PAL LOSONCZI (OCTOBER 15-19), IRAQI VICE PRESIDENT TAHA MUHI-AL-DIN MA'RUF (OCTOBER 22-25), AND MONGOLIAN FOREIGN MINISTER MANGALYN DUGERSUREN (OCTOBER 26-30). UPON HIS RETURN FROM THE UNGA SESSION (AND A TOUR OF CALIFORNIA), AFGHAN FOREIGN MINISTER WAHEED ABDULLAH VISITED IRAQ, IRAN, AND VARIOUS PERSIAN GULF STATES (WHERE HE TRIED TO ATTRACT FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FROM THE LATTER GROUP OF WEALTHY CORELIGIONISTS). MOST OF THIS FLURRY OF DIPLOMATIC VISITING WAS DESIGNED TO BURNISH AFGHANISTAN'S CREDENTIALS AS AN ACTIVE NON-ALIGNED STATE, AS KABUL AMBITIOUSLY PREPARED TO HOST THE MAY MEETING OF THE COORDINATING COMMITTEE OF THE NON-ALIGNED GROUP OF STATES. THE GOA HAS BEEN INCREASING ITS ACTIVITY IN SUPPORT OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT IN SEVERAL AREAS, SUCH AS THE LAWSOF-THE SEA CONFERENCES AND NORTH-SOUTH ECONOMIC ISSUES. KABUL IS PARTICULARLY EAGER TO IMPROVE THE STATUS OF LAND-LOCKED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND HAS THROUGHOUT 1977 UTILIZED EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO PROMOTE THIS CAUSE.

17. ALTHOUGH THE GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED AFGHAN PRESS REPORTED THE PEACE-TALKS ACTIVITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST IN A THOROUGH AND BALANCED FASHION, THE GOA WARILY CONTINUED ITS LONG-STANDING POLICY OF AVOIDING ANY INVOLVEMENT -- AND HAS BEEN PARTICULARLY CAREFUL IN THIS AREA SINCE SADAT'S BREAK WITH SEVERAL ARAB STATES. THE AFGHANS SEE THEMSELVES AS NON-SEMITIC MUSLIMS, WITH NOTHING TO GAIN BY TAKING ANY STAND OTHER THAN PROVIDING GENERAL LIP-SERVICE TO THE ARAB CAUSE.

18. COMMENT: U.S. INTERESTS IN THE PROMOTION AND PRESERVATION OF REGIONAL STABILITY WERE WELL SERVED DURING THE YEAR BY DAOUD'S RESPONSIBLE IMPROVEMENT OF AFGHAN RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN AND IRAN. HIS HANDLING OF THE DIFFICULT AND COMPLEX RELATIONSHIP WITH THE USSR ALSO CONTINUED TO BE DEFT AND ABLE. IN SEVERAL WAYS, AFGHANISTAN'S GEOPOLITICAL SITUATION ROUGHLY RESEMBLES THAT OF FINLAND -- AND DAOUD MANAGES THIS CHALLENGE AT LEAST AS WELL AS, IF NOT BETTER, THAN KEKKONEN.

CONFIDENTIAL

19. IN ORDER TO SUPPORT AFGHANISTAN'S EFFORTS TO PRESERVE THE LARGEST POSSIBLE DEGREE OF INDEPENDENCE FROM SOVIET PRESSURES -- WHICH IS THE PRINCIPAL US POLICY GOAL HERE, WE CONTINUE TO DEMONSTRATE OUR FRIENDLY AND TANGIBLE INTEREST THROUGH A VISIBLE AMERICAN PRESENCE IN THIS COUNTRY. THE STATE VISIT WE HAVE ALREADY PROMISED DAOUD IS THE KEY ITEM ON THE 1978 US-AFGHAN AGENDA.

ELIOT

The most important figures in the Afghan government after Amin are:

Sadh Wali, Deputy Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, Politburo member. He generally regarded as the third man in the inner circle that rules Afghanistan. He has no differences with Amin or Taraki. A physician, [illegible], possibly with some training in the Soviet Union, he served as Health Minister and Acting Prime Minister.

Mohammed Aslam Watanjar, Minister of Interior. He led the tanks against the Palace in the last coup, and apparently was also driving the lead tank in the previous coup in 1973. He became deputy Prime Minister after the coup, was soon demoted to Interior Minister (where he apparently had little influence even in his own ministry) was then made army commander briefly and then Defense Minister when the government needed a popular soldier in the job, and in the latest cabinet shuffle was sent back to Interior. He has been characterized as a pliable, not very bright tank driver, and as a capable and ambitious man. No one doubts his courage or his willingness to take personal risks. He has given no evidence of disloyalty to Taraki and Amin, but is still regarded by everyone--apparently including them--as the person most likely to lead a coup against the government. He is regarded as less pro-Soviet and doctrinaire than the civilians in the government.

Lt. Col. Sherjan Mazdooryar, Minister of Frontier Affairs. The ministry is unimportant, and Mazdooryar may be finished. He was recently moved from Interior, and before that he simultaneously commander of one of the armored brigades near Kabul, commander of the Kabul garrison, and commander of the army corps in Kabul, giving him the most critical commands in the country. Apparently he was believed to be too close to Watanjar and too likely to become involved in a military coup.

Abdul Karim Misaq, Finance Minister, Politburo Member. Self educated, from a poor family, at one time he was supposed to be the fourth most important man in the government, but he may have slipped. Again, we know of no differences with the party leaders.

Dr. Mohammed Iqbal, First Deputy Minister of Defense. He is in charge of ensuring the loyalty of the military, and apparently actually runs the ministry. (This may have changed since Amin took direct control of the ministry last month.) He is Amin's man, and a key link in the government's chain of control.

THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN

I. The localized tribal fighting that erupted in the eastern provinces when the pro-Soviet coup group seized power in late April 1978 has since grown into a countrywide insurgency. (S)

A. Faced with the hostility of the great majority of the traditionally independent population, the regime of President Taraki and Prime Minister Amin has no better than an even chance to complete its second year in power. (S)

B. Taraki and Amin will survive only as long as the loyalty of the military, the security service and the ruling party remains intact, under the heavy pressure being brought to bear by hostile forces. (S)

1. The most likely successor regime would be led by, or at least have the backing of leftist military officers. (S)

2. Coup plotters might seek Moscow's tacit approval to seize power would in any case retain strong ties with the Soviet Union. (S)

3. The Soviets favor the installation of a more broadly based government as a means of defusing the tribal insurgency. (S)

II. Taraki and Amin have been the key figures in the regime since the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan seized power in April 1978. (S)

A. However, Taraki, 62, is not in good health and there are signs he is playing a less active role than during the early days of the revolution. (S)

B. Amin is de facto key decision-maker in the day-to day affairs of the government. (S)

1. His status as the regime's mover and shaker was confirmed 31 March when he was promoted from deputy prime minister to prime minister, a post Taraki had held since the revolution. (S)

C. The regime's key policymaking body is the ruling party's seven-man Political Bureau. (S)

1. Taraki, Amin and Deputy Prime Minister Shah Wali make up the Political Bureau's Secretariat. (S)

D. The top party leadership seems fairly well united as it faces the country's multiple domestic problems. (S)

1. There are some frictions but the key figures recognize they must submerge their differences at a time when their survival is threatened by a countrywide insurgency. (S)

III. The beleaguered Taraki regime's survival has come to depend increasingly, as the insurgency has spread, on Soviet political, military, economic and technical support. (There are between 1,5000 and 2,000 Soviet advisers presently in Afghanistan.) (S)

A. Afghanistan's nearly total dependence on Moscow has given the Soviets far more say in the Afghan Government's day-to-day decisionmaking process than they have ever had. (S)

1. Still, Taraki and Amin appear to be setting the main lines of policy. (S)

B. The regime does not yet face a security situation that might prompt a request to Moscow for the direct intervention of Soviet forces. (S)

1. However, an appeal for Soviet combat units is conceivable within the next 12 months. (S)

C. The Soviets will go to some lengths to protect their interests in Afghanistan but probably not to the extent of intervening militarily. (S) although,

1. The Soviets would be deterred by the prospects that their forces would be bogged down indefinitely trying to shore up a discredited regime. (S) [Traditionally, strong central govt opposed by tribes when it tackles of tribes fight each other. Govt will be assisted & dependent on USSR]

They could put small units in to protect Soviet personnel

2. Soviet leaders also have to weigh the regional--particularly wiht respect to Iran, Pakistan and India--and international political costs of direct intervention. (S)

3. However, if serious fighting broke out in areas near the Soviet border, Moscow might provide increased numbers of tactical aircraft, helicopters, (MI-24's) (17) pilots and advisers to assist Kabul. (S)

(T-62's)-60 MIG-21-B's SU-20's

IV. The government is making no progress against the tribal insurgency, which continues to spread and erode military capabilities. (S)

A. If morale in the military continues to decline it will affect the government's ability to hold Kabul and other key cities. (S)

B. Casualties and defections to the rebels have left the regime short of men in major commands throughout the country. (S)

C. In spite of continuing Soviet support, the Afghans face problems in maintaining equipment and supplying units in the field. (S)

V. The tribal insurgents operate with impunity in over half of the country. They have overrun a few government positions in the east and interdicted main roads for a few hours but they have been unable to seize an important town. (S)

A. They lack centralized leadership and strategic coordination needed to unify them into a cohesive force. (S)

B. Still, they should be able to maintain pressure against the regime for some time. (S)

1. They have a long tradition of guerrilla warfare and can draw on large manpower reserves. (S)

2. Simple logistic requirements enable them to live off the land and to equip themselves with arms captured from government forces. (S)

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INCOMING TELEGRAM CONTROL NO. 6715

ACTION:

INFO: AMB 1 DCM 1 SA ___ POL ___ ECON 2 PM 1 ICA 1 CONS ___ OR 1 ADM ___ GSO ___ RF ___ PER ___ HU ___ RSO ___ MSG ___ TSO ___ SCRO ___ CRO ___ TCU ___ MP ___ DAO 1 MAAG ___ AGR ___ CEA ___ INS ___ TAIR ___ CEOC ___ CEOR ___ CRU 1 SNIR 1 TABR ___ ISFA ___ FAA ___

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RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 5485
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MAY 4 1978

S E C R E T KABUL 3511 SECRET

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

ISLAMABAD, NEW DELHI, TEHRAN: ALSO FOR USDAOS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: ASEC, PINS, AF
SUBJECT: BIOGRAPHIC DATA ON AFGHAN CABINET

REF: KABUL 3423

1. FOLLLOWING IS BIOGRAPHIC DATA NOW AVAILABLE TO THE EMBASSY ON THE MEMBERS OF THE AFGHAN CABINET ANNOUNCED MAY:

NUR MOHAMMAD TARAKI--PRIME MINISTER AND CHAIRMAN OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL. (RIO REPORTED KABUL 3372).

BABRAK KARMAL--VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL AND VICE PRIME MINISTER. KARMAL (FREQUENTLY KNOWN SIMPLY AS BABRAK) WAS BORN ABOUT 1929 NEAR KABUL. HE IS THE SON OF A GENERAL AND POSSIBLY A DISTANT RELATIVE OF DAOUD. HE WAS A STUDENT AGITATOR WHILE ATTENDING KABUL UNIVERSITY AND SPENT FIVE YEARS IN JAIL (1952-56). AFTER HIS RELEASE HE COMPLETED HIS LAW DEGREE AND BECAME ASSOCIATED WITH MIR AKBAR KHAIBAR, THE COMMUNIST LEADER WHOSE MURDER APRIL 17 WAS THE FIRST CLEAR SIGN OF TROUBLE TO COME (KABUL 3142). APPROXIMATELY 1960 HE BECAME A CLOSE FRIEND (LOVER) OF ANAHITA RATEBZADAH, NOW MINISTER OF SOCIAL AFFAIRS, AND IN 1965 HE WAS ELCIED TO PARLIAMENT. IN 1965 HE WAS CHOSEN AS A MEMBER OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY AT ITS FOUNDING CONGRESS. IN 1967 HE JOINED WITH KHAIBAR IN OPPOSITION TO THE TARAKI GROUP (KHALQ) TO FORM PARCHAM. HE WAS NOTED AS A STRONG SUPPORTER OF THE PUSHTUNISTAN ISSUE WITH CLOSE CONTACTS WITH WALI KHAN AND THE NATIONAL AWAMI PARTY IN PAKISTAN. IN 1973 HE LED "THE LARGEST DEMONSTRATION IN AFGHAN HISTORY" TO PROTEST THE HELMAND WATERS AGREEMENT WITH IRAN. BABRAK WAS ONE OF THE SEVEN COMMUNIST LEADERS ARRESTED BY THE DAOUD GOVERNMENT ON APRIL 25 (KABUL 3227).

HAFIZULLAH AMIN--VICE PRIME MINISTER AND MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. AMIN WAS BORN IN PAGHMAN IN 1928. AS EARLY AS 1959 HE WAS CONSIDERED A RADICAL AGITATOR. AMIN HAS A MASTERS DEGREE IN SECONDARY EDUCATION FROM COLUMBIA (1958) AND RETURNED

SECRET

TO COLUMBIA (1963-65) FOR TWO ADDITIONAL YEARS OF EDUCATION. BOTH SOJOURNS WERE FINANCED BY USAID GRANTS. AMIN WAS ASSOCIATED WITH TARAKI IN THE MID-SIXTIES AND IN THE BITTER FACTIONALISM BETWEEN KHALQ AND PARCHAM IN 1967 WAS ACCUSED BY PARCHAMISTS OF BEING A CIA AGENT. AS A MEMBER OF THE LOWER HOUSE OF PARLIAMENT, AMIN WAS OCCASIONALLY OUTSPOKEN AGAINST US AC
TIVITIES IN AFGHANISTAN. AMIN WAS AMONG THOSE COMMUNISTS ARRESTED BY THE DAOUD GOVERNMENT ON APRIL 25.

CAPTAIN MOHAMMAD ASLAM--VICE PRIME MINISTER AND MINISTER OF COMMUNICATIONS. (SEE KABUL 3359)

COLONEL ABDUL QADER--MINISTER OF DEFENSE. (SEE STATE 110074 AND USDAO KABUL 84-6-847-8038-78.

MIR AHMAD (MIR) (PANJWAI)--MINISTER OF INTERIOR. AHMAD OR MIR OF PANJWAI IS THE SON OF A WEALTHY LANDLORD IN THE KANDAHAR AREA. HE IS BELIEVED TO BE A UNIVERSITY GRADUATE, SPEAKS ENGLISH, AND WAS A MINOR OFFICIAL IN THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS PRIOR TO HIS ELECTION TO PARLIAMENT IN 1965. IN 1968 HE WAS ASSOCIATED WITH BABRAK KARMAL AND THE PARCHAM PARTY. IN PARLIAMENT HE TOOK A HARD COMMUNIST LINE, BUT OUR BIO DATA STATES ENIGMATICALLY) THAT HE MAY BE MORE TRACTABLE AND OPEN-MINDED THAN OTHER COMMUNISTS.

SULTAN ALI KESHTMAN--MINISTER OF PLANNING. KESHTMAN WAS BORN CA. 1935. IN 1966 HE WAS REPORTED TO HAVE BEEN ON THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC PARTY (AN EARLIER INCARNATION OF KHALQ). IN 1965 HE RAN FOR A LOWER HOUSE SEAT IN PARLIAMENT BUT LOST THE ELECTION. IN 1967 HE HELD THE POSITION OF DIRECTOR GENERAL IN THE ECONOMICS SECTION OF THE MINISTRY OF MINES AND INDUSTRIES. HIS SISTERS HAVE BEEN EARLY SUPPORTERS OF DR. ANAHITA RATEBZADAH, THE PRESENT MINISTER OF SOCIAL AFFAIRS.

ABDUL KARIM MESAQ--MINISTER OF FINANCE. (NO BIO DATA).

DR. SALEH MOHAMMAD ZARAY -- MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE. DR. ZARAY WAS A GRADUATE OF THE KABUL UNIVERSITY MEDICAL FACULTY WHERE HE WAS IN THE TOP OF HIS CLASS ALL SEVEN YEARS. HE WAS A CANDIDATE FOR PARLIAMENT FROM KANDAHAR IN THE 1959 ELECTIONS. HE WAS APPARENTLY ARRESTED SOMETIME DURING THE CAMPAIGN. AT THAT TIME HE WAS REPORTED TO BE A MEMBER OF THE "CENTRAL COMMITTEE-BABRAK GROUP."

A SECOND REPORT INDICATED THAT DR. ZARAY SOMETIME AT THE END OF 1969 TENDERED HIS RESIGNATION FROM THE KHALQ PARTY ON GROUNDS THAT THE PARTY HAD NOT PROTESTED TO THE GOVERNMENT AGAINST HIS ARREST. HE AT THAT TIME SUGGESTED THAT HAFIZULLAH AMIN (FORMER KHALQ CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBER) SHOULD HAVE BEEN ASKED BY THE PARTY TO RESIGN FROM PARLIAMENT IN PROTEST AGAINST HIS (DR. ZARAY'S ARREST. HIS RESIGNATION REPORTEDLY WEAKENED THE APPEAL IN THE KANDAHAR AREA. HE IS BELIEVED SUBSEQUENTLY TO HAVE RESUMED HIS KHALQ PARTY AFFILIATION. ZARAY IS BROTHER-IN-LAW OF KABUL UNIVERSITY DIRECTOR OF CULTURAL AND FOREIGN RELATIONS, [illegible] ZARAY.

ABDUL HAKIM SHARAYEE--MINISTER OF JUSTICE AND ATTORNEY GENERAL. SHARAYEE IN 1962 WAS A SECOND YEAR STUDENT IN THE DEPARTMENT OF JOURNALISM, FACULTY OF LETTERS. AT THAT TIME THERE WAS SOME SUSPICION HE WAS AN INFORMANT FOR THE AFGHAN SECURITY FORCES. AT THAT SAME TIME HE TOLD A SOURCE THAT HE WAS ACTIVE IN THE COMMUNIST PARTY AND THAT HE EXPECTED SOME DAY THEREBY TO BE AN IMPORTANT LEADER. IN 1963 HE REPORTEDLY WAS SENT TO THE USSR FOR FURTHER STUDY. IN 1967 SHARAYEE WAS REPORTED TO BE A VERY ACTIVE COMMUNIST [illegible] ENGAGED IN STIRRING UP CONFLICT BETWEEN UZBEKS AND PUSHTUNS AT SAR-E-PUL, NEAR MAZAR-E-SHARIF. AT THAT TIME HE WORKED IN THE AFGHAN ENCYCLOPEDIA DEPARTMENT OF THE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION. AT THIS SAME TIME ANOTHER SOURCE REPORTED THAT HE WAS ATTENDING REGULAR COMMUNIST PARTY MEETINGS AND INVOLVED IN DISSEMINATING PARTY PROPAGANDA AND "ANTI-ISLAMIC IDEAS." SHARAYEE [illegible] OF THE COMMUNISTS ARRESTED BY THE DAOUD GOVERNMENT ON APRIL 27.

DR. SHAH WALI (ALEKOZAI)--MINISTER OF PUBLIC HEALTH. THE LAST NAME ALEKOZAI [illegible] HE IS A PUSHTUN FROM THE KANDAHAR AREA. WALI GRADUATED FROM THE MEDICAL SCHOOL OF KABUL UNIVERSITY AND WAS AN ASSISTANT PROFESSOR AT THE MEDICAL SCHOOL IN JALALABAD. HE MAY HAVE RECEIVED SOME TRAINING IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA. AT THE TIME OF THE COUP HE WAS DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF KABUL UNIVERSITY WOMEN'S HOSPITAL. WALI WAS ONE OF THE SEVEN COMMUNISTS ARRESTED BY THE DAOUD GOVERNMENT ON APRIL 25.

GHULAM DASTGIR PANJSHIRI--MINISTER OF EDUCATION. PANJSHIRI WAS FORMERLY DIRECTOR OF CENSORSHIP, RADIO AFGHANISTAN (1963-65) AND DIRECTOR OF LITERARY PRIZES, MINISTRY OF INFORMATION AND CULTURE (1965). HE WAS IMPRISONED DURING THE 1969 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS FOR "INSULTING THE KING" AND WAS RELEASED IN 1970. BEFORE HIS ARREST HE WAS ASSOCIATED WITH KHALQIS AND BABRAK KARMAL, BUT EVIDENTLY WHILE IN PRISON HE RESIGNED FROM THE PARCHAM PARTY IN WHICH HE WAS A MEMBER OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE. IN 1970, PANJSHIRI AND A COUSIN FORMED A SPLINTER GROUP CALLED DEMOCRATIC KHALQ KARGARI AFGHANISTAN. HE WAS ONE OF THE GROUP OF SEVEN ARRESTED ON APRIL 25.

MOHAMMAD HASSAN BAREK SHAFII (SHAFI'E) -- MINISTER OF INFORMATION AND CULTURE. A "LEADING AFGHAN POET", SHAFI'E WAS THE EDITOR OF THE THEN NEW PUBLICATION "KHALQ" IN 1966, AND WAS DIRECTOR OF PHOTOGRAMMETRY IN THE CARTOGRAPHIC INSTITUTE OF THE MINISTRY OF MINES AND INDUSTRIES FROM 1968 TO 1967. HE ALSO EDITED "PASHTUN JAGH" MAGAZINE AND WAS DIRECTOR FOR "PAYAME EMROZ" IN 1965. IN 1968 HE WENT TO WORK AT THE MINISTRY OF INFORMATION AND CULTURE IN AN UNSPECIFIED POSITION. DURING THE SAME YEAR HE BECAME A SECRETARY OF THE PARCHAM CENTRAL COMMITTEE, HAVING STAYED WITH PARCHAM AFTER THE TARAKI SPLIT. DURING A 1966 CONVERSATION WITH TARAKI AND SHAFE'I, EMBASSY OFFICERS REPORTED THAT TARAKI WAS VERY SOLICITOUS OF SHAFE'I, AND THAT HE CONSULTED WITH HIM PRIOR TO ANSWERING DIFFICULT QUESTIONS. ALTHOUGH SHAFE'I'S LANGUAGES ARE SUPPOSEDLY LIMITED TO FARSI AND PUSHTO, THESE OFFICERS BELIEVED HE COULD FOLLOW MOST OF THEIR ENGLISH CONVERSATION.

SULAIMAN LAEQ--MINISTER OF RADIO AND TELEVISION. SEE KABUL 2492.

ISMAIL DANESH--MINISTRY OF MINES AND INDUSTRIES: DANESH IS 37 YEARS OLD, A GRADUATE OF HABIBIA HIGH SCHOOL AND THE FACULTY OF ENGINEERING OF KABUL UNIVERSITY. HE SPENT THREE AND A HALF YEARS IN THE U.S. IN THE LATE 1960'S -- EARLY 1970'S RECEIVING A BS AND MS IN MINING FROM THE UNIVERSITY OF WEST VIRGINIA. U.S. TRAINING, SAYS A RECENT CP APPRAISAL, PUTS YEARS IN MOSCOW, WHERE HE RECEIVED A SECOND MASTER'S DEGREE. DANESH HAS SERVED AS DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF THE ISHPUSHTA COAL MINES AND DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF SCIENTIFIC RECORDS IN THE MINISTRY OF MINES AND INDUSTRIES. MOST RECENTLY HE WAS CHAIRMAN OF THE PHYSICS DEPARTMENT AT POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE. ACCORDING TO HIS RECORD, AN EMBASSY FOL, HIS CLOSE FRIENDS ARE NUR MOHAMMAD TARAKI, HAFIZULLAH AMIN AND SULTAN ALI KESHTMAND, ALSO NAMED TO THE CABINET. DANESH IS A MEMBER OF KHALQ.

LT COLONEL MOHAMMED ZAI--MINISTER OF PUBLIC WORKS. (NO BIO DATA).

MOHAMMAD NAZIM WARDAK--MINISTER OF WATER AND POWER. MOHAMMAD NAZIM WARDAK IS THE SON OF MUHAMMAD [illegible] BORN KHAKI, 1913. [illegible] OCCUPATION WAS A CO-WORKER [illegible] IN THE TEACHER TRAINING COLLEGE. FROM 1956-1960 [illegible] AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT. IN MAY 1962 HE APPLIED FOR STUDY IN THE UNITED STATES FOR AN 18-MONTH [illegible] WAS GRANTED AUGUST 1963 FOR TRAVEL TO COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY. OUR INFORMATION INDICATES THAT HE MET WEEKLY AT THE HOME OF ONE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE OFFICIAL FOR COMMUNIST CELL MEETINGS BEGINNING NOVEMBER 1966.

PROFESSOR MAHMOOD SUHAN--MINISTER OF HIGHER EDUCATION. SUHAN IS A PROFESSOR IN THE FACULTY OF SCIENCE. HE IS EITHER A SYMPATHIZER OR MEMBER OF THE KHALQ PARTY. HE MAINTAINS CONTACT WITH KNOWN PARTY MEMBERS.

DR. ANAHITA RATEBZADAH--MINISTER OF SOCIAL AFFAIRS. BORN ABOUT 1929 IN KABUL, SHE ATTENDED NURSES SCHOOL IN CHICAGO 1951-53, AND MEDICAL SCHOOL AT KABUL UNIVERSITY. SHE HEADED THE LOWER OF BABRAK KARMAL ABOUT 1960 AND, WHEN ELECTED TO PARLIAMENT IN 1967, WAS ASSOCIATED WITH KARMAL AND HIS ANTI-CHAD AS ONE OF THE "COMMUNIST TRIUMVIRATE IN [illegible] IN 1970 SHE WAS REPORTED TO BE ON THE PARCHAM PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE.

ABDUL QADUS GHORBANDI--MINISTER OF COMMERCE. IN 1970 GHORBANDI WAS A MEMBER OF THE PARCHAM CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND A CLOSE FRIEND OF BABRAK KARMAL. WE HAVE NOTHER INFORMATION AT THIS TIME.

NIZAMUDDIN TAHZIB--MINISTER OF TRIBAL AFFAIRS. TAHZIB IS FROM KUNDUZ, BORN APPROXIMATELY 1935. IN THE EARLY 1960'S TAHZIB TAUGHT AT HABIBIA COLLEGE AND AND AT [illegible] LYCEUM. HE IS A GRADUATE OF THE ISLAMIC FACULTY OF KABUL UNIVERSITY. LATER HE WORKED FOR KABUL RADIO AND THEN TOOK A JOB WITH THE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION WHERE HE WORKED IN THE DEPARTMENT OF ENCYCLOPEDIAS AND WAS A CELL MEMBER OF SOME SECTION OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY. IN 1966 HE WAS REPORTED TO ATTEND REGULAR WEEKLY MEETINGS AT THE HOME OF NUR MOHAMMAD TARAKI. AT THAT TIME HE WAS REPORTEDLY INVOLVED IN PARTY TRAINING. IN 1970 HE WAS [illegible] TO BE BACK AT HIS [illegible] SHORTLY BABRAK KARMAL AND SULAIMAN LAEQ, AND [illegible] PARTY POSITION.

SECRET

POL-3 AmEmbassy TEHRAN E 2-5

ACTION: INCOMING TELEGRAM CONTROL NO. 6812

	O 061601Z MAY 78
	FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
INFO:	TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 7834
	INFO RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 7075
AMB 1	RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 944
DCM 1	RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 5518
SA	RUQMTR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE 6113
POL	BT
ECON 2	C O N F I D E N T I A L KABUL 3619
PM 1	LIMDIS
ICA 1	CONFIDENTIAL
CONS	E. O. 11652: GDS
OR 1	TAGS: PGOV, PEPER, PINT, AF, US
	SUBJECT: FIRST CONVERSATION WITH NEW AFGHAN PRESIDENT
ADM	
GSO	1. NUR MOHAMMAD TARAKI, THE PRESIDENT OF AFGHANISTAN'S NEW
BF	REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL, AND HE LIKES TO BE CALLED "MR PRESIDENT,"
PER	RECEIVED ME ALONE IN HIS OFFICE AT THE OLD PRIME MINISTRY
HU	BUILDING AT 5 P.M. ON MAY 6. I WAS RECEIVED AT THE ENTRANCE OF
RSO	THE BUILDING BY THE SAME CHIEF AND DEPUTY CHIEF OF PROTOCOL WHO
MSG	HAD SERVED THE PREVIOUS REGIME. AS AN INDICATION OF THE TIMES,
TSO	THE DEPUTY CHIEF, WHO IS A MOHAMMADZAI, STARTED WEEPING WHEN I
SCRO	ASKED HIM ABOUT HIS FAMILY. IT WAS IN THIS MOOD THAT HE USHERED
CRO	ME INTO HIS NEW CHIEF'S OFFICE. SECURITY PRECAUTIONS SEEMED
TCU	TO BE MINIMAL, WITH ONLY ONE ARMORED VEHICLE VISIBLE IN THE
MP	COMPOUND OF THE PRIME MINISTRY.
DAO 1	
MAAG	2. TARAKI GREETED ME WITH A WARM HANDSHAKE AND A FRIENDLY SMILE,
AGR	DULY RECORDED BY PHOTOGRAPHERS. WE THEN SAT DOWN IN THE CORNER
DEA	OF HIS OFFICE AND EXCHANGED A FEW PLEASANTRIES WHILE OUR PICTURES
IRS	CONTINUED TO BE SNAPPED. I GOT A GOOD LAUGH FROM HIM WHEN I
TCTR	SAID I WAS SORRY I HAD NOT MET HIM DURING MY FOUR AND ONE-
CEOC	HALF YEARS IN AFGHANISTAN -- AND EVEN SORRIER DURING THE PAST
CEOR	NINE DAYS. TARAKI SPOKE EXCELLENT, IF SOMEWHAT RUSTY, ENGLISH.
CRU 1	
	3. TARAKI BEGAN HIS CONVERSATION BY RECOUNTING WITH OBVIOUS
SHIR 1	PRIDE AND RELISH THE SUCCESS OF HIS REVOLUTION, STRESSING THAT
TABR	IT IS A REVOLUTION AND NOT A COUP. HE SAID ON THURSDAY, APRIL
ISFA	27, THE TANKS FIRST MOVED IN THE DIRECTION OF KABUL ABOUT
	9 A.M., BUT TOOK MORE THAN TWO HOURS TO REACH THE CENTER OF THE
FAA	CITY. BY EVENING, THE DAOUD REGIME HAD LOST THE BATTLE, ALTHOUGH
13yrs	THEY TRIED IN VAIN DURING THE NIGHT TO SEND REINFORCEMENTS
	FROM CENTRAL CORPS HEADQUARTERS AND FROM KARGHA. WITH THE COMING
	OF DAYLIGHT, HE SAID, THE AIR FORCE WAS ABLE TO FINISH THE JOB.
	MEANWHILE, WITHIN THE PALACEDAOUD HAD BEEN ASKED TO SURRENDER,
	BUT REFUSED, SHOT AT HIS ATTACKERS, AS DID HIS WIFE AND FAMILY,
	AND WAS THEREFORE KILLED. THE INTENTION, SAID TARAKI, HAD BEEN
	TO TAKE HIM AS A CAPTIVE. TARAKI ADDED THAT DAOUD PROBABLY WOULD
	HAVE BEEN COURT-MARTIALED AND POSSIBLY SHOT. TARAKI HAD YESTERDAY
	VISITED THE HOSPITAL AND CONGRATULATED THE SOLDIER WHO HAD BEEN
	SHOT BY DAOUD'S "WHITE PISTOL."

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4. TARAKI THEN SAID HE WAS SURPRISED THAT I HAD NOT BEEN THE FIRST AMBASSADOR TO CALL ON HIM, BECAUSE WHAT HE IS TRYING TO ESTABLISH IN AFGHANISTAN IS A "GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE, BY THE PEOPLE, AND FOR THE PEOPLE." CORRECTING HIMSELF A BIT, HE SAID HE HAD ASKED THE SAME QUESTION OF THE PAKISTANI AMBASSADOR BECAUSE PAKISTAN AND AFGHANISTAN HAVE SO MUCH IN COMMON, CULTURALLY AND ETHNICALLY.

5. I THEN EXPLAINED THAT IN CASES LIKE THIS, WESDO NOT EXTEND FORMAL RECOGNITION BUT INDICATE, AS WE HAVE DONE, THAT WE WANT TO CONTINUE NORMAL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS. I SAID, IN FACT, WE HOPE TO HAVE CLOSE WORKING RELATIONS WITH THE NEW GOVERNMENT. I ADDED, AS OUR NOTE STATED, THAT I HOPE HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE A CHANCE SOON TO AFFIRM THE VALIDITY OFNXISTING TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS. HE MADE NO COMMENT ON THAT SUGGESTION.

6. AT SEVERAL POINTS DURING THESE PRELIMINARY EXCHANGES, TARAKI REFERRED TO THE TIME HE HAD SPENT IN THE UNITED STATES, HIS FRIENDSHIP FOR AMERICANS, AND HIS LIKING FOR THE AMERICAN QUALITY OF FRANKNESS. WE AGREED THAT AFGHANS AND AMERICANS HAVE LOTS IN COMMON IN THIS REGARD.

7. I THEN STATED I WANTED TO BE FRANK WITH HIM. I SAID THAT, AS HE KNEW, THE UNITED STATES HAD NEVER SOUGHT ANY STRATEGIC OR POLITICAL ADVANTAGE FROM AFGHANISTAN. HE AGREED. I SAID THAT ONE OF THE CARDINAL POINTS OF OUR POLICY IS TO HELP AFGHANISTAN MAINTAIN ITS INDEPENDENCE, ITS INTEGRITY, AND ITS NATIONAL IDENTITY. HE NODDED ENTHUSIASTICALLY. I SAID THAT SINCE THE BRITISH LEFT INDIA, IT WAS OUR VIEW THAT THE ONLY COUNTRY THAT COULD POSSIBLY THREATEN AFGHANISTAN'S INDEPENDENCE IS THE SOVIET UNION. IN PAST TIMES, I NOTED, OUR POLICY HAD BEEN TO TRY TO CONSTRUCT BLOCS AGAINST SOVIET EXPANSIONISM, BUT THAT OUR APPROACH TO THIS PROBLEM HAD, IN THE COURSE OF TIME BECOME MORE SOPHISTICATED.

I STATED WE COULD READILY UNDERSTAND -- GIVEN AFGHANISTAN'S GEOGRAPHIC POSITION AND ECONOMIC NEEDS -- WHY IT WOULD WANT A CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION. BUT, I SAID, WE WOULD BE DISTURBED IF AFGHANISTAN'S FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC POLICIES WERE TO BECOME INDISTINGUISHABLE FROM THOSE OF THE SOVIET UNION BECAUSE THAT WOULD OBLITERATE AFGHANISTAN'S NATIONAL IDENTITY AND WOULD GIVE RISE TO TENSIONS IN THIS PART OF THE WORLD WHICH WOULD THREATEN PEACE. I SAID THAT IT IS IN THIS CONTEXT THAT WE APPRECIATE AFGHANISTAN'S NONALIGNED POLICY.

8. IN RESPONSE, TARAKI AFFIRMED THAT AFGHANISTAN IS AND DESIRES TO REMAIN AN INDEPENDENT COUNTRY AND MASTER OF ITS OWN DESTINY. HE SAID HE WAS PLEASED THAT THE UNITED STATES TAKES A MORE FLEXIBLE VIEW OF THE WORLD AND ADMITS, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT IT MADE A MISTAKE IN VIETNAM. HE REFERRED TO HIS BEING IN WASHINGTON DURING THE DAYS OF SENATOR MCCARTHY, AND NOTED THAT THE THEN VICE PRESIDENT NIXON HAD REFUSED ONCE TO COME TO AN AFGHAN EMBASSY RECEPTION BECAUSE AFGHANISTAN WAS TOO CLOSE TO THE SOVIET UNION. HE WAS PLEASED THAT THAT IS NO LONGER THE APPROACH THE UNITED STATES TAKES TOWARD HIS COUNTRY.

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9. I THEN SAID THAT IN EVALUATING THE POLICIES OF A GOVERNMENT IN A DEVELOPING COUNTRY LIKE AFGHANISTAN, THE UNITED STATES WOULD LOOK FIRST AND FOREMOST AT WHAT THAT GOVERNMENT IS DOING TO RAISE THE STANDARD OF LIVING OF ITS PEOPLE AND TO ASSURE THE MAINTENANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS -- ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, POLITICAL, AND LEGAL. AT THIS POINT, TARAKI BECAME MUCH MORE ANIMATED AND HELD FORTH AT SOME LENGTH ON THE SUBJECT OF HOW HIS GOVERNMENT WANTS TO HELP THE PEOPLE OF AFGHANISTAN. HE SAID THAT HE AND HIS COLLEAGUES -- UNLIKE HIS PREDECESSORS, REALLY CARE ABOUT THE POOR PEOPLE OF THIS COUNTRY AND HAVE NO INTEREST IN PUTTING MONEY IN SWISS BANKS. HE SAID THAT IN JUDGING HIS GOVERNMENT'S POLICIES, WE SHOULD ASK THE PEOPLE OF AFGHANISTAN WHETHER THEY THINK THEY ARE SUCCESSFUL. IN THE PAST, HE BELIEVED FOREIGNERS TENDED TO TSK THE ARISTOCRATS WHO, OF COURSE, WERE NOT INTERESTED IN HELPING THE POOR BECAUSE SUCH A POLICY WOULD THREATEN THEIR OWN PROSPERITY. REGARDING HUMAN RIGHTS, TARAKI SAID THIS IS A VERY COMPLICATED PROBLEM AND THAT EACH NATION MUST JUDGE FOR ITSELF THE KIND OF HUMAN RIGHTS THAT ARE MOST SUITED TO ITS OWN SITUATION AND CULTURE. HE MADE IT CRYSTAL CLEAR THAT HE WOULD NOT WANT US TO MMAKE VALUE JUDGMENTS WHICH WOULD BE TANTAMOUNT TO INTERFERENCE IN AFGHANISTAN'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS. I ASSURED HIM THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS NO DZKIRE TO TRY TO TRANSPLANT ITS GOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM ELSEWHERE, BUT THAT WE, NEVERTHELESS, CARE DEEPLY ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS.

10. TARAKI THEN SAID HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD JUDGE OTHER GOVERNMENTS BY THEIR WILLINGNESS TO HELP AFGHANISTAN. HE SAID THAT HIS GOVERNMENT'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PLANS HAD NOT YET BEEN FORMULATED, BUT THAT HE WOULD BE ASKING US FOR ASSISTANCE AS, INDEED, HE WOULD BE ASKING THE SOVIET UNION AND OTHER COUNTRIES. HE SAID THAT THE PRINCIPAL SLOGAN, ADDUNG THAT HE REALLY MEANT POLICY AMJ NOT SLOGAN, OF HIS GOVERNMENT IS TO PROVIDE BREAD, CLOTHING, AND SHELTER FOR THE MASSES. I DESCRIBED OUR AID PROGRAM OF RECENT YEARS AND ITS EMPHASIS ON HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND AGRICULTURE FOR THE RURAL POOR. HE SAID HE WOULD TELL ME, AS HE HAD TOLD THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR, THAT OUR RESPECTIVE AID PROGRAMS HAD FAILED, AND THAT THE FAILURE WAS DUE TO THE LACK OF COMMITMENT OF THE PREVIOUS REGIME. I SAID I AGREED WITH HIM THAT OUR AID PROGRAM HAD NOT ACHIEVED ITS GOALS. HE ASKED ME WHY. I REPLIED THAT HE KNEW HIS OWN COUNTRY BETTER THAN I, AND THAT I WOULD MERELY SAY THAT THE PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT WAS NOT CAPABLE OF IMPLEMENTING THE KIND OF PROGRAM THAT WE WISHED TO SEE IMPLEMENTED. HE OBVIOUSLY TOOK GREAT PLEASURE IN MY SAYING THIS.

11. TARAKI THEN SAID HE WANTED TO MAKE SURE THAT I UNDERSTOOD WHAT HE MEANT BY "BREAD". HE SAID HE WANTS TO PROVIDE JOBS FOR THE THOUSANDS OF AFGHANS WHO HAVE LEFT THE COUNTRY TO WORK IN IGNOMINY ABROAD. THIS WILL MEAN THE CONSTRUCTION OF INDUSTRY AND INFRA-STRUCTURE, AND HE HOPED WE WOULD HELP WITH THAT. I TOLD HIM THAT ONCE THE APPROPRIATE MINISTERS IN HIS GOVERNMENT WERE PREPARED TO DISCUSS SUCH MATTERS WITH US, MY AID MISSION DIRECTOR AND I WOULD BE HAPPY TO DO SO.

12. I THEN SAID THAT ONE OTHER MATTER OF IMPORTANCE TO THE UNITED STATES IS THE STABILITY OF THIS REGION OF THE WORLD. I SAID WE HAVE BEEN DELIGHTED AT THE PROGRESS THAT HAS BEEN MADE IN RECENT YEARS IN DEVELOPING REGIONAL COOPERATION. TARAKI SAID THAT THAT WAS, OF COURSE, A MATTER THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD BE STUDYING. HE ALSO SAID THAT WHEN ONE TALKS OF REGIONAL CO-OPERATION, THAT MEANS NOT ONLY COOPERATION WITH INDIA, PAKISTAN, AND IRAN -- BUT ALSO WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

13. THE CONVERSTATION ENDED WITH PLEASANTRIES AS IT HAD BEGUN. HE SAID THAT HE HOPED THE SOVIET UNION WOULD NOT JUDGE HIM BADLY IF HE BUILT MORE MOSQUES; BY THE SAME TONN, HE HOPED WE WOULD NOT JUDGE HIM BADLY IF HE, HIMSELF, DID NOT GO TO A MOSQUE. HE CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT EVERYTHING HE HAD TOLD ME HE HAD ALSO TOLD THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR.

14. COMMENT: TARAKI IS A SLIM, WHITE-HAIRED, PROFESSORIAL MAN WHO LOOKS SOMEWHAT OLDER THAN 61. HE HAS THE CHAM AND EMPATHY THAT ONE LEARNS TO ASSOCIATE WITH AFGHANS. HE IS ALSO CLEARLY HARDHEADED AND EXHILARATED BY HIS SUCCESS. WHEN HE IS PARTICULARLY ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT A POINT HE IS MAKING, HIS EYES ASSUME A FIERCE, GCOST DSNATICAL INTENSITY. OUR CONVERSATION WAS EXTREMELY CORDIAL AND WAS ALSO, I THINK, A REAL DIALOG.

ELIOT

BT

E2-5 ET

AmEmbassy TEHRAN

ACTION: ECON 5 INCOMING TELEGRAM CONTROL NO. 7692

ACTION

O R 181130Z NOV 78
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
INFO: TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7931
AMB 1 INFO RUSBOD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 7108
DCM 1 RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 6145
SA ST
POL 2 C O N F I D E N T I A L KABUL 3805
ECON
PM 1 STATE: FOR NEA: ASSISTANT SECRETARY SAUNDERS
ICA 1
CONS AID: FOR AA/NE: WHEELER
CR 1 E.O. 11652: GDS
ADM TAGS: EAID, AF
GSO SUBJECT: FUTURE OF US AID PROGRAMS IN AFGHANISTAN
REF: STATE 116319

BE 1. SUMMARY: IN OUR VIEW, THE INSTRUCTIONS IN REFTEL CONCERNING
PER OUR AID PROGRAM IN AFGHANISTAN ARE TOO LIMITED AND TOO INFLEXIBLE
HU A STRATEGY FOR PURSUING OUR INTERESTS HERE.
RSO ALLOWING "THE DUST TO SETTLE" BEFORE ESTABLISHING A DIALOGUE
MSG ON AID MATTERS MAY FORECLOSE FUTURE OPTIONS WITH THE NEW REGIME.
TSO WE RECOMMEND AN EARLY PROBING OF THE TARAKI GOVERNMENT'S
SCRO INTENTIONS AND PLANS. END SUMMARY

CRO 2. WE HAVE NOT YET BEEN ABLE TO DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT
TCU THE NEW AFGHAN GOVERNMENT INDEED QUALIFIES AS A "COMMUNIST"
MP REGIME IN THE CONTEXT OF SECTION 620 (F) OF THE "FOREIGN
DAO ASSISTANCE ACT." THE TARAKI GOVERNMENT HAS REPEATEDLY
MAAG REJECTED THAT LABEL -- AND, FOR THAT MATTER, HAS NOT YET
AGR 1 EVEN USED THE WORD "SOCIALIST" IN ANY OF ITS PUBLIC
DEA ANNOUNCEMENTS OR CONVERSATIONS WITH US. THE MAJORITY
IRS OF THE NEW REGIME'S LEADERSHIP INDEED POSSESS WHAT COULD
TCTR BE DESCRIBED AS A "COMMUNIST" PARTY BACKGROUND (ALTHOUGH
CEOC THE NAME "COMMUNIST" HAS NEVER BEEN USED BY ANY OF THE
CEOR AFGHAN LEFTIST PARTIES). THE NEW LEADERSHIP UNDENIABLY
CRU 1 CAME TO POWER THROUGH VIOLENCE AND BLOODSHED, BUT THEY
WOULD CLAIM THAT THAT WAS NECESSARY IN ORDER TO OVERTHROW
THE "TYRANNICAL DICTATORSHIP" OF DAOUD. WE BELIEVE THE
TRUE INTENTIONS AND POLICIES OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT MAY NOT
BE DISCERNIBLE FOR SOME TIME.

SHIR 1 3. THE NEW GOVERNMENT HAS MADE IT CRYSTAL CLEAR PUBLICLY --
TABR AND TO ME PERSONALLY -- THAT IT WANTS AID FROM ANY AND ALL
ISFA SOURCES, INCLUDING THE US, AND, IN THE NONALIGNED CONTEXT,
WILL BE JUDGING THE "FRIENDLINESS" OF FOREIGN NATIONS
FAA IN THE LIGHT OF THEIR WILLINGNESS TO EXTEND ECONOMIC AID.
UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, WE SEE NO POLITICAL
ADVANTAGE TO OUR APPEARING TO BE UNDULY STANDOFFISH OR
NEGATIVE/ SUCH A STANCE COULD IMPEL THE NEW AFGHAN REGIME
TO BECOME TOTALLY DEPENDENT ON -- AND ALIGNED WITH THE
USSR, A LA CUBA. BY WAITING TOO LONG, WE RISK CAUSING

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THE TARAKI GOVERNMENT TO CONCLUDE IT IS DEVOID OF ECONOMIC OPTIONS, OTHER THAN FULL REVIANCE ON MOSCOW AND ITS SATELLITES. DEPUTY CHAIRMAN BABRAK MADE THIS PLAIN TO ME THIS MORNING. A FEELING OF LACK OF ALTERNATIVES MIGHT BECOME STRONGER HERE IN COMING WEEKS IF, AS IS POSSIBLE, AFGHANISTAN IS DENIED FURTHER SAUDI ARABIAN, KUWAITI, OR IRANIAN ASSISTANCE.

4. OTHER WESTERN DONORS WE HAVE CONSULTED, INCLUDING THE CANADIANS (REF KABUL 3716), BRITISH, AND WEST GERMANS, PLAN TO CONTINUE THEIR ONGOING ASSISTANCE PROGRAMSOC HERE. THE GERMANS AVE TOLD US THAT THEY PLAN TO TEST THE WATERS BY INDICATING A WILLINGNESS TO CONTINUE THEIR PROJECTS, AND THENMWHAFQ K THE CLIMAZE UNDER ACTUAL OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS. IF THEY SENSE AFGHAN OPPOSITION OR MISDIRECTION, THEY PLAN TO PULL BACK. IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, THE GERMANS FIND THAT THE NEW AFGHAN REGIME IS RECEPTIVE, THEY ARE READY TO CONSIDER THE NEGOTIATION OF NEW PROGRAMS/ THERE IS APPARENTLY NO GERMAN LAW PROHIBITING AID TO COMMUNIST COUNTRIES, ONLY A POLITICAL POLICY WHICH BONN APPLIES SEPARATELY TO EACH SITUATION. FOR EXAMPLE, THE GERMANS ASSIST "SOCIALIST" REGIMES IN AFRICA WHICH COULD STRICTLY BE REGARDED AS "COMMUNIST," BUT BONN IN SUCH CASES DOES NOT DISCERN A MEANINGFUL LINK TO MOSCOW. INNXYE CASE OF THESNEW AFGHAN REGIME, THE GERMAN EMBASSY DOES NOT YET THINK THE TARAKI GOVERNMENT CAN BE ACCURATELY DESCRIBED AS "COMMUNIST" OR LINKED TO MOSCOW THROUGH THE "INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST CONSPIRACY.WOCKE UNDERLANDT AT THE UNDP AND THE WORLD BANK ARE ALSO PLANNING TO CONTINUE THEIR ASSISTANCE OPERATIONS HERE.

5. WE BELIEVE WE SHOULD BE DOING SOMETHING SIMILAR TO THE GERMANS. ADOPTING A POLICY WHICH EXPLICITLY HOLDS UP NEW AID OBLIGATIONS, AND IMPLICITLY PUTS IN ABEYAMBE ANY MEANINGFUL DISCUSSION WITH THE NEW GOVERNMENT, WILL LIKELY BE INTERPRETED AS A NEGATIVE SIGNAL BY THE W REGIME.

6. WE HAVE TWO PROJECTS WHERE A FREEZE ON NEW OBLIGATIONS WILL EFFECTIVELY HALT PROGRESS ON IMPLEMENTATION. WITHOUT NEW OBLIGATIONS FOR THE HELMAND PROJECT, WE WILL BE UNABLE TO FUND THE PHASE II DRAINAGE CONSTRUCTION. JUST BEFORE THE REVOLUTION, WE HAD SENT THE PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT A LETTER STATING THAT THE CONDITIONS PRECEDENT (CPS) WERE SATISFIED, AND THAT WE WERE READY TO SIGN A PROJECT AGREEMENT AMENDMENT WHICH WOULD OBLIGATE 3.2 MILLION DOLLARS FOR DRAIN CONSTRUCTION. A SIMILAR SITUATION EXISTS WITH THE INTEGRATED WHEAT PROJECT. IF THE NEW GOVERNMENT DECIDES TO ACCEPT THE MIAC CONTRACT PROPOSAL, WE WILL BE UNABLE TO FIELD A TEAM UNTIL ADDITIONAL FUNDS

ARE OBLIGATED; AN OBLIGATION OF 1.86 MILLION DOLLARS WAS PLANNED THIS MONTH TO FUND THE PROJECT FOR ONE YEAR.

7. DISCUSSIONS WITH THE FORMER GOVERNMENT REGARDING OTHER PROJECTS HAD REACHED THE STAGE WHERE FAILURE TO MOVE AHEAD WITH THE NEW GOVERNMENT COULD SIGNIFICANTLY DISRUPT OUR MOMENTUM, WHICH WE MIGHT POSSIBLY NEVER REGAIN -- AND WOULD GIVE A NEGATIVE POLITICAL SIGNAL. PROJECT PAPERS HAVE BEEN COMPILED FOR DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT TRAINING (DST) PROJECT AND FOR THE TECHNICAL MANPOWER DEVELOPMENT PROJECT. (TDD) (THE DST PROJECT PROVIDES FUNDING WHICH WILL BE REQUIRED DURING JUNE FOR EX-GOVT PARTICIPANTS IN THE US.) THE AMENDMENT TO THE BASIC HEALTH SERVICES PROJECT WAS NEAR COMPLETION AT THE TIME OF THE REVOLUTION. THE NEW MINISTER OF HEALTH HAS ALREADY INDICATED HIS INTEREST IN MOVING AHEAD TO DISCUSS THIS EXPANDED PROJECT (KABUL 3943). THE MINISTRY OF HIGHER EDUCATION HAS ALSO EXPRESSED INTEREST IN RESUMING ITS DIALOGUE WITH AID (KABUL 3732).

8. ALTHOUGH WE ARE NOT RECOMMENDING ANY SIGNING ACTION AT THIS TIME, WE DO THINK IT WOULD BE HIGHLY USEFUL FOR THE AMBASSADOR AND AID DIRECTOR, DURING OUR INITIAL CALLS ON THE PLANNING AND OTHER RELEVANT MINISTERS, TO BE ABLE TO PROBE AFGHAN THINKING RE THEIR DEVELOPMENT PLANS, SPECIFICALLY IN THESE PRIORITY AREAS. WE WOULD ALSO WANT TO BE CERTAIN THAT THE NEW GOVERNMENT UNDERSTANDS AND ACCEPTS THEIR COMMITMENTS UNDER EXISTING PROJECT AGREEMENTS. SUCH PROBINGS WOULD NOT IRRETRIEVABLY COMMIT US IN ADVANCE TO HELP, BUT THEY WOULD IMPLY THAT IF WE GET AN ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE FROM THE NEW GOVERNMENT, WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO MOVE AHEAD QUICKLY ON THOSE FEW PROJECTS WHICH ARE READY AND WHERE WE CAN REACH MUTUAL AGREEMENT ON HOW TO PROCEED. WE WOULD ALSO BE EMPHASIZING THAT AMERICA IS COMMITTED TO AIDING THE WORLD'S POOR, BUT THAT OUR ABILITY TO DO SO IN AFGHANISTAN WILL DEPEND, IN LARGE PART, ON ACTIONS BY THE NEW GOVERNMENT IN HUMAN RIGHTS, AS WELL AS IN THEIR COMMITMENT TO ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT. IN THIS REGARD, WE SHOULD NOTE THAT THE NEW GOVERNMENT HAS REPEATEDLY EMPHASIZED ITS COMMITMENT TO PROVIDE "FOOD, CLOTHING, AND SHELTER" AND HAS BITTERLY ATTACKED PREVIOUS GOVERNMENTS FOR FAILING TO HELP THE POOR. FOREIGN MINISTER AMIN HAS ALSO TOLD ME THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WISHES PEACEFUL RELATIONS WITH ALL NATIONS IN ORDER TO ALLOW IT TO ADDRESS ITS INTERNAL PROBLEMS. THUS, IT MAY BE THAT THIS GOVERNMENT WILL PROVE MUCH MORE DYNAMIC AND EFFECTIVE IN WORKING TO UPLIFT THE POOR MAJORITY THAN DAOUD'S REGIME. TIME WILL OF COURSE TELL.

9. IN SHORT, WE BELIEVE THAT A PROBING ACTION ALONG THE ABOVE LINES IS NECESSARY AT THIS TIME IN ORDER TO PRESERVE AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE OF OUR AID BRIDGEHEAD HERE IN CASE WE DO INDEED REMAIN IN THE AFGHAN ASSISTANCE PICTURE. AND WE BELIEVE SUCH A POSTURE WILL KEEP OPEN OUR POLITICAL OPTIONS. WE SHOULD PROBE THE INTENTIONS OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT AND SHOW OUR WILLINGNESS TO MOVE AHEAD WITH ONGOING AID PROJECTS WHERE THE NEW GOVERNMENT WILL

RECONFIRM ITS RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER THE PROJECT AGREEMENTS, AND TO INDICATE OUR WILLINGNESS TO CONTINUE THE DIALOGUE ON THE BASIC HEALTH SERVICES PROJECT AMENDMENT AND ON THE TWO AND DST PROJECT PAPERS. IF THE DEPARTMENT AND AID PERCEIVE NO OBJECTION, THIS FISHING EXPEDITION WILL BE LAUNCHED DURING MY AND THE USAID DIRECTOR'S INITIAL CALLS ON CABINET MINISTERS INVOLVED IN ECONOMIC AID PROGRAMS.

10. AS FOR THE FUTURE, WE STRONGLY HOPE THAT OUR GOALS IN AFGHANISTAN CAN CONTINUE TO BE SUPPORTED BY AN AID PROGRAM PERCEIVED BY THE NEW REGIME AS MEANINGFUL AND HELPFUL. WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO DETERMINE FAIRLY EARLY IN THE GAME WHETHER THIS WILL BE POSSIBLE.

11. REQUEST INSTRUCTIONS SOONEST. I AM ALREADY IN MY ROUND OF CALLS ON THE NEW MINISTERS, ~~AS ARE ALL OTHER AMBASSADORS HERE, AND IT WILL BE NOTED IF I AVOID SEEING THE DEVELOPMENT MINISTERS.~~

ELIOT

BT
#3805

TELEGRAM

1978 SEP 26 AM 8 02

E2-5

INDICATE
☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

09279

FROM	CLASSIFICATION
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN	CONFIDENTIAL

E.O. 11652:
TAGS:
SUBJECT:

ACTION:

POL:3

AMB
DCM
ECON-2
P/M
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ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC

INFO: AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY DACCA
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KABUL
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
USLO PEKING

09279

CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN

LIMDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: EAID, PEPR, AF IR, US

SUBJ: IRANIAN ASSESSMENT OF AFGHAN DEVELOPMENTS AND U.S.-AFGHAN RELATIONS

REF: STATE 240411

1. ADDRESSEES AWARE THAT SHAH HAS VIRTUALLY FROM THE FIRST HELD PRIVATE VIEW OF NEW AFGHAN GOVERNMENT AS FOR ALL INTENTS AND PURPOSES A SERVANT OF THE SOVIETS. HE HAS DISGUISED THIS VIEW BEHIND AN OFFICIAL POLICY OF "WAIT-AND-SEE", GIVING THE NEW GOA EVERY BENEFIT OF THE DOUBT. FORMAL RELATIONS HAVE CONTINUED AS BEFORE, INCLUDING CONTINUING DISBURSEMENTS ON EXISTING ECONOMIC COMMITMENTS (TEHRAN 7818 AND MEMORANDUM TO DEPT AND KABUL

DRAFTED BY:	DRAFTING DATE	TEL. EXT.	CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY:
POL:GBLambrakis	9/25/78	1110	DCM:CWNaas

CLEARANCES:
ECON:JMill

CONFIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATION

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OPTIONAL FORM 152(H)
(Formerly FS-413(H))
January 1975
Dept. of State

OF AUGUST 23) BUT ALWAYS WARILY.

2. SHAH MADE IT CLEAR TO THE AMBASSADOR, AT THE TIME, THAT HE SAW LITTLE TO GAIN FROM "CODDLING" NEW AFGHAN REGIME, BUT HE WOULD GO ALONG WITH USG DESIRES IN THE MATTER. HE SHOULD THEREFORE BE GIVEN ADVANCE WARNING IF USG POLICY IS TO UNDERGO A CHANGE (VIZ. SENATE AMENDMENT TO FOREIGN ASSISTANCE APPROPRIATIONS BILL, STATE 241684 NOTAL). ~~WE WOULD THEN EXPECT THE PRIVATE POLICY TO BECOME THE PUBLIC ONE. SHAH WOULD ASSUME PAKISTANIS WELCOME SUCH A CHANGE AS HARBINGER OF GREATER U.S.-IRANIAN SUPPORT FOR THEM. THIS MIGHT GIVE~~ HIM ~~PAUSE, BUT HE WOULD PROBABLY END UP OPTING FOR PARALLEL POLICY~~ TO OURS.

SULLIVAN

NNNNVV ESA813MJC587
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DE RUSBLK #8517/1 2960845
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FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 662
INFO RUSBGO/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 7859
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 6109
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 6735
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

23 OCT 78 N/2

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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 1 OF 2 KABUL 8517

ACTION
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E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, PINT, SOCI, SHUM, AF
SUBJECT: NEW AFGHAN DECREE LIBERALIZES MARRIAGE ARRANGEMENTS

1. THERE FOLLOWS THE TEXT OF DECREE NUMBER SEVEN OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN (DRA) REGARDING MARRIAGE, WHICH WAS ISSUED ON OCTOBER 17:

BEGINNING OF TEXT:

"DECREE NO. 7

"DOWRY (MAHAR) AND MARRIAGE EXPENSES

"THIS DECREE IS ISSUED FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE 12 OF THE BASIC LINES OF REVOLUTIONARY DUTIES OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN FOR ENSURING OF EQUAL RIGHTS OF WOMEN WITH MEN IN THE FIELD OF CIVIL LAW, FOR REMOVING THE UNJUST PATRIARCHIAL FEUDALISTIC RELATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE, AND FOR CONSOLIDATION OF FURTHER SINCERE FAMILY TIES.

"ARTICLE ONE

"NO ONE SHALL ENGAGE OR GIVE IN MARRIAGE (NIKAH) A GIRL IN EXCHANGE FOR PAYMENT IN CASH OR COMMODITIES.

"NO ONE SHALL COMPEL THE BRIDEGROOM TO MAKE A PAYMENT IN CASH OR COMMODITIES IN THE NAME OF A MARRIAGE PORTION (TOYANA OR WALWAR) AT THE TIME OF MARRIAGE.

"ARITCLE TWO:

"NO ONE SHALL COMPEL THE BRIDEGROOM OR HIS GUARDIAN TO PREPARE CLOTHING OR PRESENTS FOR TYE GIRL OR HER FAMILY IN THE NAME OF EDI, NAUROZI, BARATI, OR OTHER OCCASIONS.

"ARTICLE THREE:

"THE GIRL OR HER GUARDIAN SHALL NOT TAKE AS MONEY, IN CASH OR COMMODITIES IN THE NAME OF DOWRY (MAHAR) MORE THAN THE TEN DARHAM SPECIFIED BY THE SHARIAT, WHICH DOES NOT (NOW) EXCEED 300 AFS., ON THE BASIS OF THE (CURRENT) BANK RATE OF SILVER. (NOTE: AFS. 300 EQUALS LESS THAN TEN DOLLARS AT THE EXCHANGE RATE OF OCTOBER 23, 1978.)

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"ARTICLE FOUR:

"THE ENGAGEMENT AND MARRIAGE SHALL TAKE PLACE (ONLY) WITH THE FULL CONSENT OF THE PARTIES; THEREFORE:

"1. NO ONE SHALL FORCE A MARRIAGE;

"2. NO ONE SHALL PREVENT THE FREE MARRIAGE OF A WIDOW OR FORCE HER INTO MARRIAGE BECAUSE OF RELATIONSHIP OR PAROCHIAL TIES;

"3. NO ONE SHALL PREVENT LEGAL MARRIAGE OF ANOTHER PERSON ON THE PRETEXT OF ENGAGEMENT, FORCED ENGAGEMENT EXPENSES, OR BY USING FORCE.

"ARTICLE FIVE:

"THE ENGAGEMENT AND MARRIAGE OF WOMEN UNDER 16 YEARS OF AGE AND MEN UNDER 18 YEARS OF AGE ARE NOT PERMISSABLE.

"ARTICLE SIX:

"1. THOSE VIOLATING THE PROVISIONS OF THIS DECREE SHALL BE LIABLE TO IMPRISONMENT FROM SIX MONTHS TO THREE YEARS.

"2. THE MONEY OR COMMODITIES WHICH HAVE BEEN ACCEPTED IN VIOLATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THIS DECREE SHALL BE CONFISCATED.

"ARTICLE SEVEN:

"THIS DECREE SHALL BE PROMULGATED AFTER PUBLICATION IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE."

END OF TEXT
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RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 6110
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 6736
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C O N F I D E N T I A L

P-3 15335

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 2 OF 2 KABUL 8517

2. COMMENT: THROUGH THE NEW DECREE, THE GOVERNMENT PLANS TO ELIMINATE FORCED MARRIAGES OF CHILDREN AND WIDOWS, AND TO REDUCE THE TRADITIONAL MARRIAGE EXPENSES WHICH OFTEN FORCE THE INVOLVED FAMILIES DEEP INTO DEBT. WHILE THE ELIMINATION OF THE DOWRY AND MARRIAGE PORTION ARE LIKELY TO BE POPULAR WITH POTENTIAL BRIDEGROOMS AND THEIR PARENTS, THESE CUSTOMS ARE DEEPLY ROOTED IN AFGHAN SOCIETY, AND HAVE BOTH HISTORICAL AND RELIGIOUS SANCTION BEHIND THEM. FOR THIS REASON ANY SERIOUS ATTEMPT BY THE GOVERNMENT TO ENFORCE THIS DECREE, PARTICULARLY IN THE MORE CONSERVATIVE RURAL AREAS, IS LIKELY TO MEET INITIALLY WITH CONSIDERABLE RESISTANCE. KING ZAHIR TRIED THE SAME PROHIBITIONS IN THE LATE 1950S. IF A FAMILY DESIRED A CERTAIN GIRL AS A BIRDE FOR THEIR SON, THEY HAD TO AGREE SECRETLY TO THE TRADITIONAL CHARGES. THE PAYING FAMILY WAS THEN UNDERSTANDABLY RELUCTANT TO JAUNDICE THE NEWLY FORGED RELATIONSHIP WITH THE GIRL'S FAMILY BY BETRAYING THEM TO THE KING'S JUSTICE. THE LAW, NEGLECTED, WITHERED AWAY.

3. IT SHOULD ALSO BE NOTED THAT THE DOWRY (MAHAR) IS TRADITIONALLY AN AGREED-UPON SUM OF MONEY WHICH IS PLACED IN THE BRIDE'S NAME AT MARRIAGE, BUT REMAINS UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE HUSBAND UNLESS HE DIVKORCES THE WIFE, AT WHICH TIME THE MONEY REVERTS TO THE WIFE. IN EFFECT, IT IS A KIND OF "ALIMONY IN ESCROW". THE REMOVAL OF THIS PROTECTION -- AND DISCOURAGEMENT FOR DIVORCE -- WITHOUT CONCURRENT CIVIL PROTECTIONS WILL, IN EFFECT, PLACE WOMEN IN A MUCH MORE PRECARIOUS ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL POSITION, HENCEFORTH VIS-A-VIS THEIR HUSBANDS.

4. SOME KABUL WITS HAVE OBSERVED THAT THEY CAN NOW FINALLY AFFORD TO ACQUIRE THEIR FULL MUSLIM QUOTA OF FOUR WIVES. THEY ARE, OF COURSE, OPTIMISTICALLY OVERLOOKING THE OVERWHELMING MAINTENANCE EXPENSES OF BEING RESPONSIBLE FOR FOUR WOMEN WHO ARE, BY CUSTOM, ENTITLED TO -- AND WHO DEMAND -- EQUAL TREATMENT.

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SECRET

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 6410
INFO RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 2545
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 8391
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 4725
RUMJDK/AMEMBASSY DACCA 7116
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 3754
RUMJPG/USLO PEKING 3985
RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 6935
RUHQHQA/ CINCPAC HONOLULU HAWAII 1843
RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 304356/01

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E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PEPR, EAID, AF, US

SUBJECT: ASSESSMENT OF AFGHAN DEVELOPMENTS AND U.S.-AFGHAN RELATIONS

REFS: (A) STATE 240411; KABUL 7370

1. WE AGREE WITH THE BROAD OUTLINES OF YOUR ASSESSMENT OF THE GENERAL DIRECTION OF DEVELOPMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN AND THE UNCERTAIN PROSPECTS FOR A RETURN TO CLOSE U.S.-AFGHAN RELATIONS. NEVERTHELESS, WE STILL FIND OURSELVES UNSURE ABOUT THE SHAPE OF THINGS TO COME, EVEN ASSUMING THAT THE PRESENT REGIME MAINTAINS ITS HOLD ON POWER, AND WE BELIEVE WE SHOULD WORK FROM THE PREMISE THAT A CONSTRUCTIVE U.S.-AFGHAN WORKING RELATIONSHIP COULD STILL EMERGE. WE WONDER, IF AND WHEN THE SITUATION GELS A BIT MORE, WHETHER THE DRA WILL BECOME A DOCILE CAMP-FOLLOWER DOMINATED BY THE USSR, OR A RADICAL-LEFTIST REGIME ON THE FRINGE OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT BUT WITH PECULIAR AFGHAN CHARACTERISTICS AND A DEGREE OF INDEPENDENCE. THE MOST ADVERSE DEVELOPMENT IN TERMS OF OUR INTERESTS WOULD BE THE INTRODUCTION OF SOVIET COMBAT TROOPS IN AFGHANISTAN, WHICH WOULD SERIOUSLY DISTURB THE ENTIRE REGION.

2. WE SEE, AS YOU DO, OUR REGIONAL INTERESTS AS PARAMOUNT IN OUR CONSIDERATION OF A PROPER APPROACH TO THE DRA AND WOULD VIEW AN IRREDENTIST AFGHANISTAN, ESPECIALLY ONE BACKED BY THE SOVIETS, AS A SERIOUS THREAT TO PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE AREA. WE BELIEVE THIS IS A REAL FEAR

ESPENIALLY IN PAKISTAN AND ALSO IN IRAN.

3. THE ASSESSMENTS OF AFGHANISTAN'S NEIGHBORS ARE SIMILAR TO OURS ALTHOUGH PAKISTAN AND IRAN CONTEND THAT AFGHANISTAN IS ALREADY IRREVOCABLY "LOST" TO THE SOVIET UNION. PAKISTAN SEEMS TO WANT US TO SHARE THEIR ASSESSMENT OF THE THREAT, PRESUMABLY TO OBTAIN A GREATER U.S. COMMITMENT TO PAKISTAN'S SECURITY. AT NO TIME HAVE THE PAKISTANIS QUESTIONED OUR POLICY OF MAINTAINING THE U.S. PRESENCE IN

AFGHANISTAN. THE INDIANS SEEM SOMEWHAT MORE SANGUINE ABOUT BEING ABLE TO DEAL WITH THE DRA BUT, NONETHELESS, ARE VERY DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT INCREASED SOVIET INFLUENCE IN KABUL. WE NEED TO KEEP THESE VIEWS IN MIND WHEN JUDGING POSSIBLE REGIONAL REACTIONS TO ANY CHANGES IN OUR OWN POLICIES TOWARD AFGHANISTAN.

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P. 2

4. THE COUNTRIES OF THE REGION ARE IN FACT FOLLOWING POLICIES QUITE SIMILAR TO OUR OWN. IRAN IS CONTINUING AID ALREADY COMMITTED ALTHOUGH HOLDING BACK FROM NEW AGREEMENTS. INDIA HAS APPARENTLY OFFERED TO STEP UP ITS ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS IN AFGHANISTAN AND HAS IN OUR VIEW BEEN PLAYING A VERY HELPFUL ROLE IN ATTEMPTING TO ENCOURAGE SOME DEGREE OF INDEPENDENCE AND NON-ALIGNMENT BY THE NEW REGIME. PAKISTAN IS ACTIVELY PURSUING A POLICY OF FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH THE DRA (EXPEDITING TRANSIT OF AFGHAN TRADE, Ø43Ø$3,5 "8-'S SEPTEMBER 1Ø VISIT, DOWNPLAYING OF AFGHAN REFUGEES, RESTRAINED RHETORIC) AND APPEARS TO SEE SUCH A POLICY AS IN ITS INTEREST.

5. ONE OPTION WOULD BE FOR US TO PHASE OUT OUR ACTIVITIES IN AFGHANISTAN, BUT WE BELIEVE THIS WOULD BE VERY UNSETTLING TO AFGHANISTAN'S NEIGHBORS AND INCOMPATIBLE WITH THEIR POLICIES. THE DRA HAS NOT ASKED US TO PACK OUR BAGS AND LEAVE BUT ON THE CONTRARY HAS ACCEPTED OUR POLICY OF MAINTAINING OU
INTEREST AND PRESENCE. CLOSING
OUT OUR EFFORTS IN AFGHANISTAN WOULD LIKELY BE SEEN AS AN ABDICATION OF OUR RESPONSIBILITY AND WOULD ACCOMPLISH FOR THE SOVIETS ONE OF THEIR PRIMARY OBJECTIVES, NAMELY TO REDUCE FURTHER U.S. AND WESTERN INFLUENCE IN AFGHANISTAN (MOSCOW 23479) AND THE REGION. IT WOULD NOT BE IN OUR INTEREST TO GIVE SUCH A BLANK CHECK SIGNAL TO MOSCOW.

6. CONSEQUENTLY, WE BELIEVE THE GENERAL APPROACH ADVOCATED

IN STATE 211102 REMAINS VALID AS A FRAMEWORK FOR U.S. POLICY. WE SHOULD NOT PRESS OUR AID ON THE AFGHANS BUT

WE SHOULD SEEK OPPORTUNITIES TO MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH THE

DRA, TRY TO ESTABLISH MUTUALLY COMPATIBLE OBJECTIVES FOR

OUR ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, AND IDENTIFY PROJECTS WHICH SATISFY OUR AID MANDATE, OUR HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY AND THEIR CONCERNS. WE FULLY RECOGNIZ- THAT THE AFGHANS THEMSELVES SEEM TO BE MOVING TO REDUCE OUR PRESENCE: A MUCH SMALLER PEACE CORPS PROGRAM; NO MILITARY TRAINING FOR AFGHANS IN THE U.S. FOR THE MOMENT, AND RESTRICTIONS ON THE DAO OFFICE; A MORE LIMITED CULTURAL EXCHANGE PROGRAM; AND A RESISTANCE TO PROPOSED USAID PROJECTS INCORPORATING LARGE AMOUNTS OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE. FOR OUR PART, WE WILL ALSO HAVE TO BALANCE OUR HUMANITARIAN CONCERN IN HELPING THE PEOPLE OF ONE OF THE WORLD'S POOREST COUNTRIES WITH OUR BI

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SECRET

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TO RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 6411
INFO RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 2546
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 8392
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 4726
RUMJDK/AMEMBASSY DACCA 7117
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 3705
RUMJPG/USLO PEKING 3936
RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 6936
RUHQHQA/ CINCPAC HONOLULU HAWAII 1344
RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
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S E C R E T FINAL SECTION OF 02 STATE 304356/02

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CONCERN ABOUT THE NEW REGIME'S QUESTIONABLE HUMAN RIGHTS PERFORMANCE. THE AFGHANS SHOULD BE KEPT FULLY AWARE OF THESE CONCERNS IN DISCUSSIONS WITH THE LEADERSHIP.

7. WE REGARD THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN AS AN EVOLVING ONE WHICH REQUIRES OUR CONTINUING ATTENTION AS WELL AS A CONTINUING DIALOGUE WITH OTHER STATES IN THE REGION. WE ENCOURAGE EMBASSIES TEHRAN, ISLAMABAD, AND NEW DELHI IN PARTICULAR TO CONTINUE EXCHANGING VIEWS WITH HOST GOVERNMENTS ON THE NHANGING AFGHAN SCENE, KEEPING IN MIND THAT OUR INFLUENCE IN KABUL IS SEVERELY LIMITED AND THAT WE

LOOK TO AFGHANISTAN'S NEIGHBORS TO TAKE THE LEAD IN DEVELOPING A NETWORK OF COOPERATIVE RELATIONS WHICH WILL CONTRIBUTE TO PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE REGION. VANCE
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RUFHEB/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0034
RUDT./AMEMBASSY LONDON 1461
RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 8464
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1483
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 6565
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 0009
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 0008
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 KABUL 2052

AIDA.

E.O. 12.65: GDS 3/17/84 (GRADER, C.R.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, EAID, AF, US
SUBJ: USAID DIRECTOR'S MEETING WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF OTHER BILATERAL AID DONORS IN AFGHANISTAN

(C- ENTIRE TEXT)

1. SUMMARY. DURING PAST TEN DAYS, USAID DIRECTOR MET IN KABUL WITH AID DONOR REPRESENTATIVES FROM BRITISH, GERMAN, CANADIAN AND INDIAND EMBASSIES TO EXPLAIN RECENT PRESIDENTIAL DECISION REDU.ING U.S. AID TO AFGHANISTAN AND TO ELICIT THEIR VIEWS ABOUT THE FUTURE USAID POSTURE. ALL BELIEVED THAT THE U.S. DECISION TO CUT BACK ON ITS AID PROGRAM WAS INEVITABLE IN LIGHT OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING AMBASSADOR DUBS' DEATH. MOST ALSO BELIEVED THAT THE DRA WOULD INCREASINGLY BECOME DISILLUSIONED WITH THE SOVIETS. ALL COUNSELLED THE U.S. TO CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN AN AID PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN. END SUMMARY.

2. MEETING WITH MR. HANNSPETER DISDORN, COUNSELOR, FRG: THE WEST GERMAN DCM APPEARED KEENLY INTERESTED IN THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE U.S. CUTBACK OF AID TO AFGHANISTAN AND EXPLICITLY WANTED TO KNOW WHETHER THE U.S. INTENDED TO TERMINATE ASSISTANCE TO AFGHANISTAN. AFTER THE AID DIRECTOR EXPLAINED THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL DECISION TO CUT BACK BUT NOT TERMINATE U.S. ASSISTANCE TO AFGHANISTAN, DISDORN SAID THAT, UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, HE AGREED THE DECISION WAS NECESSARY, EVEN IF REGRETTABLE. HE SAID THE WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES BELIEVE THERE IS STILL A REASONABLE CHANCE THAT AN INDEPENDENT AFGHANISTAN CAN EMERGE, AND, THEREFORE, CONCLUDE THAT THE WEST SHOULD MAINTAIN ITS AID PROGRAMS TO OFFER AFGHANISTAN ANOTHER OPTION--AN ALTERNATIVE OPENING. HE SAID THAT ONE OR TWO WESTERN COUNTRIES WITHOUT THE U.S. WAS NOT A REAL ALTERNATIVE, AND URGED A CONTINUED U.S. AID PRESENCE.

DISDORN ALSO SAID HE BELIEVED THAT THE DRA WOULD BECOME INCREASINGLY DISILLUSIONED WITH THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES. HE CITED A RECENT EXAMPLE CONCERNING A DM15 MILLION AGREEMENT WITH EAST GERMANY. WHEN THE PRELIMINARY AGREEMENT WAS SIGNED LAST AUGUST, THERE WAS MUCH PUBLICITY ABOUT THE SOCIALIST BROTHERHOOD AND FOREIGN ASSISTANCE. WHEN THE FINAL AGREEMENT WAS WORKED OUT IN LATE FEBRUARY, IT WAS SEEN TO BE A BASICALLY COMMERCIAL AGREEMENT WITH TERMS OF EIGHT YEARS AT 7 PERCENT. MOREOVER, MANY OF THE EQUIPMENT PRICE QUOTATIONS WERE VERY HIGH. MR. DISDORN SAID THE AFGHANS WERE ASTONISHED AND EXTREMELY ANGRY. HE SAID HE HAD TALKED TO A GDR OFFICIAL CONCERNED WITH THE TRANSACTION WHO WAS SURPRISED BY THE AFGHAN REACTION, AND RHETORICALLY ASKED, "DO THEY EXPECT GIFTS?". (COMMENT: A UNDP OFFICIAL HAS TOLD US THAT AN EAST GERMAN ADVISOR RECENTLY THREW COLD WATER OVER AN AFGHAN PLAN TO REPLACE ALL WEST GERMAN EDUCATIONAL PERSONNEL HERE WITH EAST GERMANS. HIS REPORTED RESPONSE WAS: "NO, YOU WON'T.")

3. MEETING WITH BRITISH AMBASSADOR K.R. CROOK: THE MEETING WAS REQUESTED BY MICHAEL HOWELL, FIRST SECRETARY AND HEAD OF CHANCERY, WHO WAS ALSO PRESENT AT THE MEETING. BOTH WERE FAMILIAR WITH THE DETAILS OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS RELEASE ANNOUNCING THE U.S. CUTBACK OF AID TO AFGHANISTAN. AFTER POSING DETAILED QUESTIONS ON T B IMPLICATIONS OF THE AID CUT BACK FOR SPECIFIC PROJECTS, AMBASSADOR CROOK ASKED IF THE PRESS RELEASE'S STRESS ON THE U.S. CUTBACK BEING THE RESULT OF A CONTINUING REVIEW OF U.S./AFGHAN RELATIONS IMPLIED A BASIC CHANGE IN U.S. POLICY TOWARDS AFGHANISTAN--SPECIFICALLY DID THE U.S. STILL BELIEVE IT WAS WORTHWHILE TO MAINTAIN A U.S. AID PRESENCE TO OFFER AFGHANISTAN AN ALTERNATIVE TO RELIANCE ON THE SOVIET BLOC? THE USAID DIRECTOR REPLIED THAT WHILE U.S. ASSISTANCE POLICY WAS UNDER CONTINUING REVIEW, THE DECISION TO CONTINUE OUR ONGOING AID PROJECTS STOPPED WELL SHORT OF WITHDRAWING OUR AID PROGRAM AND ALLOWED A CONTINUED AID PRESENCE. AMBASSADOR CROOK ASKED IF THERE WAS ANY INDICATION THAT THE U.S. DESIRED OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES TO CHANGE THEIR AID POLICY TOWARD AFGHANISTAN. THE USAID DIRECTOR SAID NONE OF WHICH HE WAS AWARE.

AMBASSADOR CROOK SAID HE PERSONALLY BELIEVED THAT THE U.S. DECISION TO CURTAIL AID WAS THE ONLY POSSIBLE ONE IN THE FACE OF THE DRA'S SHAMEFUL HANDLING OF AMBASSADOR DUBS' ABDUCTION, BUT HE BELIEVED IT NONETHELESS UNFORTUNATE THAT A DRASTIC REDUCTION IN U.S. AID WAS NECESSARY. HE SAID THAT HE WAS CONVINCED THERE WOULD BE SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN DRA POLICY AS THEY BECOME DISILLUSIONED WITH THEIR CLOSE TIES TO THE SOVIET BLOC. FOREIGN AID WAS THE ONLY BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP OF ANY IMPORTANCE IN AFGHANISTAN. HE EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THE U.S. WOULD CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN AN AID PRESENCE. HE BELIEVED THAT IT COULD BE VERY DIFFICULY TO REESTABLISH A U.S. AID PROGRAM ONCE TERMINATED; ON THE OTHER HAND, MAINTAINING AN AID PRESENCE WOULD PERMIT THE DRA TO GRADUALLY INCREASE ITS RELATIONS WITH THE WEST IF IT SO DESIRED. CONSEQUENTLY, HE SAID HE BELIEVED THAT MAINTAINING A WESTERN OPTION WAS DESIRABLE AND IMPORTANT. HE SAID OUR POLICY DECISION TO DRASTICALLY CUT BACK U.S. ASSISTANCE WOULD HAVE FAILED IF IT ONLY SERVED TO PUSH AFGHANISTAN INTO GREATER RELIANCE ON THE USSR.

AMBASSADOR CROOK SAID HE DID NOT BELIEVE THE DRA WOULD REACT IN A HOSTILE FASHION TO THE US. AID CUTBACK. HE SAID HE BELIEVED THE DRA LEADERSHIP WAS IN SERIOUS TROUBLE, AND WAS UNLIKELY TO TAKE ON ADDITIONAL PROBLEMS BY REACTING DIRECTLY TO THE U.S. CUTBACK.

4. MEETING WITH MR. E. YENDALL, FIRST SECRETARY (DEVELOPMENT), CANADIAN EMBASSY IN ISLAMABAD: YENDALL CALLED ON THE AID DIRECTOR DURING HIS ROUTINE SCHEDULED VISIT TO KABUL FROM ISLAMABAD. HE WANTED TO KNOW THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE RECENT BT

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RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1462
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1484
RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 8465
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 6566
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 0010
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 0009
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 KABUL 2052

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AID CUTBACK IN AFGHANISTAN. HE SAID THAT HIS EMBASSY VIEWED THE U.S. AID CUTBACK AS A REASONABLE REACTION TO THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING AMBASSADOR DUBS' DEATH, BUT HAD NOT CHANGED THEIR EARLIER VIEW THAT A U.S. AID PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTA WAS DESIRABLE. HE SAID THAT HIS OWN GOVERNMENT'S AID POLICY TOWARDS AFGHANISTAN HAD BEEN UNDER REVIEW FOR MORE THAN A YEAR, BUT NO CLEAR POLICY DECISION HAD YET BEEN TAKEN AS TO FUTURE AID PROGRAM DIRECTIONS.

5. MEETING WITH INDIAN AMBASSADOR S.K. SINGH: AFTER THE AID DIRECTOR BRIEFED AMBASSADOR SINGH ON THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL DECISION CONCERNING THE USAID PROGRAM, SINGH SAID THAT HE UNDERSTOOD AND WAS SYMPATHETIC TO THE U.S. POLICY DECISION. HE SAID THAT HE BELIEVES THE U.S. STATEMENTS EMPHASIZING THAT THE AID CUTBACK WAS THE RESULT OF AN "ONGOING EVALUATION" AND MINIMIZING ITS RELATIONKQTO THE CONDITIONS SURROUNDING THE AMBASSADOR'S DEATH WAS UNFORTUANTE.H HE ALSO SAID HE FAILED TO UNDERSTAND OUR ANNOUNCED DECISION TO TERMINATE THE IMET PROGRAM SINCE IT WAS ALREADY WELL KNOWN THAT THE DRA HAD REJECTED THE PROGRAM.

SINGH GOOD-NATUREDLY CHIDED THE U.S. FOR A LACK OF PATIENCE SOMETIMES, WHICH HE FELT WAS VERY MUCH CALLED FOR UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES. HE SAID A GREAT MANY PEOPLE IN THE KHALQI PARTY ARE DISSATISFIED WITH PRESENT POLICIES OF THEIR LEADERSHIP AND ARE ANXIOUS FOR CHANGE. HE DOES NOT SEE MUCH ANTI-WESTERN SENTIMENT EXCEPT AT THE VERY HIGHEST LEVEL OF THE GOVERNMENT. SPECIFICALLY AMONG THE TOP TWO OR THREE. WHEN QUERIED ABOUT DR. SHAH WALI, HE SAID HE WAS NOT CERTAIN OF WHERE HE STOOD, BUT THAT SHAW WALI WAS VERY CLEARLY TERRIBLY IMPRESSED WITH THE SOVIET SYSTEM. NEVERTHELESS, HE SAID THAT DISILLUSIONMENT WITH THE SOVIET BLOC WAS INCREASING DRAMATICALLY WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT. HE BELIEVES THE SOVIETS, IN TURN, MAY HAVE BITTEN OFF A BIGGER MOUTHFUL THAN THEY AT FIRST REALIZED. HE DOUBTED IF THE SOVIETS WANTED THE U.S. ENTIRELY OUT OF AFGHANISTAN.

WITH REGARD TO THE LIKELY DRA REACTION TO OUR AID CUTBACK, SINGH SAID HE HAD NOT YET RECEIVED ANY INDICATION OF THIS. HE SAID HE DOUBTED VERY MUCH IF THERE WILL BE ANY IMMEDIATE REACTION, JUST HARDER TO GET APPOINTMENTS WITH DRA OFFICIALS, ETC. HE SAID THE DRA CERTAINLY EXPECTED SOME U.S. REACTION TO THE AMBASSADOR'S DEATH. HE BELIEVED THE CURRENT INTERNAL SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN WAS SIMPLY TOO DELICATE FOR THE DRA TO REACT STRONGLY TO THE U.S. AID CUTBACK EVEN IF IT WAS INCLINED TO DO SO. IF THERE IS A REACTION, HE SAID IT WILL BE AN IRRATIONAL ONE.

WITH REGARD TO THE FUTURE USAID POSTURE, SINGH SAID HE STRONGLY FAVORED THE U.S. CONTINUING TO MAINTAIN AN AID PRESENCE. HE SAID HE DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT A U.S. AID PRESENCE GIVES ANY SIGNIFICANT RESPECTABILITY TO THE REGIME. WHILE HE SAID HE WOULD NOT WANT TO JUDGE WHAT U.S. INTERESTS IN THE GULF AREA MAY REQUIRE, HE SAID HE BELIEVED U.S. INTERESTS IN A STABLE REGION ARE FURTHERED BY MAINTAINING AN AID PRESENCE. HE DID NOT BELIEVE THIS AID LEVEL HAD TO BE LARGE, AND, IN FACT, BELIEVED THE U.S. SHOULD KEEP IT MODEST FOR THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE, LEAVING ANY INITIATIVE FOR EXPANSION WITH THE DRA. HE COUNSELLED A LOW U.S. PROFILE, BUT DEFINITELY A PRESENCE. HE CONCLUDED BY NOTING THAT ANYTHING COULD HAPPEN IN THE NEXT YEAR OR SO, AND THAT IT PROMISES TO BE A VERY INTERESTING, IF DIFFICULT, PERIOD. AMSTUTZ

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CONFIDENTIAL 003213 DRAFTER: GBLambrakis

ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 516 RUEAC
AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE 26 RUSBLK
INFO: AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 22 RUSBQD
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 34 RUDTC
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 32 RUEHMO
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 16 RUSBAE

E.O. 12065: RDS-4 3/25/89 (LAMBRAKIS, G.B.) OR-P

TAGS: PINS, PEPR, AF, IR

SUBJECT: Situation in Afghanistan

1. C - entire text.

2. Sultan Mahmud-Ghazi, member of Afghan royal family, former president of Afghan Civil Aviation and Tourism Authority, and brother of former Afghan Ambassador to Iran, visited Pol Counselor March 25 in connection with visa problem. He said he does not have extensive information on situation in Afghanistan, but had talked with people who have come from there as recently as three days ago.

3. He said rebellion is widespread and affects at least eight provinces. Afghan government has no confidence in most of its army, particularly the conscripts, and there have been cases of military units being bombed by the Air Force because they were believed to be untrustworthy. In Kabul security at night is carried out by many civilians and other Communists rather than the military. Indeed, the military are being kept out of the city to a great extent.

4. If the Afghan government had to stand alone, it would not last "for more than a week", according to Mahmud-Ghazi.

However, he is sure the Soviets are bucking up the government and reinforcing it with racial Tadzhiks, Uzbeks and Turkomans from across the frontier. This is something which an outsider can never prove, since Afghanistan government can provide the identity cards at will.

5. Unfortunately, neither U.S. nor Pakistani nor Iranian governments appear to be interested in assisting the revolt. Iranians might possibly be providing some financial assistance, but they have no military, and their weapons are almost entirely U.S. or western style. Chinese weapons in the hands of the Pakistani would probably be useful in Afghanistan, on the other hand.

6. Above seems to fit with reporting from Kabul and other sources. Mahmud-Ghazi himself has refused offer of an Iranian passport provided he changes his nationality and has not lost hope of returning to Afghanistan when and if the situation changes some time.

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E.O. 12065 N/A

TAGS: EAID, PEPR, AF, US

SUBJECT: HOUSE COMMITTEE CUTS AID TO AFGHANISTAN

1. IN MARCH 28 MARKUP OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT, HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE ACCEPTED FOLLOWING AMENDMENT INTRODUCED BY CONGRESSMAN DERWINSKI:

2. QUOTE: NONE OF THE FUNDS AUTHORIZED TO BE APPROPRIATED BY THE AMENDMENTS MADE BY THIS TITLE MAY BE MADE AVAILABLE FOR ASSISTANCE FOR AFGHANISTAN UNLESS THE PRESIDENT DETERMINES, AND REPORTS TO CONGRESS, THAT ASSISTANCE FOR AFGHANISTAN IS IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES. UNQUOTE.

3. EFFECT OF AMENDMENT IS TO DELETE FUNDS FOR TITLE I PROGRAMS (ECONOMIC AI) FOR FY80. VANCE
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Afghanistan and U.S.-Afghan Relations

PARTICIPANTS:

Vasiliy K. Gorovoi, First Secretary, USSR Embassy

Ronald D. Lorton, Country Officer for Afghanistan

DATE: April 11, 1979

DISTRIBUTION:

NEA/PAB, EUR/SOV, S/MS, SY, INR/RNA/SOA, INR/OIL/B, NEA-Mr. Miklos, Embassy Kabul, Embassy Moscow, Embassy Islamabad, Embassy Tehran, Embassy New Delhi, NSC-Mr. Thornton

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Gorovoi said he had not been able to understand developments in U.S.-Afghan relations since he had last met with Lorton, commenting that on his last visit (February 8) relations between the U.S. and Afghanistan had appeared to be "calm" but that since the terrible event which resulted in the death of the American Ambassador in Kabul there had been an abrupt change in those relations. He cited as evidence, the U.S. decision to reduce economic aid to Afghanistan and calls in Congress for other actions such as withdrawal of the Peace Corps. Gorovoi explained these developments as incomprehensible because the U.S. has always sought to preserve its position around the world.

Lorton agreed there have been difficulties in the U.S.-Afghan relationship, explaining that although relations before February 14 had been normal, we nonetheless had a number of questions on our minds including

our inability to agree with the Afghans on various matters of International concern and the apparent lack of interest in the part of the DRA in many of the programs we were continuing to offer. What disturbed us about the handling of the kidnapping of Ambassador Dubs was the DRA's complete lack of cooperation or even consultation with us in their handling of the incident. All of these factors were part of our decision to reduce our assistance level, Lorton concluded.

Gorovoi questioned what he called the U.S. view that the Soviets were in a position to control the behavior of the Afghans at that time. He said Afghanistan was a sovereign country and denied that the USSR is in any position to "order" the Afghans to do something. Lorton demurred and said it was not a question of issuing orders, but our view that the Soviets who were advising the Afghans should have been in a position to urge restraint on them. In reality, the Soviets even played an operational role in some aspects of the anti-terrorist operation, according to eyewitness reports. Nonetheless, Lorton noted we have expressed our view to interested Members of Congress and others that it is the Afghan Government which must bear the responsibility for the outcome of their action.

Gorovoi opined it is difficult to see how U.S.-Afghan relations can make progress in the light of the sharp U.S. decisions. Lorton said the U.S. had no desire to see a deterioration in our relationship with Afghanistan but observed that one of the major difficulties in having a cooperative relationship in the future is the continuing charges emanating from Moscow regarding outside interference in Afghanistan's affairs. Lorton noted the two recent public statements made by the U.S. in this regard, reaffirming that the U.S. has not interfered and has no intention of interfering in Afghanistan's affairs. Improvements in U.S.-Afghan relations would be difficult, Lorton concluded, as long as these kinds of charges and the atmosphere they create continue.

Lorton asked Gorovoi for his assessment of developments in Afghanistan and the major problems faced by the Taraki Government. Gorovoi thought that the DRA was facing problems common to all revolutions as the old and new classes vie for control. Gorovoi observed that there is a strong religious tradition in

Afghanistan and indicated this was a source of opposition to a regime which sought to separate church and state and remove religion from politics. He also noted the autonomous traditions of certain tribal groups and observed that a number of dissidents have crossed the border into Pakistan to carry out anti-DRA activities. However, Gorovoi continued, the DRA enjoys a lot of support for its reform programs (such as land reform) which benefit the masses of the Afghan population. He viewed the military as key to the progress of a revolution in developing countries.

Lorton questioned whether the regime indeed had "mass" support, observing that large segments of the general population appear to have expressed their opposition to the regime in the revolt in Herat and by leaving Afghanistan for Pakistan. Lorton suggested that these were indications of less than mass popular support for the regime and a reaction to the harsh measures the regime is taking against its opponents.

Gorovoi responded that every action provokes counteraction and quoted Lenin on the need of a revolution to defend itself. He recalled that large numbers of Russian peasants had opposed the Russian Revolution because they were uneducated and illiterate and did not know where their real interests lay. He saw the task of the Afghan Government's leadership as being the education of the masses regarding their true interests and described this process as difficult.

Lorton concluded by saying that he thought it would indeed be a difficult time ahead for the Afghan people since the DRA appears to prefer destruction of old institutions in favor of new structures rather than attempting to work with or through those institutions.

Drafted by: NEA/PAB:RDLorton:lcb x29552; 04/12/79

Cleared by: NEA/PAB:AQoon

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RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1553
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1592
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 6779
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3017
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 KABUL 3557

CINCPAC: ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12065: GDS 5-7-85 (TAYLOR, JAMES E.) OR-P
TAGS: PEPR, PINR, PGOV, PINT, SHUM, AF, PK, UR, IR
SUBJECT: THE "BIG LIE" BECOMES STANDARD KHALQI TOOL

REF: (A) KABUL 3278; (B) KABUL 3166

1. (C- ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. SUMMARY: SEVERAL NEW POLITICAL WRINKLES WERE PART OF A DELUGE OF ANNIVERSARY SPEECHES AND PRESS CONFERENCES GIVEN OVER THE LAST DAYS BY PRESIDENT NOOR MOHAMMAD TARAKI AND PRIME MINISTER HAFIZULLAH AMIN, INCLUDING ANOTHER HINT THAT SOME FRICTION BETWEEN THE TWO LEADERS MAY BE A REALITY. FLAT DENIALS THAT ANY ARMY MUTINY HAD OCCURRED IN JALALABAD, OR THAT THE REGIME TORTURES ITS POLITICAL PRISONERS, INDICATE THAT THE "BIG LIE" MAY HAVE BECOME THE REGIME'S PREFERRED PUBLIC TACTIC FOR DEALING WITH THORNY ISSUES. ALLEGED INTERFERENCE BY IRAN, PAKISTAN, AND "IMPERIALISM" REMAINED THE GOVERNMENT'S PRIMARY EXCUSE FOR CONTINUED DOMESTIC OPPOSITION, WHILE THINLY-VEILED BARBS WERE LAUNCHED AT "BROTHERLY" COUNTRIES (SPECIFICALLY CZECHOSLOVAKIA) WHO MAY CONSIDER PROVIDING REFUGE TO THE EXILED PARCHAMIST LEADERS. END OF SUMMARY.

3. TARAKI-AMIN RELATIONS: DESPITE AMIN'S RECENT EFFUSIVE DESCRIPTION OF TARAKI AS "THE MOST GLORIOUS PERSONALITY IN AFGHAN HISTORY" (WHICH ELIMINATES SUCH NOTABLES AS DARIUS, ALEXANDER THE GREAT, GENGHIS KHAN, TAMERLANE, AHMAD SHAH DURRANI, LADY SALES, AND FLASHMAN), HINTS CONTINUE TO SURFACE THAT DIFFERENCES OR FRICTION BETWEEN THE TWO LEADERS MAY EXIST. IN ONE NEWS CONFERENCE RESPONSE REGARDING AMIN'S RECENT CONDEMNATION OF ANY CULT OF PERSONALITY SURROUNDING TARAKI (REF A), THE GREAT LEADER HIMSELF MODESTLY REPLIED THAT THE AFGHAN PEOPLE "LOVE AND RESPECT ME" SO MUCH THAT THEY INSIST ON PUTTING UP PHOTOGRAPHS EVEGVWHERE. HE ADDED THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAS ISSUED INSTRUCTIONS TO CEASE THIS PRACTICE, BUT THE REGIME WILL NOT USE FORCE TO PREVENT THE PEOPLE FROM EXHIBITING THEIR AFFECTION. (COMMENT: A LARGE NUMBER OF TARAKI PHOTOGRAPHS HAVE DISAPPEARED RECENTLY.) AT THE SAME CONFERENCE, TARAKI CATEGORICALLY DENIED THAT AMIN HAD EVER SAID, OR EVEN INTIMATED, THAT CERTAIN UNKNOWN ENEMIES ARE ATTEMPTING TO "INFLUENCE" THE AFGHAN PRESIDENT (REF B). TARAKI PETULANTLY INSISTED THAT AMIN HAD SAID "NOTHING OF THE SORT," AND THAT HE KNEW THIS WAS TRUE BECAUSE HE HAD "READ ALL OF AMIN'S INTERVIEWS OVER THE PAST YEAR."

4. HUMAN RIGHTS: OBLIQUELY COUNTERING WIDESPREAD REPORTS, CONFIRMED BY EYEWITNESSES AND VICTIMS, THAT THIS REGIME PHYSICALLY MISTREATS MANY OF THE NUMEROUS PRISONERS IN ITS CUSTODY (INCLUDING LARGE-SCALE NIGHTTIME EXECUTIONS OF POLITICAL PRISONERS, SANS TRIAL, AND THE APPLICATION OF ELECTRICAL SHOCKS TO CERTAIN PARTS OF THE BODY), AMIN CLAIMED THAT "WE HAVE NOT UNDERMINED HUMAN DIGNITY, EVEN WHEN DEALING WITH THOSE HATCHING INTRIGUES AGAINST OUR PEOPLE AND THE COUNTRY," AND ADDED THAT "WE HAVE NOT ACTED AGAINST ANYONE USING MEANS CONTRARY TO RESPECT FOR HUMAN DIGNITY". TARAKI INSISTED THAT ONLY "BETWEEN 1,000 AND 1,100 POLITICAL PRISONERS ARE INTERNED." (COMMENT: WE THINK THAT THE FIGURE IS ACTUALLY WELL OVER TEN THOUSAND.)

5. DOMESTIC SECURITY: BLAME FOR INTERNAL SECURITY PROBLEMS CONTINUED TO BE LAID AT THE DOORSTEP OF "FOREIGN INFILTRATORS," ESPECIALLY "SOLDIERS IN AFGHAN DRESS" FROM PAKISTAN AND IRAN. TARAKI INDIRECTLY ADMITTED THAT FIGHTING IS UNDERWAY IN NORTHWEST AFGHANISTAN WHEN HE INSISTED THAT VIOLENCE AROUND MAIMANA (A TURKMAN REGION NEAR THE SOVIET BORDER) IS THE WORK OF "IRANIAN INFILTRATORS" WHO ESCAPED FOLLOWING THE UPHEAVAL IN HERAT. TARAKI ALSO ASSERTED THAT "INTEREFERENCE" BY IRAN AND PAKISTAN HAS COMPELLED THE REGIME TO RETAIN THE OVERNIGHT CURFEW IN KABUL MORE THAN ONE YEAR AFTER THE REVOLUTION. TARAKI BENT THE FACTS SURROUNDING A COUPLE OF POINTS WHEN HE CATEGORICALLY DENIED THAT "ANYTHING," MUCH LESS ANY ARMY MUTINY, HAS HAPPENED IN JALALABAD RECENTLY, AND INSISTED THAT NO ONE (SPECIFICALLY SHI'IAS) HAS BEEN ARRESTED BECAUSE OF THEIR RELIGIOUS BELIEFS.
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RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1554
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1593
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 6780
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3018
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 KABUL 3557

CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLAD

6. GOALS OF THE REVOLUTION: TARAKI ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE BUILDING OF A SOCIALIST SOCIETY IS A LONG-TERM TASK, BUT HE CLAIMED THAT THE "FOUNDATION" OF A SOCIALIST SOCIETY WILL BE LAID IN "SIX TO TEN YEARS." AS FOR THE NATURE OF THE REGIME, TARAKI REMARKED THAT "DEMOCRACY MEANS THAT MEASURES SHOULD BE TAKEN FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE MAJORITY," AND ADDED THAT "WE CAN CALL THE DRA A DEMOCRATIC DICTATORSHIP BECAUSE IT IS IN FAVOR OF 98 PERCENT OF THE PEOPLE."

7. RELATIONS WITH IRAN AND PAKISTAN: "REGIONAL REACTIONARY POWERS" (READ IRAN AND PAKISTAN) WITH THE SUPPORT OF "IMPERIALISM" (READ US AND UK) CONTINUE TO CARRY OUT "ARMED AGGRESSION" AGAINST AFGHANISTAN, ACCORDING TO THE AFGHAN LEADERS, AND HAVE "MARTYRED A LARGE NUMBER OF PEOPLE" INCLUDING WOMEN, CHILDREN AND THE ELDERLY. TARAKI CLAIMED THAT SINCE APRIL 8, 1979, "PAKISTANI SOLDIERS HAVE COMMITTED ELEVEN INFRINGEMENTS ONTO AFGHAN TERRITORY". TARAKI INSISTED THAT ALL FURTHER ENCROACHEMENTS WOULD BE REPULSED BY THE ARMED FORCES OF AFGHANISTAN, "SUPPORTED BY AFGHANISTAN'S INTERNATIONAL FRIENDS." TARAKI ADDED THAT "WE DO NOT CONSIDER ZIA-UL-HAQ AS OUR ENEMY, BUT MAYBE SOONER OR LATER HE WILL STOP SENDING INFILTRATORS INTO THIS COUNTRY."

8. RELATIONS WITH SOCIALIST COUNTRIES: TARAKI INSISTED THAT THERE ARE ONLY BETWEEN 1,000 AND 1,100 SOVIET ADVISERS HERE, AND, OF THESE, ABOUT 300 ARE SERVING WITH THE AFGHAN MILITARY. (COMMENT: WE BELIEVE THAT THERE ARE APPROXIMATELY 1,000 SOVIET MILITARY ADVISERS HERE -- AND AROUND 2,500 CIVILIAN ADVISERS.) HE SUGGESTED THAT FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS COMPARE THAT FIGURE WITH THE SITUATIONS IN IRAN, PAKISTAN, AND OTHER COUNTRIES WHERE "SIXTY TO SEVENTY THOUSAND AMERICAN" AND OTHER ADVISERS ARE PRESENT. REGARDING MILITARY ASSISTANCE FROM THE USSR, TARAKI CLAIMED THAT "WHATEVER WE NEED AND CAN MANAGE, WE GET." ON THE POLITICAL FRONT, TARAKI INSISTED THAT "BROTHERLY RELATIONS" BETWEEN AFGHANISTAN AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA INDICATE THAT CZECHOSLOVAKIA WOULD "NEVER GIVE SHELTER" TO FORMER AMBASSADOR BABRAK KARMAL, HIS EXILED PARCHAMIST COLLEAGUES, OR OTHER ENEMIES OF THE REVOLUTION.

9. PARTY RELATIONS WITH THE INTERNATIONAL MOVEMENT: ACCORDING TO TARAKI, THE PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF AFGHANISTAN (PDPA) HAS HAD "HISTORICAL SOLIDARITY WITH THREE MAIN ANTI-IMPERIALIST MOVEMENTS." THE "GLOBAL FRONT FOR PEACE AND PROGRESS;" THE "INTERNATIONAL WORKING CLASS MOVEMENT;" AND, THE "NATIONAL AND SOCIAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS ALL OVER THE WORLD."

10. CONCLUSIONS: ASIDE FROM THESE NEW FORMULATIONS, THE GREAT DELUGE OF HIGH-LEVEL VERBIAGE SURROUNDING THE FIRST ANNIVERSARY OF THE REVOLUTION COVERED OLD GROUND. PUBLIC DENIALS BY THE LEADERSHIP THAT EVENTS KNOWN TO HAVE TAKEN PLACE (E.G., THE JALALABAD MUTINY, TORTURE OF PRISONERS, ETC.) HAVE EVER OCCURRED APPEAR TO HAVE BECOME THE ACCEPTED "BIG LIE" TACTIC, THEREBY FURTHER UNDERCUTTING WHATEVER DOMESTIC CREDIBILITY THE REGIME MAY HAVE POSSESSED. OF PARTICULAR INTEREST IN THIS CONNECTION IS TARAKI'S DISINGENUOUS DENIAL THAT AMIN EVER MENTIONED THAT "PEOPLE" WERE TRYING TO INFLUENCE THE GREAT LEADER, A REFERENCE BY THE PRIME MINISTER WHICH IS PART OF THE OFFICIAL PUBLIC RECORD IN THE GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED PRESS. TARAKI'S BARBS DIRECTED AT PRAGUE COULD ALSO HVE BEEN AIMED AT OTHER "BROTHERLY" COUNTRIES (E.G., YUGOSLAVIA, OR EVEN THE USSR) WHO MAY NOW OR AT SOME POINT PROVIDE A SAFE HAVEN FOR THE EXILED PARCHAMIST LEADERS. IN THIS CONNECTION, IT SEEMS THAT THE LONGER THE KHALQI REGIME REMAINS UNABLE TO CONSOLIDATE ITS OWN DOMESTIC SECURITY, THE MORE CONCERNED THE KHALQI LEADERSHIP MAY BECOME THAT ITS "INTERNATIONAL FRIENDS" MAY BEGIN CASTING ABOUT FOR ALTERNATE LEFTIST LEADERSHIP TO SUPPORT.
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CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 1 OF 2 KABUL 3626

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E.O. 12065: GDS 5/9/85 (FLATIN, BRUCE A.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, MASS, PINS, AF, UR
SUBJECT: (LOU) THE CURRENT SOVIET ROLE IN AFGHANISTAN

REF: STATE 113474 (NOTAL)

1. (LOU) SUMMARY: SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN HAS INCREASED PERCEPTIBLY IN RECENT WEEKS, BUT HAS NOT YET REACHED THE EXAGGERATED LEVELS SO OFTEN REPORTED IN THE WORLD'S PRESS. ALTHOUGH THERE IS A POSSIBILITY THAT SOVIET COMBAT TROOPS MIGHT INTERVENE IN THE DOMESTIC CONFLICT IN AFGHANISTAN, OUR JUDGMENT IS THAT THE USSR WILL PROBABLY TRY TO AVOID PLUNGING INTO WHAT COULD WELL BECOME A VIETNAM-TYPE TRAP. END OF SUMMARY.

2. (C) MINDFUL OF THE FACT THAT SELECTED ELEMENTS OF THIS REPORT WILL BE USED BY THE DEPARTMENT IN ANSWERING PUBLIC AND CONGRESSIONAL QUERIES (REFTEL, THE EMBASSY PRESENT BELOW DATA ON THE CURRENT SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN THE RELEASE OF WHICH WOULD NOT PREJUDICE SERIOUSLY OUR OPERATIONS HERE, NOR ENDANGER OUR SOURCES.

3. (LOU) QUANTITATIVELY, THE SOVIET PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN HAS NOT INCREASED SIGNIFICANTLY DURING RECENT MONTHS, IN SPITE OF THE DETERIORATING SECURITY SITUATION THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. THE NUMBER OF SOVIET MILITARY ADVISORS REMAINS SLIGHTLY OVER 1,000 -- AND THERE ARE PROBABLY STILL ABOUT 5,000 CIVILIAN ADVISORS FROM THE USSR IN THE COUNTRY. ALTHOUGH THE SOVIET EMBASSY DENIES IT, WE BELIEVE THAT LARGE NUMBERS OF THEIR DEPENDENTS HAVE BEEN EVACUATED TO THE USSR.

4. (LOU) QUALITATIVELY, THE INFLUENCE OF SOVIET ADVISORS APPEARS TO HAVE BECOME MORE PRONOUNCED IN RECENT WEEKS, PARTICULARLY SINCE THE VISIT OF THE USSR'S GENERAL A.A. YEPISHEV, CHIEF OF THE MAIN POLITICAL DIRECTORATE OF THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES, EARLY IN APRIL. ALTHOUGH THE ANNOUNCED REASON FOR YEPISHEV'S VISIT WAS TO UPGRADE THE "POLITICAL EDUCATION" OF THE AFGHAN FORCES, HE CAME WITH A LARGE STAFF OF SOVIET OFFICIALS WHO ARE BELIEVED TO HAVE LOOKED INTO SEVERAL ASPECTS OF MILITARY SUPPORT FOR THE AFGHAN ARMY AND AIR FORCE. WE ARE ALSO AWARE OF INCREASED SOVIET GUIDANCE IN VARIOUS CIVILIAN MINISTRIES.

5. (LOU) THE BEST QUALITY EQUIPMENT WHICH THE USSR HAS PROVIDED TO AFGHANISTAN THUS FAR HAVE BEEN MIG-21 AND SU-7 FIGHTER AIRCRAFT, MI-24 HIND-TYPE HELICOPTER GUNSHIPS AND T-62 TANKS. IN SPITE OF FREQUENT RUMORS TO THE CONTRARY, THE AFGHANS HAVE NOT BEEN SUPPLIED WITH MIG-23 AIRCRAFT.

6. (LOU) THE EMBASSY HAS WEIGHED THE WIDESPREAD RUMORS THAT SOVIET PILOTS FLY SOME OF THE OPERATIONAL MISSION OF AFGHAN AIRCRAFT AGAINST GUERRILLA TARGETS. WE HAVE NO SOLID EVIDENCE RULING OUT THIS POSSIBILITY, BUT, UNTIL SUCH AN AIRCRAFT CRASHES WITH SOVIET PERSONNEL ON BOARD, IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO SUBSTANTIATE THESE RUMORS. BECAUSE SOME OF THE NEW EQUIPMENT, SUCH AS THE MI-24 GUNSHIP, IS MORE SOPHISTICATED THAN THE OLDER AFGHAN ARMAMENT, SOVIET PERSONNEL ARE BELIEVED TO BE ENGAGED IN INTENSIVE TRAINING ACTIVITY. THERE ARE SEVERAL REPORTS THAT THE MI-24S HAVE BEEN USED OPERATIONALLY AGAINST THE INSURGENTS. BECAUSE THIS IS A SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS SYSTEM, WE DOUBT THERE HAS BEEN SUFFICIENT TIME TO TRAIN AFGHANS TO FLY THESE ALONE. THEREFORE, IT IS QUITE POSSIBLE THAT SOVIETS COULD BE HELPING TO FLY THOSE MI-24S BEING USED OPERATIONALLY, AS WELL AS PROVIDING TRAINING TO AFGHAN PILOTS.

7. (LOU) BECAUSE THERE ARE SOVIET MILITARY ADVISORS ASSIGNED THROUGHOUT THE AFGHAN GROUND FORCES -- IN ALL CASES DOWN TO THE BATTALION LEVEL, AND ALSO WITH SEVERAL SMALL SPECIALIZED UNITS, IT WOULD BE UNUSUAL IF SOVIET MILITARY PERSONNEL WERE NOT CAUGHT UP IN MILITARY OPERATIONS FROM TIME TO TIME.

8. (LOU) THE MOST IMPORTANT QUESTION IS: CAN WE EXPECT TO SEE SOVIET COMBAT TROOPS ENTER AFGHAN CONFLICT? WE CAN ONLY OBSERVE THAT THAT POSSIBILITY CANNOT BE EXCLUDED.
BT
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9 Mar 79 14 52z

VV ESA654MJC708
OO RUQMHR
DE RUSBLK #3626/2 1291400
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 091315Z MAY 79
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3760
INFO RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 530
RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 8730
RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 288
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1561
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1605
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 6797
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3026
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 165
RUHQHQA/CINCPAC
RUSNAAA/CINCEUR
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 KABUL 3626

CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLAD
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ARTICLE 4 OF THE NEW AFGHAN-SOVIET FRIENDSHIP TREATY OF DEC-
EMBET 5, 1978, PROVIDES THAT THE TWO PARTIES "...SHALL CONSULT
EACH OTHER, AND TAKE, BY AGREEMENT, APPROPRIATE MEASURES TO
ENSURE THE SECURITY, INDEPENDENCE, AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY
OF THE TWO COUNTRIES." THE ARTICLE CONCLUDES: "IN THE IN-
TERESTS OF STRENGTHENING THE DEFENSE CAPACITY OF THE HGIH CON-
TRACTING PARTIES, THEY SHOULD CONTINUE TO DEVELOP COOPERATION
IN THE MILITARY FIELD ON THE BASIS OF APPROPRIATE AGREEMENTS
CONCLUDED BETWEEN THEM"

9 (LOU) MANY DIPLOMATIC OBSERVERS HAVE COMMENTED THAT THE
CAREFUL PHRASEOLOGY OF ARTICLE 4 SEEMS TO ENABLE THE SOVIET
UNION TO HAVE ITS CAKE AND EAT IT TOO. IT APPEARS TO PERMIT
SOVIET FORCES TO ENTER AFGHANISTAN IN PEACTIME, BUT ALSO
CONTAINS ENOUGH ESCAPE LANGUAGE TO ALLOW THE SOVIETS TO IGNORE
A KHALQI CALL OF HELP. IT IS RUMORED THAT SENIOR SOVIET MI-
LITILARY OFFICERS HAVE GIVEN THE KHALQIS ORAL ASSURANCES THAT THE USSR
WOULD DO EVERYTHING NECESSARY TO PROTECT THE REVOLUTION. WHILE THE
KHALQIS, IN CONVERSATIONS WITH FOREIGN DIPLOMATS AND THE FOREIGN
PRESS (KABUL 3538) HAVE PROFESSED TO BELIEVE THEMSELVES
"ASSURED" THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD HELH THEN HANDLE
"INTERFERENCE" (WHETHER FOREIGN OR DOMESTIC IS NEVER
SPECIFIED), IT IS NOT APPARENT WHETHER THEY REALLY
POSSESS THAT CERTITUDE. THE TARAKI-AMIN LEADERSHIP IS
UNDOUBTEDLY AWARE THAT THERE ARE OTHER OPTIONS TO THEIR REGIME
WAITING IN THE WINGS -- INCLUDING THE EXILED PARCHAMIST LEADERS.

10. (LOU) ALTHOUGH THIS EMBASSY WOULD DEFER TO EMBASSY MOSCOW'S EXPERTISE IN ALALYZING THE POSSIBLE SOVIET VIEWPOINT OF THE AFGHAN SITUATION, WHICH THE KREMLIN MUST REGARD BOTH AS A MESS AND AN OPPORTUNITY, THIS TOPIC IS A PRIME SUBJECT OF SPECULATION AT KABUL. SOME ARGUE THAT THE USSR WOULD WANT TO AVOID BECOMING BOGGED DOWN IN THE VIETNAM-TYPE QUAGMIRE OF AN AFGHAN CIVIL WAR, WHILE OTHERS BELIEVE THAT WE MIGHT BE AT THE THRESHOLD OF A 1968 CZECHOSLOVAKIA-TYPE SITUATION. THE USSR MIGHT DECIDE THAT IT HAS TO MOVE BECAUSE "THE AFGHAN REVOLTUION IS ENDANGERED." IN THIS CONNECTION, REPEATED SOVIET CHARGES OF INTERFERENCE BY THE U.S., CHINA, PAKISTAN, AND OTHER STATES COULD BE INTENDED TO LAY THE PROPAGANDA AND "LEGAL" GROUNDWORK FOR SUCH A MOVE. ADDITIONALLY, REPEATED KHALQI COMPLAINTS THAT IRANIAN AND PAKISTANI TROOPS "IN AFGHAN DRESS"ARE OPERATING IN AFGHANISTAN COULD ALSO BE PART OF THIS POLITICAL PREPARATION.

11. (LOU) WHY WOULD THE USSR DECIDE TO INTERVENE? AFGHANISTAN, UNILKE ANGOLA, ETHOPIA, OR YEMEN, BORDERS ON THE SOVIET UNION ITSELF. INDEED, THSI TURBULENT COUNTRY ABUTS SEVERAL SENSITIVE, MUSLIM, CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS OF THE USSR. MOSCOW IS UNDERSTANDABLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF AN UNBROKEN BAND OF CONSERVATIVE ISLAMIC STATES STRETCHING ALONG OR NEAR ITS SOUTHERN FRONTIER, FROM IRAN TO PAKISTAN -- AND THIS COULD HAPPEN SHOULD AN IKHWAN-DOMINATED ALLIANCE EVER TOPPLE THE KHALQI REGIME. THE SOVIET UNION ALSO HAS ENORMOUS POLITICAL, PRESTIGE, ECONOMIC, STRETEGIC, AND MILITARY INVESTMENTS IN KHALQI AFGHANISTAN. MOSCOW WOULD BE UNILKELY TO LET THESE BECOME LOST WITHOUT SOME EFFORT TO SAVE THEM. ON THE OTHER HAND, ALMOST ANY AFGHAN REGIME WHICH MIGHT SUCCEED THE KHALQI REGIME WOULD PROBABLY FEEL IT WOULD HAVE TO COME TO TERMS WITH THE GEOPOLITICAL FACT OF THE COUNTRY'S GREAT NORTHERN NEIGHBOR -- AS HAVE VARIED AFGHAN GOVERNAMENTS IN THE PAST SIXTY YEARS.

AMSTUTZ

BT
#3626/2

Incoming

12 Mar 79 00 56z

POL
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NNNNKAGZVV ESA575BRA120
PP RUQMHR
DE RUEHC 0164/01 1320034
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 112013Z MAY 79
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN PRIORITY 2319
INFO RUSELK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 8479
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0827
RUQMNS/AMEMBASSY SANA 3719
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 120164/01

E.O. 12065 GDS 05/11/85 (MIKLOS, J.) NEA

TAGS: PEPR, AF, UR

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON AFGHANISTAN AND PDRY

REF: TEHRAN 4716

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. EMBASSY SHOULD ALREADY HAVE RECEIVED A NUMBER OF TELEGRAMS WHICH BEAR ON SUBJECT (STATE 83740, STATE 93724, KABUL 3626) OF SOVIET ROLE IN AFGHANISTAN AND HAS ALREADY BEEN AUTHORIZED TO SHARE MUCH OF THIS INFORMATION WITH PGOI. IN ADDITION YOU MAY USE FOLLOWING INR UPDATE OF STATE 94905 (PREPARED FOR AMBASSADOR SULLIVAN IN LATE MARCH), WHICH CONTAINS INFORMATION LARGELY DRAWN FROM OPEN SOURCES.

3. AFGHANISTAN: SOVIET COMMENTARY ON AFGHANISTAN HAS DECLINED OVER THE LAST TWO TO THREE WEEKS. WHILE THE SOVIET PRESS CONTINUES TO IMPLY THAT THE US AND PAKISTAN ARE BEHIND DISTURBANCES IN AFGHANISTAN, THE FREQUENCY, TONE AND AUTHORITATIVE LEVEL OF THESE INSINUATIONS HAVE DECREASED. MOSCOW STILL ATTACKS THE CHINESE VEHEMENTLY, HOWEVER. TO COUNTER SOME OF THE ANTI-SOVIET SENTIMENT IN THE MUSLIM WORLD ENGENDERED BY MOSCOW'S SUPPORT FOR KABUL,

ATTEMPTS ARE BEING MADE TO IMPROVE THE IMAGE OF THE MUSLIM MINORITIES IN THE USSR. ON TWO OCCASIONS IN THE LAST MONTH, SOVIET RADIO HAS CARRIED MESSAGES BY THE MUFTI OF TASHKENT EXTOLLING THE SOVIET POLICY OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE STATE OF ISLAM IN THE USSR. AT THE SAME TIME, THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN CAREFUL TO EMPHASIZE STATE-TO-STATE RELATIONS AND DOWNPLAY THE MARXIST ORIENTATION OF THE PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF AFGHANISTAN (PDPA).

4. SOVIET MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE FIRST ANNIVERSARY OF THE AFGHAN REVOLUTION ON APRIL 27 WAS UNEXCEPTIONAL. BOTH BREZHNEV AND KOSYGIN SENT THEIR CONGRATULATIONS WHILE COMMENTARY STRESSED THE PROGRESS MADE IN THE LAST 12 MONTHS, BUT ADDED THAT THERE WAS STILL A LONG WAY TO GO. DESPITE REPEATED PLEDGES OF SUPPORT, THE SOVIETS WERE CAREFUL TO STRESS THE DRA'S NON-ALIGNED STATUS. MOSCOW HAS STILL NOT RECOGNIZED THE PDPA AS A COMMUNIST PARTY, AND IS UNLIKELY TO DO SO UNTIL THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN AND THE DRA'S HOLD ON THE COUNTRY STABILIZES. INDEED, THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT THE SOVIETS REGRET THEIR CLOSE ASSOCIATION WITH THE TARAKI REGIME, BUT THEIR COMMITMENT TO ITS SURVIVAL REMAINS FIRM. THE SOVIETS HAVE REFERRED TO THE PDPA AS A "VANGUARD PARTY" AND THE REVOLUTION IN AFGHANISTAN AS IN THE SPIRIT OF "PROLETARIAN INTERNATIONALISM," HOWEVER. POLITBURO MEMBER SUSLOV RECENTLY CLAIMED AFGHANISTAN WAS ON THE ROAD OF "SOCIALIST ORIENTATION" MUCH LIKE ETHIOPIA AND MOZAMBIQUE. THAT IS, IT IS PROGRESSIVE BUT HAS A LONG WAY TO GO BEFORE IT CAN START TO BUILD "GENUINE SOCIALISM."

5. THE FIGHTING IN AFGHANISTAN SEEMS TO HAVE INTENSIFIED AND SPREAD DESPITE KABUL'S EFFORTS TO SUPPRESS REBEL ACTIVITY. GOVERNMENT CONTROL OVER RURAL AREAS OF KONARHA, NANGAHAR AND PAKTIA PROVINCES SEEMS TENUOUS AND FIGHTING THERE HAS BEEN HEAVY. DISTURBANCES HAVE OCCURED ON THE OUTSKIRTS OF KABUL. THERE WERE NO SERIOUS DISTURBANCES DURING THE ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATIONS--LARGELY DUE TO SOVIET COORDINATION OF THE SECURITY PREPARATIONS--BUT REPORTS OF ASSASINATIONS OF HIGH AFGHAN OFFICIALS AND SOVIET ADVISORS PERSIST. REPORTEDLY, A NUMBER OF SOVIETS HAVE BEEN KILLED THUS FAR, MOST RECENTLY IN AN APPARENT ARMY MUTINY IN JALALABAD.

6. IN RESPONSE TO KABUL'S NEEDS, MOSCOW HAS APPARENTLY STEPPED UP ITS MILITARY AID. MUCH OF THIS WAS ALREADY ON THE BOOKS, BUT DELIVERY DATES HAVE BEEN ADVANCED. ACCORDING TO RELIABLE PRESS ACCOUNTS, THERE ARE NOW OVER 3,000 SOVIET ADVISORS IN AFGHANISTAN; ABOUT 1000 OF THEM ARE MILITARY PERSONNEL. THE USSR HAS RECENTLY DELIVERED ABOUT A DOZEN MI-24 COMBAT HELICOPTERS; SINCE THERE ARE NO AFGHAN PILOTS CHECKED OUT ON THESE AIRCRAFT, SOVIET PILOTS MAY BE OPERATING THEM UNTIL AFGHAN PILOTS ARE TRAINED. IN EARLY APRIL, GENERAL YEPISHEV, CHIEF OF THE MAIN POLITICAL DIRECTORATE OF THE ARMY AND NAVY, HEADED A DELEGAT.ON TO KABUL, PRESUMABLY TO DISCUSS ARMY LOYALTY AND INDOCTRINATION BUT ALSO PROBABLY TO SURVEY THE SITUATION FOR MOSCOW AND JUDGE THE TARAKI REGIME'S CHANCES OF SURVIVAL./

7. PDRY: WHILE VISITING ETHIOPIA IN EARLY MAY, PDRY STRONGMAN ISMAIL PUBLICLY THANKED THE USSR AND CUBA FOR THEIR AID IN THE RECENT FIGHTING WITH THE YAR AND PLACED THE PDRY IN THE VAN OF THE "GREAT OCTOBER REVOLUTION" AND WORLD REVOLUTIONARY STRUGGLE. MOSCOW STOOD BY ADEN THROUGHOUT THE CONFLICT. WHILE THERE WAS NO SIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN ARMS DELIVERIES DURING THE FIGHTING, SOVIET SHIPMENTS TO THE PDRY HAD BEEN HIGH SINCE LAST SUMMER, AND THE PDRY PROBABLY HAD WHAT IT NEEDED.
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PP RUQMHR
DE RUEHC 0164/02 1320035
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 112013Z MAY 79
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN PRIORITY 2320
INFO RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 8480
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0828
RUQMNS/AMEMBASSY SANA 3720
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L FINAL SECTION OF 02 STATE 120164/02

12 MAY 79 00 56z

8. MOSCOW ALSO APPEARED TO FAVOR A MEDIATED SETTLEMENT AND PUBLICLY PRAISED ARAB EFFORTS TO BRING AN END TO THE CONFLICT. BEFORE THE FIGHTING BROKE-OUT, THE USSR HAD BEEN TRYING TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH BOTH THE YAR AND THE SAUDIS. FOR ITS PART, IRAQ MAY HAVE BEEN INSTRUMENTAL IN THE MEDIATION EFFORT IN ORDER TO COUNTER A GROWTH IN SOVIET INFLUENCE IN THE ARABIAN PENNINSULA.

9. DURING THE LAST WEEK OF APRIL, THE SOVIET AFRO-ASIAN SOLIDARITY COMMITTEE HOSTED A DELEGATION FROM THE POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF OMAN. SINCE JANUARY, THE SOVIET PRESS HAS CARRIED SEVERAL CRITICAL COMMENTARIES ON OMAN AND THE SULTAN'S GOVERNMENT, HINTING THAT THE IRAN THE DHOFAR REBELLION--NOW THAT IRAN IS NO LONGER PROVIDING TROOPS TO UPHOLD THE GOVERNMENT--MAY REVIVE. MOSCOW IS PARTICULARLY DISPLEASED WITH OMAN'S REFUSAL TO SUPPORT THE BAGHDAD SANCTIONS AND BREAK TIES WITH EGYPT OVER THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS.

10. WE WILL BE RESPONDING TO PARA 5 REFTEL SEPARATELY.
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14 MAY 79 04 42Z

VV ESA908MJC240
RR RUQMHR
DE RUSBQD 5531 1340235
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 140230Z MAY 79
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2951
INFO RUHQHQA/CINCPAC HONOLULU HI
RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 496
RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 728
RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 9201
RUSBKR/AMCONSUL KARACHI 7943
ZEN/AMCONSUL LAHORE POUCH
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 3966
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1318
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 787
ZEN/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR
RUQMHR/AMEBASSY TEHRAN 5207
RUFHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 609
BT
S E C R E T ISLAMABAD 5531

E.O. 12065: GDS 12/5/85 (SHERMAN, RICK) OR-P
TAGS: PEPR, PBOR, PK, AF
SUJECT: (C) GAILANI REPRESENTATIVE REPORTS PROGRESS IN UNIFYING AFGHAN DISSIDENT GROUPS

REF: ISLAMABAD 4780

1. (C) ENTIRE TEXT

2. SUMMARY: HUMAYUN ASEFI, AFGHAN ATTORNEY FROM PARIS WHO ACCOMPANIED SYED AHMED GAILANI TO EMBASSY ON APRIL 23 (REFTEL), CALLED ON EMBOFF MAY 13 WITH UP-DATE ON PROGRESS IN FORGING UNITY AMONG PESHAWAR-BASED GROUPS. ASEFI ALSO ADVISED OF SUCCESSES IN FIGHTING BETWEEN DISSIDENT FORCES AND DRA TROOPS. HE LEFT WITH US PARTS HE ALLEGED WERE TAKEN FROM MIG-21 AIRCRAFT DOWNED BY DISSIDENT FORCES IN LATE APRIL. END SUMMARY.

3. ASEFI, WHO HAS BEEN TRAVELING THROUGHOUT PAKISTAN SINCE PREVIOUS VISIT TO EMBASSY IN ATTEMPT TO ESTABLISH UNITY OF DISSIDENT MOVEMENT, SAYS "MEANINGFUL ASSOCIATION" OF THREE GROUPS (ANLF, GAILANI GROUP, AND MIAN GUL JAN GROUP) IS NOW 90 PERCENT ASSURED AND SHOULD BE ANNOUNCED BY MAY 18. THE AGREEMENT WILL BE SIGNED BY LEADERS OF THREE ORGANIZATIONS IN PESHAWAR AND WILL BE ANNOUNCED TO PRESS "THROUGHOUT THE WORLD", ASEFI SAYS. THE ASSOCIATION WILL INCLUDE COMMAND COORDINATION IN FIELD OPERATIONS AND COOPERATION AT TOP LEVELS IN PESHAWAR.

4. ASEFI HAS ALSO ARRANGED FOR EXPATRIATE AFGHAN BUSINESSMEN TO SPONSOR A RADIO STATION WHICH WILL BE PURCHASED IN EUROPE AND SET UP IN WAZIRISTAN UNDER DIRECTION OF UNIFIED GROUPS COMMITTEE. ASEFI REPORTEDLY TOLD HIS COUSIN, GOP FONSEC SHAHNAWAZ, OF HIS INTENTIONS AND ASKED PERMISSION TO IMPORT RADIO EQUIPMENT. ASEFI DID NOT REPORT FONSEC APPROVAL; RATHER, SHAHNAWAZ "DID NOT TELL ME TO STOP THE PROCESS," ASEFI SAID.

5. ASEFI SAYS MAJOR TRIBAL GROUPS OF AFGHANISTAN HAVE RECENTLY BECOME MORE ACTIVE IN SUPPORTING REBEL ACTIVITIES. WAZIRS HAVE ACTIVELY JOING FIGHT AS OF MAY 11 AND MENGALS, TAJIKS, UZBEKS, AND AFRIDIS HAVE ALL AGREED IN PRINCIPLE TO DO SO BUT LACK ORGANIZATION TO COORDINATE THEIR PEOPLE'S EFFORTS. ANOTHER FACTOR CAUSING SOME HESITATION ON PART OF THOSE ETHNIC/TRIBAL GROUPS IS LACK OF ANY LEADER OF "NATIONAL" STATURE WITH WHOM THEY CAN IDENTIFY. ASEFI HAS LETTER ALLEGEDLY SIGNED BY ALL THESE GROUPS ADDRESSED TO KING ZAHER SHAH APPEALING FOR HIS RETURN, OR THAT OF ABDUL WALI, TO REPRESENT RALLYING POINT FOR DISSIDENT ACTIVITIES. LETTER MAKES CLEAR TO KING , ACCORDING TO ASEFI, THAT RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF MONARCHY NOT, RPT NOT, INTENT OF THE GROUPS. ROYAL PERSONAGE WOULD BE FIGUREHEAD RATHER THAN RULING MONARCH.

5. ASEFI SAID HE HAS ASKED FONSEC SHAHNAWAZ ABOUT POSSIBILITY OF ZAHER SHAH'S OR ABDUL WALI'S BEING PERMITTED TO ESTABLISH A BASE IN PAKISTAN. SHAHNAWAZ' RESPONE WAS "PERHAPS A LITTLE LATER, BUT NOT NOW." SHAHNWAZ ALLEGEDLY TOLD ASEFI THAT SOVIETS HAVE MADE DEMARCH AT MFA OPPOSING GOP'S PERMITTING AFGHAN ROYAL FAMILY TO TAKE UP RESIDENCE HERE.

6. WHEN ASKED ABOUT FOREIGN SUPPORT FOR DISSIDENT GROUPS ASEFIISAID THE PRC, UAE, AND SAUDIS HAVE ALL PROMISED ASSISTANCE BUT HAVE YET TO DELIVER. AS SOON AS COMMUNIQUE OF ASSOCIATION OF GROUPS IS ISSUED, ASEFI PLANS TO VISIT UAE AND SAUDI ARABIA TO FOLLOW-UP PROMISES. HE THEN PLANS TO RETURN TO PARIS VIA ROME TO DELIVER APPEALS TO ZAHER SHAH AND ABDUL WALI. THERE IS POSSIBILITY HE MAY BE ABLE ALSO TO ARRANGE STOP IN IRAN, AS HAZARA COMMUNITY IN PAKISTAN HAS OFFERED PUT HIM IN TOUCH WITH AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI TO ELICIT ASSISTANCE FROM THAT QUARTER.

7. ASEFI SAYS GROUPS IN PESHAWAR TEND TO DOUBT SOVIETS WOULD, IN ANY CIRCUMSTANCES, OCCUPY AFGHANISTAN TO SAVE KHALQI GOVERNMENT. HE SAYS FIRST MOVE AFTER UNIFYING MAJOR GROUPS WILL BE TO CONTACT SOVIETS ON SOME NETURAL "TURF" AND ESTABLISH RELATIONSHIP BASED ON REALITIES OF THE SITUATION, I.E. THAT NO REGIME IN KABUL CAN EXIST WITHOUT GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. THESE INTENTIONS CANNOT BE MENTIONED AT THIS TIME, ASEFI CONTENDS, OR THE SUPER-RELIGIOUS WOULD MISUNDERSTAND AND UNITY WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE.

8. PURPORTEDLY REFLECTING VIEWS OF SYED AHMED GAILANI AND OTHER LEADERS IN PESHAWAR AREA, ASEFI WARNED EMBOFF THAT AMCIT ZIA NASSERY IS "PROBABLY A DOUBLE AGENT." ASEFI CLAIMS ZIA NASSERY MET WITH HAFIZULLAH AMIN AT UN LAST YEAR SHORTLY THEREAFTER VISITED KABUL. HE THEN APPEARED IN PESHAWAR AND ALLIED HIMSELF WITH GAILANI AFTER BEING REPULSED ANLF LEADER, MOJEDEDI. GAILANI NOW REGRETS BEFRIENDING ZIA NASSERY AND WANTS IT UNDER STOOD THERE IS NO RELATIONSHIP BETWEENHIM AND THE AMERICAN, ACCORDING TO ASEFI.

9. ASEFI REPORTED THAT DISSIDENT FORCES HAVE NOT SHOT DOWN THREE DRA MIG AIRCRAFT. THE FIRST AT WOZA IN THE ZADRAN AREA OF PAKTIA ON APRIIL 25; THE SECOND NEAR PACHAR OGAN (SIC) VILLAGE PAKTIA; AND THE LATEST, ON MAY 9 NEAR KHOWST IN PAKTIA. HE DID NOT SPECIFY HOW AIRCRAFT HAD BEEN SHOT DOWN BUT LEFT WITH EMBOFF--ON LOAN-- SEVERAL REMNANTS OF THE AIRCRAFT, INCLUDING FIVE MARKINGS PLATES TORN OFF THE FIRST MIG, AS WELL AS PHOTOS OF THE AIRCRAFT. COPIES BEING POUCHED TO LONGETEIG C/O INR/RNA/SOA FOR INTERESTED WASHINGTON CONSUMERS.

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ORIGIN/ACTION

WR	REP	AF
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NT	LAB	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR
RMV	CIA	NAVY
SD	USIA	NSA

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

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A-33 NO.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State
INFO : ISLAMABAD, NEW DELHI, TEHRAN
E012065: N/A
TAGS : PGOV, PINR, AF

FROM : Amembassy Kabul DATE:

SUBJECT : Educational Backgrounds of Ministers and Deputy Ministers in the Afghan Government

REF : 78 KABUL A-69

Attached is a compilation of the educational backgrounds and professional training of ministers and deputy ministers in the Government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA). By comparing information on these officials with data on individuals in the DRA's initial government, formed after the April 27, 1978, revolution, it is evident that, in terms of education at least, this group is more respectable than its predecessor. Forty-two of the top officials in the present government have received undergraduate or professional training (twenty-nine in Afghanistan and thirteen abroad), and seventeen have benefited from graduate education or advanced training. In contrast, only twenty-nine Cabinet and sub-Cabinet-level bureaucrats had undergraduate training, and twelve had received advanced education, in the DRA's first government. As was the case with the first group, however, few of the present officials have had training which appears relevant to their present responsibilities.

Also of interest is the fact that eleven ministers and deputy ministers have received training in the United States, while only six have studied in the Soviet Union. None of these officials, as far as we know, have been educated in other communist countries.

Enclosures: 1. Educational Backgrounds of Cabinet Ministers and Deputy Ministers.
2. Individual Educational Histories

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Drafted by: POL:MPAdams:as 5-14-79
Contents and Classification Approved by: CHARGE:JBAmstutz
Clearances: POL:JETaylor; POL:FATurco; A/DCM:BAFlatin

Data for this study is not available on several officials, and information on others is incomplete, because of the continuing personnel shifts by the government. Nevertheless, we shall ultimately fill the gaps in our knowledge of these higher-ranking bureaucrats.

B.A.

AMSTUTZ

Enclosure: 1
KABUL A-35

EDUCATION BACKGROUNDS OF CABINET MINISTERS AND DEPUTY MINISTERS*

A Undergraduate Degrees and Professional (e.g. military) Training:

Afghanistan	United States	USSR	UK
29	6	1	1

France	Lebanon (AUB)	India
1	3	1

B Advanced Degrees and Training:

Afghanistan	United States	USSR
5	7	5

*NOTE: This chart reflects the educational record of thirty-three individuals. We do not at this time have any information about the educational history of a further eight officials. Two deputy ministerships are currently vacant.

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INDIVIDUAL EDUCATIONAL HISTORIES

President of the Revolutionary Council:

Noor Mohammad Taraki: Schooling through the fourth grade. Night school.

Lumrai (Prime) Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs:

Hafizullah Amin: BS, Kabul University, Mathematics and Physics, 1953. MS, Columbia Teachers College, 1958. Additional two years at Columbia Teachers College between 1963 and 1965.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

First Deputy Minister for Political Affairs Shah Mohammad Dost: Graduate, Faculty of Law and Political Science, Kabul University.

Second Deputy Minister for Political Affairs Dr. Assadullah Amin: Graduate, Faculty of Medicine, Kabul University.

Deputy Minister for Administrative Affairs Abdul Hadi Mokamel: Graduate, Faculty of Law and Political Science, Kabul University.

Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reform

Minister Saleh Mohammad Ziri: Graduate, Faculty of Medicine, Kabul University.

Deputy Minister for Land Reform Fazel Rahim Rahim: Training in statistics in India. Also studied statistics at Iowa State University in 1956-1957, 1961-1964, 1970. BS, Agricultural Statistics and Livestock Research, Iowa State University in 1964. All studies in U.S. were sponsored by AID.

Deputy Minister for Agriculture Abdul Ahad Sarsam: USAID financed university training in the U.S.

Ministry of Communications

Minister Mohammad Gulabzoi: Graduate, Afghan Military Academy. Fighter pilot training in the Soviet Union.

Deputy Minister Khallilullah Kohistani:
BA, Kabul University, Mathematics and Chemistry, 1974.

Ministry of Commerce

Minister Abdul Qudus Ghorbandi:
Graduate, Afghan Institute of Technology. Fifteen month Air Controller Course with FAA in U.S.

Deputy Minister Mohammad Hakim Malyar:
Graduate, Faculty of Economics, Kabul University.

Ministry of Defense

Minister Lt. Col. Mohammad Aslam Watanjar:
Graduate, Afghan Military Academy, 1968.

Deputy Minister (Chief of Staff) Lt. Col. Mohammad Yaqub:
Graduate, Afghan Military Academy.

Ministry of Education

Minister Dr. Abdul Rashid Jalili:
Graduate, Faculty of Agriculture, Kabul University, 1963. MS, Agricultural Microbiology, University of Wyoming. Ph.D., Soviet Union.

First Deputy Minister Dr. Ghulam Mohammad Sahibi:
No information.

Second Deputy Minister, Fazl Haq:
No information.

Ministry of Finance

Minister Abdul Karim Misaq:
No formal education.

Deputy Minister Khair Mohammad Sultani:
Graduate, Kabul University. Two months at University of Pittsburgh, 1975.

Ministry of Frontier Affairs

Minister Saheb Jan Shahrayee:
No information.

Deputy Minister -- vacant.

Ministry of Higher Education

Minister Prof. Mahmoud Sooma:
BS, American University in Beirut, Science, 1960. MS and P. Dip., Columbia Teachers College, 1964.

Deputy Minister Pir Mohammad Zeray:
BS, University of London, Engineering.

Ministry of Information and Culture

Minister Khayal Mohammad Katawazi:
Graduate, Faculty of Journalism, Kabul University, 1968.

Deputy Minister for Information and Culture Ali Gul Paiwand:
Graduate, Faculty of Education, Kabul University. Post-graduate study in education, Teachers College, Kabul.

Deputy Minister for Radio and Television -- vacant.

Ministry of Interior

Minister Sher Jan Mazdooryar:
Graduate, Afghan Military Academy.

Deputy Minister -- Faqir Mohammad Faqir:
No information.

Ministry of Justice

Minister Abdul Hakim Shahrayee Jauzjani:
Graduate, Faculty of Islamic Law, Kabul University, 1960. Studied journalism at Kabul University in 1962. Further studies in the Soviet Union in 1963.

Deputy Minister for Administration Mohammad Akram Abqari:
No information.

Deputy Minister for Judicial Affairs Dr. Mohammad Anwar Wahidi:
Graduate, Faculty of Law and Political Science, Kabul University, 1953. Studied Criminal Investigation and Comparitive Law at American and George Washington Universities, 1957-8. (USAID grant.)

Ministry of Mines and Industries

Minister Mohammad Ismail Danesh:
Attended Faculty of Agriculture and Engineering, Kabul University, 1958-60. BS, Mining, University of West Virginia, 1964. MS, Mining, University of West Virginia. MS, Physics, University of Lenin, Soviet Union, 1971.

Deputy Minister for Industries Ghulam Mohammad Rahimi:
No information.

Deputy Minister for Mines, Eng. Abdul Kafi Rassuli:
No information.

Ministry of Planning

Minister Eng. Mohammad Seddiq Alemyar:
Graduate, Afghan Institute of Technology. Also studied at Afghan Politechnic. Further training in the Soviet Union in geological engineering.

Deputy Minister Fateh Mohammad Tarin:
Received training in the Soviet Union under U.N. auspices. Also spent eighteen months in France studying industrial management.

Deputy Minister for Statistics Abdul Ghafour Malikzada:
No information.

Ministry of Public Health

Minister (and Deputy Prime Minister) Dr. Shah Wali:
Graduate, Faculty of Medicine, Kabul University.

Deputy Minister -- vacant.

Ministry of Transport

Minister Mohammad Hassan Bareq Shafiyee:
No university or advanced training.

Deputy Minister Noor Mohammad Dalili:
Two years training program in U.S. with Federal Aviation Agency.

Ministry of Public Works

Minister Dastagir Panjshiri:
BA, Faculty of Letters, Kabul University.

Deputy Minister, Eng. Saleh Mohammad Pairoz:
No information.

Ministry of Water and Power

Minister Mohammad Mansur Hashemi:
Attended Teachers Training College in Kabul and then American University in Beirut from 1955-1960. BS, Kabul University, Physics, 1960. MS, University of Arizona, 1965.

Deputy Minister Eng. Mohammad Juma Barekzoi:
Two years at American University in Beirut.

S E C R E T

Tehran, Iran

May 16, 1979

Excellency:

During our recent meeting, the Prime Minister indicated interest in receiving information which might not otherwise be available to you. I have attached a separate paper on Afghanistan, the first part of which in effect is status report from the time of the April 1978 coup. The second section draws upon our recent information.

Please let me know whether information of this nature is of interest to you and/or advise me of what specific areas are of special concern to you and your colleagues.

I look forward to further exchanges with you.

Sincerely,

Charles W. Naas
Charge d'Affaires, a.i.

His Excellency,
Mr. Amir Entezam,
Deputy Prime Minister,
The Prime Minister's Office,
Tehran.

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RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0111
RUSBQD/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR 0002
RUQMYA/USLO RIYADH 0055
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF TEHRAN 05208

CLASS: SECRET
CHRGE: STATE 5/20/79
APPRV: CHARGE:CWNAAS
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DISTR: CHG POL-3 OR ECON ICA RF

XGDS-4 5/20/09

E.O. 12065: GDS 5/20/85 (MCGAFFEY, DAVID) OR-P
TAGS: PEPR, AF PK
SUBJECT: FREE-LANCE AFGHAN REBEL CALLS ON EMBASSY

REF: ISLAMABAD 5531

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT; THIS IS A REPORTING CABLE.)

2. SUMMARY: AMCIT AFGHAN ZIA NASSRY, IN IRAN TO MEET WITH AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI, AYATOLLAH KHALKHALI, AND FONMIN YAZDI TO OBTAIN FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FOR AFGHAN GUERILLA MOVEMENT, DESCRIBED TO POLOFF SUBSTANTIAL WEAKNESSES IN MOVEMENT, LEADERSHIP, FINANCES, AND ORGANIZATION, BUT STATED THAT MOVEMENT WILL UNSEAT KHALQI GOVERNMENT BY NOVEMBER, TO INSTALL DEMOCRATIC ISLAMIC REPUBLIC. END SUMMARY.

3. ZIA NASSRY CALLED POL SECTION MAY 17, DESCRIBING HIMSELF AS FRIEND OF RICK SHERMAN IN ISLAMABAD. WE MET OVER COFFEE, DISCUSSING MUTUAL ACQUAINTANCES AND HIS CURRENT ACTIVITIES. NASSRY DESCRIBES HIMSELF AS A "FREE-LANCE PATRIOT," WORKING FOR BUT NOT WITH ANY OF THE VARIOUS LEADERS IN PAKISTAN, ALTHOUGH MOST CLOSELY ASSOCIATED WITH PIR SYED AHMED GAILANI. HE STATED HE HAD JUST COME FROM NEW YORK, WHERE HE MET WITH BOXER MOHAMMAD ALI, AND FRANKFURT, WHERE HE MET WITH ABOUT THIRTY EXPATRIATE AFGHAN BUSINESSMEN. (HE SAID ALI PUT HIM OFF, BUT FRANKFURT AFGHANS HAD PLEDGED 50,000 DM.) HIS MAIN PURPOSE IS TO RAISE FUNDS AND HE CARRIED CREDENTIALS FROM THE "AFGHANISTAN ISLAMIC AND REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL." HE IS IN IRAN WITH INTRODUCTIONS TO AYATOLLAH KHALKHALI, HEAD OF ISLAMIC COURT (AND, HE STATES, SON-IN-LAW OF AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI). KHALKHALI, HE SAID, WAS TAKING HIM TO QOM THAT AFTERNOON, WHERE HE HAD AN APPOINTMENT WITH KHOMEINI FOR THE NEXT DAY. IF KHOMEINI GIVES HIS BLESSING, HE WILL MEET AGAIN WITH KHALKHALI AND FONMIN IBRAHIM YAZDI TO DISCUSS DETAILS OF FINANCIAL AID TO MOVEMENT AND ESTABLISHMENT OF ARMED REFUGEE CAMPS ON IRANIAN-AFGHAN BORDER.

4. NASSRY DESCRIBED MOVEMENT AS HIGHLY MOTIVATED, BUT ABSOLUTELY WITHOUT FUNDS." HE SAYS LEADERS ARE DECEIVING THEMSELVES ABOUT EXPECTED SUPPORT FROM SAUDI ARABIA, GULF STATES, AND CHINA, WHILE HE IS WORKING TO FIND CASH. HE STATES GAILANI WENT TO SAUDI ARABIA IN JANUARY, AND STAYED

TWO WEEKS AS GUEST OF PRINCE FAHD, BUT RECEIVED NOTHING. IN MARCH, HE, NASSRY, VISITED ABU DHABI, BUT GOT NOTHING BUT GOOD WISHES. HE HAD APPOINTMENT WITH KHOMEINI ALSO IN MARCH, BUT WAS REQUESTED TO PUT IT OFF UNTIL IRANIAN REVOLUTION GOT STRAIGHTENED OUT. MEANWHILE, HE HAS RAISED SUBSTANTIAL FUNDS FROM AFGHANS IN U.S., BUT IT HAS ALL GONE FOR FOOD, WITH NOTHING LEFT FOR ARMS OR AMMUNITION. HE DESCRIBED AFGHAN LEADERSHIP IN PAKISTAN AS "STRANGE--FROM ISLAMIC BROTHERHOOD TO ISLAMIC MARXISTS," COOPERATING SULLENLY WHILE STRUGGLING FOR PRE-EMINENCE, AND UNWILLING TO TRUST ANYONE OUTSIDE THEIR CIRCLE, INCLUDING HIMSELF. HE ALSO DECRIED THEIR FIGHTING EXPERTISE, SAYING THEY HAVE BEEN WASTING MEN ON SUICIDE MISSIONS WITH NO GENERAL STRATEGY, SUFFERING HEAVY CASUALTIES (700 WOUNDED IN ONE CAMP) FOR WHOM THERE ARE NO MEDICAL FACILITIES, AND FAILING TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF SUCCESSES. THEY ALL AGREE ON NECESSITY OF DEMOCRATIC ISLAMIC REPUBLIC, BUT DISAGREE ON THEIR DEFINITIONS. HOWEVER, MOST OF THE FIGHTING (IN 23 OF 28 PROVINCES) IS OCCURRING SPONTANEOUSLY, WITHOUT LEADERSHIP FROM PAKISTAN, AND HE BELIEVES WITH ALL ITS FAILINGS THAT, WITH FOOD SHORTAGES EXPECTED IN AFGHANISTAN IN OCTOBER, THERE WILL BE A GENERAL UPRISING, AND REVOLT OF DISILLUSIONED TROOPS, AND TARAKI GOVERNMENT WILL BE FINISHED BY NOVEMBER. THE ONLY THING WHICH CAN INTERFERE WITH THAT TIMETABLE, HE SAYS, WOULD BE THE INTRODUCTION OF RUSSIAN TROOPS, WHICH WOULD SOLIDIFY OPPOSITION TO THE SAME END, BUT WOULD REQUIRE A PROTRACTED WAR. HIS BEST GUESS IS THAT THE SOVIETS WILL NOT TAKE THAT CHANCE NOW. HE PROMISED TO CALL AFTER HE HAD MET WITH IRANIAN AUTHORITIES TO GIVE THE RESULTS OF HIS APPEAL.

5. FOR ISLAMABAD. NASSRY EXPECTS TO BE IN ISLAMABAD IN ABOUT THREE WEEKS, AND HOPES TO CALL ON RICK SHERMAN.

6. TEHRAN IS POUCHING UNDER SEPARATE COVER TO DEPARTMENT, ISLAMABAD, AND KABUL, PAPER WHICH NASSRY IS DISTRIBUTING WITH HIS APPEALS TO EXPLAIN REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT.

7. COMMENT: NASSRY'S OWN CRITICISM OF GAILANI AND OTHER LEADERS, PLUS HIS COMMENT ABOUT JEALOUSIES AND LACK OF TRUST OUTSIDE INNER CIRCLE, MAY EXPLAIN COMMENTS AGAINST

S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 02 TEHRAN 05208

E.O. 12065: GDS 5/20/85 (MCGAFFEY, DAVID) OR-P
TAGS: PEPR, AF PK
SUBJECT: FREE-LANCE AFGHAN REBEL CALLS ON EMBASSY

NASSRY BY GAILANI AIDE ASEPI (REFTEL). HOWEVER, IF HE SUCCEEDS IN OBTAINING FUNDS, GAILANI AND OTHERS MAY REASSESS HIS VALUE TO THEM. END COMMENT. NAAS

S E C R E T SECTION 02/OF 02 TEHRAN 05208

S E C R E T TEHRAN 5246

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TO RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0101
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1563
RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0114
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S E C R E T TEHRAN 05246

CLASS: SECRET
CHRGE: STATE 5/21
APPRV: CHARGE:CWH
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CLEAR: POL:VTOMSI
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File Afghanistan

E.O. 12065: XGDS45/21/09 (MC GAFFEY, DAVID C.) OR-P
TAGS: PEPR, IR, AF, PK
SUBJECT: LIMITED IRANIAN RESPONSE TO AFGHAN REBEL APPEAL

REF: TEHRAN 5208

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. SUMMARY: AFGHAN FUND RAISER NASSRY REPORTED SOME ASSISTANCE FROM IRANIANS, TALK OF "HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE." REPORTS 30-35,000 AFGHAN REFUGEES IN IRAN. END SUMMARY.

3. AMCIT AFGHAN ZIA NASSRY CALLED POLOFF MAY 21 TO REPORT RESULTS OF HIS TALKS WITH IRANIAN AUTHORITIES. HE STATES THAT HE DID TRAVEL TO QOM AND MET WITH AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI. HE SAID THEIR TALK WAS FRIENDLY, BUT NOT TOO PRODUCTIVE. HE WAS ASKING FOR ARMS ASSISTANCE, AND THE AYATOLLAH SPOKE INSTEAD OF "HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE." HE SPOKE AGAIN WITH AYATOLLAH KHALKHALI, WHO SAID THAT THIS "COULD BE A BEGINNING." HE DID NOT MEET WITH FONMIN YAZDI, BUT INSTEAD MET WITH MR.TAGHAVI, CHIEF OF THE MFA SECTION DEALING WITH AFGHANISTAN, AND HAS A SECOND MEETING SCHEDULED WITH HIM IN APPROXIMATELY TEN DAYS.

4. YESTERDAY, IN A PRESS CONFERENCE, AYATOLLAH ROHANI, A MAJOR RELIGIOUS FIGURE AND CLOSE RELATIVE OF KHOMEINI, CALLED ON "THE AFGHAN PEOPLE TO REVOLT AGAINST THEIR GOVERNMENT AS THE IRANIANS DID HERE." HE URGED THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT TO "INTERVENE IN AFGHANISTAN TO ASSIST MUSLIMS. SUCH STATEMENTS BY UNOFFICIAL, SECOND-LEVEL FIGURES, CARRY LITTLE WEIGHT UNTIL THEY ARE CONFIRMED EITHER BY KHOMEINI OR BY THE GOVERNMENT.

5. NASSRY STATES THAT THE PGOI DID ASSIST HIM IN CONTACTING AFGHAN REFUGEES IN IRAN. HE TRAVELLED TO MASHAD, WHERE THE AFGHANS HAVE A SMALL OFFICE, AND WAS ESCORTED TO THE REFUGEE CAMPS. HE STATES THERE ARE APPROXIMATELY 30-35,000 AFGHANS LOCATED IN AN AREA STRETCHING TWENTY MILES ALONG THE BORDER FROM THE TOWN OF "TYBAD," SOUTH OF MASHAD. MOST ARE SHEPHERD FAMILIES, WITH THEIR FLOCKS, AND BECAUSE OF LACK OF FODDER, MANY HAVE ALREADY RETURNED TO AFGHANISTAN. INCLUDED IN THE NUMBER, HOWEVER, ARE OVER ONE HUNDRED AFGHAN MILITARY OFFICERS--GROUND FORCES, ARTILLERY, AND AIR FORCE. THESE ARE ATTEMPTING TO TRAIN A GUERRILLA FORCE (MOST MALE REFUGEES HAVE PERSONALLY-OWNED RIFLES) AND, NASSRY SAYS, ARE CONDUCTING SOME OPERATIONS INSIDE AFGHANISTAN. NASSRY HOPES THAT THE IRANIANS

S E C R E T TEHRAN 5246

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WILL AT LEAST TAKE THE BURDEN OF THE ACTUAL REFUGEES OFF THE HANDS OF THE OFFICERS, FREEING THEM FOR MORE TRAINING AND OPERATIONS.

6. NASSRY INTENDS TO TRAVEL TOMORROW TO PAKISTAN, AND WILL PLAN TO RETURN TO IRAN AFTER APPROXIMATELY ONE WEEK THERE. NAAS

S E C R E T TEHRAN 5246

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RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD 0355
RUMJPC/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1574
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 7816
RUMJSM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO 0268
RUMJDK/AMEMBASSY DACCA 0352
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 1076
RUHCHCA/CINCPAC HONOLULU HI
RUEBOD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0961
RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 1438
RUESLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0506
RUMJHT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU 0211
RUFHLG/AMCONSUL LENINGRAD 5879
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 7454
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1440
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 7487
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 9048
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 2144
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 3577
RUFHJA/USMISSION USBERLIN 4714
RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO 6966
RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 7833
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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 03 MOSCOW 13083

E.O. 12065: RDS-3 5/21/99 (TOON, MALCOLM) OR-M
TAGS: AF, UR, MOPS, PEPR, PINT
SUBJECT: (C) AFGHANISTAN: PROSPECTS FOR SOVIET INTERVENTION

REF: (A) KABUL 3626, (B) MOSCOW 8584

1. (C) SUMMARY. WE DO NOT THINK THAT THE SOVIET UNION UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES VIEWS ITS OPTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN AS OPEN-ENDED. IN OUR OPINION, ANALOGIES WITH THE 1968 SOVIET INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA ARE FAULTY. WE THINK THE SOVIETS WILL CONTINUE TO INCREASE THEIR ADVISORY AND LOGISTICAL MILITARY SUPPORT FOR THE PRO-SOVIET KABUL REGIME. SOME SOVIET PERSONNEL MAY BECOME INVOLVED IN DRA MILITARY OPERATIONS. UNDER FORESEEABLE CIRCUMSTANCES, HOWEVER, MOSCOW WILL PROBABLY AVOID SHOULDERING A SUBSTANTIAL PART OF THE ANTI-INSURGENCY COMBAT BURDEN IN AFGHANISTAN. END SUMMARY.

2. (C) WE AGREE WITH THE MAIN TENETS OF KABUL'S ANALYSIS (REF A), IN PARTICULAR WITH THE CONCLUSION THAT THE SOVIETS WILL PROBABLY ATTEMPT TO AVOID PLUNGING INTO WHAT WELL COULD BECOME A VIETNAM-TYPE TRAP. IN FACT, WE WOULD GO EVEN FURTHER IN DOWNPLAYING THE VALIDITY OF THE CZECH ANALOGY. AS MENTIONED REF B, IN OUR OPINION THE SOVIETS WILL NOT UNDER FORESEEABLE CIRCUMSTANCES GIVE SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO THE LARGE-SCALE DISPATCH OF COMBAT UNITS (WHICH IN THE CASE OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA INVOLVED SOME 14 SOVIET DIVISIONS PLUS FOUR DIVISIONS FROM OTHER WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES) TO SAVE THE KHALQI REGIME FROM BEING OVERTHROWN.

3. (S) OUR CONCLUSION IS BASED ON SEVERAL PREMISES:

(A) STRATEGICALLY, AFGHANISTAN IS IN AN ENTIRELY DIFFERENT CATEGORY FROM CZECHOSLOVAKIA. CZECHOSLOVAKIA SITS ASTRIDE OR IS NEAR HISTORIC INVASION CORRIDORS INTO RUSSIA/THE SOVIET UNION. IT IS A MEMBER OF THE FE "SOCIALIST COMMONWEALTH", THE "WORLD SOCIALIST SYSTEM" AS WELL AS THE WARSAW PACT. AND CHANGES IN ITS INTERNAL SYSTEM CAN IMPACT RELATIVELY DIRECTLY UPON THE USSR'S INTERNAL SYSTEM.

(B) FROM THE MOSCOW PERSPECTIVE, AND ESPECIALLY IN THE UPCOMING MONTHS, A SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN WOULD PROBABLY REDOUND TO THE DISADVANTAGE OF GLOBAL STRATEGIC INTERESTS. IT WOULD DEAL A SEVERE BLOW TO DETENTE WITH THE WEST AT A TIME WHEN MOSCOW IS INCREASINGLY PRE-OCCUPIED WITH THE GROWING CHINESE THREAT IN THE EAST. SUCH A MOVE WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY DOOM SALT. IT WOULD PROVIDE EXCELLENT (AND, AS IN THE CASE OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, LONG-TERM) GRIST FOR CHARGES BY THE CHINESE AND OTHERS OF SOVIET EXPANSIONIST, HEGEMONIST OBJECTIVES IN THE WORLD. IT WOULD SOUR RELATIONS WITH THE IMPORTANT MUSLIM WORLD.

(C) IN 1968 THE SOVIETS CALCULATED CORRECTLY THAT THE CZECHS WOULD NOT FIGHT. THIS WOULD NOT HAPPEN IN THE CASE OF AFGHANISTAN. FURTHER, THE SOVIET OBJECTIVE IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA WAS EASILY ACCOMPLISHED BY OCCUPYING AND PACIFYING THE URBAN CENTERS. MOSCOW'S TASK WOULD BE MORE DIFFICULT IN AFGHANISTAN WHERE THE GREAT BULK OF THE POPULATION--AND THE RESISTANCE--ARE LOCATED IN RURAL AREAS. IT IS EVEN POSSIBLE THAT THE INSURGENCY IN AFGHANISTAN WOULD RECEIVE ADDED IMPETUS BY

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RUMJOM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO [illegible]69
RUMJDK/AMEMBASSY DACCA [illegible]
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 1077
RUHCHCA/CINCPAC HONOLULU HI
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RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 1479
RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 5907
RUMJHT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU 0912
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RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0455
RUSBAT/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1441
RUFMFS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 7488
RUFHRD/AMEMBASSY ROME 9049
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 1445
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2578
RUFMJA/USMISSION USBERLIN 4715
RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO 6567
RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 7834
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S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 03 MOSCOW 13257

THE DIRECT COMMITMENT OF SOVIET TROOPS, AND [illegible] THE SURVIVABILITY OF THE [illegible]-AMIN REGIME [illegible] INCREASINGLY DEPENDENT ON THE CONTINUED [illegible] IN COMBAT OF SUCH TROOPS.

(U) JUST IN TERMS OF PREPARING MILITARILY FOR SUCH ACTION, THE SOVIETS WOULD FIND THE AFGHANISTAN SITUATION IN SOME WAYS MORE COMPLICATED THAN THAT THEY CONFRONTED IN JULY AND AUGUST 1968. THE PREPARATION FOR THE CZECHOSLOVAK INVASION WAS EFFECTIVELY COVERED BY LARGE-SCALE COMBAT, COMMAND AND LOGISTICAL EXERCISES IN THE ESTABLISHED FRAMEWORK OF THE WARSAW PACT. THUS THE NECESSARY GROUND WORK OF RECONNAISSANCE, LOGISTICS BASING AND COMMAND AND CONTROL PROCEDURES WAS LAID, AND, MORE IMPORTANTLY, THE REQUIRED MOBILIZATION AND DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES WAS ACCOMPLISHED UNDER THE SCREEN OF COMPARATIVELY ROUTINE MANEUVERS. IT WAS DIFFICULT TO CONCEIVE OF AN EFFECTIVE, COMPARABLE "SCREEN" IN THE CASE OF AFGHANISTAN. THE CONCENTRATION OF FORCES NECESSARY FOR A CZECHOSLOVAK-STYLE OPERATION IN AFGHANISTAN WOULD PROBABLY REQUIRE LARGE-SCALE MOBILIZATION AND REDEPLOYMENT OF TROOPS IN THE CONTIGUOUS AREAS, ALTHOUGH TO SOME EXTENT THESE PROBLEMS WOULD BE OBVIATED BY ALSO DEPLOYING AIRBORNE DIVISIONS. STRETCHING THE POINT TO INCLUDE ALL OF THE TWO MILITARY DISTRICTS HAVING SOME COMMON BORDER WITH AFGHANISTAN, THE SOVIETS HAVE ELEVEN DIVISIONS, ONLY THREE OF WHICH CAN BE CONSIDERED READY FOR COMBAT WITHOUT MOBILIZATION. NONE OF THESE IS IDEALLY POSITIONED FOR AN AFGHANISTAN MISSION, AND THEY STILL HAVE TO CONSIDER THE CHINESE BORDER WHICH IS THE MAJOR CONSIDERATION OF AT LEAST ONE OF THE MILITARY DISTRICTS.

4. (C) IT IS OF COURSE NOT POSSIBLE AND WOULD BE FOOLISH FOR US TO RULE OUT COMPLETELY THE POSSIBILITY OF A SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN IN RESPONSE TO AN APPEAL FROM A BELEAGUERED KHALQI REGIME. WHILE WE BELIEVE THAT THE DISINCENTIVES IN TERMS OF MOSCOW'S CALCULATION OR ITS BEST INTERESTS AT THIS TIME APPEAR HEAVILY TO OUTWEIGH THE INCENTIVES, THE FACTORS ADVANCED BY KABUL IN PARA II REF A ARE STILL COGENT. IF THE POLITICAL-MILITARY SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN CONTINUES TO DETERIORATE, THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP MAY VERY WELL BE TEMPTED TO CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY OF SOME LESSER FORM OF DIRECT INTERVENTION TO PROTECT ITS OVERALL INVESTMENT IN AFGHANISTAN. FOR THIS REASON IT IS IN OUR INTEREST TO CONTINUE TO GIVE OCCASIONAL REMINDERS TO THE SOVIETS OF THE SERIOUS VIEW WE WOULD TAKE OF ANY SUCH ACTIONS. REMINDERS FROM WESTERN AND THIRD-WORLD GOVERNMENTS CONSTITUTE IN THEMSELVES DISINCENTIVES TO DIRECT INTERVENTION.

5. (C) SHORT OF DIRECT, LARGE-SCALE SOVIET MILITARY INTERVENTION, WHAT IS THE LIKELY NATURE AND SCOPE OF SOVIET MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO AFGHANISTAN? THE AFGHAN MILITARY'S ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY MAY WELL BE THE ONLY LIMITATION AT THIS TIME ON HOW FAR THE SOVIETS ARE WILLING TO GO. WE BELIEVE THE NUMBER OF SOVIET ADVISERS COULD PROGRESSIVELY INCREASE, AND SOME COULD BECOME INVOLVED IN MILITARY OPERATIONS. SOME SOVIET FIRE SUPPORT COULD BE PROVIDED, FOR EXAMPLE, IN THE FORM OF HELICOPTER GUNSHIP OR TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT FOR GROUND OPERATIONS, OR THE EMPLOYMENT OF SOVIET PERSONNEL TO OPERATE SOPHISTICATED MILITARY EQUIPMENT. THIS WOULD ALL BE IN THE CONTEXT, HOWEVER, OF AFGHAN AND NOT SOVIET TROOPS SHOULDERING THE COMBAT BURDEN IN A SITUATION WHERE THE DRA'S OWN CAPABILITIES TO SURVIVE AND EXPAND ITS CONTROL--AND NOT MOSCOW'S DIRECT INTERVENTION--WILL BE THE CHIEF DETERMINANTS OF THE DESTINY OF THE AFGHAN RT
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RUFNOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 7519
RUMJOM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO 0270
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RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 1078
RUHHNA/CINCPAC HONOLULU HI
RUSBGD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0963
RUSMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 1440
RUSELK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 5908
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RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 7489
RUFMRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 9050
RUMMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 0146
RUFHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 3579
RUFHJA/USMISSION USBERLIN 4716
RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO 6968
RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 7835
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S E C R E T SECTION 03 OF 03 MOSCOW 13083

"REVOLUTION".

6. (C) FINALLY, RE PARA 11 REF A WE DO NOT CONSIDER THAT CONCERN ABOUT THE MUSLIM POPULATION OF THE SOVIET CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS BY ITSELF WOULD BE AN IMPORTANT INCENTIVE FOR THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP TO ADOPT AN INTERVENTIONIST COURSE IN AFGHANISTAN. ALL THE INFORMATION WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO GATHER ABOUT THIS REGION INDICATES THAT MOSCOW HAS THE SITUATION WELL UNDER CONTROL. FREQUENT VISITS BY EMBASSY OFFICERS TO SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA IN RECENT MONTH HAVE UNCOVERED FEW SIGNS OF DISCONTENT. THE CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS HAVE MADE SIGNIFICANT SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS UNDER SOVIET RULE AND ENJOY A SIGNIFICANTLY HIGHER STANDARD OF LIVING THAN IN NEIGHBORING AREAS OF AFGHANISTAN AND IRAN. AND, SHOULD DISCONTENT NONETHELESS SURFACE IN THE COMING MONTHS, THE SOVIETS CAN BE COUNTED ON TO MOVE QUICKLY AND EFFECTIVELY TO CRUSH IT. TOON
BT
#3083

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RR RUQMHR
DE RUEHMO #3160 1442035
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 242034Z MAY 79
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6667
INFO RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1977
RUMJDK/AMEMBASSY DACCA 0355
RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0964
RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0509
RUFHLG/AMCONSUL LENINGRAD 5887
RUSBAK/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1443
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 0147
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 13160

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 5/24/99 (TOON, MALCOLM) OR-M
TAGS: AF, PEPR, UR

SUBJECT: (C) REPORTED APPOINTMENT OF SOVIET DIPLOMAT AS DIPLOMATIC ADVISER TO DRA

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. AT MAY 22 QUADRIPARTITE MEETING, UK AMBASSADOR REPORTED THAT FORMER SOVIET DEPUTY PERMREP AT THE UN AND NOW AN OFFICIAL IN THE SOVIET MFA SECOND EUROPEAN DEPT., VASILIY STEPANOVICH SAFRONCHUK, WILL BE GOING TO KABUL AS "DIPLOMATIC ADVISER" TO THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT. WE ASSUME THAT, IN EFFECT, THIS DESIGNATION WILL MAKE HIM THE PERSONAL ADVISER TO H. AMIN.

3. A PAKISTANI DIPLOMAT TOLD US MAY 24 THAT A PRC DIPLOMAT HAD MENTIONED TO HIM THAT SAFRONCHUK WILL BE GOING TO KABUL, PERHAPS AS AMBASSADOR. PAK SOURCE SAID THAT, ALTHOUGH SAFRONCHUK APPEARS TO HAVE HAD NO PREVIOUS AFGHAN OR EVEN ASIAN-RELATED ASSIGNMENTS, HIS EMBASSY'S RECORDS INDICATE THAT HE WAS IN KABUL ON AN OFFICIAL TRIP SHORTLY BEFORE OR DURING THE APRIL 27, 1978, COUP. PAK SOURCE STATED FURTHER THAT PAKS BELIEVE SAFRONCHUK HAS KGB CONNECTIONS.

4. EMBASSY'S RELATIVELY BRIEF BIO ACCOUNT ON SAFRONCHUK DESCRIBES HIM AS PRIMARILY A SPECIALIST ON UK AFFAIRS. HE SERVED FOR THREE YEARS AS SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO GHANA (1968-71) BEFORE MOVING TO THE UN AS SOVIET DEPUTY REPREP. HE APPARENTLY ALSO AT ONE TIME WAS PART OF THE SOVIET REPRESENTATION ON THE UN ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR ASIA AND THE FAR EAST, AND HAS TRAVELLED EXTENSIVELY THROUGHOUT THE FAR AND MIDDLE EAST.

5. EMBASSY WOULD APPRECIATE ANY FURTHER BIO INFO ON SAFRONCHUK THE DEPT. MAY BE ABLE TO PROVIDE. TOON
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#3169

VV ESA254MJC828
OO RUGMHR
DE RUSBLK 4236/1 1531115
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 021150Z JUN 79
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4101
INFO RUSBGD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 6821
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1644
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 6891
RUGMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 0213
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 1 OF 2 KABUL 4236

E.O. 12065: N/A
TAGS: EAID, PEPR, PINS, AF, US
SUBJ: SENATE AMENDMENT ON AID TO AFGHANISTAN

REF: STATE 131646

1. (LOU - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY. WHILE THIS EMBASSY IS MOST SYMPATHETIC TOWARD THE SENTIMENTS WHICH PROMPTED THE PELL-STONE AMENDMENT TO THE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1979 (REFTEL), WE QUESTION WHETHER THAT AMENDMENT WOULD SERVE OVERALL U.S. INTERESTS IN THIS AREA. END SUMMARY.

3. WE SHARE THE CONGRESS'S AND THE DEPARTMENT'S DESIRE TO LEARN THE WHOLE TRUTH ABOUT THE EVENTS SURROUNDING THE TRAGIC KIDNAPPING AND ASSASSINATION OF AMBASSADOR DUBS AND WE HAVE BEEN PRESSING THE DRA TO BE FORTHCOMING IN THAT REGARD. WE CONSIDER IT HIGHLY UNLIKELY, HOWEVER, THAT THIS REGIME WILL EVER APOLOGIZE OFFICIALLY FOR ITS HANDLING OF THE INCIDENT, LET ALONE ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE AMBASSADOR'S DEATH.

4. THE UTILITY OF THE AMENDMENT'S REQUIREMENT THAT "HE DRA AGREE TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE PROTECTION FOR ALL USG PERSONNEL IN AFGHANISTAN HINGES LARGELY ON WHAT IS MEANT BY "ADEQUATE." THE DRA DOES PROVIDE GUARDS FOR USG FACILITIES IN KABUL, FOR THE CHARGE, AND, AS REQUESTED, FOR OFFICIAL FUNCTIONS. IT ALSO PROVIDES A GUARD TO ACCOMPANY THE AMERICAN SCHOOL'S BUSES. WE BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT IT WOULD INHIBIT THE FULFILLMENT OF OUR FUNCTIONS WERE WE TO REQUEST AND RECEIVE BODYGUARDS FOR ALL USG PERSONNEL. MOREOVER, THERE IS NO WAY OF GUARANTEEING THAT A DETERMINED, WELL-PLANNED TERRORIST ATTACK ON USG PERSONNEL WOULD NOT BE SUCCESSFUL, NO MATTER HOW MANY DRA GUARDS MIGHT BE ASSIGNED TO PROTECT SUCH PERSONNEL.

5. THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THERE WILL BE ANY "SUBSTANTIALLY CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES IN AFGHANISTAN" OF THE KIND ENVISAGED BY THE AMENDMENT'S SECTION B WILL PROBABLY DEPEND ON FACTORS EXTRANEOUS TO THE DUBS TRAGEDY. WE WOULD NOTE, HOWEVER, THAT A KEY FIGURE IN THAT INCIDENT, SAYED DAOUD TAROUN, HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THE POLICE CHIEF POSITION HE HELD AT THAT TIME. WE ARE NOT SURE WHETHER TAROUN'S TRANSFER REPRESENTS A DEMOTION OR PROMOTION OR WHETHER IT IS AT ALL RELATED TO HIS HANDLING OF THE AMBASSADOR'S KIDNAPPING.

6. WE ARE VERY MINDFUL OF AMBASSADOR DUBS' OWN VIEWS ON AFGHANISTAN. HE RECOGNIZED THAT THE US HAS FEW INTERESTS IN AFGHANISTAN, PER SE. ACCORDINGLY, HE FELT THAT THE USG SHOULD LOOK ON AFGHANISTAN PRIMARILY IN TERMS OF REGIONAL STABILITY. HE STRONGLY BELIEVED THAT AFGHANISTAN SHOULD NOT BECOME A DESTABILIZING FACTOR AND THAT WE SHOULD COOPERATE WITH OTHER NATIONS, INCLUDING THE FREE NATIONS OF THIS AREA, IN SEEKING TO OFFER THE AFGHANS AN ALTERNATIVE PRESENCE TO THAT OF THE SOVIET UNION.

7. DURING ITS 13 MONTHS OF RULE, THE DRA HAS MOVED INCREASINGLY CLOSER TO MOSCOW AND HAS ACCUSED ITS OTHER THREE NEIGHBORS, PAKISTAN, IRAN, AND CHINA, OF MEDDLING IN ITS INTERNAL AFFAIRS (NOTABLY THE GROWING ANTI-REGIME DISSIDENCE AND GUERILLA WARFARE). WE PRESENTLY SEE NO SIGNS THAT THE DRA WILL SHIFT ITS POLICIES AWAY FROM THE RADICAL, PRO-SOVIET LINE THAT IT NOW ESPOUSES, AND NO SIGNS THAT THE ANTI-REGIME ACTIVITIES WILL ABATE.

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OO RUQMHR
DE RUSBLK 4236/2 1531220
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 021150Z JUN 79
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUENC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4182
INFO RUSBCD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 8822
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1645
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 6892
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 0214
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 2 OF 2 KABUL 4236

6. NONETHELESS, WE CONSIDER IT IN THE USG'S INTERESTS AND IN THE INTERESTS OF REGIONAL STABILITY FOR THE PRESIDENT TO HAVE THE OPTION OF CONTINUING AID DISBURSEMENTS FOR AT LEAST THE PIPELINE. EVEN THOUGH THE PRESENT AFGHAN REGIME'S LEADERSHIP OFTEN BEHAVES IN A MANNER CONTRARY TO US DESIRES AND INTERESTS, WE KNOW THAT THERE ARE AFGHANS OUTSIDE THE REGIME AND SOME PERHAPS WITHIN IT WHO VALUE A CONTINUED, THOUGH LIMITED, U.S. AID PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN. OUR MODEST AID PROJECTS HAVE BEEN DIRECTED AT MEETING BASIC HUMAN NEEDS AND SERVE TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE U.S. CONTINUES TO HAVE HUMANITARIAN CONCERNS ABOUT IMPOVERISHED AFGHANISTAN AND ITS PEOPLE, NOTWITHSTANDING THE LEADERSHIP'S SOMETIMES HOSTILE STANCE. WE WOULD ALSO NOTE THAT, TO THE BEST OF OUR KNOWLEDGE, NONE OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE AREA HAVE SUGGESTED THAT THE USG CUT OFF ALL AID TO AFGHANISTAN. ON THE CONTRARY, THEY SEEM TO FEEL IT IS IN THEIR INTEREST THAT THE USG MAINTAIN AT LEAST A MODEST AID PRESENCE HERE. THE MAINTENANCE OF SUCH A PRESENCE WOULD, MOREOVER, ENABLE THE USG TO RESPOND MORE RAPIDLY TO ANY FAVORABLY DEVELOPMENTS ON THE DOMESTIC AFGHAN POLITICAL SCENE.

9. WITH REGARD TO THE PIPELINE, IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT WE HAVE 15 AFGHANS STUDYING IN THE U.S. AND 23 AT THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT UNDER AID-FINANCED PROGRAMS. WERE WE TO BE FORCED TO CUT PIPELINE EXPENDITURES, THOSE STUDENTS MIGHT HAVE TO TERMINATE THEIR STUDIES THROUGH NO FAULT OF THEIR OWN. THIS, WE BELIEVE, WOULD NOT BE IN THE USG'S INTEREST.

10. SUMMING UP, WE HOPE THAT THE DEPARTMENT WILL SEEK TO PERSUADE CONGRESS THAT THE PRESIDENT MUST BE GIVEN A FREER HAND THAN THE PELL-STONE AMENDMENT WOULD AUTHORIZE IN DECIDING WHETHER OVERALL U.S. INTERESTS MILITATE FOR A CONTINUATION OF A MODEST LEVEL OF AID TO AFGHANISTAN. AS BETWEEN THE PELL-STONE AND BURDINSKI AMENDMENTS, WE CLEARLY PREFER THE LATTER.
AMSTUTZ
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PP RUQMHR
DE RUSBLK #4[illegible] 1760936
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P R 250842Z JUN 79
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4449
INFO RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0941
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1693
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 5015
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 266
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C O N F I D E N T I A L KABUL 4008

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E.O. 12065: GDS 6/25/85 (AMSTUTZ, J. BRUCE) OR-M
TAGS: PINT, UR, AF, PINR
SUBJECT: (C) MEETING WITH SOVIET DIPLOMAT: PART I OF III - OBSERVATIONS ON THE INTERNAL AFGHAN POLITICAL SCENE

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: HIGH SOVIET EMBASSY OFFICIAL DISCLOSES SOVIETS HAVE BEEN URGING DRA TO ESTABLISH A "NATIONAL FRONT" TO BROADEN BASE OF THE GOVT - BUT SO FAR WITHOUT SUCCESS. THE DIPLOMAT DESCRIBED THE INSURGENCY AS CONFUSING. END SUMMARY.

3. THE NEW SOVIET MINISTER-COUNSELOR, VASILIY STEPANOVICH SAFRONCHUK, PAID ME AN HOUR-LONG COURTESY CALL JUNE 24. UNQUESTIONABLY THE MOST INTERESTING SOVIET DIPLOMAT I HAVE EVER MET, I FOUND HIS OPENESS FASCINATING, ESPECIALLY FOR WHAT HE HAD TO SAY ABOUT THE INTERNAL AFGHAN POLITICAL SCENE AND SOVIET-AFGHAN POLICY (SEPTEL, PART II).

4. FROM HIS REMARKS, SOME OF WHICH WERE VEILED AND SOME NOT AT ALL, IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE SOVIET EMBASSY FINDS THE AFGHANISTAN SITUATION VERY "DIFFICULT". SOME OF SAFRONCHUK'S MORE INTERESTING COMMENTS I PRESENT BELOW:

5. THE NARROW POLITICAL BASE OF THE DRA. WHEN I MENTIONED THAT THERE WERE REPORTS CIRCULATING THAT THE DRA LEADERSHIP WAS TALKING WITH FORMER PRIME MINISTERS ETEMADI AND YOUSEF ABOUT JOINING THE GOVT SO AS TO BROADEN ITS POLITICAL BASE, AND THAT THE SOVIETS WERE PLAYING SOME ROLE IN THIS, SAFRONCHUK SHOOK HIS HEAD. "WHAT IS TRUE," HE CONFIDED, "IS THAT WE HAVE BEEN URGING THE DRA LEADERSHIP TO BROADEN ITS BASE BY BRINGING IN NEW PEOPLE INTO THE GOVT, BUT WHAT IS NOT TRUE IS THAT WE HAVE BEEN HOLDING DISCUSSIONS WITH YOUSEF OR ETEMADI." CONTINUING, HE SAID, "ESTABLISHING A NATIONAL FRONT, LIKE OTHER COUNTRIES HAVE DONE, WOULD BE SENSIBLE FOR THEM." SAFRONCHUK COMPLAINED HOWEVER THAT: "THEY (DRA) WILL NEITHER ALLOW ANY OPPOSITION, OR DO THEY WISH TO SHARE POWER. THEIR IDEA ABOUT BROADENING THE POLITICAL BASE IS SOLELY TO ORGANIZE STUDENT, YOUTH, WOMEN AND WORKERS ORGANIZATIONS, BUT THOSE ARE ALL PART OF THE SAME POLITICAL PARTY. THIS IS NOT BROADENING THE POLITICAL BASE." HE REMARKED, "THEY (DRA) ARE VERY SENSITIVE ABOUT ANY SUGGESTION OF SHARING POWER. THEY ARE STUBBORN PEOPLE."

6. REFLECTING ON THE PROBLEMS FACING THE DRA, HE SAID ONE NOTABLE WEAKNESS (AND HE KEPT RETURNING TO THIS POINT) WAS THE "VIRTUAL ABSENCE OF INTELLECTUALS IN THE GOVT." HE SAID: "YOU SEE THIS ABSENCE IN MANY WAYS. THE NEWSPAPERS ARE TERRIBLE, AND THE CULTURAL LIFE IS BARREN." IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR THE GOVT, SAFRONCHUK SAID, TO ATTRACT TO ITSELF "MORE INTELLECTUALS."

7. THE INSURGENCY - SAFRONCHUK SAID HIS EMBASSY FINDS THE INSURGENCY "VERY CONFUSING". THEY CANNOT IDENTIFY ANY SINGLE REBEL LEADER WHO DOMINATES THE OPPOSITION SUCH AS KHOMEINI OR HO CHI MIN DID IN THEIR COUNTRIES. HIS EMBASSY DOES BELIEVE THAT THE IRANIAN AND PAKISTANI GOVTS ARE ABETTING THE REBELS, THE IRANIANS BY PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND RADIO BROADCASTS, AND THE PAKISTANIS BY CLANDESTINELY SUPPLYING ARMS AND MATERIAL SUPPORT. HE BLAMED RELIGION (-ISLAM, IT IS A TERRIBLE RELIGION") AS THE SINGLE MOST IMPORTANT REASON FOR THE INSURGENCY. THE POPULACE, HE SAID, ASSUMES "COMMUNISTS ARE AGAINST ISLAM," AND THIS HE OBSERVED MAKES THE DRA'S TASK VERY DIFFICULT.

8. WHEN, AT ONE POINT, I TOLD HIM THE US GOVT WAS NOT AIDING THE INSURGENTS, THAT WE HAVE SEVERAL TIMES TOLD THE DRA THIS, AND THAT I WAS CONSEQUENTLY UPSET BY THE REPEATED PICTURE CAPTIONS IN THE DRA PRESS THIS PAST WEEK, IMPLYING THAT THE SHOWN "CAPTURED" WEAPONS ORIGINATED WITH THE USA (AND CHINA), HE HAD THIS TO SAY. "IN MY MANY CONVERSATIONS WITH TOP LEVEL DRA MINISTERS AND DEPUTY MINISTERS," HE SAID, "NOT ONCE HAVE I HEARD THE US ACCUSED AS ASSISTING THE INSURGENCY". WHEN I POINTED OUT THAT MOST OF THE FOREIGN MILITARY WEAPONS IN PAKISTAN WERE OF US OR CHINESE ORIGIN, AND THUS IT WAS UNDERSTANDABLE FOR THE INSURGENTS ALONG THE PAK FRONTIER TO HAVE SUCH WEAPONS, HE SAID THAT THE DRA LEADERSHIP "KNOWS THIS". RETURNING TO AFGHAN-US RELATIONS, SAFRONCHUK SAID THAT, "THE MAIN DRA COMPLAINT ABOUT THE USA IS NOT ABOUT YOUR GIVING ARMS BUT ABOUT YOUR VERY CRITICAL PRESS."

9. THE TIME TO EVACUATE WOMEN AND CHILDREN HAS NOT COME. I TOLD SAFRONCHUK THAT ONE OF MY GNAWING CONCERNS WAS WHEN AND IF TO EVACUATE AMERICAN DEPENDENTS. INCIDENTS LIKE THE JUNE 23 OUTBREAK IN KABUL, I SAID, COMPELLED OUR EMBASSY TO ADDRESS THE QUESTION. SAFRONCHUK RESPONDED THAT, WHILE HE HIMSELF DID NOT HAVE TO WORRY ABOUT THIS KIND OF QUESTION ("THIS IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE AMBASSADOR AND THE OTHER MINISTER-COUNSELOR"), HE SAID HE COULD UNDERSTAND MY WORRY. "WHO KNOWS," HE SAID, "WHAT NEXT WEEK OR NEXT MONTH WILL BRING?" AS FOR WHAT HIS EMBASSY HAD DONE, HE SAID IT HAD EVACUATED TO THE USSR "ALL WOMEN AND CHILDREN OF SOVIETS WORKING OUTSIDE KABUL." AS FOR THOSE IN KABUL, HE SAID, ALL THE DEPENDENTS WXJE STILL HERE. "WHEN THERE IS TROUBLE, LIKE YESTERDAY," HE SAID, "WE BRING THEM INSIDE THE EMBASSY COMPOUND FOR SAFETY." HE THOUGHT THE DRA WAS IN CONTROL OF KABUL AND DIDN'T THINK THE SECURITY SITUATION IN THE CITY REQUIRED AN EVACUATION.

10. BIO DATA. FOR A SOVIET DIPLOMAT, SAFRONCHUK IS EXTRAORDINARILY OPEN. HE IS WILLING TO ANSWER QUESTIONS, AND HE STRUCK ME AS BOTH INTELLIGENT AND A MAN YOU CAN REASON WITH. WITHIN THE HIERACHY OF THE SOVIET EMBASSY, HE DESCRIBED HIMSELF AS "PROFESSIONALLY" HAVING THE RANK OF "AMBASSADOR," BUT PROTOCOLWISE WAS HERE RANKED ONLY AS NO.3. THIS WAS BECAUSE THE OTHER MINISTER-COUNSELOR, YURIY K. ALEXEEV, HAD PRECEDED HIM TO KABUL, AND SINCE HE ARRIVED FIRST,?71-3 2- 53:#,8:-))6 ,9.2 AFTER AMBASSADOR PUZANOV. AS FOR HIS OWN RESPONSIBILITIES, SAFRONCHUK SAID HE WAS CONCERNED WITH "EXTERNAL QUESTIONS" WHILE ALEXEEV WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR "INTERNAL QUESTIONS." WHAT HE MEANT BY THIS WAS NOT CLEAR, BUT LATER HE REFERRED TO ALEXEEV'S FIELD AS "AMINISSTRATION."
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PP RUQMHR
DE RUSBLK #4889 1760945
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 25?842Z JUN 79
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4450
INFO RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 8942
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1694
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 6987
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 0267
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C O N F I D E N T I A L KABUL 4889

25 Jun 79 12 11z

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E.O. 12065: GDS 6/25/85 (AMSTUTZ, J. BRUCE) OR-M
TAGS: PINT, UR, AF, PINR
SUBJ: (C) MEETING WITH SOVIET DIPLOMAT: PART II OF III - SOVIET-AFGHAN RELATIONS

REF: KABUL 4888

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY. THE MOST INTERESTING COMMENTS SAFRONCHUK MADE DURING OUR MEETING RELATED TO SOVIET-AFGHAN RELATIONS, SPECIFICALLY HIS DENIAL THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD CONSIDER BRINGING IN SOVIET TROOPS TO SAVE THE DRA. SAFRONCHUK QUOTED LENIN AS SAYING, "EVERY REVOLUTION MUST DEFEND ITSELF." END SUMMARY.

3. DURING OUR DISCUSSION OF THE INSURGENCY, I TOLD HIM THAT THERE WAS SPECULATION IN THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS THAT HIS GOVT WOULD, IF NECESSARY, BRING IN TROOPS TO SUPPORT THE DRA. SAFRONCHUK DENIED ANY SUCH INTENTION. HE REFERRED TO BREZHNEV'S JUNE 11 SPEECH IN MOSCOW, IN WHICH THE LATTER SAID, "WE SHALL NOT ABANDON IN TROUBLE OUR FRIENDS - THE AFGHAN PEOPLE," BUT EXPLAINED THAT IN SAYING THAT, "BREZHNEV DID NOT MEAN TO IMPLY THIS INCLUDED MILITARY INTERVENTION." SAFRONCHUK WENT ON TO REPEAT SEVERAL TIMES THAT LENIN HAD SAID, "EVERY REVOLUTION MUST DEFEND ITSELF."

4. PURSUING HIS THEME, HE SAID THAT WERE THE SOVIETS TO BRING IN TROOPS, THIS WOULD HAVE BAD REPERCUSSIONS INTERNATIONALLY. HE EXPLAINED, "IT WOULD HARM SALT AND THE POSITION OF THE SOVIET UNION IN THE WORLD," HE THEN ADDED, "QUITE ASIDE FROM INTERNATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS, IT WOULD BE BAD POLICY IN TERMS OF INTERNAL AFGHAN AFFAIRS." I OBSERVED THAT SOVIET TROOPS WOULD HAVE A DIFFICULT TIME IN THIS RUGGED, MOUNTAINOUS COUNTRY. HE NODDED HIS HEAD VIGOROUSLY.

5. ENLARGING ON SOVIET POLICY, HE SAID, "LIKE YOUR COUNTRY, OUR MAIN OBJECTIVE HERE IS TO PROMOTE REGIONAL STABILITY" (HE MUST HAVE STUDIED SOME OF OUR POLICY STATEMENTS). "WHAT WE WISH TO SEE," HE SAID, "IS A PROSPEROUS AND PEACEFUL AFGHANISTAN."

6. WHAT THE COUNTRY NEEDS MORE THAN ANYTHING ELSE, HE CONTINUED, WAS TO ELIMINATE ILLITERACY. IF EVERYBODY COULD BE LITERATE AND ACHIEVE A BASIC EDUCATION, THAT WOULD BE THE BEST THING THAT COULD HAPPEN. THEN HE COMPLAINED, "INSTEAD, THE AFGHANS KEEP ASKING US FOR MORE AND MORE ARMS - NOT FOR MORE HELP IN EDUCATION."

7. IN RESPONSE, I CONFIRMED THAT IT HAD BEEN LONG-STANDING AMERICAN POLICY TOWARDS AFGHANISTAN TO PROMOTE STABILITY IN THE REGION. WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE AFGHANISTAN AT PEACE WITH ALL ITS NEIGHBORS, NOT ONLY WITH THE SOVIET UNION, BUT ALSO WITH IRAN, PAKISTAN AND CHINA. FOR DECADES TOO, WE HAVE HAD A HUMANITARIAN INTEREST HERE, INVESTING ROUGHLY $20 MILLION PER ANNUM IN THE COUNTRY'S ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT. TO THE EXTENT THE AFGHANS COULD UPLIFE THEMSELVES SOCIALLY AND ECONOMICALLY, WE BELIEVED THIS WOULD PROMOTE STABILITY. SAFRONCHUK AGREED.

8. I ALSO TOLD SAFRONCHUK THAT AS A COROLLARY TO OUR POLICY OF WORKING FOR REGIONAL STABILITY, WE HOPED THAT AFGHANISTAN WOULD NOT BECOME AN AREA OF CONFRONTATION BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. TO THIS SAFRONCHUK RESPONDED, "I AGREE WITH YOU COMPLETELY." GOING ON, I WARNED HIM, THAT WERE THE SOVIETS TO BRING IN TROOPS INTO AFGHANISTAN, THIS WOULD VERY MUCH COMPLICATE AND HARM SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS. HE NODDED HIS HEAD.

9. COMMENT: I CONSIDER SAFRONCHUK'S REMARKS SIGNIFICANT. I APPRECIATE THAT ONE COULD ARGUE THAT HIS DENIAL OF ANY SOVIET INTENTION TO INTERVENE PHYSICALLY WAS THE ONLY ANSWER A SOVIET DIPLOMAT COULD HAVE BEEN AUTHORIZED TO GIVE TO MY QUESTION, AND FURTHER THAT THE QUOTATION FROM LENIN WAS HYPOCRITICAL IN THE LIGHT OF SOVIET ACTIONS IN EASTERN EUROPE. YET, REFLECTING ON OUR CONVERSATION, I THINK HE GENUINELY BELIEVED WHAT HE WAS TELLING ME, NAMELY THAT SOVIET PHYSICAL INTERVENTION WOULD BE MORE HARMFUL THAN HELPFUL FOR SOVIET INTERESTS, AND THEREFORE IT WOULD NOT OCCUR. AMSTUTZ
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P R 25085ØZ JUN 79
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4451
INFO RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 8943
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1695
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 6988
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN Ø268
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L KABUL 4890

25 JUN 79 12 11z

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E.O. 12065: GDS 6/25/85 (AMSTUTZ, J. BRUCE) OR-M
TAGS: SHUM, PINT, UR, AF, PINR
SUBJ: (C) MEETING WITH SOVIET DIPLOMAT: PART III OF III - HUMAN RIGHTS

REF: (A) KABUL 4888, (B) KABUL 4889

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY. I REVIEWED WITH SAFRONCHUK THE DEPLORABLE SITUATION RESPECTING ARRESTS AND EXECUTIONS OF POLITICAL PRISONERS AND URGED HIS EMBASSY'S HELP. END SUMMARY.

3. HUMAN RIGHTS CAME UP DURING OUR DISCUSSION OF THE INSURGENCY. WHEN SAFRONCHUK CITED RELIGION AS THE PREDOMINANT REASON FOR OPPOSITION SENTIMENT, I TOLD HIM THAT WHILE I AGREED IT WAS THE SINGLE MOST IMPORTANT FACTOR, I THOUGHT THERE WAS AT LEAST ONE OTHER MAJOR REASON WHY THE DRA HAD LOST MUCH PUBLIC SUPPORT--NAMELY, HUMAN RIGHTS.

4. I TOLD HIM THAT IT WAS OUR INFORMATION THAT PUL-E-CHARKHI PRISON HAD, AT ANY ONE TIME, BETWEEN 12,000 TO 15,000 INMATES. WHEN HE RESPONDED THAT IT WASN'T LARGE ENOUGH TO HOUSE THAT MANY PRISONERS, I SAID THAT IS TRUE, BUT THE EXPLANATION WE HAD BEEN GIVEN WAS THAT THE PRISONERS TOOK TURNS LYING DOWN TO SLEEP. I WENT ON TO SAY THAT NOT ONLY WERE THERE THOUSANDS BEING HELD THERE, BUT NIGHTLY MANY WERE BEING EXECUTED. I SAID WE HAD REASON TO BELIEVE THAT, AT A MINIMUM, 3,000 POLITICAL PRISONERS HAD BEEN KILLED SINCE LAST SEPTEMBER. NOT A WEEK PASSED BUT WE DID NOT LEARN OF FURTHER POLITICAL ARRESTS, AND I SURMISED THAT FEW HOUSEHOLDS EXISTED IN KABUL THAT DID NOT HAVE A RELATIVE OR FRIEND WHO HAD BEEN PURGED FROM HIS JOB, IMPRISONED OR EXECUTED. AS A HUMAN BEING, I TOLD HIM I FOUND THIS ASPECT OF THE DRA'S RECORD REPUGNANT AND WISHED I COULD DO MORE ABOUT IT.

5. SAFRONCHUK RESPONDED THAT BEING NEW HERE, HE DIDN'T KNOW MUCH ABOUT "THESE THINGS," BUT HE DID KNOW THAT THE DRA WAS VERY SENSITIVE ABOUT "ANY INTERFERENCE INTO ITS INTERNAL AFFAIRS." HE IMPLIED THAT THE SOVIET EMBASSY COULD DO LITTLE IN THIS AREA BUT PROMISED TO LOOK INTO THE MATTER.

6. COMMENT: I HAVE NO ILLUSIONS THAT MY DEMARCHE WILL LEAD TO MUCH GOOD. THE SOVIETS HARDLY HAVE AN EXEMPLARY RECORD IN PRACTICING OR ADVOCATING HUMAN RIGHTS. I THINK THOUGH IT WAS USEFUL TO APPRISE THE SOVIETS THAT WE KNOW ABOUT THE DEPLORABLE CONDITIONS AT PUL-E-CHARKHI AND ARE CONCERNED ABOUT IT. AMSTUTZ
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RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1701
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 7002
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 0278
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C O N F I D E N T I A L KABUL 4981

Pol Charge
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E.O. 12065: GDS 6/28/85 (AMSTUTZ, J. BRUCE) OR-M
TAGS: PINT, US, AF
SUBJ: (U) AFGHAN-US RELATIONS: A GESTURE THAT WAS BOTCHED

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. I THINK THE DEPT WOULD BE INTERESTED IN LEARNING OF AN INCIDENT WHEREIN THE DRA ATTEMPTED TO MAKE A GESTURE OF FRIENDSHIP TO THE US BUT MUCHED IT UP.

3. YESTERDAY EVENING AT ABOUT 6:30 PM, MY DOORBELL RANG. WITH MY TIE ASKEW AND COAT OFF, I WENT TO THE DOOR AND TO MY ASTONISHMENT FOUND THERE CABINET MINISTERS SOOMA (HIGHER EDUCATION) AND JALILI (EDUCATION). BEHIND THEM WAS A BODY-GUARD WITH A BURP GUN. I EXPRESSED DELIGHT AT SEEING THEM AND ASKED WHAT I COULD DO FOR THEM. THEY LOOKED AT EACH OTHER AND SAID THEY AERE THERE TO ATTEND OUR NATIONAL DAY! I THANKED THEM BUT POINTED OUT THAT OUR NATIONAL DAY DIDN'T OCCUR UNTIL NEXT WEEK, JULY 4, AND I WAS TEMPTED TO ADD TOO THAT THEY HAD ALSO COME TO THE WRONG PLACE (THE INVITATION INDICATES IT'S BEING HELD AT THE AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE). THEY WERE EMBARRASSED AND AFTER CONFERRING RAPIDLY WITH ONE ANOTHER, SAID THAT SOMEONE HAD GOOFED. OUR JULY 4 DATE HAD BEEN CONFUSED WITH "SARATAN 4," THAT DAY'S DATE ON THE AFGHAN CALENDAR. THEY ASKED TO BE EXCUSED, I ESCORTED THEM TO THEIR CAR, AND WE SHOOK HANDS MANY TIMES WITH PROFUSE EXPRESSION OF APOLOTIES AND FRIENDSHIP. THEY SAID THEY HOPED TO SEE ME AGAIN NEXT WEEK.

4. COMMENT: I REPORT ALL THIS, NOT TO SHOW THE INEPTNESS OF DRA STAFF WORK (GOD HELP THE POOR AIDE WHO WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS MISTAKE), BUT FOR TWO OTHER REASONS, ONE IS THAT THE DRA PLACES MUCH EMPHASIS AND SIGNIFICANCE ON HOW MANY MINISTERS, AND WHAT MINISTERS, ATTEND NATIONAL DAYS. THAT THEY WOULD SEND TWO HIGHER RANKING MINISTERS, INCLUDING A POLITBURO MEMBER (SOOMA) TO OUR NATIONAL DAY, AT A TIME WHEN OUR RELATIONS WERE STRAINED, CAN ONLY MEAN THAT THEY WISHED TO MAKE A PLACATING GESTURE TO US. WHETHER THE DRA WILL NEXT WEEK STILL SEND TWO MINISTERS, AFTER: (A) THEY LEARN BY DIP NOTE TODAY THAT I HAVE BEEN SUMMONED TO WASHINGTON FOR CONSULTATIONS DURING THE JULY 4 WEEK, AND (B) WE PROTEST NEXT WEEK THEIR PICTURING FALSELY US ARMS IN THE CONTROLLED PRESS, IS MOOT.

5. THE OTHER SIGNIFICANT ASPECT OF IT IS WHAT IT TELLS US ABOUT DRA'S HANDLING OF AFGHAN-US RELATIONS. TWICE NOW IN THE SPACE OF ABOUT TWO WEEKS, THE DRA HAS MADE (IN THEIR EYES) TWO GESTURES OF FRIENDSHIP; (A) PERMITTING THE AMERICAN-AFGHAN FAMILY OF ERIKA KNISLEY TO ACQUIRE AFGHAN PASSPORTS TO GO TO THE US; AND (B) SENDING YESTERDAY TWO CABINET MINISTERS OT OUR "NATIONAL DAY". THEY MAY FEEL THAT THE US IS DIM ENOUGH TO BELIEVE THAT THESE ESSENTIALLY UNIMPORTANT GESTURES ARE SIGNIFICANT TO US. I SAY THIS BECAUSE BALANCED AGAINST THESE TWO GESTURES HAVE BEEN THREE OTHER MUCH MORE SIGNIFICANT AND CONCURRENT ONES IN MY EYES. THESE HAVE BEEN: THE DELIBERATE ACTION OF SHOWING IN THE DRA PRESS "US WEAPONS" WHICH WERE NOT US-ORIGIN WEAPONS AT ALL, WITH THE CLEAR IMPLICATION THAT THE US WAS SUPPLYING THE INSURGENTS; THE VETOING OF THE SHOWING DOMESTICALLY OF THE ICA-FINANCED ($50,000) HELMAND VALEY FILM, AFTER THIS GOVT SPECIFICALLY AGREED TO IT; AND THE VETOING OF SEVERAL RECENT USAID PARTICIPANT GRANTS JUST WHEN THE TRAINEES WERE ABOUT TO LEAVE FOR THE US.

6. THE IMPRESSION ONE GETS IS THAT THE GOVT IS FOLLOWING A TWO-TRACK POLICY. WHERE IT COUNTS, SUCH AS PROJECTING A CERTAIN IMAGE OF THE US TO ITS PEOPLE OR ALLOWING ITS PEOPLE TO VISIT THE US, THE GOVT IS DETERMINED TO DEPICT AN UNFAVORABLE IMPRESSION AND PREVENT ITS PEOPLE FROM SEEING FOR THEMSELVES WHAT OUT COUNTRY IS LIKE. WHERE IT DOESN'T REALLY COUNT, IN TERMS OF INFLUENCING DOMESTIC PUBLIC OPINION, SUC AS BY ALLOWING A DUAL NATIONAL FAMILY TO LEAVE AFGHANISTAN, OR BY SENDING TWO MINISTERS TO OUR NATIONAL DAY PARTY, THE GOVT IS FORTHCOMING. I WONDER WHETHER THE GOVT REALLY THINKS WE ARE SO OBTUSE AS TO OVERLOOK ITS MORE SIGNIFICANT ACTIONS AND PUT GREATER WEITHT ON THEIR INSIGNIFICANT ONES.

AMSTUTZ

BT
#4981

SECTION ONE - SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN AFGHANISTAN

(A) WHILE THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE SOVIETS WERE BEHIND THE COUP THAT BROUGHT THE TARAKI REGIME TO POWER LAST APRIL 27, THEY WELCOMED THE CHANGE AND MOVED QUICKLY TO TURN IT TO THEIR ADVANTAGE. BY EARLY JUNE 1978, THE USSR HAD:

--INCREASED THE NUMBER OF ITS MILITARY ADVISORS FROM 350 TO 650;

--PLACED SOVIET PERSONNEL IN VIRTUALLY EVERY AFGHAN MINISTRY;

--TAKEN OVER KEY POSITIONS IN THE AFGHAN DEFENSE AND SECURITY APPARATUS; AND

--SIGNED OVER 30 ECONOMIC DEALS NEGOTIATED UNDER THE DAOUD REGIME.

(B) SINCE THEN, THE SOVIET PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN HAS CONTINUED TO GROW:

--A NEW ARMS AGREEMENT WAS SIGNED;

--ADDITIONAL ECONOMIC AGREEMENTS WERE CONCLUDED, INCLUDING A MULTI-MILLION DOLLAR ACCORD, DURING TARAKI'S VISIT TO MOSCOW LAST DECEMBER;

--THE NUMBER OF SOVIET MILITARY ADVISORS HAS INCREASED TO AT LEAST 1,000;

--THE NUMBER OF SOVIET ECONOMIC ADVISORS HAS GROWN TO OVER 2,000;

--SOVIET MILITARY ADVISORS HAVE OPERATED WITH AFGHAN MILITARY UNITS FIGHTING THE REBEL TRIBESMEN AND PROBABLY HAVE SUFFERED CASUALTIES.

(C) PERHAPS THE MOST DRAMATIC DEVELOPMENT OF 1978, HOWEVER, WAS THE SIGNING IN DECEMBER OF THE AFGHAN-SOVIET FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION TREATY WHICH:

--UNDERSCORED WHAT BREZHNEV HAS CALLED THE "QUALITATIVELY NEW CHARACTER" OF AFGHAN-SOVIET RELATIONS;

--LEGITIMATIZED THE SOVIET ROLE IN AFGHANISTAN AND PROVIDED LEGAL BASIS FOR HELPING THE DRA SURVIVE;

--GAVE KABUL A MEANS OF BOLSTERING ITS OWN POSITION AND DISCOURAGING OPPOSITION AT HOME AND ABROAD -- ALBEIT UNSUCCESSFULLY SO FAR.

(D) UNLIKE THE OTHER FRIENDSHIP TREATIES THE USSR HAS SIGNED WITH THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES, THE DEFENSE CONSULTATION CLAUSE IN THE AFGHAN ACCORD IS OPEN-ENDED WHICH:

--ALLOWS THE SOVIETS TO JUSTIFY THEIR PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN; BUT

--DOES NOT NECESSARILY TIE THEM TO KABUL'S DEFENSE.

(E) THE SOVIETS WERE RATHER SILENT ABOUT THE TRIBAL UNREST IN AFGHANISTAN UNTIL PRAVDA CARRIED AN AUTHORITATIVE PIECE BY I. ALEXANDROV ON MARCH 19. ALEXANDROV:

--ACCUSED PAKISTAN, EGYPT, AND CHINA OF SUPPORT FOR THE REBELS;

--IDENTIFIED THE REBELS AS "REACTIONARY AND CONSERVATIVE MUSLIMS."

(F) SINCE THEN, THE SOVIETS HAVE FURTHER BLAMED THE PAKISTANIS, IRANIANS, THE US AND UK, AND SUGGESTED THAT THE SAUDIS MIGHT BE INVOLVED. THEY HAVE ALSO:

--PRAISED THE REVOLUTIONARY ASPECTS OF TARAKI REGIME;

--CLAIMED THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAS PUT DOWN THE UPRISING;

--EMPHASIZED THAT THE REBELS WERE MAINLY DISCONTENTED RICH LANDLORDS OPPOSING THE TARAKI LAND REFORM;

--STATED THAT THE RELIGIOUS-MOTIVATED INSURGENCY IS LED BY "FALSE MUSLIMS."

(G) MORE SUBSTANTIVELY, THE SOVIETS HAVE:

--INCREASED THEIR MILITARY AID TO AFGHANISTAN AND MAY HAVE SUPPLIED MORE ARMOR AND AIRCRAFT;

--PROBABLY HELPED DIRECT MILITARY OPERATIONS AND PROVIDED LOGISTICAL IF NOT COMBAT SUPPORT TO AFGHAN MILITARY UNITS; AND

--WARNED OFF OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE BOTH PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY.

(H) MOST RECENTLY, THE SOVIETS HAVE:

--SHIFTED THE EMPHASIS OF THEIR PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN AWAY FROM PAKISTAN AND IRAN;

--PLACED GREAT EMPHASIS ON AN ALLEGED U.S. ROLE AND CIA MACHINATIONS;

--NONETHELESS MADE QUITE CLEAR THAT THEY WANT NO PAKISTANIS OR IRANIANS MEDDLING IN AFGHAN AFFAIRS.

(I) IN GENERAL, THIS IS PROBABLY INTENDED TO DIVERT ATTENTION FROM EVENTS IN AFGHANISTAN AND THE SOVIET ROLE THERE, AND POSSIBLY BUILD A CASE TO JUSTIFY A LARGER SOVIET INVOLVEMENT.

SECTION TWO - THE CURRENT SOVIET ROLE IN AFGHANISTAN

QUANTITATIVELY, THE SOVIET PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN HAS NOT INCREASED SIGNIFICANTLY DURING RECENT MONTHS, IN SPITE OF THE DETERIORATING SECURITY SITUATION THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. THE NUMBER OF SOVIET MILITARY ADVISORS REMAINS SLIGHTLY OVER 1,000 -- AND THERE ARE PROBABLY STILL ABOUT 2,500 CIVILIAN ADVISORS FROM THE USSR IN THE COUNTRY. ALTHOUGH THE SOVIET EMBASSY DENIES IT, WE BELIEVE THAT LARGE NUMBERS OF THEIR DEPENDENTS HAVE BEEN EVACUATED TO THE USSR.

QUALITATIVELY, THE INFLUENCE OF SOVIET ADVISORS APPEARS TO HAVE BECOME MORE PRONOUNCED IN RECENT WEEKS, PARTICULARLY SINCE THE VISIT OF THE USSR'S GENERAL A.A. YEPISHEV, CHIEF OF THE MAIN POLITICAL DIRECTORATE OF THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES, EARLY IN APRIL. ALTHOUGH THE ANNOUNCED REASON FOR YEPISHEV'S VISIT WAS TO UPGRADE THE "POLITICAL EDUCATION" OF THE AFGHAN FORCES, HE CAME WITH A LARGE STAFF OF SOVIET OFFICIALS WHO ARE BELIEVED TO HAVE LOOKED INTO SEVERAL ASPECTS OF MILITARY SUPPORT FOR THE AFGHAN ARMY AND AIR FORCE. WE ARE ALSO AWARE OF INCREASED SOVIET GUIDANCE IN VARIOUS CIVILIAN MINISTRIES.

THE BEST QUALITY EQUIPMENT WHICH THE USSR HAS PROVIDED TO AFGHANISTAN THUS FAR HAS BEEN MIG-21 AND SU-7 FIGHTER AIRCRAFT, MI-24 HIND-TYPE HELICOPTER GUNSHIPS AND T-62 TANKS. IN SPITE OF FREQUENT RUMORS TO THE CONTRARY, THE AFGHANS HAVE NOT BEEN SUPPLIED WITH MIG-23 AIRCRAFT.

WE ARE AWARE OF THE WIDESPREAD RUMORS THAT SOVIET PILOTS FLY SOME OF THE OPERATIONAL MISSIONS OF AFGHAN AIRCRAFT AGAINST GUERRILLA TARGETS. WE HAVE NO SOLID EVIDENCE RULING OUT THIS POSSIBILITY. BECAUSE SOME OF THE NEW EQUIPMENT, SUCH AS THE MI-24 GUNSHIP, IS MORE SOPHISTICATED THAN THE OLDER AFGHAN ARMAMENT, SOVIET PERSONNEL ARE BELIEVED TO BE ENGAGED IN INTENSIVE TRAINING ACTIVITY. THERE ARE SEVERAL REPORTS THAT THE MI-24'S HAVE BEEN USED OPERATIONALLY AGAINST THE INSURGENTS. BECAUSE THIS IS A SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS SYSTEM, WE DOUBT THERE HAS BEEN SUFFICIENT TIME TO TRAIN AFGHANS TO FLY THESE ALONE. THEREFORE, IT IS QUITE POSSIBLE THAT SOVIETS COULD BE HELPING TO FLY THOSE MI-24'S BEING USED OPERATIONALLY, AS WELL AS PROVIDING TRAINING TO AFGHAN PILOTS.

BECAUSE THERE ARE SOVIET MILITARY ADVISORS ASSIGNED THROUGHOUT THE AFGHAN GROUND FORCES -- IN ALL CASES DOWN TO THE BATTALION LEVEL, AND ALSO WITH SEVERAL SMALL SPECIALIZED UNITS, IT WOULD BE UNUSUAL IF SOVIET MILITARY PERSONNEL WERE NOT CAUGHT UP IN MILITARY OPERATIONS FROM TIME TO TIME.

THE MOST IMPORTANT QUESTION IS: CAN WE EXPECT TO SEE SOVIET COMBAT TROOPS ENTER AFGHAN CONFLICT? WE CAN ONLY OBSERVE THAT THAT POSSIBILITY CANNOT BE EXCLUDED. ARTICLE 4 OF THE NEW AFGHAN-SOVIET FRIENDSHIP TREATY OF DECEMBER 5, 1978, PROVIDES THAT THE TWO PARTIES "...SHALL CONSULT EACH OTHER, AND TAKE, BY AGREEMENT, APPROPRIATE MEASURES TO ENSURE THE SECURITY, INDEPENDENCE, AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF THE TWO COUNTRIES." THE ARTICLE CONCLUDES: "IN THE INTERESTS OF STRENGTHENING THE DEFENSE CAPACITY OF THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES, THEY SHOULD CONTINUE TO DEVELOP COOPERATION IN THE MILITARY FIELD ON THE BASIS OF APPROPRIATE AGREEMENTS CONCLUDED BETWEEN THEM."

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RUENMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1967
RUSBQE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 5894
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 6349
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L KABUL 5308

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINT, PEPR, IR, AF
SUBJECT: NEW AFGHAN AMBASSADOR TO IRAN IS ANOTHER HIGH-RANKING PARCHAMIST

REF: TEHRAN 5250 (NOTAL)

1. WE HAVE LITTLE TO ADD TO THE BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION ON THE YOUTHFUL DR. NAJIB, WHO FORMERLY USED THE NAME SYED NAJIBULLAH, CONTAINED IN THE OFFICIAL ANNOUNCEMENT OF HIS APPOINTMENT AS AFGHAN ENVOY TO TEHRAN (REFTEL). HE REPORTEDLY IS ONLY ONE YEAR OUT OF MEDICAL SCHOOL, AND WAS THE DEPUTY MINISTER OF INTERIOR FOR A FEW WEEKS FOLLOWING THE APRIL 27 REVOLUTION. IN THE SUBSEQUENT JOCKEYING FOR POSITIONS (WHICH OBVIOUSLY IS CONTINUING), NAJIB, A MEMBER OF THE FORMER PARCHAM WING OF THE PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF AFGHANISTAN, BECAME A "SPECIAL ASSISTANT" TO REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL CHAIRMAN NOOR MOHAMMAD TARAKI, AN APPOINTMENT THAT WAS NEVER MADE PUBLIC.

2. NAJIB'S SELECTION FOR TEHRAN IS UNQUESTIONABLY PART OF THE ONGOING PURGE OF PARCHAMISTS FROM THE UPPER LEVELS OF THE NEW REGIME'S POLITICAL LEADERSHIP. OF THE SIX AFGHAN AMBASSADORS FOR WHOM AGREMENT HAS DEFINITELY BEEN ASKED, NOT ONE IS A KNOWN KHALQIST, WHILE FIVE ARE CONFIRMED PARCHAMISTS. THE FUTURE OF DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER BABRAK (LEADER OF THE FORMER PARCHAM) TOPS THE LIST OF RUMORS IN KABUL, AND THE FAVORITE VERSION NOW IS THAT HE HAS REFUSED TO ACCEPT A POST ABROAD AND WILL REMAIN IN KABUL COME WHAT MAY. IN THIS CONNECTION, WE CONTINUE TO SEE NO SIGNS THAT THIS PARTICULAR EPISODE HAS RESULTED IN ANY HEIGHTENED SECURITY MEASURES IN THE CAPITAL, BUT THE REGIME'S SENSE OF URGENCY IN REQUESTING HOST COUNTRY AGREMENT FOR THESE AMBASSADORS COULD INDICATE THAT TARAKI AND HIS COLLEAGUES PREFER TO HAVE THEIR RIVALS OUT OF AFGHANISTAN PRONTO. AN IRANIAN DIPLOMAT TOLD US THAT THREE DAYS AFTER NAJIB'S NAME WAS SUBMITTED TO THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT, AMBASSADOR DAVOUDI WAS CALLED TO THE MFA AND ASKED, "WHY THE DELAY?" THE GOI APPARENTLY ACCEPTED THE INEVIDABLE, AND GRANTED AGREMENT WITHIN TWO DAYS.

AMSTUTZ

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INFO RUDIC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1557
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RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 7028
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1717
RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 603
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 294
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C O N F I D E N T I A L KABUL 5146

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E.O. 12065: GDS 7/5/85 (FLATIN, BRUCE A.) OR-M
TAGS: NATO, PEPR, PINT, UR, GE, AF
SUBJECT: (C) COMMUNIST DIPLOMATS AT KABUL CONTINUE TO HINT AT POSSIBILITY OF "NATIONAL FRONT" ALTERNATIVE TO KHALQI REGIME

1. (C) -- ENTIRE TEXT.

2. IN REFTEL C, CHARGE AUSTUTZ REPORTED THAT SOVIET MINISTER-COUNSELOR VASSILI S. SAFRONTCHOUK TOLD HIM ON JUNE 24 THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE SEEKING A "NATIONAL FRONT" SOLUTION AT KABUL.

3. POSSIBLY AT THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SOVIETS, EAST GERMAN AMBASSADOR HERMANN SCHWEISAU HAS BEEN TALKING ABOUT A "NATIONAL FRONG" APPROACH WITH OTHER DIPLOMATS AT KABUL. WE KNOW THAT HE DISCUSSED THIS MATTER WITH THE PAKISTANI AMBASSADOR ON JUNE 27, AND WITH THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR ON JULY 3. DURING THESE SESSIONS, SCHWIESAU QUESTIONED THE COMPETENCE OF THE KHALQI LEADERSHIP. AT OUR INDEPENDENCE DAY RECEPTION ON JULY 4, SCHWIESAU ASKED IF HE COULD SEE ME ON JULY 8 OR 9. I EXPECT HIM TO COVER THE SAME GROUND WITH ME.

4. WE ARE REPEATING REFTELS B AND C TOUSNATO.

FLATIN

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SBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 7029
EHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1718
MJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0604
QMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 0295
DTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1658
FNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3134
QMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 0326
UHQHQA/CINCPAC
USNAAA/CINCEUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L KABUL 5147

E.O. 12065: GDS 7/5/85 (FLATIN, BRUCE A.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, AF, US
SUBJ: (LOU) AFGHAN REGIME MAKES DISPLAY OF GOOD WILL ON AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE DAY

1. (C) AFGHAN GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATION AT OUR JULY 4 RECEPTION WAS HIGH-RANKING, COMPARED TO THAT SEEN AT THE RECENT NATIONAL DAY RECEPTIONS OF OTHER FREE-WORLD EMBASSIES AT KABUL. ATTENDING OUR RECEPTION WERE: PROFESSOR MAHMUD SOOMA, MINISTER OF HIGHER EDUCATION AND MEMBER OF THE POLITBURO OF THE PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF AFGHANISTAN (PDPA); DR. ABDUL RASHID JALILI, MINISTER OF EDUCATION--AND ANOTHER IMPORTANT KHALQI; AND ENGINEER MOHAMMED ISMAIL DANESH, MINISTER OF MINES AND INDUSTRIES--WHO IS NEAR THE BOTTOM OF THE CABINET TOTEM POLE. IN COMPARISON, THE HIGHEST RANKING KHALQI TO ATTEND THIS YEAR'S BRITISH QUEEN'S BIRTHDAY RECEPTION WAS DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER DOST. (COMMENT: THE KHALQIS ARE MAD AT BBC.) COMPARED TO LAST YEAR, HOWEVER, WE HAVE COME DOWN A FEW PEGS. FOREIGN MINISTER HAFIZULLAH AMIN ATTENDED OUR RECEPTION THEN.

Pol
Charge
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RF
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(U) ON JULY 4, GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED "KABUL TIMES" RAN A FRONT-PAGE PHOTOGRAPH OF PRESIDENT CARTER AND REPORTED THAT PRESIDENT TARAKI HAD SENT HIM A CONGRATUALTORY TELEGRAM. THIS IS A USUAL AFGHAN PRACTICE FOR ALL NATIONAL DAYS OF COUNTRIES HAVING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH KABUL.

(U) THE SAME NEWSPAPER CARRIED A FRIENDLY EDITORAL ABOUT THE UNITED STATES--ALSO A CUSTOMARY PRACTICE ON NATIONAL DAYS. THE TEXT WAS UPBEAT, NOTING THAT THE AMERICAN PEOPLE SECURED THEIR INDEPENDENCE "AS A RESULT OF HARD STRUGGLES AND CAMPAIGNS." THE "KABUL TIMES" CITED AMERICA'S "PROGRESS AND ACHIEVEMENTS" WHICH "ARE TOO OBVIOUS TO THE PEOPLES OF THE WORLD." THE PAPER NOTED THAT: "THE PEOPLES OF AFGHANISTAN AND AMERICA HAVE AT LEAST ONE IMPORTANT THING IN COMMON, AND THAT IS THEIR STRIFE AND STRUGGLES AGAINST COLONIALISM AT THE START OF THE INCROACHMENT OF THE COLONIALISTS; BOTH THE DRA AND THE USA HAVE REJECTED COLONIALISM FOR THE FIRST TIME IN THEIR (RESPECTIVE) REGIONS AND CONTINENTS."

(U) NOTING THAT AFGHANISTAN AND THE U.S. HAVE "HAD, FOR MANY YEARS NOW, NORMAL RELATIONS," THE "KABUL TIMES" ALSO CITED THE VALUE OF THEIR CULTURAL AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION, INCLUDING THE U.S.-STUDY EXPERIENCES OF "A LARGE NUMBER OF AFGHANS." THE PAPER OBSERVED THAT THE KHALQI REGIME IS KEEPING THESE BILATERAL RELATIONS "NORMAL."

(LOU) WE HAVE NOTED A MUTING OF ANTI-U.S. PROPAGANDA SINCE OUR JUNE 30 DEMARCHE TO DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER DOST ABOUT THE FAKE "SEIZED AMERICAN WEAPONS" PHOTOGRAPHS IN THE AFGHAN MEDIA. FLATIN

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RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY DJAKARTA
RUCBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
RUDIC/AMEMBASSY LONDON
RUSBAS/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T KABUL 5148

EXDIS

E.O. 12065: GDS 7/5/79 (PLATIN, BRUCE A.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, PINS, AF, US, UR
SUBJECT: (C) DEMARCHE TO SOVIET AMBASSADOR AT KABUL ON SOVIET MEDIA ALLEGATIONS OF U.S. INTERFERENCE IN AFGHANISTAN

REF: STATE 172400

1. (S) ENTIRE TEXT.

2. AS INSTRUCTED IN PARAGRAPH FOUR OF THE REFTEL, I SAW ALEXANDER M. PUZANOV, SOVIET AMBASSADOR AT KABUL, ON JULY 5, AT 3:00 P.M., THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE TIME AN APPOINTMENT COULD BE MADE, AND PRESENTED TO HIM THE DEPARTMENT'S TALKING POINTS.

3. AFTER LISTENING TO THE DEPARTMENT'S POINTS, PUZANOV OBSERVED THE SOVIET MEDIA HAVE MERELY BEEN REPEATING WHAT MUCH OF THE WORLD'S PRESS HAS BEEN SAYING ABOUT OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE IN AFGHANISTAN'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS. PUZANOV CLAIMED THAT HE HAD GAINED FROM TALKS WITH PRESIDENT TARAKI AND PRIME MINISTER HAFIZULLAH AMIN AN IMPRESSION THAT THE KHALQI LEADERS HAVE "DOCUMENTED EVIDENCE" OF "FOREIGN INTERFERENCE" IN AFGHAN AFFAIRS. I REPLIED THAT WE HAD OFTEN CHALLANGED THE KHALQIS TO SHOW US ANY "PROOF" WHICH THEY THOUGHT MIGHT INDICATE USG INVOLVEMENT. TO DATE, I ADDED, NO SUCH EVIDENCE HAS BEEN DISPLAYED. PUZANOV OBSERVED THAT AFGHANISTAN WANTED GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE US. AS AN INDICATION OF THIS, HE CITED THE HIGH-LEVEL KHALQI ATTENDANCE AT OUR JULY 4 RECEPTION (SEE KABUL 5147). HE FURTHER OBSERVED THAT, "IN SPITE OF CLEAR EVIDENCE" THAT PAKISTAN HAS BEEN INTERFERING IN AFGHAN AFFAIRS, THE KHALQI REGIME HAS RESPONSIBLY OPENED A PROMISING DIPLOMATIC DIALOGUE WITH ISLAMABAD. PUZANOV CONCLUDED THAT THE USSR WELCOMED ANY SUCH PEACEFUL INITIATIVE THAT PRESERVED PEACE AND STABILITY IN THIS REGION. I REPLIED THAT WE SHARED THOSE OBJECTIVES, AND, RETURNING TO THE ORIGINAL THEME OF THE DEMARCHE, STRESSED THAT IRRESPONSIBLE PROPAGANDA, SUCH AS THAT IN THE JUNE 27 TASS PIECE, ONLY FURTHER INFLAMED THE SITUATION, HINDERING THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THOSE GOALS.

PLATIN

NNNNVV FSA936 JA395
RR RUQMHR
DE RUSELK #5824 1900455
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R 090427Z JUL 79
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4625
INFO RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 833
RUEHMO/AMZPASSY MOSCOW 1722
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 7037
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3136
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 381
RUEHDT/USUN NEW YORK 916
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9 Jul 79 08 17z

POL
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E.O. 12065: RDS-4 7-8-99 (PLATIN, BRUCE A.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, PINR, AF, UN
SUBJECT: (LOU) DR. ABDUL HAKIM TABIBI APPOINTED AS MINISTER-COUNSELOR OF AFGHANISTAN'S UN MISSION

REF: KABUL 4086

1. C- ENTIRE TEXT

2. SUMMARY: ON JULY 3, THE DRA INFORMED THE EMBASSY OF THE APPOINTMENT OF DR. ABDUL HAKIM TABIBI TO ITS PERMANENT MISSION TO THE U.N. WITH THE RANK OF MINISTER-COUNSELOR. THE APPOINTMENT IS ONE OF THE DRA'S BETTER SELECTIONS, BUT WE UNDERSTAND THAT TABIBI PLANS TO DEFECT ONCE HE CAN GET OUT OF AFGHANISTAN. END OF SUMMARY.

3. ON JULY 3, THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN (DRA) NOTIFIED THE EMBASSY OF ITS APPOINTMENT OF DR. ABDUL HAKIM TABIBI TO ITS PERMANENT MISSION TO THE U.N. WITH THE RANK OF MINISTER-COUNSELOR, AND REQUESTED THE NECESSARY U.S. VISAS. DR. TABIVI WAS SCHEDULED TO DEPART KABUL ON JULY 4, BUT NO ARRIVAL DATE IN NEW YORK WAS GIVEN. ON JULY 3, THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR (PLEASE PROTECT) TOLD THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES THAT HE HAD JUST QUIETLY ISSUED FRENCH VISAS TO TABIBI AND HIS FAMILY. HE THINKS TABIBI, A SENIOR AND DISTINGUISHED AFGHAN OFFICIAL, HAS DECIDED THAT THE MOMENT HAS COME TO DEFECT. TABIBI ONLY AGREED TO BECOME "SECOND BANANA" AT NEW YORK IN ORDER TO GET OUT OF AFGHANISTAN AGAIN WITH HIS FAMILY. TABIBI, A SENIOR DIPLOMAT, RESENTED BEING NAMED A FLUNKY TO A KHALQI POLITICAL APPOINTEE. HIS MAIN MOTIVATION FOR DEFECTION, HOWEVER, IS THAT HE DETESTS THE KHALQI REGIME.

4. BIOGRAPHIC DATA: DR. TABIBI, WHO WAS BORN AT KABUL ON JUNE 24, 1924, GRADUATED FROM THE FACULTY OF LAW AT KABUL UNIVERSITY IN 1946, AND JOINED THE AFGHAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS THAT SAME YEAR. FROM 1948-53 HE SERVED AS AN ATTACHE AT THE AFGHAN EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON, D.C. WHILE THERE, TABIBI OBTAINED AN M.A. FROM GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY (1952) AND RECEIVED A PH.D. IN LAW FROM AMERICAN UNIVERSITY WITH HONORS (1954). HE WAS THEN ASSIGNED TO THE AFGHAN PERMANENT MISSION TO THE UN FROM 1956-61, AND SERVED CONSECUTIVELY AS FIRST SECRETARY, COUNSELOR, AND MINISTER-COUNSELOR. IN 1961, TABIBI WAS APPOINTED AMBASSADOR TO YUGOSLAVIA. IN 1965, HE WAS NAMED MINISTER OF JUSTICE AND ATTORNEY GENERAL AND REMAINED IN THE AFGHAN CABINET UNTIL HIS RESIGNATION IN 1966. IN 1968 HE WAS NAMED AS AMBASSADOR TO JAPAN. FROM 1970-73, HE SERVED AS THE AFGHAN ENVOY TO INDIA. IN MAY OF 1973 HE WAS APPOINTED AS THE AFGHAN PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UN, WHERE HE SERVED UNTIL THE OCTOBER, 1973 COUP IN WHICH MOHAMMAD DAOUD DEPOSED KING ZAHIR. IN 1975 TABIBI WAS ELECTED CHAIRMAN OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION (HE HAS BEEN A MEMBER OF THAT BODY SINCE 1962). IN MAY OF 1976 TABIBI LOST A BID FOR REELECTION TO THE ILC BUT, IN 1977, SUBSEQUENTLY CHOSEN TO FILL THE UNEXPIRED TERM OF ANOTHER MEMBER. TABIBI SPEAKS GOOD ENGLISH AND SOME FRENCH. HE HAS BEEN ESPECIALLY FRIENDLY TO U.S. OFFICIALS DURING HIS CAREER. DR. TABIBI HOPES TO BE ACCOMPANIED OUT OF AFGHANISTAN BY HIS WIFE, NAJIBA, HIS TWO SONS, ABDULLAH AND NAJIBULLAH, AND HIS DAUGHTER, DINA.

5. COMMENT: THE SELECTION OF THIS ABLE AND EXPERIENCED DIPLOMAT TO BACK OF THE DIPLOMATICALLY INEXPERIENCED DR. BISMULLAH SAHAK (REFTEL) WOULD HAVE BEEN ONE OF THE MORE INTELLIGENT DIPLOMATIC APPOINTMENTS YET MADE BY THE KHALQI REGIME; UNFORTUNATELY FOR THE BADLY DEPLETED AFGHAN FOREIGN SERVICE, HOWEVER, ANOTHER GOOD MAN APPEARS TO BE HEADED OVER THE HILL.
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NNNNVV ESA207MJC237
RR RUQMHR
DE RUSBLK #5243/1 1920415
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 101125Z JUL 79
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4652
RUEHIA/USICA WASHDC
INFO RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 8992
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1728
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 7046
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 0308
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 KABUL 5243

JOINT STATE/USICA MESSAGE
USICA FOR NEA, ECA; STATE FOR NEA/PAB

E.O. 12065: GDS 7/10/85 (MORLEY, GARY G.) OR-ICA
TAGS: PINS, PINT, AF
SUBJ: KABUL UNIVERSITY: TROUBLE ON CAMPUS

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: ARRESTS OF PROFESSORS AND CONSCRIPTION OF STUDENTS AT KABUL UNIVERSITY ARE RAISING TENSION THERE. EPISODES OF VIOLENCE HAVE BEEN REPORTED ON CAMPUS. SOVIET INFLUENCE AT THE UNIVERSITY HAS INCREASED, AND SOVIETS ARE BEING IDENTIFIED WITH THE DECLINING QUALITY OF EDUCATION AS THE REGIME EXPANDS THE SIZE OF THE STUDENT BODY RAPIDLY, PARTICULARLY WITH KHALQI FAITHFUL. END SUMMARY.

3. SEVERAL CONVERGING CAUSES HAVE BEGUN TO REVEAL STRAINS AT THE UNIVERSITY. THE DRA HAS EXPANDED THE SIZE OF THE STUDENT BODY RAPIDLY, PARTICULARLY WITH KHALQI FAITHFUL, BUT STAFF AND PHYSICAL PLANT HAVE NOT KEPT PACE. ACCORDING TO SOME PROFESSORS, AS MANY AS 4,000 NEW STUDENTS WERE ENROLLED AT THE KABUL CAMPUS IN MARCH AND APRIL. THAT WOULD BE A 53 PERCENT INCREASE OVER THE 7,500-STUDENT ENROLLMENT LAST YEAR. MINISTER OF HIGHER EDUCATION MAHMOUD SOOMA, IN A CONVERSATION AT THE JULY 5 RECEPTION, SAID THERE ARE ABOUT 10,000 STUDENTS AT THE CAMPUS, UP 33 PERCENT SINCE THE APRIL 1978 COUP. (HE TOLD ANOTHER OFFICER, HOWEVER, THAT THERE ARE 11,500 STUDENTS ENROLLED.) SOOMA ADMITTED THAT THE RAPID EXPANSION WAS "CAUSING PROBLEMS IN FOUR AREAS -- LACK OF CLASSROOM SPACE, LACK OF DORMITORIES, LACK OF INSTRUCTORS, AND SOME REDUCTION IN THE QUALITY OF PREPARATION" OF INCOMING STUDENTS FOR UNIVERSITY-LEVEL STUDY. HE WAS OPTIMISTIC THAT "CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT" UNDER THE FIVE-YEAR PLAN WOULD ALLEVIATE THE "GROWING PAINS." AT THE SAME TIME, HE ESTIMATED THAT STUDENTS IN THE "HIGHER EDUCATION SYSTEM" WOULD DOUBLE IN FIVE YEARS, FROM ABOUT 20,000 PRESENTLY, AND THAT "THE DIFFICULTIES OF TRYING TO KEEP PACE WITH THE EXPANSION WILL LONG BE WITH US." (THE HIGHER EDUCATION SYSTEM INCLUDES KABUL UNIVERSITY, NANGARHAR UNIVERSITY AND THE POLYTECHNICS. REPORTEDLY, THE TEACHER TRAINING ACADEMIES, NOW IN THE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION, WILL SOON BE BROUGHT UNDER THE MINISTRY OF HIGHER EDUCATION.) SOOMA SAID ONE PRIORITY AIM WILL BE TO ESTABLISH SATELLITE UNIVERSITY CAMPUSES AROUND THE COUNTRY. THE FIRST TWO, HE SAID WILL BE COMPLETED AT MAZAR-I-SHARIF AND KANDAHAR UNDER THE FIVE-YEAR PLAN.

4. THE INCREASE OF YOUNG KHALQIS (NICKNAMED "ROBOTS") AT KABUL UNIVERSITY HAS KINDLED POLITICAL FRICTION IN A STUDENT BODY PREVIOUSLY A STRONGHOLD OF PARCHAMIST SENTIMENT. IN THE MONTHS FOLLOWING THE COUP, A NUMBER OF PARCHAM SUPPORTERS IN BOTH THE FACULTY AND STUDENT BODY OSTENSIBLY CHANGED ALLEGIANCE TO THE KHALQ. AS RECENTLY AS SIX MONTHS AGO, ONE CLOSE OBSERVER ESTIMATED, LEFT-WING POLITICAL OPINION ON CAMPUS HAD BEEN ABOUT 60-40 IN FAVOR OF THE KHALQIS OVER THE PARCHAMISTS. THAT RATIO HAS DECAYED STEADILY, HE SAID, AND KHALQIS ARE AGAIN IN THE MINORITY TO PARCHAMISTS.

5. SOVIET INFLUENCE AND PRESENCE AT THE UNIVERSITY HAS INCREASED, AND THEY ARE BEING IDENTIFIED WITH THE DECLINING QUALITY OF EDUCATION THERE. A RUSSOPHILE RECTOR POLEAXED ENGLISH, GERMAN, AND FRENCH AS LANGUAGES OF INSTRUCTION, CRIPPLING SEVERAL FACULTIES, ESPECIALLY ENGINEERING AND SCIENCE. LECTURES ARE NOW IN RUSSIAN (THOUGH THAT MAY CHANGE AGAIN AS PUSHTU SPEAKERS CONTINUE TO GAIN INFLUENCE), WHILE TEXTBOOKS ARE STILL IN ENGLISH. "AND EACH IS IRRELEVANT TO THE OTHER," SAID A FOURTH-YEAR ENGINEERING STUDENT. MEANWHILE, RUSSIAN LANGUAGE STUDY HAS RECEIVED A STRONG BOOST. RECENT DRA-SOVIET AGREEMENTS PROVIDE FOR UNIVERSITY-WIDE COURSES IN RUSSIAN LANGUAGE AND LITERATURE AND THE INTRODUCTION OF MATERIALS IN THAT LANGUAGE. SIMULTANEOUSLY, STUDENT AND FACULTY EXCHANGES WITH THE WEST ARE DIMINISHING AND THOSE WITH SOCIALIST NATIONS, PARTICULARLY THE SOVIET UNION, ARE SPIRALING.
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UNNNVV ESA243MJC332
RR RUEHC
DE RUSDLK #5243/2 1931438
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FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4653
RUEHIA/USICA WASHDC
INFO RUSBOD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 8993
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1729
RUSPAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 7347
RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 0309
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 KABUL 5243

11 Jul 79 07 122

JOINT STATE/USICA MESSAGE
USICA FOR NEA, ECA; STATE FOR NEA/PAB

6. THE REGIME HAS STARTED PURGING POLITICALLY UNDESIRABLE FACULTY. A SAMPLING: FORMER RECTOR DR. M. HAIDAR, FACULTY OF LAW AND POLITICAL SCIENCE (PH.D., FRANCE); DR. FAREUQ AZIZI, FACULTY OF LAW AND POLITICAL SCIENCE (PH.D., UNIVERSITY OF INDIANA); PROF. ALI AQA BALKHI, FACULTY OF ECONOMICS; PROF. HABIBULLAH JALALI, FACULTY OF LETTERS (M.A., MICHIGAN STATE); PROF. RAFI HASHIMI, FACULTY OF LETTERS; DR. A. RAZAQ FALWAL, FACULTY OF LETTERS (PH.D., PENN STATE). ONE CASE: A DOCTOR IN THE FACULTY OF MEDICINE (AND THE HUSBAND OF A USICA EMPLOYEE) WAS HAILED FROM HIS OFFICE AND TAKEN TO THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR. FROM THERE HE HAS APPARENTLY DISAPPEARED. AFTER A WEEK OF FRUITFUL WAITING, A DISCREET INQUIRY BY THE FAMILY BROUGHT THE STERN REPLY, "BE PATIENT." AFTER FIVE WEEKS, THE FAMILY INQUIRED AGAIN. "WHY ARE YOU BEING SO IMPATIENT?" THEY WERE ASKED. RELATIVES HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO LEARN WHERE OR WHY THE DOCTOR IS BEING DETAINED OR EVEN WHETHER HE IS STILL ALIVE.

7. STUDENTS ARE BEING ARRESTED AND CONSCRIPTED. WE HAVE BEEN TOLD THAT AS MANY AS 2,000 STUDENTS HAVE BEEN ARRESTED OR "VOLUNTEERED" FOR DUTY IN THE ARMED FORCES. SOME OF THE RECRUITS DO INDEED ENLIST, INDUCED BY THE PROMISE OF PARTY MEMBERSHIP. MANY OTHERS, HOWEVER, ARE SCRAMBLING TO AVOID IMPRESSMENT. THEIR APPREHENSION AND RESENTMENT FOSTER FURTHER TENSION.

8. SPORADIC, LETHAL VIOLENCE ON CAMPUS EVINCES SOME OF THAT TENSION. ON JUNE 23, THE DAY FIGHTING ERUPTED BRIEFLY IN JADI MAIDAN, A BOMB REPORTEDLY EXPLODED IN THE CAR OF A KHALQI (IN FRONT OF THE FACULTY OF ENGINEERING), KILLING ONE STUDENT AND INJURING TWO OTHERS SERIOUSLY. AT ABOUT THE SAME TIME, ANOTHER BOMB WENT OFF ELSEWHERE ON CAMPUS, APPARENTLY CAUSING NO INJURIES. FURTHERMORE, SOURCES SAY THAT RECENTLY TWO KHALQI WOMEN STUDENTS WERE SLAIN AND MUTILATED IN A LABORATORY ON CAMPUS. TWO OTHER UNIVERSITY GIRLS WERE REPORTEDLY RECENTLY ARRESTED, TAKEN TO PUL-I-CHARKI PRISON AND RAPED BY SOLDIERS. THE GIRLS WERE SUBSEQUENTLY RELEASED AND ARE NOW HOSPITALIZED.

9. COMMENT: THE UNIVERSITY IS IN FERMENT, NOT UPHEAVAL. THERE ARE NO INDICATIONS, AS YET, THAT THE REGIME CANNOT DEFUSE THE TENSION, CONTAIN IT, OR CRUSH THE NASCENT DISSENSION. NEITHER CAN WE DISCARD THE POSSIBILITY THAT RESTIVENESS AND SPORADIC VIOLENCE ON CAMPUS COULD DEVELOP INTO A SERIOUS PROBLEM FOR THE GOVERNMENT. WE WILL KEEP A CLOSE WATCH ON THE SITUATION AS IT DEVELOPS. FLATIN

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DE RUSBLK #5244/1 1911257
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4649
INFO RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 3653
RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 607
RUMJDK/AMEMBASSY DACCA 855
RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 8989
RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 329
RUSBKR/AMCONSUL KARACHI 4236
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1668
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1725
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 7043
RUSBQD/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR 1278
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 305
RUHQHQA/CINCPAC
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BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 KABUL 5244

DEPT.: ALSO FOR A/SY/CC

CINCPAC: ALSO FOR PLAD

KARACHI: FOR RSS

E.O. 12065: GDS, 7/10/85 (PLATIN, BRUCE A.) OR-M
TAGS: PINS, ASEC, MOPS, PINT, AF
SUBJECT: CURRENT STATUS OF THE INSURGENCY IN AFGHANISTAN

REF: KABUL 4325

1. (LOU) INTRODUCTORY NOTE: IN THE JUDGMENT OF THIS EMBASSY, THE CONTENTS OF THIS REPORT CAN BE USED TO BRIEF MEMBERS OF THE CONGRESS, SELECTED MEMBERS OF THE MEDIA, OR REPRESENTATIVES OF FRIENDLY GOVERNMENTS. ITS OVERALL CLASSIFICATION HAS BEEN KEPT AT CONFIDENTIAL, HOWEVER, SHOULD SOME WASHINGTON AGENCY PREFER THAT CERTAIN MATERIAL BE WITHELD AT THIS TIME. ALL CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED IN THIS REPORT SHOULD BE REGARDED AS SENSITIVE. END OF INTRODUCTORY NOTE.

POL

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2. (LOU) SUMMARY: AS A HOT, DUSTY SUMMER SETTLES OVER AFGHANISTAN, THE KHALQI REGIME OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLID OF AFGHANISTAN (DRA) STILL FACES A SLOWLY, BUT STEADILY, INCREASING SPREAD OF REBEL ACTIVITY THROUGHOUT MOST OF THE COUNTRY. ALTHOUGH THE KHALQIS HAVE MET THE MORE SERIOUS REBEL CHALLENGES EFFECTIVELY WITH DECISIVENESS, SPEED, EFFICIENCY, AND RUTHLESSNESS, THE REGIME HAS NOT YET SHOWN ITSELF ABLE TO COPE MILITARILY OR POLITICALLY WITH THE OVERALL INSURGENCY WHICH CONTINUES TO SPREAD AND ERODE GOVERNMENTAL ASSETS. THE VARIOUS REBEL GROUPS STILL LACK SUFFICIENT INTERNAL ORGANIZATION, STRATEGIC COORDINATION WITH EACH OTHER, CENTRALIZED LEADERSHIP, MEANINGFUL OUTSIDE SUPPORT, AND AN IDEOLOGICAL- POLITICAL ALTERNATIVE AROUND WHICH THEY CAN COALESCE. LIKE THE KHALQIS, THE REBELS ARE ALSO SUFFERING HIGH ATTRITION RATES IN MEN AND MATERIEL. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE INSURGENT AFGHAN TRIBESMEN CAN DRAW UPON A LONG TRADITION OF GUERRILLA ACTIVITY AND THEIR SIMPE LOGISTIC REQUIREMENTS ENABLE THEM TO LIVE OFF THE LAND-- AND WHATEVER THEY CAN PLUNDER FROM GOVERNMENT CONVOYS. ALTHOUGHTHE IMMEDIATE FUTURE LOOKS GRIM FOR THE KHALQIS, THE TOUGH, WELL-ORGANIZED PARTY CADRE IS KEEPING THE RANKS OF LOYALISTS FIRM AND DEIDCATED -- AND THE KEY ELEMENTS OF THE ARMED FORCES (E.G., THE ARMORED CORPS, ELITE COMMANDO UNITS, AND THE AIR FORCE) CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE REGIME. THE SITUATION, ALTHOUGH SERIOUS FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF THE LEFTISTS, IS NOT YET BAD ENOUGH TO TRIGGER A KHALQI PLEA FOR THE DIRECT ASSISTANCE OF SOVIET MILITARY UNITS. IT IS STILL TOO EARLY TO COUNT OUT THE TOUGH AND DETERMINED TARAKI-AMIN LEADERSHIP. END OF SUMMARY.

3. (LOU) THE MILITARY SITUATION: GUERRILLA ACTIVITY CONTINUES TO SPREAD THROUGHOUT MOST OF THE PROVINCES OF AFGHANISTAN. AS WAS THE CASE A MONTH AGO (REFTEL, THE KHALQI REGIME ACTUALLY CONTROLS LESS THAN HALF OF THE COUNTRY -- AND MUCH OF THAT ONLY DURING THE DAYTIME HOURS (AS A REBEL CHIEFTAIN WAS RECENTLY REPORTED TO HAVE SAID: "THE AFGHAN INSURGENCY IS LIKE A GOOD LOVE AFFAIR: MOST OF THE ACTION IS AT NIGHT.") GOVERNMENT FORCES HAVE BEEN CONCENTRATED ON RETENTION OF MAJOR POPULATION CENTERS, MOST OF THE MAJOR ROADS AND COMMUNICATIONS, THE BEST AGRICULTURAL DISTRICTS, AND CERTAIN KEY OUTPOSTS WHERE THEIR PRESTIGE IS INVOLVED, SUCH AS KONAR'S PROVINCIAL CAPITAL OF ASADABAD (ALSO KNOWN AS CHIGHA SERAI) WHERE EMBATTLED KHALQI TROOPS HAVE FOR MONTHS LOOKED UP AT A RING OF DEFIANTLY WAVING GREEN FLAGS OF ISLAM IN THE SURROUNDING HILLS.

4. (LOU) ALTHOUGH THE KHALQIS CLAIM TO CONTROL THE ROAD FROM THE JALALABAD REGION TO ASADABAD, IT'S A RARE VEHICLE THAT CAN MAKE THAT RISKY TRIP WITHOUT RECEIVING AT LEAST
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NNNNVV ESA195MJC219
PP RUQMHR
DE RUSBLK #5244/2 1911250
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INFO RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 3654
RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 6?8
RUMJDK/AMEMBASSY DACCA 856
RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 8990
RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 330
RUSBKR/AMCONSUL KARACHI 4237
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1669
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1726
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 7?44
RUSBQD/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR 1279
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 306
RUHQHQA/CINCPAC
RUSNAAA/CINCEUR
RUFHNA/USNATO 09
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11 JUL 79 05 36Z

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 3 KABUL 5244

DEPT.: ALSO FOR A/SY/CC

CINCPAC: ALSO FOR PLAD

KARACHI: FOR RSS

E.O. 12065: GDS, 7/10/85 (PLATIN, BRUCE A.) OR-M

TNE BULLET HOLE. A SPECIAL UN PROJECT VEHICLE WAS RECENTLY REMOVED FROM ASADABAD, AND ACQUIRED A SWISS-CHEESE APPEARANCE ON THE WAY OUT, PICKING UP OVER ONE HUNDRED BULLET AND SHELL HOLES. THIS PARTICULAR ROUTE WOULD ILLUSTRATE THE LOWER END OF THE SCALE OF "GOVERN-MENT CONTROL." MOST MAIN ROADS ARE USUALLY UNDER GOVERNMENT CONTROL; HOWEVER; IF THE REBELS SUCCESSFULLY INTERDICT A SECTION OF A KEY HIGHWAY, GOVERNMENT FORCES WILL ORDINARILY CLEAR THE AREA WITHIN THREE OR FOUR HOURS. A FEW ROUTES, SUCH AS THOSE WHICH PASS OVER THE REBEL-INFESTED PAKTIA MOUNTAINS TO THE CHRONICALLY SURROUNDED GOVERNMENT OUTPOST OF KHOST, ARE ONLY RARELY OPEN. THEREFORE, THE KHALQIS RELY UPON AERIAL SUPPORT OF THEIR FORCES IN SUCH CASES.

5. (LOU) WHILE THE FIGHTING CONTINUES ON ONLY A LOW LEVEL IN SOME PROVINCES OF THE COUNTRY AT THIS TIME, IT HAS BEEN PARTICULARLY FIERCE RECENTLY IN EASTERN PROVINCES OF BADAKHSHAN, KONAR, NANGARHAR, PAKTIA, AND PAKTIKA. KHALQI FORCES HAVE LOST AN OCCASIONAL TOWN, WEAPONS, AMMUNITION, VEHICLES, SUPPLIES, AND -- WHAT MUST BE A PARTICULARLY VEXATIOUS PROBLEM TO THE KABUL LEADERSHIP -- TROOPS AS WELL. EVERY DAY, KHALQI SOLDIERS ARE GETTING KILLED IN ACTION, WOUNDED, LOST, CUT-OFF -- AND, NOT INFREQUENTLY, THEY ARE DEFECTING TO THE REBEL SIDE. RECENTLY, SOME COMPANY-SIZED UNITS HAVE SLIPPED OUT OF KHALQI CONTROL. IN ONE OR TWO CASES, BATTALIONS HAVE DISAPPEARED. THIS HAS LEFT THE REGIME SHORT OF MEN IN MAJOR COMMANDS ALL OVER AFGHANISTAN. POLITICAL PURGES HAVE GUTTED THE OFFICER CORPS, LEAVING CIVILIAN PARTY CADRE OR YOUNG LOYALIST JUNIOR OFFICERS IN CHARGE OF MAJOR MILITARY UNITS -- WITH THE VERY CLOSE AND ACTIVIE ASSISTANCE OF THEIR SEVERAL SOVIET MILITARY ADVISORS (WHO, AS WAS ALSO THE CUSTOM BEFORE THE KHALQI REVOLUTION, USUALLY WEAR AFGHAN UNIFORMS).

6. (LOU) THE REGIME APPEARS TO BE SCRAPING THE BOTTOM OF THE BARREL FOR FIGHTING MEN: CONVINCING YOUNG UNIVERSITY AND HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS TO "VOLUNTEER"; IMPRESSING INTO "MILITIA" SERVICE THE ABLE ADULT MALE POPULATIONS OF ENTIRE VILLAGES; PICKING UP CASUAL DAY LABORERS FOUND WAITING ON KABUL STREET CORNERS FOR JOBS, AND PUTTING THEM ON THE FRONT; OR RECALLING THOSE WHO HAD ALREADY COMPLETED THEIR MILITARY OBLIGATIONS. THIS INCREASING SCARCITY OF MILITARY MANPOWER MIRRORS THE SHRINKING NUMBER OF CIVILIAN OFFICIALS IN KABUL'S MINISTRIES AS THE KHALQI-LEADERSHIP CONTINUES ITS SEEMINGLY ENDLESS POLITICAL PURGES. THIS SHORTAGE OF HUMAN RESOURCES GREATLY HAMPERS KHALQI OPERATIONS, BUT THE LEADERSHIP STILL APPEARS TO PLACE ITS HIGHEST PRIORITY ON LOYALTY. (HOWEVER, WE HAVE RECENTLY HEARD A REPORT, AS YET UNCONFIRMED, THAT SEVENTY PERSONS WERE RELEASED FROM PUL-I-CHARKI PRISON ON JULY 8. AMONG THOSE FREED WERE REPORTEDLY SEVERAL FORMER ARMY OFFICERS, SOME OF WHOM HAD BEEN SUSPECTED OF PARCHAMIST SYMPATHIES.)

7. (LOU) NEW SECURITY PROBLEMS FOR THE KHALQIS: THE MOST NOTEWORTH NEW DEVELOPMENT HERE HAS BEEN THE FIRST TENTATIVE SIGNS THAT THE INSURRECTION MIGHT BE ENTERING THE CITY OF KABUL, ITSELF. ON JUNE 23, A NUMBER OF SMALL, SEEMINGLY UNCOORDINATED -- OR POORLY COORDINATED -- SHOOTING EPISODES BROKE OUT IN VARIOUS PARTS OF KABUL. THE MOST IMPORTANT CONFLICT WAS LAUNCED BY A GROUP OF SHI'A HAZARAS, WHO SUFFER FROM BEING BOTH AN ETHNIC MINORITY AND A RELIGIOUS MINORITY IN THIS INTOLERANT PUSHTUN AND SUNNI-DOMINIATED SOCIETY. THE REBELS APPEARED UNABLE TO LAUNCH WHATEVER THEY HAD IN MIND, HOWEVER, AND THE REGIME RESTORED ORDER SMOOTHLY-- BUT BLOODILY. SINCE THAT DATE, THE LEVEL OF VIOLENCE IN KABUL SEEMS TO HAVE INCREASED SLIGHTLY. SINCE THE 1978 REVOLUTION, ISOLATED GUNFIRE HAS FREQUENTLY BEEN HEARD HERE, BUT SOME OF THE RECENT SHOOTING INCIDENTS HAVE BEEN MORE PROLONGED. ADDITIONALLY, THE REBELS ARE BEGINNING TO AMBUSH MILITARY VEHICLES FROM TIME TO TIME ALONG THE VITAL KABUL-TO-TORKHAM HIGHWAY. COMMUNICATIONS HAVE ALSO BEEN CUT OCCASIONALLY ALONG THAT ROUTE. THUS FAR, THE KHALQIS HAVE QUICKLY AND EFFECTIVELY DEALTH WITH THESE NUISANCE RAIDS. THE KHALQI LEADERSHIP AT KABUL CONTINUES TO DISPLAY A CALM, UNRUFFLED, "IN-CHARGE" FACADE TO THE PUBLIC. ASIDE FROM THE FEW INCIDENTS DESCRIBED ABOVE, AND THE FACT THAT THE CITY IS AN ARMED CAMP, KABUL RETAINS A REMARKABLY QUIET, RELAXED, AND PEACEFUL APPEARANCE. THERE IS A DISCERNABLE TENSION UNDER THE SURVACE, HOWEVER.
BT
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PP RUS [illegible]
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FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4651
INFO RUEHOV/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 3655
RUEHJP/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 669
RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DACCA 857
RUEHOD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 8991
RUEHJA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 331
RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI 4238
RUEHC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1672
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1727
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 7845
RUEHOD/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR 1290
RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 367
RUHOMA/CINCPAC
RUSNAAA/CINCEUR
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BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 3 KABUL 5244

11 Jul 79 04 58z

DEPT.: ALSO FOR A/SY/CC

CINCPAC: ALSO FOR PLAD

KARACHI: FOR RSS

E.O. 12065: GDS, 7/12/85 (PLATIN, BRUCE A.) OR-M

8. WHAT HAVE THE REBELS ACCOMPLISHED THUS FAR? ALTHOUGH SUBJECTED TO HEAVY ATTRITION AT TIMES -- AND FIGHTING WITHOUT MEANINGFUL OUTSIDE SUPPORT, THE REBELS HAVE MANAGED TO BLOODY THE KHALQI REGIME'S NOSE FREQUENTLY -- AND HAVE RENDERED HOLLOW THE KHALQI LEADERSHIP'S STILL OFT-REPEATED CLAIM THAT THEY ENJOY " THE ENTHUSIASTIC SUPPORT OF 98 PERCENT OF THE AFGHAN POPULATION." ALSO OF INCREASING ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE IS THE FACT THAT INSURRECTIONIST ACTIVITY HAS DISRUPTED AND STALLED MOST OF THE FOREIGN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS IN THIS COUNTRY-- THEREBY DEPRIVING THE KHALQIS OF MUCH-NEEDED FOREIGN REMITTANCES.

9. CAN THE KHALQIS HOLD OUT -- OR WILL THEY BE FORCED TO CALL IN THE RUSSIANS? AS OF EARLY JULY, THE KHALQI REGIME, THOUGH EMBATTLED, STILL SEEMS ABLE TO SURVIVE WITH ITS OWN MILITARY AND POLICE RESOURCES, GIVEN THE CONTINUATION OF GENEROUS MEASURES OF SOVIET MATERIEL AND ADVISORY SUPPORT. THE KHALQIS UNDOUBTEDLY REALIZE THAT TO CALL IN COMBAT TROOPS OF WHAT HAS TRADITIONALLY BEEN REGARDED HERE AS THE EXPANSIONIST NEIGHBOR TO THE NORTH WOULD COMPLETELY DISCREDIT THEM IN THE EYES OF MOST AFGHANS (INCLUDING MANY OF THOSE WHO HAD BEEN WILLING TO GIVE THE KHALQIS' MODERNIZING FORCE A CHANCE TO MOVE THIS COUNTRY FORWARD OUT OF THE MIRE OF CENTURIES OF FEUDAL SLUDGE). THEREFORE, THE KHALQIS CLEARLY REGARD THIS COURSE OF ACTION AS A LAST RESORT. THAT TIME HAS NOT YET ARRIVED. PLATIN
BT
#5244

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FM USDAO KABUL
TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC//DB-2C//
INFO RUSBQD/USDAO ISLAMABAD
RUQMHR/USDAO TEHRAN
RUHQHQA/COMIPAC CP H.M. SMITH HI//IPAC I44/I25/I53//
RUHQHQA/CINCPAC, HONOLULU, HI//J233/J23//
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L/NOFORN

SUBJECT: THIS IS IR 6 800 0046 79

1. (U) COUNTRY: AFGHANISTAN (AF)/PAKISTAN (PK)
2. (U) REPORT NUMBER: 6 800 0046 79
3. (U) TITLE: SOVIET INTENTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN/PAKISTAN
4. (U) PROJECT NUMBER: N/A
5. (U) DATE OF INFORMATION: 790709
6. (U) DATE OF REPORT: 790710
7. (U) DATE AND PLACE OF ACQ: 790709; KABUL
8. (U) REFERENCE: INITIATIVE
9. (U) ASSESSMENT: A. F-6, B. F-6
10. (U) ORIGINATOR: USDAO KABUL
11. (U) REQUEST EVAL: NO
12. (U) PREPARING OFFICER: ROBERT C. DISNEY, LTC, USA, ADATT
14. (U) SOURCE: A. SCI 6 800 066, B. ONE TIME SOURCE
15. (U) DIRC: NO
16. CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN SUMMARY: ACCORDING TO TWO THIRD-COUNTRY DIPLOMATS, THE SOVIET UNION ALLEGEDLY HAS THREE OBJECTIVES IN AFGHANISTAN. THESE ARE SAFEGUARDING THE INVESTMENTS THEY HAVE MADE TO SUPPORT THE REVOLUTION, MAINTAINING A SOCIALIST REGIME IN AF, AND EXTENDING THEIR AREA OF INFLUENCE. IF IT APPEARS TO THE SOVIET'S THAT THE CURRENT ((TARAKI)) REGIME IS NOT GOING TO BE SUCCESSFUL IN AFGHANISTAN, THEY WILL NOT HESITATE TO REPLACE THE REGIME WITH ONE THAT WOULD BE MORE ACCEPTABLE TO THE BULK OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE, IN ORDER TO SAVE FACE AND TO ATTAIN THESE OBJECTIVES. THIS NEW REGIME WOULD PROBABLY BE OUTWARDLY MORE NATIONALISTIC AND WOULD PROBABLY BE DRAWN FROM THE ARMED FORCES. THE SOVIETS WOULD NOT HESITATE TO INTRODUCE THEIR OWN TROOPS INTO AF TO INSURE THE SUCCESS OF THE REVOLUTION, A DEVELOPMENT WHICH WOULD, IN SOURCES' VIEW, NOT PROMPT A SERIOUS USG REACTION.

DAO-3
Charge
Chron
JUL 79

22. CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN DETAILS: SOURCE A. ON HIS OWN INITIATIVE PAID AN OFFICE CALL ON REPORTING OFFICER (RO). DURING THE RATHER LENGTHY (2 AND A HALF HOURS) VISIT SOURCE AND RO HAD A CONVERSATION WHICH COVERED SEVERAL SUBJECTS. THE PRIMARY TOPIC OF CONVERSATION WAS SOURCE'S VIEWS ON SOVIET INTENTIONS IN AF. IN RESPONSE TO RO'S QUESTION SOURCE STATED THAT IN HIS VIEW THE SOVIET UNION HAD THREE OBJECTIVES IN AF. THE FIRST OF THESE WERE THE SAFEGUARDING OF THE MASSIVE INVESTMENTS OF WEAPONS, EQUIPMENT AND MONEY WHICH THEY HAD PROVIDED THE TARAKI REGIME TO SUCCESSFULLY CONCLUDE THE REVOLUTION. THE SECOND WAS TO ENSURE THAT A SOCIALIST REGIME SURVIVED IN AF, AND LASTLY, TO ENSURE THAT THEIR AF VENTURE, AND EXTENSION OF THEIR AREA OF INFLUENCE, WAS NOT REDUCED BUT FURTHER EXTENDED. SOURCE CONTINUED BY STATING THAT IN HIS VIEW THE CURRENT REGIME WOULD NOT LAST "TOO MUCH LONGER" BECAUSE OF THEIR INCREASING PROBLEMS WITH THE MUSLIM INSURGENTS" WHO WERE DIAMETRICALLY OPPOSED TO A SOCIALIST GOVERNMENT AND BECAUSE OFITS UNPOPULARITY WITH
THE FERVENTLY RELIGIOUS MUSLIM POPULATION
OF AFGHANISTAN. ALLEGEDLY THE SOVIETS ARE ALSO BEGINNING TO RELAIZE THIS AND, IN ORDER TO ENSURE THE SUCCESS OF THE REVOLUTION AND TO ACHIEVE THEIR OBJECTIVES, THEY WOULD NOT HESITATE TO REPLACE THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT WITH ONE WHICH
WOULD BE MORE ACCEPTABLE TO THE ISLAMIC MAJORITY, BUT WHICH WOULD ALSO BE PRO-MOSCOW, BUT IN A LESS GLARING SENSE. RO ELICITED SOURCE'S VIEWS ON WHO WOULD FORM THE NEW REGIME. SOURCE STATED THAT IT WOULD MAINLY COMPOSED OF NATIONALISTIC MILITARY OFFICERS WHO WERE SYMPATHETIC TO THE SOVIET CAUSE. HE CONTINUED BY STATING THAT HE KNEW SEVERAL AF OFFICERS WHO WOULD FIT THIS MOLD, BUT DID NO ELABORATE FURTHER. CONTINUING, SOURCE STATED THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD NOT GIVE UP THEIR ULTIMATE GOAL OF OBTAINING AN ACCESS TO PK WARM WATER PORTS ON THE ARABIAN SEA. THE PURPOSE OF THIS WOULD BE TO PROVIDE THE SOVIETS WITH A BASE FROM WHICH THEY COULD PROJECT THEIR NAVAL POWER TO CONTRO THE SEA LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS UPON WHICH MOVE THE BULK OF THE FREE WORLD'S FUEL REQUIREMENTS. ACCORDING TO SOURCE THIS ACCESS WOULD BE OBTAINED THROUGH THE ASSISTANCE

OF FRIENDLY ELEMENTS IN THE BALUCHISTAN PROVINCE OF PK. "EVEN TODAY THERE ARE BOTH COVERT AND OVERT ELEMENTS IN BALUCHISTAN, IN THE PAY OF THE SOVIETS, WHO ARE ADVOCATING THE INCREASED AUTONOMY OF THE PROVINCE. IN TIME, AND WITH THE REQUISITE POLITICAL CLIMATE, BALUCHISTAN COULD BECOME A SEPERATE POLITICAL ENTITY AND THEN THE SOVIETS WOULD BE ABLE TO ACHIEVE THEIR LONG-SOUGHT GOAL - ACCESS TO THE ARABIAN SEA". IN SOURCE'S VIEW IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT THE USG PROVIDE THE NECESSARY ECONOMIC AID TO ASSIST PK IN THE RAPID DEVELOPMENT OF BALUCHISTAN IN AN EFFORT TO BLUNT SOVIET INITIATIVES IN THE REGION. ADDITIONALLY SOURCE MADE A STRONG REQUEST FOR USG MILITARY ASSISTANCE IN ORDER TO PROVIDE PK WITH "CREDIBLE DEFENSE FORCES". IN RESPONSE TO RO'S QUESTION AS TO HOW THIS MILITARY AID, IF PROVIDED, MIGHT BE VIEWDD BY INDIA, SOURCE STATED THAT IT WAS "LUDICROUS" FOR ANY NATION, INCLUDING INDIA, TO BELIEVE THAT PK HAD ANY HOSTILE INTENTIONS TOWARDS INDIA. "PK IS A SMALL COUNTRY WITH VERY LIMITED RESOURCES AND IT HAS NO INTENTION OF TAKING ANY HOSTILE STEPS AGAINST A MAJOR POWER SUCH AS INDIA. PK WOULD BE WILLING TO PROVIDE ANY GUARANTEES NECESSARY THAT ITS MILITARY CAPABILITY WOULD NEVER BE USED AGAINST INDIA, EXCEPT IN DEFENSE OF ITS OWN SOVEREIGNTY". TO ENSURE THE SUCCESS OF THE SOCIALIST REVOLUTION IN AF AND TO ACHIEVE THEIR OBJECTIVES IN THIS REGION, SHOURCE SAID THAT "I AM CONVINCED THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD NOT HESITATE TO INTRODUCE THEIR OWN TROOPS INTO AF" IF THIS PROVIED NECESSARY. IN RESPONSE TO RO'S QUESTION AS TO HOW THIS DEVELOPMENT MIGHT BE VIEWED BY THE NATIONS OF THE WORLD, AND ESPECIALLY BY THE USG IN LIGHT O THE RECENT SALT II AGREEMENT, SOURCE COUNTERED BY STATING THAT IT WOULD NOT CAUSE "TOO MUCH CONCERN" ESPECIALLY AS IT APPEARED TO PK AND MANY OTHER FRIENDLY NATIONS THAT THE USG HAD "WRITTEN OFF PK AND THIS REGION AS BEING UNESSENTIAL TO YOUR STRETEGIC AND NATIONAL INTERESTS".

DURING AN ATTACHE FUNCTION WHICH RO ATTENDED LATER THAT DAY, SOURCE B, IN RESPONSE TO RO'S QUESTION REGARDING SOURCE'S VIEW OF SOVIET INTENTIONS, GAVE ESSENTIALLY THE SAME VIEWS AS STATED BY SOURCE A. ONE POINT WHICH BOTH SOURCES STRESSED WAS THE APPARANT LACK OF INTERST BEING DISPLAYED BY THE USG IN THE UNFOLDING DEVELOPMENTS IN THIS REGION. BOTH SOURCES UNDERLINED THIS POINT BY STATING THAT THE USG MUST TAKE THE APPROPRIATE ACTION TO HALT THE SOVIET EXPANSION IN THIS REGION.
ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: (CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN) BASED ON THE ABOVE IT APPEARED TO RO THAT BOTH SOURCES WERE ENUNCIATING THE PARTY LINE OF THEIR GOVERNMENT. IN AS MUCH AS THIS IS THE FIRST TIME RO HAS OBTAINED ANY INFORMATION FROM EITHER OF THE SOURCES AN F-S RATING HAS BEEN ASSIGNED.
DECL 10 JUL 85.
BT
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VV ESA501MJC987
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ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 110355Z JUL 79
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4655
INFO RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 611
RUDKRB/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 187
RUFHEB/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 24
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 652
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 376
RUMJGM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO 459
RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 8995
RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 333
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1672
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1731
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3140
RUDKRP/AMEMBASSY PRAGUE 68
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 311
RUHQHQA/CINCPAC
RUSNAAA/CINCEUR
RUFHNA/USNATO 13
RUEHDT/USUN 917
RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA 62
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 KABUL 5246

CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLAD
CINCEUR ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 7/9/99 (FLATIN, BRUCE A.) OR/M
TAGS: PEPR, EAID, PINT, PORG (NAME), AF, GE, UR, PK
SUBJECT: (C) PUZZLEMENT OF THE EAST GERMAN AMBASSADOR OVER "CONTRADITIONS" OF THE KHALQI REGIME

REF: KABUL 5146 (NOTAL)

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. AS ANTICIPATED IN THE REFTEL, DR. HERMANN SCHWIESAU, THE AMBASSADOR OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC AT KABUL, CALLED ON ME JULY 9 TO CHAT ABOUT THE CURRENT SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN. AS IS HIS USUAL PRACTICE, SCHWIESAU ENDEAVORED TO APPEAR FRIENDLY AND FRANK.

3. SCHWIESAU EXPRESSED PUZZLEMENT OVER HOW THE AFGHANS SEEM TO MISMANAGE THEIR RELATIONS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES, MISSING OBVIOUS OPPORTUNITIES TO DISPLAY A SMOOTHER DIPLOMATIC IMAGE. USING KABUL'S BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP WITH ISLAMABAD AS AN EXAMPLE, HE WONDERED WHY AFGHANISTAN HAD APPARENTLY CHANGED ITS SIGNALS AT THE LAST MINUTE AND HAD OPPOSED PAKISTANI MEMBERSHIP IN THE NONALIGNED MOVEMENT AT THE RECEN NAM CONFERENCE AT COLOMBO. SCHWIESAU RECALLED THAT THE AFGHANS HAD APPEARED TO HAVE CLEARLY PROMISED PAKISTAN BEFORE THAT CONFERENCE THAT THEY WOULD SUPPORT PAKISTAN'S BID FOR MEMBERSHIP IN THE NAM. SCHWIESAU REVEALED THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD EVEN URGED THIS COURSE OF ACTION. SCHWIESAU SAID THAT HE AND OTHER OBSERVERS WERE SURPRISED WHEN THE AFGHANS TOOK A STRON ANTI-PAKISTAN STAND AT COLOMBO. 7#3 -8$ 5#-5 85 297)$ #-;3 733, :)3VERER FOR THE AFGHANS TO HAVE INSTEAD STATED THAT, "ALTHOUGH AFGHANISTAN HAS MANY BILATERAL PROBLEMS WITH PAKISTAN, THOSE CAN BE RESOLVED IN OTHER WAYS; THEREFORE, AFGHANISTAN IS NOT BLOCKING PAKISTAN'S ENTRY INTO THE NAM." HE FOUND THE AFGHAN POSITION ESPECIALLY "STUPID" BECAUSE THEY COULD NOT GET ENOUGH VOTES TO BLOCK PAKISTANI MEMBERSHIP ANYWAY.

4. SCHWIESAU ALSO WAS SURPRISED THAT THE AFGHAN POLICE AUTHORITIES WOULD BE SEIZING A PAKISTANI EMBASSY STAFFF MEMBER AT THE SAME TIME THE THE AFGHAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS WAS PREPARING FOR DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER DOST'S FRIENDLY VISIT TO ISLAMABAD. SCHWIESAU LEFT NO DOUBT THAT HE BELIVED THAT THE PAKISTANI HAD BEEN FORCIBLY SEIZED BY THE AFGHAN'S SECURITY POLICE, AND HAD NOT DEFECTED VOLUNTARILY TO THE AFGHAN SIDE AS THE KHALQIS CLAIM. WHILE ON THE TOPIC OF THE DOST VISIT, SCHWIESAU WONDERED WHY THE KHALQIS HAD FELT COMPELLED TO REFUTE THE SUBSEQUENT PAKISTANI STATEMENT THAT AGHA SHAHI WOULD BE PAYING A RETURN VISIT ON PRIME MINISTER HAFIZULLAH AMIN. ASIDE FRO THE PROTOCOL SENSITIVITIES INVOLVED, SCHWIESAU THOUGHT AMIN SHOULD BE ABLE TO RECEIVE AGHA SHAHI GRACEFULLY - AND TRANSFER HIM OVER TO A LOWER OFFICIAL, SUCH AS EDUCATION MINISTER JALILI, FOR SUBSTANTIVE TALKS.

5. WHEN I ASKED SCHWIESAU WHY HE THOUGHT THE KHALQI REGIME SO FREQUENTLY SEEMED TO BE OPERATING AT CROSS PURPOSES WITH ITSELF, SCHWIESAU REPLIED THAT IS A MYSTERY TO HIM. HE OBSERVED THAT, ALTHOUGH ONE MINISTRY MIGHT PROCEED ALONG A DIFFERENT COURSE FROM ANOTHER MINISTRY, THERE HAD TO BE SOME OVERALL DIRECTION FROM THE TOP. FOR EXAMPLE, SCHWIESAU NOTED THE AFGHAN DELEGATE'S ANTI-PAKISTAN SPEECH AT COLOMBO HAD TO HAVE BEEN APPROVED IN ADVANCE BY NO ONE LESS THAN PRIME MINISTER AMIN.

6. TURNING TO THE INSURGENCY SITUATION, SCHWIESAU REGARDED IT AS SERIOUS. HE RECOMMENDED THAT THE DEPENDENTS OF ONE OF HIS OFFICERS REMAIN BEHIND IN BERLIN WHEN THAT OFFICER RETURNS TO KABUL FROM HOME LEAVE, BECAUSE HE THOUGHT THE SECURITY SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN IS "DANGEROUS." SCHWIESAU REVEALED THAT THE CZECHOSLOVAKS ARE SENDING SOME TECHNICAL ADVISERS BACK TO THE HERAT REGION, BUT WITHOUT THEIR WIVES AND CHILDREN.
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FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4656
INFO RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 612
RUDKRB/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 188
RUFHEB/AMEMBASSY BERLING 25
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 653
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 377
RUMJGM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO 460
RUSBGD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 8996
RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 334
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1673
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1732
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3141
RUDKRP/AMEMBASSY PRAGUE 69
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 312
RUHQHQA/CINCPAC
RUSNAAA/CINCEUR
RUFHNA/USNATO 14
RUEHDT/USUN 918
RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA 63
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 KABUL 5246

CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLAD
CINCEUR ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 7/9/99 (FLATIN, BRUCE A.) OR/M

7. SCHWIESAU SAID THAT HE FINDS ESPECIALLY FRUSTRATING THE ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE MESS IN THIS COUNTRY. HE HAS OFTEN TOLD THE AFGHANS THAT THEY ARE FOOLS NOT TO ENCOURAGE THE BROADEST POSSIBLE PARTICIPATION BY ALL NATIONS, EAST AND WEST, IN THEIR DEVELOPMENT. IN THIS CONNECTION, SCHWIESAU STATED THAT HE WAS TOLD KHALQI POLITICAL EXTREMISTS THAT THEY ARE OUT OF STEP WITH THE MODERN SOCIALIST MOVEMENT WHEN THEY ATTEMPT TO SQUEEZE "IMPERIALIST" REPRESENTATION OUT OF KABUL. HE SAID THAT HE TOLD THEM HOW IT IS NECESSARY FOR ALL NATIONS TO WORK TOGETHER FOR PEACE AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS.

6 AS FOR EAST GERMAN PROGRAMS FOR AFGHANISTAN, SCHWIESAU WAS VERY BEARISH. HAVING LONG BEEN VERY SKEPTICAL ABOUT THE ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY OF AFGHANISTAN FOR FOREIGN AID, SCHWIESAU SAID THAT, AT HIS RECOMMENDATION, THE GDR HAS OFFERED THE KHALQI REGIME A MODEST INITIAL AMOUNT OF AID CREDIT TO TEST THE POSSIBLE SUCCESS OF EAST GERMAN PROGRAMMING IN THIS AREA. SCHWIESAU WAS DISCOURAGED, HOWEVER, BY HIS FIRST TECHNICAL CONVERSATIONS WITTH AFGHAN AID OFFICIALS. THEY WANTED EAST GERMANY TO BUILD A TURNKEY-TYPE INDUSTRIAL INSTALLATION IN AFGHANISTAN, REQUESTING THAT EAST GERMANY UNDERTAKE THE COMPLETE PROJECT. SCHIESAU SAID THAT HE TOOK THE AFGHANS TO A WORLD MAP, POINTED OUT HOW DISTANT EAST GERMANY WAS FROM AFGHANISTAN, AND ASKED THE AFGHANS WHETHER THEY WERE SERIOUSLY PROPOSING THAT HE, FOR EXAMPLE, HAVE EAST GERMAN BRICKS TRANSPORTED ACROSS POLAND AND THE SOVIET UNION FOR SUCH A PROJECT. HE CONCLUDED THAT HE HAS THUS FAR GOTTEN NOWHERE IN GETTING THE AFGHANS TO BE PRACTICAL ABOUT SUCH PROPOSITIONS.

8. COMMENT: THE VIEWS EXPRESSED BY SCHWIESAU ON JULY 9 WERE CONSISTENT WITH THE GENERALLY CRITICAL ATTITUDE HE HAS DISPLAYED TOWARD THE KHALQI REGIME IN PROVATE CONVERSATIONS WITH OTHER DIPLOMATS SINCE HIS ARRIVAL HERE ELEVEN MONTHS AGO. SCHWIESAU DID NOT MENTION THE SUBJECT OF RECENT SOVIET-SPONSORED "NEGOTIATIONS" TO FORM A "NATIONAL FRONT" REPLACEMENT FOR THE KHALQI REGIME (REFTEL).

FLATIN

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DE RUSBLK #5360 1970510
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R 160401Z JUL 79
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4718
INFO RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 3661
RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 619
RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 9011
RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 336
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1680
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1740
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 7064
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3148
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 320-
RUHQHQA/CINCPAC
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L KABUL 5360

16 JUL 79 1 152

Pol
Charge
Econ
Chron
RF

CINCPAC: ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12065: GDS 6-15-85 (TAYLOR, JAMES E.) OR-P
TAGS: PEPR, PINS, PINT, AF
SUBJECT: (LOU) AFGHAN UNDERGROUND PROPAGANDA CALLS FOR THE OUSTER OF PRIME MINISTER AMIN

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. SUMMARY: A RECENT SPATE OF "UNDERGROUND" LETTERS CALLING FOR THE OUSTER OF PRIME MINISTER AMIN AND HIS COLLEAGUES (BUT NOT PRESIDENT TARAKI), AND THE FORMATION OF A UNITED FRONT OF ALL "TRUE REVOLUTIONARIES," COULD BE PART OF A RUMORED EFFORT TO MODIFY THE COMPOSITION OF THIS REGIME'S LEADERSHIP IN ORDER TO DEFUSE THE GROWING DOMESTIC INSURGENCY. THE LETTERS' THEMES, HOWEVER, ARE THOSE OF THE RIVAL PARCHAM WING OF THE PARTY, AND THEREBY, WITH THEIR EXTREME LEFTIST AND INHERENT ANTI-WESTERN BASES, OFFER LITTLE COMFORT TO THOSE WHO MIGHT HOPE FOR A GENUINE MODIFICATION OF THE KHALQI GOVERNMENT'S POLICIES. END OF SUMMARY.

3. UNDERGROUND "NIGHT-LETTERS" (SHABNAHMAS") STARTED CIRCULATING THROUGHOUT KABUL SEVERAL DAYS AGO. DISTRIBUTION HAS BEEN SURREPTITIOUS, BUT STILL FAIRLY OPEN (I.E., COPIES HAVE BEEN FOUND LYING ON THE STREETS, AND ONE FLUTTERED OVER A DIPLOMAT'S WALL IN BROAD DAYLIGHT) THEREBY SUGGESTING THAT SOME SEGMENTS OF THE GOVERNMENT ARE TURNING THE OTHER WAY. THE SUBSTANTIVE THRUST OF THESE LETTERS IS SIMILAR, AND INCLUDES THE FOLLOWING HIGHLIGHTS:

-- PRIME MINISTER HAFIZULLAH AMIN, AND HIS "FASCIST BAND OF GANGSTERS," REPRESENTS THE PRINCIPAL TARGET, WHILE NO CRITICISM OF PRESIDENT TARAKI HAS YET BEEN SEEN.

-- OTHER TARGETS ARE: "UNITED STATES IMPERIALISM" (WHOSE NEFARIOUS HAND, BY CLEAR IMPLICATION IS BEHIND ALL EVENTS IN THE REGION); THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD ("IKHWAN-I-MUSLIMIN"); THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN; THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT; AND "REACTIONARY FORCES."

-- GOALS OF "TRUE REVOLUTIONARIES" SHOULD BE TH OSEPROCLAIMED BY MIR AKBAR KHAIBAR (THE FORMER PARCHAMIST INTELLECTURAL WHOSE MURDER ON APRIL 17, 1978, SET OFF THE CHAIN OF EVENTS LEADING TO THE KHALQI REVOLUTION), AND THE "WORKERS' IDEOLOGY," WITH THE SUPPORT OF THE SOVIET UNION AND OTHER SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, SHOULD SERVE AS A GUIDING LIGHT.

-- THE REGIME OF THE "CHIEF OF THE PROFIESSIONAL CRIMINALS" (AMIN) IS TYPIFIED BY INDISCRIMINATE ARREST AND TORTURE OF FEMALES, THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE INTERESTS OF "U.S. IMPERIALISM," "ANIMAL TORTURES" OF "TRUE REVOLUTIONARIES," AND THE PILLAGING OF INNOCENT PEOPLES' HOMES, ALL OF WHICH WERE FEATURES OF ADOLPH HITLER'S RULE.

-- PROGRESS OF THE REVOLUTION , AND DEFENSE OF THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF THE HOMELAND, IS IMPOSSIBLE WITHOUT THE "IMMEDIATE ELIMINATION" OF AMIN AND HIS ASSOCIATES.

-- "DEATH TO AMIN AND HIS FASCIST PARTISANS, TO THE CIA, TO IKHWANIS, TO MAOISTS," AND "FORWARD WITH ALLIANCE AND UNITY OF THE DEMOCRATIC AND NATIONALIST FORCES."

4. COMMENT: THE TRACT CLEARLY REFLECTS A PARCHAMIST AUTHORSHIP, AS MOST OF THE VITRIOL IS DIRECTED AT THE KHALQI LEADERSHIP, ALBEIT MINUS TARAKI. THIS PARTICULAR FEATURE COULD BE PART OF THE RUMORED EFFORT UNDERWAY TO REMOVE SOME MEMBERS OF THE CURRENT LEADERSHIP IN ORDER TO DEFUSE THE DOMESTIC INSURGENCY, SINCE A GENERAL PARCHAMIST BROADSIDE AT THE KHALQIS WOULD PRESUMABLY HAVE RESERVED SOME BRICKBATS FOR TARAKI. IN THIS CONNECTION, THE APPEAL TO FOLLOW THE PREACHINGS OF KHAIBAR -- WHO BEFORE HIS DEATH WAS REPORTEDLY A PROPONENT OF THE 1977 KHALQ/PARCHAM WEDDING -- AND THE ASSERTION THAT THERE REMAI "TRUE REVOLUTIONARIES" WITHIN THE KHALQ PARTY, COULD REPRESENT AN APPEAL TO ALL LEFTISTS (PARCHAMISTS AND DISENCHANTED KHALQIS) TO FORM A "UNITED FRONT" FOR THE OUSTER OF AMIN AND HIS COLLEAGUES. WE HASTEN TO ADD, HOWEVER, THAT THE MYRAID ANTI-WESTERN DIATRIBES UNDERSCOR THE CONCLUSION THAT A LEFTIST AFGHAN REGIME'S BASIC POLICIES, EVEN WITHOUT AMIN, WOULD PROBABLY NOT MODIFY TO ANY GREAT EXTENT.

5. FINALLY, THE MERE APPEARANCE OF THESE LETTERS IN SUCH VOLUME (VIRTUALLY EVERY DIPLOMATIV MISSION HAS GAINED POSSESSION OF ONE OR MORE COPIES) AND THE MANNER OF THEIR DISTRIBUTION SUGGEST THAT, FOR SOME REASON, THE POLICE AND SECURITY AUTHORITIES HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO SQUELCH THE SPREAD OF PROPAGANDA CALLING FOR THE REMOVAL (OR WORSE) OF THE COUNTRY'S "STRONG-MAN." HOW LONG THIS SITUATION WILL PERSIST REMAINS TO BE SEEN, BUT AMIN, IN OUR JUDGMENT, IS NOT THE KIND OF POLITICIAN TO MEEKLY FOLD HIS TENT AND PERMIT OTHERS TO TAKE OVER "HIS" REVOLUTION.

6. OTHER ANTI-AMIN PROPAGANDA HEARD HERE RECENTLY PORTRAYS THE PRIME MINISTER AS A SECRET CIA AGENT WHOSE MISSION HAS BEEN TO DESTROY THE CREDIBILITY OF THE USSR IN AFGHANISTAN.
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INFO RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 3663
RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 621
RUSBGD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 9021
RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 339
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1683
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1743
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 7075
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3152
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 324
RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO 15
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 KABUL 5433

CINCPAC: ALSO FOR POLAD
CINCEUR: ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12065: GDS 7-17-85 (TAYLOR, JAMES E.) OR-P
TAGS: PEPR, PINS, PINT, AF, UR
SUBJECT: (LOU) SOVIET EFFORT TO URGE DRA TO FIND A POLITICAL RESOLUTION OF DOMESTIC CONFLICT MAY BE UNDERWAY

REF: (A) KABUL 5092; (B) KABUL 5088; (C) KABUL 5146;
(D) KABUL 5288; (E) KABUL 5360; (F) KABUL 4695 (ALL NOTAL)

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. SUMMARY: A NUMBER OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN SUGGEST THAT A SOVIET CAMPAIGN MAY BE UNDERWAY IN KABUL, AIMED AT "HELPING" THE EMBATTLED DRA LEADERSHIP FIND A POLITICAL, RATHER THAN STRICTLY MILITARY, MEANS TO COUNTER THE GROWTH OF DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN OPPOSITION. STEPS TAKEN SO FAR, WHILE PERHAPS BUYING THE REGIME AND MOSCOW SOME BREATHING SPACE, ARE PROBABLY INSUFFICIENT IN THEMSELVES TO GUARANTEE THE FUTURE OF THE REVOLUTION, AND CONSIDERABLY MORE SUBSTANTIVE CHANGES WILL PROBABLY BE NECESSARY. OPTIONS ALONG THESE LINES ARE FEW, HOWEVER, AND THE "VOLUNTARY" DEPARTURE OF ONE OR MORE MEMBERS OF THE TOP DRA LEADERSHIP MAY BE MANDATORY IF MOSCOW WANTS TO AVOID FACING A DRA SOS FOR DIRECT MILITARY INTERVENTION IN ORDER TO HELP THE KHALQIS STAY AFLOAT. WE ARE NOT CERTAIN THAT SOVIET "ADVICE" WILL BE HEEDED BY THE AFGHAN LEADERSHIP, AND MUCH MAY DEPEND ON THE PERSONAL DIPLOMACY OF VASILY SAFRONCHUK, THE RECENTLY ARRIVED "TROUBLESHOOTER" AND SENIOR DIPLOMAT WHO COULD WELL HAVE BEEN CHARED WITH SOME RESPONSIBILITY FOR FINDING A VIABLE EXIT FROM THE CURRENT MAZE. PITFALLS AND UNKNOWNS REMAIN NUMEROUS, BUT CONTINUED SOVIET ASSURANCES TO THE AFGHAN "PEOPLE," AND RECENT INDICATIONS OF INCREASED SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN THE MILITARY FIELD HERE, SUGGEST THAT A SOVIET "GUARANTEE" OF THE REVOLUTION MAY BE THE INDUCEMENT OFFERED THE KHALQIS IN RETURN FOR THE SACRIFICES WHICH MAY BE NECESSARY TO REVERSE THE TIDE OF CURRENT EVENTS. END OF SUMMARY.

3. A SEARCH FOR A POLITICAL RESOLUTION OF DOMESTIC PROBLEMS MAY BE UNDERWAY: OVER THE PAST FEW WEEKS THERE HAVE BEEN A NUMBER OF DEVELOPMENTS WHICH SUGGEST THAT THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT, PROBABLY AT SOVIET URGING, MAY BE SEEKING A POLITICAL RATHER THAN STRICTLY MILITARY, MEANS TO COUNTER ITS DOMESTIC OPPOSITION. THE REGIME HAS BOLDLY, ALBEIT PERHAPS DISINGENUOUSLY, DECLARED ITS LAND REFORM PROGRAM "SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED" (REF A), THEREBY AT LEAST AVOIDING THE CREATION OF FURTHER OPPOSITION ALONG THE LINES THAT PARTICULAR REFORM MEASURE APPARENTLY HAS PROMPTED SINCE ITS INCEPTION. LIKEWISE, ACCORDING TO RECENT HINTS BY PRIME MINISTER AMIN, THE DRA'S LITERACY CAMPAIGN, WHICH HAS PROVOKED HOSTILITY IN THIS EXTREMELY CONSERVATIVE SOCIETY BECAUSE MOST AFGHANS DO NOT WISH TO SEE THEIR FEMALES EDUCATED EVEN TO RUDIMENTARY LEVELS, OR "EXPOSED" TO MALE TEACHERS, MAY SOON BE DECLARED A "SUCCESS." A DRA ANNOUNCEMENT ON JULY 11 PROMULGATING SEVERAL "CONCESSIONS" TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR OF THE ECONOMY REPRESENTED, INTER ALIA, ANOTHER ATTEMPT TO MOLLIFY ANY OPPOSITION STEMMING FROM FEAR OF THIS REGIME'S FUTURE ECONOMIC POLICIES. THUS, THE GOVERNMENT APPARENTLY HAS BEGUN TO DISTANCE ITSELF FROM A NUMBER OF ITS MORE AMBITIOUS AND GRATING REFORMS, NOT NECESSARILY BECAUSE THEY WERE ILL-CONCEIVED, OR UNNECESSARY, BUT PERHAPS BECAUSE THEY WERE OVERZEALOUSLY INITIATED -- AND AROUSED SERIOUS RESISTANCE.

4. REPORTS OF "NEGOTIATIONS" AMONG THE REGIME, THE SOVIETS, AND SEVERAL LEADERS OF FORMER GOV
RMENTS WOULD ALSO POINT
TO AN EFFORT TO ESTABLISH SOME SOR OF "NATIONAL FRONT" (REF B). COMMENTS BY USUALLY WELL-INFORMED EASTERN EUROPEAN AND SOVIET DIPLOMATS HERE LEND A CERTAIN CREDENCE TO THIS PARTICULAR THESIS (REF C). IN THIS CONNECTION, THE REPORTED RELEASE FROM PRISON OF PARCHAMISTS (REF D), AND THAT GROUP'S SUBSEQUENT PRINTING AND WIDESPREAD DISTRIBUTION OF "UNDERGROUND" LETTERS (REF E) ATTACKING, INTER ALIA, AMIN AND OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE REGIME, REINFORCE THE CONTENTION THAT CERTAIN FORCES ARE WORKING TO PROVIDE SOME FORM OF LEADERSHIP AND PARTY MORE BROADLY BASED THAN THE PEOPLES' DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF AFGHANISTAN (PDPA).

5. ON THE FOREIGN POLICY FRONT AS WELL SOME SIGNS HAVE BEEN DETECTED THAT SUGGEST A DEVELOPING PROGRAM TO AVOID OR DRAW BACK SELECTIVELY FROM CONFRONTATION. THE EARLY JULY VISIT TO ISLAMABAD BY DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER DOST HAS BEEN THE MOST IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENT ALONG THESE LINES, ESPECIALLY SINCE THERE HAS BEEN RECENTLY A SLIGHT MODERATION IN THIS GOVERNMENT'S ANTI-
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INFO RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 3664
RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 622
RUSBGD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 9022
RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 340
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1684
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1744
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 7076
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3153
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 325
RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO 16
RUHQHQA/CINCPAC
RUSNAAA/CINCEUR
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 3 KABUL 5433

CINCPAC: ALSO FOR POLAD
CINCEUR: ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12065: GDS 7-17-85 (TAYLOR, JAMES E.) OR-P

PAKISTAN PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN. MOREOVER, WE HAVE BEEN TOSED A FEW MINOR OLIVE-TWIGS LATELY -- RELATIVELY HIGH-LEVEL ATTENDANCE AT OUR JULY 4 RECEPTION, A FIRST-EVER MEETING, AT AFGHAN INITIATIVE, BETWEEN AMIN AND A VISITING USICA LECTURER -- WHICH COULD INDICATE THAT THE DRA MAY BE INTERESTED IN LIFTING OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP FROM THE NADIR IT HAS REACHED IN RECENT MONTHS.

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6. HIGH-LEVEL SOVIET DIPLOMAT COULD BE THE RASPUTIN BEHIND THESE DEVELOPMENTS: ALL OF THESE SIGNS HAVE EMERGED SINCE THE EARLY JUNE ARRIVAL IN KABUL OF SOVIET DIPLOMAT VASILY SAFRONCHUK, FORMER AMBASSADOR TO GHANA, FORMER DEPUTY PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE AT THE UNITED NATIONS, AND A CAREER DIPLOMAT WITH APPRENTLY SOLID POLITICAL CONNECTIONS, WHO IS OBVIOUSLY OVER-QUALIFIED TO SERVE AS THE THIRD-RANKING MAN IN THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN KABUL (HIS PROTOCOL RANK WHICH NO ONE HERE BELIEVES). PRIOR TO HIS ARRIVAL, STORIES CIRCULATED IN KABUL AND IN MOSCOW THAT SAFRONCHUK WOULD SERVE AS SOME SORT OF "ADVISOR" TO THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT, STORIES WHICH MAY HAVE BEEN BORNE OUT BY SUBSEQUENT EVENTS. GIVEN SAFRONCHUK'S EXPERIENCE, WE BELIEVE IT SAFE TO CONCLUDE THAT HE MAY HAVE COME TO AFGHANISTAN WITH ORDERS TO TRY AND FIND A POLITICAL, RATHER THAN PURELY MILITARY, RESOLUTION OF THIS COUNTRY'S DOMESTIC STRIFE, PROBABLY MOST IMPORTANTLY IN ORDER TO PRECLUDE A DRA APPEAL FOR DIRECT SOVIET MILITARY HELP IN STAYING AFLOAT. IN THIS CONNCECTION, MOST OBSERVERS BELIEVE THAT SAFRONCHUK HAS NO NORMAL FUNCTION IN THE SOVIET EMBASSY. ALTHOUGH SOME OF THE SURMISES ABOUT SAFRONCHUK'S MISSION ARE SPECULATION, WE BELIEVE THAT THE SUDDENNESS OF, AND THE PECULIAR CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING, HIS APPOINTMENT, HIS STATUS SINCE HIS ARRIVAL, AND THE POLICY DEVELOPMENTS NOTED ABOVE, CLEARLY INDICATE THAT MOSCOW IS URGING, IF NOT PRESSURING, THE DRA TO TAKE STEPS TO REVERSE THE TIDE OF EVENTS, AND TO PRESERVE THE INTEGRITY OF THE REVOLUTION.

7. LOCAL CONDITIONS WHICH COULD HAVE PROMPTED SOVIET PRESSURE ON THE DRA TO FIND A POLITICAL SOLUTION: THE AFGHAN REGIME'S APPRENT INABILITY -- OR UNWILLINGNESS -- TO UNDERTAKE, ON ITS OWN, STEPS WHICH WOULD STABSLIZE THE DETERIORATING SECURITY AND POLITICAL SITUATION IN THE COUNTRYSIDE, OR BROADEN THE GOVERNMENT'S BASE OF SUPPORT, WOULD PROBABLY CONSTITUTE THE GREATEST IMPETUS FOR ANY SOVIET DECISION TO URGE, CAJOLE, OR PRESSURE THE AFGHAN LEADERSHIP TO SEEK POLITICAL SOLUTIONS TO ITS PROBLEMS. LIKEWISE, MOSCOW MAY WELL HAVE WANTED TO DEFLECT THE DRA'S WILLINGNESS TO BUILD TENSIONS WITH ITS NEIGHBORS (ESPECIALLY PAKISTAN), A TREND WHPCH COULD HAVE LED TONUN AFGHAN APPEAL FOR SOVIET HELP TO COUNTER FOREIGN "AGGRESSION" (REF F). MOREOVER, THE CHILL IN AFGHAN-U.S. RELATIONS, AND THE DRASTIC REDUCTION OF OUR ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (ESPECIALLY SINCE THE JULY 13 VOTE BY A SENATE-HOUSE CONFERENCE COMMITTEE TO CUT AID), COULD ALSO HAVE BEEN VIEWED BY THE KREMLIN AS COUNTER TO SOVIET LARGER INTERESTS, SINCE MOSCOW OR ITS SURROGATES WILL PROBABLY HAVE TO TAKE UP THE ASSISTANCE SLACK IF OTHER FREE-WORLD DONORS DEPART FROM THE AID FIELD HERE, AND BECAUSE AND EVEN GREATER PERCEIVED DEPENDENCE BY THE DRA ON THE SOVIETS WOULD PROBABLY EXACERBATE THE DOMESTIC UNREST, RATHER THAN AMELIORATE IT. IN THE LAST ANALYSIS, A CONCERN THAT AN AFTHAN SOS WAS BECOMING MORE AND MORE LIKELY, AS WELL AS "JUSTIFIED" IN TERMS OF THE 1978 BILATERIAL TREATY, AT A TIME WHEN MOSCOW HAD LARGER INTERSTS WHICH IT PROBABLY DID NOT WANT TO THREATEN BY PURSUING A DECISION TO INTERVENE, MAY WELL HAVE BEEN THE BOTTOM-LINE CONSIDERATION IN DISPATCHING SAFRONCHUK ON HIS MISSION TO KABUL.

8. A POLITICAL RESOLUTION WILL PROBABLY REQUIRE MORE "CONCESSIONS" THAN HAVE SURFACED HERETOFORE: BASED ON OUR READING OF WHAT MAKES THE INSURGENTS FIGHT, WE BELIEVE THAT THE DRA LEADERSHIP WILL HAVE TO SWEATEN THE POT CONSIDERABLY MORE BEFORE THE TIDE CAN BE TURNED IN THE COUNTRYSIDE. THE VARIOUS REFORM PROGRAMS DID INDEED CONTRIBUTE A GREAT DEAL TO THE GROWTH OF DOMESTIC HOSTILITY TOWARD THIS REGIME, BUT, NEVERTHELESS, THE OVERWHELMING MOTIVATION FOR MOST AFGHAN PEASANTS WHO HAVE TAKEN UP ARMS HAS BEEN THEIR PERCEPTION THAT THE KHALQIS ARE ATHEISTS, COMMUNISTS, AND SOVIET PUPPETS. TO DISPEL THESE DEEPLY-HELD BELIEFS WILL CLEARLY REQUIRE GREAT SKILL AND SUBSTANTIVE CONCESSIONS WELL EXCEEDING WHAT THE REGIME HAS DONE SO FAR. WHETHER THE SOVIETS AND THE DRA LEADERSHIP CAN COME UP WITH AGREED AND NECESSARY NEXT STEPS REMAINS TO BE SEEN, BUT THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THEIR TASK IS FORMIDABLE.

9. AVAILABLE OPTIONS ARE NOT PLENTIFUL; IF, IN FACT, THE GROWTH OF THE OPPOSITION HAS NOT BEEN COMPLETELY STUNTED BY THE GOVERNMENT'S REPRESSIVE MOVES SO FAR, THERE STILL ARE NOT MANY MORE STEPS AVAILABLE TO CREATE AN ALTERNATE REGIME WHICH WOULD CARRY ANY GENUINE POSSIBILITY OF TURNING THE TIDE, YET STOP SHOR OF THREATENING THE INTEGRITY OF THE REVOLUTION.
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RR RUQMHR
DE RUSBLV #5433/3 1990725
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R 1825252 JUL 79
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INFO RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 3665
RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 823
RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 9923
RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 341
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1685
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1745
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 7477
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3154
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 326
RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO 17
RUEHQHQA/CINCPAC
RUSNAAA/CINCEUR
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 3 KABUL 5433

CINCPAC: ALSO FOR POLAD
CINCEUR: ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12065: GDS 7-17-85 (TAYLOR, JAMES E.) OR-P

10. THE MOST PROBABLE, AND PERHAPS THE MOST NECESSARY, WOULD BE A CHANGE IN THE DRA'S TOP LEADERSHIP, ENCOMPASSING THE DEPARTURE OF AMIN OR TARAKI -- OR BOTH. BASED ON SOME INDICATIONS (THE RECENT SPATE OF UNDERGROUND TRACTS, MOST OF WHICH HAVE BITTERLY ATTACKED AMIN), AND ON A GENERAL "FEEL" AMONG VIRTUALLY ALL OUR AFGHAN CONTACTS, TARAKI IS INCREASINGLY VIEWED AS A FIGUREHEAD WHO SHOULD NOT BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY. THE REAL VILLAIN IS AMIN, WHO IS CONSIDERED RESPONSIBLE FOR, INTER ALIA, THE DRA'S OPPROESSIVE POLICIES OF ARREST, TORTURE, AND EXECUTION, AS WELL AS THE DRIVING FORCE BEHIND THE GRATING DOMESTIC REFORM PROGRAMS, AND AFGHANISTAN'S ARDENT EMBRACE OF THE USSR. THEREFORE, ANY SINCERE ATTEMPT TO RECONCILE THE FORCES LOOSE IN AFGHANISTAN THROUGH A LEADERSHIP CHANGE WOULD PROBABLY HAVE TO INCLUDE THE DEPARTURE, OR -- BETTER YET -- THE DEATH OF AMIN (IN THIS LAND OF THE BLOOD FEUD, SOME KHALQI LEADER HAS TO PAY THE TRADITIONAL PRICE FOR THOUSANDS OF DEATHS). WE COULD FORESEE A SCENARIO IN WHICH TARAKI WOULD REMAIN AS THE POLITICALLY IMPOTENT "GREAT LEADER." IN THIS REGARD, THE CONSTANTLY BUILDING TARAKI "PERSONALITY CULT" (SYMBOLIZED MOST RECENTLY BY THE LAVISH CELEBRATIONS SURROUNDING HIS 62ND BIRTHDAY ON JULY 14) SUGGESTS THAT TARAKI'S DEPARTURE WOULD BE A WRENCHING ONE FOR THE REVOLUTION, AND WOULD BE UNDERTAKEN ONLY AS

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A DESPERATE LAST RESORT. INCIDENTALLY, TARAKI IS STILL RESPECTED BY ELEMENTS IN NON-KHALQI SEGMENTS OF AFGHAN SOCIETY, PARTICULARLY IN THE RANKS OF THE EDUCATED.

11. THE SALIENT QUESTION, OF COURSE, IS WHETHER THE SOVIETS CARRY SUFFICIENT WEIGHT THAT THEIR "ADVICE" COULD CONVINCE TARAKI AND/OR AMIN TO SACRIFICE HIMSELF FOR THE SAKE OF THE REVOLUTION. EVERYTHING WOULD DEPEND ON HOW SUCH ADVICE WAS COUCHED. PROBABGY THE MOST VIABLE APPROACH ALONG THESE LINES WOULD BE THE THESIS THAT THE STATE OF AFFAIRS FOR THIS GOVERNMENT HAS REACHED THE POINT THAT THE SHEER EXISTENCE OF THE REVOLUTION MANDATES THE "HONORABLE AND VOLUNTARY" RETIREMENT OF CERTAIN MEMBERS OF THE DRA LEADERSHIP. AT THE SAME TIME, MOSCOW WOULD THEREAFTER "GUARANTEE" THE FUTURE OF THE REVOLUTION THROUGH PLEDGES OF INCREASED MILITARY AND ECONOMIC SUPPORT. RECENT STATEMENTS BY THE SOVIET ELITE PROMISING SUPPORT FOR THE AFGHAN "PEOPLE," AND THE ARRIVAL IN AFGHANISTAN OF DOZENS OF SOVIET HELICOPTER PILOTS, INDICATES THAT MOSCOW IS PROBABLY REASSURING THE DRA LEADERSHIP OF CONTINUED SOVIET BACKING, DESPITE THE SIMULTANEOUS CAMPAIGN TO FIND A POLITICAL SOLUTION.

12. SOVIET MISCALCULATION OR HEAVY-HANDEDNESS, OR A TARAKI-AMIN DECISION THAT THEY TRULY HAVE NO OPTION, BUT TO FORGE AHEAD ALONG CURRENT PATHS, COULD VERY POSSIBLY SCOTCH ANY SEARCH FOR A NON-MILITARY APPROACH TO THE INSURGENCY. WE DOUBLT THAT THE SOVIETS ARE WILLING OR ABLE TO FORCE THE REMOVAL OF ANY OF THE DRA LEADERSHIP, ALTHOUGH MOSCOW MAY EVENTUALLY DECIDE TO LEND "SUPPORT" TO ANY ELEMENTS WHICH DISPLAY AN INCLINATION TO SETTLE THE CONFLICT SHORT OF AN APPEAL FOR DIRECT SOVIET MILITARY HELP. THIS COULD INCLUDE A COUP D'ETAT BY THE AFGHAN MILITARY.

13. INTRANSIGENCE ON THE PART OF TARAKI AND AMIN, OR AN ABORTED SOVIET CAMPAIGN WHICH MAY NOW BE UNDERWAY, WOULD PROBABLY SIGNAL "MORE OF THE SAME" FROM THE DRA, A STANCE WHICH WOULD LEADE TO FURTHER CONFLICT, BLOODSHED, AND INSTABILITY. THIS LOWERED THRESHOLD OF VIOLENCE WOULD, OF COURSE, CARRY SERIOUS ECURITY IMPLICATIONS FOR FOREIGNERS STATIONED IN THIS COUNTRY.

14. CONCLUSIONS: WE MAY BE IN THE MIDST OF A SOVIET ATTEMPT TO NUDGE OR PUSH AFGHAN POLICIES IN DIRECTIONS WHICH WOULD REVERSE THE GROWTH OF DOMESTIC OPPOSITION, AND DEFUSE DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN HOSTILITY TO THIS REGIME, SO THAT, IN THE LAST ANALYSIS, MOSCOW WILL NOT HAVE TO FACE AN AFGHAN APPEAL FOR DIRECT MILITARY HELP. AT THE SAME TIME, STATEMENTS BY THE SOVIET ELITE AND INDICATIONS OF INCREASED SOVIET MILITARY INVOLVEMENT SUGGEST A

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PARALLEL POLICY AIMED AT INSURING THE FUTURE OF THE REVOLUTION, ALTHOUGH PERHAPS WITHOUT THE PRESENT COMPOSITION OF THE AFGHAN LEADERSHIP.

15. SAFRONCHUK COULD BE THE LOCAL BEHIND-THE-SCENES DIRECTOR OF THIS PARTICULAR DRAMA, BUT THE PROBLEMS AND PITFALLS CONFRONTING HIM AND THE DRA LEADERSHIP ARE FORMIDABLE, AND THE UNKNOWNS REMAINING IN THE EQUATION ARE STILL NUMEROUS. AMSTUTZ
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4763
INFO RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 3667
RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 628
RUMJDK/AMEMBASSY DACCA 859
RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 8827
RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 344
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1683
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1748
RUSBAE/AMMBASSY NEW DELHI 7083
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3159
RUQMER/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 333
RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO 18
RUEQFCA/CINCPAC
RUSNAAA/CINCEUR
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C O N F I D E N T I A L KABUL 5448

CINCPAC: ALSO FOR POLAD
CINCEUR: ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12065: GDS 7-18-85 (FLATIN, BRUCE A.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, PINR, PGOV, PINT, AF, UR
SUBJECT: (C) SOVIETS REPEATEDLY HAVE INCLUDED FORMER ROYAL MINISTER ABDUL SAMAD HAMED IN "NATIONAL FRONT" TALKS

REF: KABUL 5433

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. ACCORDING TO A PAKISTANI EMBASSY OFFICIAL, THE SOVIETS HAVE RECENTLY INCLUDED IN THEIR "NATIONAL FRONT" NEGOTIATIONS (REFTEL) ABDUL SAMAD HAMED, WHO HAD ONCE SERVED AS A MINISTER OF PLANNING AND DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER UNDER KING ZAHIR.

3. HAMED, WHO HAS BEEN DESCRIBED BY SOME AFGHANS AS A "NON-COMMUNIST LEFTIST," HAD REPORTEDLY BEEN ARRESTED BY THE KHALQIS ON JANUARY 4 OF THIS YEAR. AMSTUTZ
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FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4767
INFO RUFHEB/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0026
RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 9028
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1749
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 7085
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 0331
RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0627
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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 KABUL 5459

(48)

EXDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS 7/18/99 (AMSTUTZ, J. BRUCE) OR-M
TAGS: PINT, PINR, AF, US
SUBJ: (S) GDR AMBASSADOR REPORTS THAT SOVIETS HOPE TO REPLACE PRIME MINISTER AMIN WITH A BROADER BASED GOVT.

REF: KABUL 5433

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY. I HAVE JUST HAD AN EXTRAORDINARY MEETING WITH GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC AMBASSADOR DR. HERMANN SCHWIESAU. IT AAS EXTRAORDINARY ON ACCOUNT OF WHAT HE "DISCLOSED" WITH RESPECT TO SOVIET INTENTIONS HERE INCLUDING THE LIKELIHOOD OF A SOVIET-BACKED MOVE TO OUST PRIME MINISTER HAFIZULLAH AMIN. OVER THE LAST 3 WEEKS WE HAVE HAD HINTS OF A POSSIBLE SOVIET-ASSISTED INTERNAL COUP, BOTH FROM GDR AMBASSADOR SCHWIESAU (KABUL 5246) AND EARLIER FROM SOVIET MINISTER-COUNSELOR VASILIY STEPANOVICH SAFRONCHUK (KABUL 4888). THIS TIME, THE GDR AMBASSADOR WENT MUCH FURTHER IN SPELLING OUT SOVIET DISSATISFACTION WITH THE DRA, THE SOVIET DILEMMA ABOUT WHAT TO DO, AND THE POSSIBILITY OF AN INTERNAL PARTY COUP TO ELIMINATE AMIN. HE HINTED THAT THIS MIGHT OCCUR IN AUGUST. END SUMMARY.

3. ON JULY 17, I PAID A CALL ON SCHWIESAU. HE HAD CALLED ON CHARGE FLATIN ON JULY 9, AND BESIDES WANTING TO RETURN THE COURTESY CALL, I WELCOMED AN EXCUSE TO SEE HIM. WE TALKED AN HOUR. OF ALL THE PRO-MOSCOW COMMUNIST COUNTRY AMBASSADORS HERE, SCHWIESAU IS PERHAPS THE MOST ASTUTE AND INTELLIGENT, AND CERTAINLY THE MOST APPROACHABLE. ALONE AMONG PRO-MOSCOW COMMUNIST DIPLOMATS, HE CALLS PERIODICALLY ON WESTERN AND THIRD-WORLD DIPLOMATS, AND INVARIABLY LIKES TO ENGAGE IN CANDID POLITICAL DISCUSSIONS ABOUT AFGHANISTAN. HE HAS BEEN PROVED TO BE ONE OF OUR MOST IMPORTANT SOURCES OF INFO ABOUT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE KABUL COMMUNIST DIPLOMATIC COMMUNITY AND RECENTLY ABOUT MOSCOW'S THINKING.

4. SOVIET DISSATISFACTION WITH THE DRA: YESTERDAY WE SENT A REPORT (REFTEL) ANALYZING THE PRESSURES SEEMINGLY BUILDING UP FOR AN INTERNAL CHANGE IN THE DRA LEADERSHIP. WHAT SCHWIESAU TOLD ME AT OUR MEETING CONFIRMED ALL THIS, INCLUDING THE EXISTENCE OF BEHIND-THE-SCENES NEGOTIATIONS BY SOVIET MINISTER-COUNSELOR SAFRONCHUK WITH PDPA PARTY LEADERS AND OTHERS TO BRING ABOUT AN INTERNAL CHANGE. SCHWIESAU REPEATEDLY SAID THAT THE SOVIETS WERE DEEPLY WORRIED OVER THE WORSENING SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN. HE SAID, "THEY KNOW THE REGIME HAS LITTLE PUBLIC SUPPORT AND IS LOSING CONTROL OF THE COUNTRY." WHILE TELLING ME THIS, HE ALSO SAID, "WE ARE DETERMINED TO SAVE THE REVOLUTION."

5. SCHWIESAU CLEARLY LAID THE BLAME FOR THE DRA'S TROUBLES ON PRIME MINISTER/FOREIGN MINISTER HAFIZULLAH AMIN. HE DESCRIBED AMIN AS "THE STRONG MAN" IN AFGHANISTAN. "HE PERSONALLY RUNS THE ENTIRE GOVT," HE SAID, "CONTROLLING THE ARMY, THE INTERIOR MINISTRY, AND HE MAKES ALL IMPORTANT DECISIONS." AMIN HAS BLUNDERED BADLY, HE SAID, IN THE WAY HE HAS IMPLEMENTED THE GOVT'S ECONOMIC AND REFORM PROGRAMS, AND PARTICULARLY IN THE WAY HE HAS "HARSHLY" ACTED AGAINST PERSONS HE SUSPECTED MIGHT OPPOSE HIM.

6. SCHWIESAU DISMISSED TARAKI AS INEFFECTIVE. HE DESCRIBED HIM AS AN "OLD, KINDLY TEACHER, PHILOSOPHER, AND WRITER" WHO IS WELL INTENTIONED, AND LOVES THE ADULATION HEAPED ON HIM IN THE PRESS ("ESPECIALLY THE PICTURES"). "WE SUSPECT," SCHWIESAU SAID, "THAT HE DOES NOT KNOW MUCH OF WHAT IS GOING ON IN THE COUNTRY."

7. SOVIET MANEUVERS: SCHWIESAU CONFIRMED THAT SOVIET MINISTER-COUNSELOR SAFRONCHUK HAS BEEN GIVEN THE TASK, BY MOSCOW, TO BRING ABOUT A "RADICAL CHANGE" IN THE GOVT. SAFRONCHUK WAS GIVEN THIS TASK, SCHWIESAU SAID, BECAUSE, "IT IS NOT GOOD FOR THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR HIMSELF TO BE SEEN HOLDING THESE DELICATE NEGOTIATIONS." HE CONTINUED, "IF THESE NEGOTIATIONS FAIL, AND/OR SAFRONCHUK WERE EXPELLED AS PERSONA NON GRATA, THAT WOULD ATTRACT LESS ATTENTION AND BE LESS OF A DIPLOMATIC EMBARRASSMENT FOR THE SOVIET UNION THAN IF AMBASSADOR PUZANOV WERE EXPELLED."

8. AS TO WHAT IS LIKELY TO HAPPEN, SCHWIESAU CLEARLY INDICATED THAT A MILITARY INTRAPARTY COUP, DEPOSING AMIN AND PERHAPS OTHERS, IS WHAT THE SOVIETS INTEND. SCHWIESAU SAID THERE ARE NOW DEEP DIVISIONS IN THE PDPA PARTY, MANY OF WHOSE LEADING MEMBERS ARE VERY DISSATISFIED WITH THE PRESENT COURSE OF EVENTS AND AMIN'S LEADERSHIP. HE SAID THAT WHAT IS NEEDED IS A NEW PRIME MINISTER WHO IS A "STRONG MAN" AND "NOT IDENTIFIED" WITH "PRESENT" POLICIES.

9. WHEN I MENTIONED DEFENSE MINISTER WATANJAR AS A POSSIBILITY, SCHWIESAU ACTED AS IF I HAD CAUGHT HIM IN A SECRET. AFTER A PAUSE, HE SAID WATANJAR IS "NOT A POLITICIAN, BUT OF COURSE THE MILITARY IS KEY TO ANY CHANGE." THEN HE WENT ON TO OBSERVE THAT, SINCE THE REVOLUTION, WATANJAR HAS NEVER MADE A SPEECH THAT WAS PRINTED IN THE PRESS AND THAT HIS EXACT POLITICAL VIEWS ARE NOT CLEAR TO THE PUBLIC, IMPLYING BY THIS THAT WATANJAR WAS "CLEAN." SCHWIESAU WENT ON, HOWEVER, TO HINT THAT WHILE WATANJAR MIGHT PLAY A ROLE IN A COUNTER COUP, HE WAS NOT LIKELY TO BE PRIME MINISTER SINCE "HE WAS NOT EXPERIENCED."

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 KABUL 5459

18 JUL 79 17 17Z

EXDIS

10. SEVERAL TIMES SCHWIESAU SAID, "WE ARE NOW SEEING THE CLOSING CHAPTER OF THIS GOVT." HE MUST HAVE USED THE TERM, "CLOSING CHAPTER", AT LEAST THREE TIMES TO ME. AS TO WHEN THE CHANGE WAS LIKELY TO OCCUR, SCHWIESAU HINTED THAT IT COULD HAPPEN ANY TIME BUT WOULD MOST LIKELY TAKE PLACE IN AUGUST. HE SAID HE WAS SENDING HIS WIFE TO EAST BERLIN SOON FOR "THREE OR FOUR WEEKS REST," AND LATER HE TOLD ME HE HIMSELF COULD NOT POSSIBLE LEAVE KABUL THIS SUMMER SINCE "AUGUST IS GOINT TO BE HOT, AND I DON'T MEAN THE WEATHER." EARLIER IN OUR CONVERSATION, HE SAID THAT THE SITUATION WITHIN THE GOVT WAS HIGHLY UNSTABLE AND THAT SECURITY IN KABUL COULD DETERIORATE ANY TIME, SO FAST IN FACT THAT IT WOULD BE "IMPOSSIBLE TO EVACUATE DEPENDENTS."

11. SOVIET INTERESTS: SCHWIESAU SAID THAT NO INTERNAL PARTY "RADICAL CHANGE" COULD OCCUR HERE WITHOUT SOVIET SUPPORT, AND THAT SOVIET INTERESTS WOULD HAVE TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT BY ANY NEW AFGHAN GOVT. "AFTER ALL," HE SAID, "AFGHANISTAN BORDERS THE SOVIET UNION AND JUST AS YOU HAVE A SPECIAL INTEREST IN ANYTHING HAPPENING IN CANADA AND MEXICO, THE SOVIET UNION HAS A SPECIAL INTEREST IN AFGHANISTAN." THUS, HE SAID, A POLITICAL SOLUTION HAS TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THREE FACTORS: "SAVING THE FACE OF THE SOVIETS, SAVING THE FACE OF THE AFGHAN PARTY (PDPA), AND SAVING THE FACE OF MUSLIMS."

12. IN CONNECTION WITH SAVING SOVIET FACE, SCHWIESAU SAID THAT THE SOVIETS HAD TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THEIR RELATIONSHIP AND REPUTATION WITH "OTHER PARTIES AROUND THE WORLD." IF THE SOVIETS WERE SEEN TO ABANDON THE PARTY HERE IN AFGHANISTAN, HE SAID, IT WOULD HAVE A "VERY UPSETTING EFFECT ON PARTIES ELSEWHERE WHICH WERE FRIENDLY WITH MOSCOW." THIS COMMENT TRACKS WITH HIS COMMENT MENTIONED ABOVE (PARA 4) THAT, "WE MUST SAVE THE REVOLUTION."

13. QUESTION OF SOVIET MILITARY INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN. TOWARD THE END OF OUR CONVERSATION, SCHWIESAU VOLUNTARILY RAISED THIS QUESTION. HE SAID HE WAS AWARE THERE WAS SPECULATION IN THE DIPLOMATIC COMMUNITY AS TO WHETHER THE SOVIETS WOULD, IN THE LAST ANALYSIS, INTERVENE MILITARILY IN AFGHANISTAN. "WERE THEY TO DO SO," HE SAID, "IT WOULD SOLVE ONE PROBLEM BUT CREATE ANOTHER." SOVIET INTERVANTION COULD ELIMINATE THE PRESENT GOVT THEREBY SOLVING ONE PROBLEM. IT WOULD, HOWEVER, CREATE ANOTHER PROBLEM; NAMELY, THAT THE "ENTIRE AFGHAN NATION" WOULD TURN AGAINST THE SOVIETS, JUST AS THE AFGHANS TURNED AGAINST THE "BRITISH INVADERS" IN THE 19TH CENTURE. HENCE, HE SAID, IT MADE NO SENSE FOR THE SOVIETS TO INTERVENE MILITARILY.

14. THE PARCHAMISTS: SCHWIESAU, IN DISCUSSING THE PARCHAMISTS, COMMENTED THAT TARAKI HIMSELF HAD BEEN ACCEPTABLE TO THE PARCHAMIST WING. THIS WAS NOT THE CASE WITH HAFIZULLAH AMIN. EXILED PARCHAMIST LEADER, BABRAK KARMAL, AND AMIN WERE "RIVALS." SCHWIESAU OBSERVED THAT IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR AMIN AND BABRAK KARMAL TO BE IN THE SAME GOVT. REFLECTING ON THE TWO WINGS OF THE PARTY AT THE TIME OF THE REVOLUTION, SCHWIESAU CONFIRMED OUR IMPRESSION THAT THE PARCHAMISTS HAD A WIDER FOLLOWING THAN THE KHALQIS WITHIN THE PARTY AND AMONG PARTY SYMPATHIZERS, BUT THAT THE KHALQIS WERE STRONGER IN THE MILITARY. THE LATTER'S STRENGTH IN THE MILITARY PROVED DECISIVE, SCHWIESAU OBSERVED, IN PURGING THE PARCHAMISTS. I ASKED HIM WHETHER HE HAD INFORMATION AS WE DID, THAT MANY PARCHAMISTS HAD BEEN RECENTLY RELEASED FROM PUL-E-CHARKI PRISON. HE SHOOK HIS HEAD. HE SAID THOUGH THAT, AT THIS PRESENT JUNCTURE IN THE CRISES FACING THE DRA, IT WAS NOT ENOUGH TO BRING BACK PARCHAMISTS INTO THE GOVT. "IT IS NECESSARY TO BROADEN THE BASE OF THE GOVT FAR BEYOND THE PARCHAMISTS." TWO OTHER THINGS NEED TO BE DONE TOO, HE SAID. ONE WAS TO RELEASE MANY POLITICAL PRISONERS ("EVEN PARTY MEMBERS HAVE BEEN ARRESTED"), AND THE OTHER WAS FOR A NEW GOVT TO BE "FIRENDS WITH THE MOSLEM COUNTRIES."

15. BITS AND PIECES: SCHWIESAU OBSERVED THAT THE DRA HAS "LOST CONTROL OF MANY PROVINCES." WHEN I ASKED HIM FOR EXAMPLES, HE SAID HERAT (THOUGH WE KNOW HERAT CITY REMAINS IN DRA HANDS) AND THE PROVINCES IN THE CENTRAL PART OF THE COUNTRY (THE HAZARAJAT REGION).

16. HE THOUGHT IRANIAN INFLUENCE IN AFGHANISTAN WAS MORE DANGEROUS TO THE GOVT THAN THAT OF PAKISTAN. WHEN I ASKED HIM WHY, HE SAID IT WAS BECAUSE OF IRANIAN RELIGIOUS INFLUENCE OVER THE SHIIA POPULATION WHICH RELIGIOUS ELEMENT PREDOMINATEED IN THE PROVINCES BORDERING IRAN AND IN THE PROVINCED MAKING UP THE MOUNTAINOUS CENTRAL MASSIF.

17. THEN, SOMEWHAT IN CONTRADICTION TO THE ABOVE REMARK, HE SAID THAT THE PUS TUNS WERE POLITICALLY THE MOST IMPORTANT ETHNIC ELEMENT IN THE COUNTRY. HENCE, SINCE SO MANY OF THE PUSHTUNS WERE."OPPOSING THE REGIME MILITARILY," THIS WAS ANOTHER SERIOUS POLITICAL PROBLEM.

18. COMMENT: AS A RESULT OF THIS CONVERSATION, TOGEHER WITH EARLIER ONES MENTIONED, WE BELIEVE THE EVIDENCE IS NOW CLEAR THAT THE SOVIERT ARE DISSATISFIED WITH HAFIZULLAH AMIN AND ARE TRYING TO ENGINEER A "RADICAL CHANGE." WE ARE ALSO TEMPTED TO BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIETS, BY MEANS OF SAFRONCHUK'S CONVERSATION WITH ME ON JUNE 24, AND SCHWIESAU'S TWO CONVERSATIONS WIT US ON JULY 9 AND 17, HAVE TRIED TO SEND US A SIGNAL. THAT SIGNAL SEEMS TO BE THAT, THEY ARE UNHAPPY WITH THE AMIN REGIME, THAT THEY ARE TRYING TO ARRANGE A CHANGE, AND 8I AM SPECULATING HERE) ARE HOPING THIS WILL NOT HAVE A NEGATIVE IMPACT ON US. ONE COULD ALSO DRAW THE CONCLUSION THAT, WITH THE OBVIOUS SLIPPING GRIP THE DRA HAS OVER THE COUNTRY, THE SOVIETS HOPE THAT BY BRINGING ABOUT A CHANGE AND BROADENING THE BASE OF THE GOVT, AND BY POSSIBLY MAKING AMIN A SCAPEGOAT, THEY CAN AVOID LOSING THEIR INVESTMENT IN THIS MARXIST PARTY AND GOVT, AND AVOID A MAJOR BLOW TO SOVIET INTERNATIONAL PRESTIGE. AMSTUTZ
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19 Jul 79 12

EXDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 7/19/99 (FLATIN, BRUCE A.) OR-M
TAGS: PINT, PINS, PINR, AF, GE, US
SUBJECT: (S) FURTHER COMMENTS BY EAST GERMAN AMBASSADOR ABOUT SOVIET EFFORTS TO ALTER AFGHAN REGIME

REF: KABUL 5459

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: EAST GERMAN AMBASSADOR SCHWIESAU HAS IDENTIFIED CERTAIN NON-PUSHTUN CABINET MINISTERS AS BEING IN SUPPORT OF CURRENT SOVIET MACHINATIONS TO ALTER THE AFGHAN REGIME. SCHWIESAU THINKS IT MIGHT BE TOO LATE TO ACHIEVE A POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THE PRESENT MESS IN AFGHANISTAN. END OF SUMMARY.

3. DURING A CONVERSATION WITH THE A/DCM AT A SOCIAL EVENT ON JULY 18, DR. HERMANN SCHWIESAU, AMBASSADOR OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, EXPANDED SOMEWHAT ON THE PRESENTATION HE MADE TO CHARGE AMSTUTZ ON JULY 17 CONCERNING CURRENT SOVIET EFFORTS TO RESTRUCTURE THE AFGHAN REGIME (REFTEL). SCHWIESAU EXERCISED CARE TO CONVEY HIS VIEWS ONLY TO THE AMERICAN OFFICER, CHANGING THE TOPIC OF CONVERSATION WHEN THE BRITISH AND JAPANESE AMBASSADORS JOINED THE GROUP.

4. WHEN ASKED WHETHER HE THOUGH PRIME MINISTER HAFIZULLAH AMIN, THE PRIMARY TARGET OF THE SOVIET MACHINATIONS, IS AWARE OF WHAT IS HAPPENING, SCHWIESAU AFFIRMED THAT AMIN IS VERY ALERT TO DEVELOPMENTS, BUT PROBABLY NOT AWARE OF EVERYTHING THAT HAS OCCURRED DURING THE PAST WEEK, WHEN THE SOVIET EFFORT HAS MOVED INTO A MORE ACTIVE PHASE. WHEN ASKED WHETHER AMIN WOULD ACCEPT HIS FATE QUIETLY OR FIGHT, SCHWIESAU REPLIED THAT HE DID NOT KNOW.

5. AS MEMBERS OF THE ANTI-AMIN ALIGNMENT, SCHWIESAU IDENTIFED THE FOLLOWING MINISTERS, NOTING THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FACT THAT ALL ARE NON-PUSHTUN: FINANCE MINISTER ABDUL KARIM MISAQ, A HAZARA; JUSTICE MINISTER ABDUL HAKIM SHARAIE JAUZJANI, AN UZBEK; PUBLIC WORKS MINISTER DASTAGIR PANJSHIRI, A TAJIK; AND MINISTER OF INFORMATION AND CULTURE BAREQ-SHAFEYE, A TAJIK. (HE DID NOT MENTION OTHER NON-PUSHTUNS, LIKE MINISTER OF COMMERCE ABDUL QUDUS GHORBANDI, A TAJIK, OR MINISTER OF MINES AND INDUSTRIES MOHAMMAND ISMAIL DANESH, A KIZILBASH.) SCHWIESAU IMPLIED THAT AN IMPORTANT PART OF THE CURRENT POLITICAL PROBLEM IS THE EXCESSIVE PUSHTUNIZATION TENDENCIES OF THE CURRENT KHALQI LEADERSHIP.

6. WHEN THE A/DCM OBSERVED THAT IT NOW SEEMED A LITTLE LATE IN THE GAME FOR AN ATTEMPT TO ACHIEVE A POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THE KHALQI MESS, SCHWIESAU GRAVELY NODDED HIS AGREEMENT. SCHWIESAU FURTHER AGREED THAT A GENUINELY EXPANDED POLITICAL BASE WOULD NOW APPEAR DIFFICULT TO CONSTRUCT SINCE THE KHALQIS SEEM TO HAVE ALIENATED ALMOST EVERY ELEMENT OF AFGHAN SOCIETY.

7. SCHWIESAU WNE ON TO COMPLAIN BITTERLY ABUT TME RASH INCOMPETENCE OF TME KHALQI LEADERSHIP THAT INEVITABLY LED TO TME CURRENT SITUATION. AS AN EXAMPLE, ME CITED THE CONTROVERSIAL LAND REFORM PROGRAM, WHICH HAS BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR MUCH OF THE OPPOSITION IN THIS COUNTRY. SCHWIESAU RECALLED THAT ME MAD WARNED THE KHALQIS LAST YEAR TO GO SLOW WITH A COMPLICATED PROGRAM OF THIS TYPE, ADVISING THEM THAT THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, "THE MOST ADVANCED SOCIETY IN THE SOCIALIST CAMP, "MAD' CAREFULLY PHASED ITS LAND-REFORM PROGRAM OVER A FIFTEEN-YEAR PERIOD. SCHWIESAU ADDED GLUMLY THAT THE OVERLY ENTHUSIASTIC KHALQIS REJECTED HIS ADVICE -- AND STATED THEIR CONVICTION THAT THE AFGHAN PEOPLE WOULD SUPPORT THEIR ACCELERATED PROGRAM. AFTER SIX MONTHS, SCHWIESAU OBSERVED, IT WAS CLEAR THAT LAND REFORM WAS A DISASTER. ME RECALLED HOW MANY LANDLESS AND "LAND-POOR" PEASANTS MAD WANTED TO REFUSE TO ACCEPT LAND BECAUSE OF RELIGIOUS SCRUPLES OR FEAR OF FUTURE RETRIBUTION BY THE DEPRIVED LANDLORDS. THE KHALQIS FORCED THEM TO ACCEPT THE LAND, THREATENING THEM WITH IMPRISONMENT IF THEY REFUSED. ACCORDING TO SCHWIESAU, SEVERAL OF THESE PEASANTS LATER COMMITTED SUICIDE.

8. COMMENT: THROUGH SCHWPQSAU, THE SOVIETS WOULD SEEM TO BE TRYING TO MAKE CERTAIN THAT WE ARE BEING KEPT "INZRMED" 15 /5-
/$5 $3;3390.3,5 -- FOGIWHATEVER PURPOSE THEY HAVE IN MIND. (AN INTERESTING NOTE, INCIDENTALLY, IS THAT SCHWIESAU MAD A LARGE BOUQUET OF YOWERS DELIVERED CHARGE AMSTUTZ AFTER THEIR JULY 17 MEETGNG.)

9. THIS EMBASSY REMAINS SKEPTICAL THAT THE SOVIETS WILL BE ABLE TO BROADENT THE POLITICAL BASE OF THE AFGHAN REGIME SUFFICIENTLY TO STILL THE WIDESPREAD INSURRECTION IN AFGHANISTAN. WE FREQUENTLY HEAR RUMORS THAT THE SOVIETS ARE STILL TRYING TO BUILD A NEW REGIME AROUND FORMER ROYALIST PRIME MINISTER YUSUF, WHO WOULD PROBABLY SERVE AS A FIGUREHEAD PERSONAGE. THE LARGE NUMBERS OF AFGHANS FWHO HAVE NOW BEEN INCITED TO BLOOD-FEUD ACTION ARE UNLIKELY TO BE FOOLED BY OLD WINE IN NEW BOTTLES. ANY SOLUTION INVOLVING THE REPLACEMENT OF KHALQIS BY PARCHAMISTS WOULD ALSO BE A LOSER. THE LATTER ARE ALSO REGARDED BY AFGHANS AS PRO-MOSCOW ATHEISTS.

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RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 9031
RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 345
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1690
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1752
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 7089
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RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 334
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C O N F I D E N T I A L KABUL 5463

19 JUL 79

E.O. 12065: GDS 7-18-85 (TAYLOR, JAMES E.) OR-P
TAGS: PGOV, PINT, AF, UR
SUBJECT: (LOU) REPORTS OF "UNITED FRONT" NOT SUPPORTED BY INFORMATION HERE

REF: STATE 184996

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. SUMMARY: ALTHOUGH APPEALS TO "RALLY AROUND THE PARTY" ARE STANDARD FARE IN LEADERSHIP SPEECHES HERE, THE TERM "UNITED FRONT" HAS NOT YET BEEN USED PUBLICLY, AND WE BELIEVE THAT, FOR SOME REASON, MOSCOW RADIO CORRESPONDENT HAS CHOSEN TO EXPAND OR RECAST JULY POLITBURO ANNOUNCEMENT OF FORMATION, INTER ALIA, OF A "NATIONAL ORGANIZATION" FOR THE DEFENSE OF THE REVOLUTION. COMPOSITION AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THAT BODY ARE STILL UNKNOWN, BUT EVEN IF IT INCLUDED ORGANIZATION CITED BY MOSCOW RADIO, WE FEEL IT WOULD FALL WELL SHORT OF A GENUINE AND CLASSIC "UNITED FRONT." SPATE OF REPORTS COULD BE PART OF LARGER SOVIET EFFORT TO ALTER DRA LEADERSHIP IN SOME WAY. END OF SUMMARY.

3. RADION MOSCOW REPORTS OF A RECENT AFGHAN POLITBURO DECREE PROMULGATING THE FORMATION OF SOME SOR TO F"UNITED FRONT" COMPOSED OF ALL "SOCIAL, PROGRESSIVE, AND PATRIOTIC FORCES" FOR THE DEFENSE OF THE REVOLUTION (REFTEL) ARE MISLEADING TO THE EXTENT THAT A "UNITED FRONT" IMPLIES POLITICAL PARTICIPATION BY ELEMENTS WHICH ARE NOT NECESSARILY PART AND PARCEL OF THE REGIME'S "NATURAL" CONSTITUENCY. THE GROUPS CITED IN THE RECENT FBIS ACCOUNTS OF THE MOSCOW RADION STORIES -- E.G., THE PARTY ITSELF, THE PARTY YOUTH AND WOMEN'S ORGANIZATIONS, THE JOURNALISTS' UNION -- ARE ALL THE USUAL HACK, FRONT-ORGANIZATION PROPS OF THE REGIME, AND THEIR INCLUSION IN ANY ORGANIZATION TO DEFEND THE REVOLUTION WOULD NOT SEEM TO US TO REPRESENT ANY SIGNIFICANT NEW DEPARTURE, AND WOULD CERTAINLY NOT IN THEMSELVES REPRESENT A DISTINCT "UNITED FRONT."

4. TO THE BEST OF OUR KNOWLEDGE, THE SPECIFIC TERM "UNITED FRONT" HAS NOT BEEN USED YET IN ANY OFFICIAL PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN, ALTHOUGH THERE HAVE BEEN CONSTANT KHALQI EXHORTATIONS FOR ALL SEGMENTS OF SOCIETY TO JOIN HANDS TO FIGHT AGAINST THE "ENEMIES OF THE PEOPLE." THE MOST RECENT SUBSTANTIVE REPORT OF POLITBURO DELIVERATIONS WAS A STORY CARRIED IN THE JULY 1 GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED PRESS WHICH REVEALED THAT THE POLITBURO HAD DECIDED THE PREVIOUS DAY TO: EXPAND POLITICAL ACTIVITIES AMONG THE MASSES; STRENGTHEN THE KHALQI ORGANIZATION OF AFGHAN YOUTH; ESTABLISH "ADVISORY GROUPS" WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT'S MINISTRIES; ESTABLISH A "NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR THE DEFENSE OF THE REVOLUTION"; PREPARE APPLICATION QUESTIONAIRES FOR PROBATIONARY PARTY MEMBERS; AND, STRENGTHEN THE ROLE OF THE PRIMARY PARTY ORGANIZATIONS IN THE FIELD OF ACCEPTING NEW MEMBERS.

5. WE HAVE NOT UNCOVERED ANY FURTHER INFORMATION ON THE COMPOSITION OR RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE NEW "NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR THE DEFENSE OF THE REVOLUTION," BUT, SINCE THE JULY 1 ANNOUNCEMENT, THE HIGH COUNCIL FOR THE DEFENSE OF THE HOMELAND (THE BODY WHICH WE BELIEVE IS PRIMARILY CHARGED WITH DEVISING POLITICAL AND MILITARY STRATEGIES FOR COUNTERING THE INSURGENCY) HAS MET AT LEAST ONCE IN A REGULAR SESSION. THUS, THE NEW ORGANIZATION WOULD PROBABLY NOT HAVE MILITARY OR SECURITY TASKS, BUT WOULD MOST LIKELY SERVE AS A POLITICAL PROPAGANDA BODY WHOSE JOB WOULD BE TO DEMONSTRATE AND PUBLICIZE THE "WIDESPREAD SUPPORT" WHICH THE REGIME OSTENSIBLY COMMANDS. IN THIS CONNECTION, "COMMITTEES FOR THE DEFENSE OF THE REVOLUTION" HAVE BEEN SET UP THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY AT THE LOCAL LEVEL, AND IT COULD BE THAT THIS NEW ORGANIZATION WILL HAVE SIMILAR RESPONSIBILITIES AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL.

6. WE HAVE JUST RECEIVED (JULY 18) FBIS REPORTS WITH THE TEXTS OF THE MOSCOW RADIO REPORTS (TA 151307; LD 132124; TA 170608) WHICH APPEAR TO GO BEYOND THE JULY 1 POLITBURO ANNOUNCEMENT. IT APPEARS THAT THE SOVIET CORRESPONDENT, FOR WHATEVER REASON, MAY HAVE CHOSEN TO TRANSLATE (INCORRECTLY) "NATIONAL ORGANIZATION" INTO "UNITED NATIONAL FRONT," THEREBY USING WELL-KNOWN CODE WORDS TO GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THE DRA HAS PUBLICLY ANNOUNCED THAT IT HAS EMBARKED ON A CAMPAIGN TO BROADEN ITS BASE -- A DEVELOPMENT WHICH IS DEFINITELY NOT YET THE CASE.

7. ALTHOUGH WE HAVE NO FIRM INFORMATION AS YET ALONG THESE LINES, THESE MOSCOW RADIO REPORTS COULD REFLECT AN ATTEMPT BY CERTAIN PARTIES TO GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THE DRA IS BROADENING ITS POLITICAL BASE, AN IMPRESSION WHICH MIGHT HELP THWART A SOVIET EFFORT TO ALTER THE DRA LEADERSHIP COMPOSITION. SUCH AN EFFORT NOW SEEMS TO BE UNDERWAY (KABUL 5433 -,$ (-?7) 5459), AND IS APPRENTLY AIMED AT ACHIEVING A MORE GENUINE INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF POLITICAL PROPS UNDERPINNING THIS GOVERNMENT. IT STRIKES US THAT THESE RADIO REPORTS ARE SOMEHOW RELATED TO THE LARGER DRAMA NOW UNFOLDING, OTHERWISE MOSCOW RADIO'S ATTENTION TO MORE OR LESS STANDARD DRA APPEALS TO RALLY AROUND THE PARTY WOULD BE UNUSUAL.

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RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 1002
RUQMBA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 1453
RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 2557
RUFHLG/AMCONSUL LENINGRAD 6401
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0629
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1502
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 7685
RUQMBR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 2197
RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO 7121
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C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 18739

E.O. 12065: GDS 7/20/85 (GARRISON, MARK) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, UR

SUBJECT: (U) PRAVDA COMMENTARY ON AFGHAN NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR THE DEFENSE OF THE REVOLUTION

REF: (A) KABUL 5463, (B) STATE 184996, (C) KABUL 5433

1. (U) A JULY 18 PRAVDA COMMENTATOR'S COLUMN DISCUSSED THE CREATION BY THE PDPA POLITBURO OF A NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR THE DEFENSE OF THE REVOLUTION WHICH IS SUPPOSED TO INCLUDE ALL "PROGRESSIVE AND PATRIOTIC FORCES OF THE NATION, IRRESPECTIVE OF PARTY, RELIGIOUS, NATIONAL AND SOCIAL AFFILIATION." ACCORDING TO PRAVDA, ITS MEMBERS WILL BE THE PDPA, TRADE UNIONS, PEASANTS' COMMITTEES, THE NATIONAL YOUTH ORGANIZATION, NATIONAL WOMEN'S ORGANIZATION, THE COUNCIL OF ULEMAS AND OTHERS. PRAVDA SAYS THE ORGANIZATION IS NEEDED TO COMBAT COUNTERREVOLUTIONARY FORCES WHICH ARE BECOMING ACTIVE PRECISELY BECAUSE THE GOVERNMENT'S REFORM MEASURES HAVE ALREADY BROUGHT IMPROVEMENT TO THE CONDITION OF ALL LEVELS OF THE WORKING POPULATION. NO MENTION IS MADE OF A "UNITED NATIONAL FRONT."

2. (C) COMMENT: THE PRAVDA COMMENTARY MAKES CLEAR THAT THE SOVIET UNION APPROVES OF THE NEW ORGANIZATION AND LENDS CREDENCE TO REPORTS THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS ENCOURAGED THE DRA TO BROADEN ITS BASE OF SUPPORT AND TO TRY TO SEEK A POLITICAL SOLUTION TO ITS DIFFICULTIES (REF C). GARRISON
BT
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* U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1977—223-333

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RUFHEB/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 29
RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 9036
RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 346
RUDIC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1692
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1755
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 7094
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3165
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C O N F I D E N T I A L KABUL 5493

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E.O. 12065: GDS 7-21-85 (TAYLOR, JAMES E.) OR-P
TAGS: PEPR, PINS, PINT, AF, UR
SUBJECT: (LOU) TARAKI AND AMIN HINT PUBLICLY THAT THEY MAY BE AWARE OF BEHIND-THE-SCENES MANEUVERING AGAINS THE REGIME

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. SUMMARY: IN PUBLIC SPEECHES PUBLISHED OVER THE AFGHAN WEEKEND, TARAKI AND AMIN HINTED THEY MAY BE AWARE OF BEHIND-THE-SCENES MANEUVERING TO ALTER THE REGIME'S LEADERSHIP COMPOSITION, AND THAT THEY DO NOT INTEND TO PERMIT THE "BETRAYAL" OF THE REVOLUTION. AMIN, PARTICULARLY, REFLECTED DISAPPOINTMENT AT A POSSIBLE SOVIET ROLE IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS. THE GENERAL IMPRESSION, PUBLICLY AT LEAST, IS THAT NEITHER LEADER MAY TIMIDLY AND WITHOUT RESISTANCE ACCEPT WHATEVER SCENARIO MAY BE DEVISED BY OTHERS. END OF SUMMARY.

3. PRIME MINISTER HAFIZULLAH AMIN, IN A SPEECH PUBLISHED JULY 18, DROPPED SOME VEILED HINTS THAT HE MAY BE COGNIZANT OF POSSIBLE ONGOING EFFORTS TO ALTER THE MAKEUP OF THIS REGIME'S LEADERSHIP. ALLUDING TO THE CONCEPT OF A BROADENED GOVERNMENT, AMIN CLAIMED THAT THOSE CLASSES WHO HAD BEEN OVERTHROWN BY THE APRIL 1978 REVOLUTION HAD "NO RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE IN THE POLITICAL STRUGGLE" AND THAT "TO REINSTATE THE FEUDAL SYSTEM OR A PUPPET REGIME OF TE IMPERIALISTS (WOULD BE) HARMFUL TO THE REVOLUTION (AND) A BETRAYAL OF THE PEOPLE."

4. IN ADDRESSING RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION, AMIN ASSERTED "WE WILL ALWAYS BE FAITHFUL (TO) WHATEVER COUNTRY WE EXTEND THE HAND OF FRIENDSHIP, AND WITH WHICH WE MAKE A TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP; THE FIRST CONDITION OF OUR FRIENDSHIP IS RESPECT FOR OUR HOMELAND, RESPECT FOR OUR NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND RESPECT FOR THE INDEPENDENCE AND FREEDOM OF OUR BELOVED COUNTRY." AMIN ADDED POINTEDLY THAT "WE HAVE NOT MADE A TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP WITH ANYBODY UNLESS HE HAS RESPECT FOR OUR SOIL, RESPECT FOR OUR NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY RESPECT FOR OUR INDEPENDENCE, AND UNLESS HE SUPPORTS US HONESTLY IN THE SAFEGUARDING OF OUR INDEPENDENCE, IN KEEPING OUR SOIL AND OUR HOMELAND, AND IN KEEPING OUR NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTH. IT IS FOR THIS REASON THAT OUR FRIENDSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION HAS DEVELOPED TO THE STAGE OF BROTHERHOOD," AMIN ADDED.

5. AT ANOTHER POINT, AMIN INSISTED THAT "OUR DESIRE IS THAT IF SOME ONE HAS THE SAME IDEOLOGY (AS OURS) AND THE SAME FEELINGS, HE SHOULD LET US FIGHT AGAINST THE ENEMIES OF THE COUNTRY, AND TO BUILD OUR COUNTRY."

6. IN A SPEECH PUBLISHED JULY 19, PRESIDENT TARAKI MADE A BRIEF COMMENT ALONG RELATED LINES WHEN HE INSISTED THAT "OUR PARTY AND STATE HAVE MANY OTHER PLANS FOR THE WELFARE AND PROSPERITY OF OUR PEOPLE," AND THAT "STOPPAGE OF OUR EFFORTS IS THE DEATH OF OUR REVOLUTION. WE DO NOT ACCEPT THIS DEATH AND WILL FORGE AHEAD."

7. COMMENT: IN THE CONTEXT OF PERSISTING REPORTS THAT BEHIND-THE-SCENES SOVIET MANEUVERING IS UNDERWAY TO BROADEN THE BASE OF THE DRA REGIME IN ORDER TO BUILD SOME SORT OF SAFETY-VALVE FOR THE GROWING OPPOSITION, THESE BRIEF HINTS BY THE COUNTRY'S TOP TANDEM REFLECT A STANCE THAT SHOWS NO INCLINATION TO GO ALONG WITH EITHER A SIGNIFICANT "STOPPAGE" IN THE REGIME'S FUTURE REFORM PROGRAMS, OR TO BEND TO SOVIET PRESSURE. IN THIS REGARD, THE TONE OF AMIN'S REMARKS ABOUT THE SOVIETS SUGGESTS A SENSE OF BETRAYAL, WHILE AT THE SAME TME AN ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THE CRUCIAL SOVIET ROLE IN PRESERVING THE REGIME'S FUTURE.

8. THESE ARE THE FIRST PUBLIC INDICATIONS WE HAVE SEEN THAT THE TARAKI/AMIN TEAM MAY BE AWARE OF SECRET "NEGOTIATIONS" AND THAT THEY MAY NOT TIMIDLY ACQUIESCE TO WHATEVER SCENARIO MAY BE ON VARIOUS DRAWING BOARDS. ACTIVE RESISTANCE ON THE PART OF TARAKI AND AMIN (OR BOTH) AND THEIR SUPPORTERS, WOULD HAVE NOT ONLY POLITICAL BUT POTENTIALLY SERIOUS SECURITY RAMIFICATIONS A WELL.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 KABUL 5609

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E.O. 12065: GDS 7/24/85 (AMSTUTZ, J. BRUCE) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, AFNR, ASEC, PINS, SHUM, US, AF
SUBJ: (C) AFGHAN GOVERNMENT COMPLAINS ABOUT EVACUATION OF AMERICAN DEPENDENTS FROM AFGHANISTAN

REF: (A) STATE 191371, (B) STATE 190958, (C) KABUL 5544

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: ON JULY 24, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN (DRA) OFFICIALLY EXPRESSED ITS DISPLEASURE OVER THE U.S. DECISION TO EVACUATE AMERICAN DEPENDENTS AND LEAST ESSENTIAL PERSONNEL FROM AFGHANISTAN, AND ALSO COMPLAINED ABOUT THE ATTENDANT PUBLICITY. THE DRA TERMED THE U.S. ACT AS "AGAINST THE SPIRIT AND DESIRE OF THE DRA FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF NORMAL FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES." END SUMMARY.

3. ON JULY 24, I WAS SUMMONED ON ONE-HOUR'S NOTICE TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY BY SHAH MOHAMMAD DOST, FIRST DEPUTY MINISTER FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS. A/DCM FLATIN ACCOMPANIED ME.

4. DOST OPENED THE CONVERSATION BY OBSERVING ACIDLY THAT, IN SPITE OF MY ASSURANCES OF THE PRECEDING DAY THAT THE USG DID NOT INTEND TO PUBLICIZE THE EVACUATION OF AMERICAN DEPENDENTS AND LEAST ESSENTIAL PERSONNEL FROM AFGHANISTAN (REF C), BOTH THE VOICE OF AMERICA AND BBC HAD CARRIED THE NEWS ONLY HOURS LATER. DOST COMMENTED THAT HE HAD FEARED THAT THIS MIGHT HAPPEN, BUT HAD NEVERTHELESS CONVEYED MY ASSURANCES TO PRIME MINISTER HAFIZULLAH AMIN IMMEDIATELY AFTER YESTERDAY'S CONVERSATION.

5. WITHOUT SPECIFICALLY CITING MY OTHER ASSURANCE OF JULY 23 -- THAT THE USG DID NOT INTEND TO EMBARRASS THE DRA POLITICALLY WITH ITS EVACUATION DECISION, DOST DEPLORED IN PARTICULAR THE VOA'S TYING THE EVACUATION STORY TOGETHER WITH ALLEGATIONS THAT THE AFGHAN REGIME IS NOT ABLE TO MAINTAIN ORDER IN AFGHANISTAN. HE SAID, "YOU AND I BOTH CAN SEE THAT THERE ARE NO PROBLEMS IN KABUL -- AND OTHER EMBASSIES ARE NOT MAKING THIS MOVE." I EXPLAINED THE SECURITY REASONS FOR OUR DECISION AGAIN IN SOME DETAIL. ALTHOUGH DOST DID NOT COMMENT ABOUT THE ROAD INCIDENTS I CITED, HE QUARRELED WITH MY CITATION OF THE MAY 9 CLOSURE OF KABUL AIRPORT DUPING NEARBY FIGHTING, ARGUING THAT IT HAD BEEN CLOSED FOR "ONLY A FEW HOURS."

6. DOST ALSO COMPLAINED THAT THE VOA ANNOUNCEMENT CONTAINED ALLEGATIONS ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS, "SUCH AS THE EXECUATION OF 3,000 POLITICAL PRISONERS." HE REGARDED SUCH STATEMENTS AS UNFAIR BECAUSE ALL HIS GOVERNMENT COULD DO IS REFUTE THEM AFTER THEY HAD ALREADY BEEN PUBLICIZED TO THE WORLD.

7. IN RESPONSE, I INFORMED DOST THAT IT HAD BEEN THE INTENTION OF THE USG NOT TO INITIATE ANY PUBLICITY ABOUT THE EVACUATION, BUT THAT OUR DEPARTMENT OF STATE PRESS SPOKESMAN HAD BEEN PREPARED TO ANSWER QUESTIONS SHOULD THE MATTER BE RAISED AT A DAILY NOONTIME PRESS CONFERENCE. I EXPLAINED THAT THE SUBJECT HAD INDEED BEEN RAISED IN SUCH A FASHION AT HIS JULY 23 PRESS BRIEFING (REFTELS A AND B), AND THAT THEREFORE WE HAD TO RESPOND. AS FOR THE OTHER ISSUES OF SECURITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS, VOA HAD PRESUMABLY DECIDED FOR JOURNALISTIC REASONS TO ADD THEM TO THE STORY. I TOLD DOST THAT THE USG CONTINUES TO REGARD WITH GREAT CONCERN THE CIVIL RIGHTS SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN, BUT REMINDED HIM THAT THE USG IS NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CONTENT OF VOA BROADCASTS. DOST NOTED WRYLY THAT THE BRITISH EMBASSY HERE MAKES THE SAME DISCLAIMER ABOUT BBC BROADCASTS.

8. WHILE SPEAKING OF VOA'S NEW PERSIAN-LANGUAGE PROGRAM FOR THIS REGION, DOST TOLD US THAT, IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT THE VOA'S BROADCAST TIME OF 2300 IS TOO LATE FOR MOST AFGHAN LISTENERS, HIS GOVERNMENT TAPES EACH BROADCAST AND MONITORS ITS CONTENT. DOST ALSO NOTED THAT VOA HAD RECENTLY ADDED SOME DARI (AFGHAN PERSIAN) CONTENT TO THE PROGRAM, WHICH OTHERWISE IS BASICALLY IN FARSI (IRANIAN PERSIAN).

9. I ASSURED DOST THAT I WAS SORRY ABOUT ANY EMBARRASSMENT THAT HAD BEEN CAUSED HIS GOVERNMENT, BUT THAT I HOPED THAT HE NOW UNDERSTOOD HOW IT HAD ALL COME ABOUT. I REPEATED THAT BE OUR EVACUATION WE ONLY WERE DOING WHAT WE REGARDED AS NECESSARY, OBSERVING THAT THE AMERICAN MISSION HERE HAD UNDERGONE A GREAT REDUCTION IN SIZE SINCE THE REVOLUTION. DOST NOTED THAT "WITHOUT AN AID PROGRAM, AID PERSONNEL ARE UNNECESSARY."
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RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1702
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1765
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 7120
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3174
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 2341
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 KABUL 5609

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10. DOST THANKED ME FOR MY EXPLANATION. HE TOLD ME THAT HIS GOVERNMENT HOPED THAT "THINGS WILL BECOME BETTER" IN OUR "NORMAL" STATE OF RELATIONS, ADDING: "THAT'S THE SPIRIT OF OUR RECENT ACTIONS; THAT IS OUR DESIRE." HE REPEATED HIS COMMENT OF JULY 23 THAT THE SAFETY OF AMERICANS IS OUR OWN BUSINESS, BUT WONDERED WHY WE HAD TO MAKE A BIG PRODUCTION OVER THEIR DEPARTURE. I REPLIED THAT IT WAS DIFFICULT TO MASK THE DEPARTURE OF ONE HUNDRED PEOPLE. DOST THEN WONDERED WHY THE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN COULD NOT HAVE STALLED UNTIL THIS "SENSITIVE" OPERATION HAD BEEN CONCLUDED. HE OBSERVED SADLY: "THIS IS JUST THE BEGINNING; I AM NOW WAITING FOR OTHERS." (NOTE: I HAD INFORMED DOST EARLIER THAT I WAS BRIEFING "FIRENDLY" EMBASSIES ABOUT OUR DECISION.)

11. I REASSURED DOST THAT THE USG ALSO WANTS FRIENDLY, NORMAL RELATIONS WITH THE DRA -- AND, ONCE AGAIN, DENIED THAT WE WERE ENGAGED IN ANY SUBVERSIVE ANTI-KHALQI EFFORTS. IN THIS CONTEXT, I MENTIONED THE UNHELPFUL EFFECTS OF OBLIQUE -- AND NOT-SO-OBLIQUE -- "HINTS" IN THE LOCAL MEDIA THAT WE WERE SO INVOLVED, CITING SPECIFICALLY THE FALSE PICTURE STATEMENTS ABOUT US ARMS BEING CAPTURED. (NOTE: IT IS TO DOST'S CREDIT, HOWEVER, THAT SINCE OUR DEMARCHE OF JUNE 18 TO HIM ABOUT PHONY NEWSPAPER PHOTOGRAPHS OF "AMERICAN WEAPONS" ALLEGEDLY SEIZED FROM ANTI-DRA GUERRILLAS, THAT WE HAVE NOT SEEN THIS PARTICULAR LIE REPEATED IN THE PRESS.)

12. THE MEE
NG ENDED ON A FRIENDLIER, MORE RELAXED NOTE THAN IT OPENED. UPON OUR DEPARTURE, DOST HANDED ME AN AIDE MEMOIRE, WHICH, AFTER TRANSLATION AT THE EMBASSY, APPEARED TO BE MUCH STIFFER IN TONE THAN HIS ORAL PRESENTATION. ITS TEXT FOLLOWS:

"MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
JULY 24, 1979
KABUL

"TO: EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
KABUL

"AIDE MEMOIRE

"IN CONNECTION WITH THE TALKS OF THE FIRST DEPUTY MINISTER OF THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS MINISTRY OF DRA WITH J. BRUCE AMSTUTZ, CHARGE D'AFFAIRES OF THE U.S. EMBASSY IN KABUL ON JULY 23, 1979, AND THE (LATTER'S) RELATED AIDE MEMOIRE, THE CONCERN OF U.S. AUTHORITIES REGARDING THEIR CITIZENS IN KABUL AND THEIR PLACES OF WORK IN OTHER REGIONS (OF AFGHANISTAN), AND THE EVACUATION OF SOME OF THEM FROM KABUL HAS NO ACCEPTABLE REASON.

"THE SITUATION IN KABUL AND IN OTHER PLACES OF THEIR WORK IS CALM AND SECURITY HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED. NECESSARY SECURITY MEASURES FOR THE PROTECTION OF FOREIGN MISSIONS AND THEIR NATIONALS HAVE BEEN ADOPTEDALONG AGO.

"NONE OF THBCOTHER FOREIGN MISSIONS HAVE YET SHOWN SUCH A CONCERN, AND THE AMERICAN EMBASSY IS THE FIRST TO TAKE THE LEAD IN THIS CASE. THIS MEASURE OF THE U.S. EMBASSY WILL CREATE NEGATIVE ANXIETIES AND PROPAGANDA WHICH WILL HELP THE GOALS OF THE ENEMIES OF THE REVOLUTION AND THE PEOPLE OF AFGHANISTAN.

"THIS PLAN COULD HAVE WORKED OUT IN A CALM AND QUIET FORM WITHOUT BEING PUBLICIZED; BUT, BEFORE THE DEPARTURE OF THE EVACUEES, PROPAGANDISTIC SOURCES HAVE ALREADY TAKEN STEPS TO MAKE PROPAGANDA REGARDING THEIR LEAVING. THIS ACT OF YOUR EMBASSY CAN BE CONSIDERED AGAINST THE SPIRIT AND WISH OF DRA FOR MAINTAINING NORMAL FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES."
END OF TEXT.

13. COMMENT: THE DRA CLEARLY RESENTS OUR EVACUATION DECISION, REGARDING IT AS A HOSTILE POLITICAL ACT. WE DO NOT EXPECT ANY SPECIFIC RETRIBUTION AT THIS TIME, HOWEVER.

14. IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY AND VULNERABILITY OF OUR CURRENT EVACUATION OPERATION, THE EMBASSY HOPES THAT USG SPOKESMEN WILL BE CAREFUL ABOUT HOW THIS EVACUATION IS HANDLED. WE WERE PARTICULARLY DISTRESSED TO NOTE THAT THE RECENT "WASHINGTON POST" REPORT ON AFGHANISTAN CITING US OFFICIAL SOURCES AND IMPLYING POSSIBLE EMBASSY KABUL CONTRIBUTIONS (STATE 190634) APPEARED AT APPROXIMATELY THE

SAME TIME AS OUR EVACUATION DECISION. THIS COINCIDENCE COMPLICATED OUR RELATIONS WITH THE DRA SINCE THEY SEEMED TO TIE THE TWO TOGETHER. AMSTUTZ
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RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1757
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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 KABUL 5627

CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12065: GDS 7/24/85 (TAYLOR, JAMES E.) OR-P
TAGS: PEPR, PINT, AF, UR
SUBJ: (CLOU) POSSIBLE MOTIVATIONS BEHIND SOVIET DECISION TO PUBLICIZE ITS EFFORTS TO "NEGOTIATE" SETTLEMENT OF DRA'S DOMESTIC CONFLICT

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: THE SOVIET DECISION TO INFORM US AND A NUMBER OF OTHER MISSIONS HERE, DIRECTLY BY SOVIET MINISTER-COUNSELOR VASILY SAFRONCHUK AND INDIRECTLY BY GDR AMBASSADOR HERMANN SCHWEISAU, WAS PROBABLY MOTIVATED PRIMARILY BY A DESIRE TO ARTICULATE IMPORTANT SOVIET INTERESTS IN AFGHANISTAN, WHILE SIMULTANEOUSLY UNDERSCORING MOSCOW'S EFFORTS TO FIND A POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THIS REVOLUTIONARY REGIME'S GROWING DOMESTIC DIFFICULTIES. BY DOING SO, MOSCOW POSSIBLY BELIEVES THAT IT HAS "LEGITIMIZED" WHATEVER FUTURE POLITIES IT MAY PURSUE, AND HAS ALSO MADE A CASE FOR DEFLECTING ANY FOREIGN CRITICISM STEMMING FROM WHATEVER ACTIONS THE SOVIETS MIGHT EVENTUALLY DECIDE ARE NECESSARY.

3. MOST OBSERVERS HERE FEEL AN ELEVENTH-HOUR ATTEMPT TO ARRANGE A POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THE ONGOING STRIFE IS DOOMED TO FAILURE, NOT LEAST OF ALL BECAUSE THE KEY INGREDIENT -- THE DEPARTURE OF PRIME MINISTER HAFIZULLAH AMIN -- MAY BE UNATTAINABLE. NONETHELESS, SAFRONCHUK'S EFFORTS -- WHICH MAY STILL BE UNDERWAY -- AT THE MINIMUM LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR A FUTURE SOVIET CLAIM THAT MOSCOW DID EVERYTHING IN ITS POWER TO NEGOTIATE A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF AFGHANISTAN'S DOMESTIC CONFLICT, AND THAT WHATEVER FUTURE STEPS MAY BE TAKEN WILL BE JUSTIFIED BY A MAJOR POWER'S REQUIREMENTS TO PROTECT WHAT IT VIEWS AS ITS LEGITIMATE IMPORTANT INTERESTS.

4. WE DO NOT ANTICIPATE THAT SAFRONCHUK'S MISSION WILL MEET WITH RINGING SUCCESS, AND THAT, AS A RESULT, AN ENHANCED SOVIET ROLE -- WHICH NOW MAY BE EMERGING IN THE MILITARY FIELD HERE -- WILL PROBABLY EVOLVE INTO THE SALIENT FEATURE OF THIS DRAMA'S DENOUEMENT. END SUMMARY.

5. THE PRIMARY MOTIVATION BEHIND THE SOVIET DECISION TO INFORM US, AND SEVERAL OTHER EMBASSIES HERE (WE ARE AWARE THAT THE AUSTRIANS, BANGLADESHIS, FRENCH, INDIANS, AND PAKISTANIS HAVE BEEN APPROACHED), DIRECTLY BY VASILY SAFRONCHUK AND INDIRECTLY THROUGH GDR AMBASSADOR SCHWIESAU, OF MOSCOW'S "NEGOTIATIONS" WITH THE AFGHANS TO BRING ABOUT A "BROADENED POLITICAL BASE" FOR THIS REGIME, AND, PERHAPS, COSMETIC ALTERATION IN THE MAKE-UP OF THE DRA LEADERSHIP, WAS PROBABLY A DESIRE TO "LEGITIMIZE" WHATEVER FUTURE ACTIONS AND POLICIES THE SOVIETS MAY PURSUE TOWARD AFGHANISTAN. BY STRESSING MOSCOW'S JUSTIFIABLE CONCERNS FOR DEVELOPMENTS IN A COUNTRY BORDERING ON ITS OWN INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS, AND BY EMPHASIZING MOSCOW'S NEED TO SUPPORT A "FRATERNAL" PARTY (LEST OTHER "FRATERNAL" PARTIES IN THE WORLD RAISE QUESTIONS REGARDING THE DEPTH OF SOVIET COMMITMENT AND RESOLVE TO THE SOCIALIST MOVEMENT), THE SOVIETS ARE MAKING A CASE THAT THEIR INTERESTS IN AFGHANISTAN ARE SIGNIFICANT, ALBEIT PERHAPS NOT VITAL, AND THAT THEY HAVE THE "RIGHT" OF A MAJOR POWER TO TAKE WHATEVER STEPS NECESSARY TO PROTECT THESE INTERESTS. (LEFT UNSAID BY SAFRONCHUK AND SCHWIESAU, SO FAR AT LEAST, ARE MOSCOW'S LESS ALTRUISTIC DESIRES TO PROTECT ITS CONSIDERABLE INVESTMENT OF RESOURCES IN THIS COUNTRY AND AN UNDERSTANDABLE WISH TO AVOID POSSIBLY EMBARRASSING CONSEQUENCES IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA WHICH THE FALL OF THE DRA WOULD ENTAIL.) AT THE SAME TIME, BY WIDELY "PUBLICIZING" THEIR REPORTED EFFORTS TO FORMULATE A POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THE DOMESTIC STRIFE HERE, THE SOVIETS ARE PERHAPS ALSO LAYING THE GROUNDWORK FOR A CLAIM THAT MOSCOW GENUINELY DESIRES A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF ONGOING PROBLEMS AND IS EXPENDING CONSIDERABLE EFFORT -- AND RUNNING NOT INSIGNIFICANT POLITICAL RISKS -- TO AVOID FURTHER DETERIORATION IN THE DRA'S POSITION.
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RUFHEB/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0031
RUSBOD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 9057
RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 0350
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1704
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1768
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 7124
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3176
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6. THIS RELATIVELY OVERT SOVIET APPROACH TO US AND REPRESENTATIVES OF AFGHANISTAN'S REGIONAL NEIGHBORS COULD WELL BE AIMED AT HEADING OFF ANY OBJECTIONS TO A HEIGHTENED SOVIET PRESENCE IN THIS COUNTRY, SHOULD SAFRONCHUK'S EFFORTS TO REACH A POLITICAL SOLUTION PROVE FRUITLESS. IN THE U.S.-SOVIET CONTEXT, WE PRESUME THAT NOT THE LEAST OF SOVIET CONCERNS WOULD BE A DESIRE TO AVOID SPARKING A NEGATIVE REACTION IN THE U.S. AT THE TIME OF THE DEBATE ON SALT II.

7. WE HAVE LITTLE DOUBT THAT MOSCOW WOULD GENUINELY LIKE TO DISCOVER A POLITICAL MEANS TO GUARANTEE THE FUTURE OF A FUNCTIONING AND REASONABLY SECURE MARXIST REGIME IN KABUL. THE HOUR IS LATE FOR SUCH AN EFFORT, HOWEVER, AND IT COULD WELL BE THAT SAFRONCHUK IS ON A "MISSION IMPOSSIBLE" REPRESENTING LITTLE MORE THAN A LAST-DITCH TRY AT CONVINCING THE KHALQIS TO "DO SOMETHING" TO PUT THEIR DOMESTIC HOUSE IN ORDER. MOST OBSERVERS, APPARENTLY INCLUDING THE SOVIETS, BELIEVE THAT THE MINIMUM NECESSARY TO DEFUSE THE OPPOSITION EFFECTIVELY WOULD BE THE DEPARTURE (PREFERABLY FEET FIRST) OF PRIME MINISTER HAFIZULLAH AMIN, AN EVENTUALITY WHICH THESE SAME OBSERVERS CONSIDER VERY DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE. THUS, IN THE ABSENCE OF AMIN'S DEMISE, VOLUNTARY OR OTHERWISE, SAFRONCHUK'S GOAL PROBABLY IS UNATTAINABLE.

8. THE SOVIETS WERE PROBABLY AWARE OF THE VIRTUAL FUTILITY OF SAFRONCHUK'S TASK (ASSUMING MOSCOW IS UNWILLING TO HARKEN BACK TO THE STALIN DAYS AND ELIMINATE AMIN THEMSELVES), BUT FOR THE REASONS CITED ABOVE, HIS "NEGOTIATING" EFFORT HAD TO BE MADE AND GIVEN CONSIDERABLE PUBLICITY PRIOR TO ANY FURTHER ESCALATION OF SOVIET STEPS TO PROP UP THE DRA REGIME. THE SOVIETS MAY HAVE FELT THAT IF AMIN COULD BE PERSUADED TO ACCEPT "HONORABLE EXILE," PERHAPS IN A DACHA OUTSIDE TASHKENT, SO MUCH THE BETTER. IF HE COULD NOT, HOWEVER, MOSCOW WOULD FORGE AHEAD WITH WHATEVER SUPPORT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO "GUARANTEE" THE SURVIVAL OF THE AFGHAN REVOLUTION. ANY ENHANCED SUPPORT -- BY VIRTUE OF THE GROUNDWORK ALREADY PREPARED WITH US AND AFGHANISTAN'S REGIONAL NEIGHBORS -- WOULD THEREFORE, BE "ACCEPTABLE" IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA, SINCE IT WOULD SERVE TO PROTECT IMPORTANT AND LEGITIMATE SOVIET INTERESTS, A RESPONSIBILITY WHICH NO GOVERNMENT IN MOSCOW COULD BE EXPECTED TO SHIRK.

9. ONE COULD ARGUE, OF COURSE, THAT THE SOVIETS, IF THEIR "GOOD-OFFICES" ARE REBUFFED BY AMIN, COULD DECIDE TO WITHHOLD FURTHER ASSISTANCE AND LEAVE THE DRA AT THE MERCY OF THE INSURGENTS. WE SERIOUSLY DOUBT THAT SUCH AN EVENTUALITY IS PROBABLE, NOT ONLY BECAUSE THE USSR DOES INDEED HAVE IMPORTANT INTERESTS AT STAKE IN AFGHANISTAN, BUT ALSO BECAUSE RECENT INFORMATION HERE POINTS TO A GROWING SOVIET PROFESSIONAL INVOLVEMENT IN THE ACTUAL CARRYING OUT OF ANTI-INSURGENCY MILITARY OPERATIONS, A DEVELOPMENT WHICH DOES NOT POINT TO AN IMMINENT ABANDONMENT OF THE DRA.

10. THE CURRENT STATUS OF SAFRONCHUK'S "PEACE MISSION" IS UNKNOWN. SAFRONCHUK HIMSELF HAS BEEN INDISPOSED THE PAST FEW DAYS WITH "STOMACH PROBLEMS," BUT WHETHER THIS SUGGESTS A STOCKTAKING PERIOD IS IMPOSSIBLE TO SAY. SCHWIESAU CONTINUES HIS "BRIEFING" OF FOREIGN EMBASSIES REGARDING SAFRONCHUK'S MISSION. BASED ON HINTS IN PUBLIC SPEECHES, AND ON SCHWIESAU'S PERIPATETIC CALLS, WE ARE VIRTUALLY CERTAIN THAT INFORMATION REGARDING SAFRONCHUK'S ACTIVITIES HAS LONG AGO REACHED AMIN'S EARS, AND WE CANNOT RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT SAFRONCHUK HAS ALREADY BROACHED THE ISSUE OF AMIN'S DEPARTURE WITH THE PRIME MINISTER HIMSELF. NONETHELESS, THE CONTINUED TARAKI-AMIN HAND AT THE HELM, AND SCHWIESAU'S ONGOING ACTIVITY, SUGGEST THAT THE SAFRONCHUK CAPER HAS NOT YET RUN ITS COURSE, AND THAT FURTHE DEVELOPMENTS MAY YET EMERGE. THE FACT THAT SAFRONCHUK AND SCHWIESAU HAVE NOT BEEN PNGED BY AMIN SUGGESTS FURTHER THAT SOVIET "PRESSURE" MAY NOT BE SEVERE, OR EVEN HOSTILE, BUT THAT THE "NEGOTIATIONS" ARE, IN FACT, GENUINE ATTEMPTS TO FIND VIABLE ANSWERS.

11. THUS, THE DENOUEMENT OF THIS PARTICULAR DRAMA PROBABLY REMAINS TO BE SEEN. WE ANTICIPATE, HOWEVER, THAT AN ENHANCED SOVIET ROLE WILL PROBABLY EMERGE AS A RESULT OF AMIN'S INTRANSIGENCE, AND MOSCOW'S POSSIBLY REACHING THE CONCLUSION THAT THEIR OPTIONS ARE SEVERELY RESTRICTED AND THAT EVEN A REGIME CONTROLLED BY AMIN IS PREFERABLE TO ONE LED BY THE "MAD MULLAHS." AMSTUTZ
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RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 7131
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE 344
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 1772
RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 638
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26 JUL 79 08 42Z

~~S E C~~ R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 KABUL 5648

EXDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 7/26/99 (FLATIN, BRUCE A.) OR-M
TAGS: AEMR, PEPR, AF, UR, US, PK, IR, CH
SUBJECT: (S) DEMARCHE TO SOVIET AMBASSADOR AT KABUL ABOUT EVACUATION OF AMERICAN DEPENDENTS

REFS: (A) MOSCOW 18979, (B) STATE 189714

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. SUMMARY: DURING THE CHARGE'S CALL ON THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR CONCERNING THE AMERICAN EVACUATION FROM KABUL, AMBASSADOR PUZANOV REFLECTED THE IRRITATION OF THE AFGHAN AUTHORITIES OVER THE USG PUBLICITY ATTENDING THIS OPERATION. PUZANOV ALSO COMMENTED ON AFGHAN EFFORTS TO TRIM THE SIZE OF THE AMERICAN EMBASSY AT KABUL. END SUMMARY.

3. ON WEDNESDAY, JULY 25, 1979, THE CHARGE CALLED ON ALEXANDER M. PUZANOV, SOVIET AMBASSADOR AT KABUL AND DEAN OF THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS. THE CHARGE WAS ACCOMPANIED BY THE A/DCM.

4. THE CHARGE EXPLAINED THAT HE WAS SEEING PUZANOV AT THE INSTRUCTION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE. HE OBSERVED THAT A SIMILAR DEMARCHE HAD BEEN CONDUCTED EARLIER BY OUR EMBASSY IN MOSCOW WITH THE SOVIET MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. (REFTEL A). THE CHARGE WENT OVER THE TALKING POINTS SUGGESTED IN REFTEL B, LEAVING AN INFORMAL COPY WITH THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR.

5. PUZANOV THANKED THE CHARGE FOR HIS PRESENTATION, BUT STATED THAT HE COULD NOT UNDERSTAND "YOUR WORRY ABOUT POTENTIAL HARM TO YOUR CITIZENS HERE." WHEN THE CHARGE REPLIED THAT, ACCORDING TO INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO THE AMERICAN EMBASSY, THERE HAD BEEN A WORSENING OF THE INSURRECTION IN THE AFGHAN COUNTRYSIDE, PUZANOV INTERRUPTED TO SAY THAT WAS NOT WHAT HE MEANT. HE WAS WONDERING WHY THE AMERICAN EMBASSY WAS CONCERNED THAT THERE MIGHT BE POSSIBLE HARM TO ITS CITIZENS DURING THE EVACUATION OPERATIONS.

6. THE CHARGE REPLIED THAT WE HOPED THAT THE DRA WOULD NOT STAND IN THEIR WAY. THE CHARGE EXPLAINED THAT HE HAD SEEN DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER DOST ON JULY 23, AS A MATTER OF COURTESY, TO EXPLAIN THE U.S. EVACUATION DECISION. HE TOLD PUZANOV THAT HE HAD MADE TWO POINTS CLEAR TO DOST:

(A) THE EVACUATION DECISION WAS NOT POLITICALLY MOTIVATED, BUT WAS SOLELY PRECAUTIONARY, REFLECTING USG CONCERN OVER THE SECURITY OF AMERICAN DEPENDENTS;

(B) THE USG WOULD NOT SEEK PUBLICITY CONCERNING THIS ACTION, BUT, IF ASKED, WOULD HAVE TO RESPOND TRUTHFULLY, BUT IN A LOW-KEY FASHION.

7. THE CHARGE WENT ON TO EXPLAIN TO PUZANOV IN SOME DETAIL HOW THE INFORMATION CAME OUT AT THE JULY 23 PRESS CONFERENCE IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT. HE TOLD PUZANOV THAT DOST CALLED HIM IN ON JULY 24TH CO COMPLAIN ABOUT THIS PUBLICITY, NOTING THAT THE CHARGE HAD ASSURED HIM THE PREVIOUS DAY THAT THE U.S. WOULD NOT INITIATE ANY. THE CHARGE OBSERVED THAT DOST STRESSED TWO POINTS IN THIS MEETING:

(A) THAT THERE WERE NO SECURITY PROBLEMS IN KABUL OR ELSEWHERE IN THE COUNTRY, AND

(B) THE VERY FACT THAT THE AMERICANS ARE MOVING OUT CREATES A "FALSE IMPRESSION" TO THE WORLD

8. PUZANOV THEN CHANGED THE SUBJECT, NOTING THAT THERE HAD BEEN AN AFGHAN RADIO BROADCAST ON JULY 24TH STATING THAT THE DRA HAD PROPOSED A REDUCTION IN THE U.S. EMBASSY STAFF. THE CHARGE OBSERVED THAT, ALTHOUGH DOST HAD MADE SOME VAGUE ALLUSION TO POSSIBLE STAFF CUT-BACKS FOR VARIOUS EMBASSIES IN KABUL DURING THE FIRST CONVERSATION, ON JULY 23RD, HE DID NOT MENTION THAT SUCH A DIPLOMATIC NOTE WAS ON THE WAY IN THE JULY 24TH CONVERSATION.

9. THE CHARGE OBSERVED THAT THE TEXT OF THE AFGHAN NOTE SUGGESTED THAT IT WAS A CIRCULAR NOTE; THEREFORE, THE AMERICAN DID NOT KNOW WHETHER OTHER EMBASSIES, SUCH AS THE SOVIET EMBASSY, HAD ALSO RECEIVED COPIES. PUZANOV REPLIED THAT HE HAD ONLY LOOKED AT THOSE NOTES WHICH HAD ARRIVED AT HIS EMBASSY UP UNTIL NOON OF JULY 24TH, AND HE HAD NOT YET SEEN ANY SUCH NOTE.

10. THE CHARGE NOTED THAT THE SUBSEQUENT AFGHAN MEDIA TREATMENT ABOUT THE NOTE IMPLIED THAT IT APPLIED ONLY TO THE AMERICAN MISSION. HE EXPRESSED REGRET OVER THE DRA'S ACTION AND OBSERVED THAT THE DRA SEEMED TO BE OVERREACTING TO THE EVACUATION DECISION. THE CHARGE RECALLED THAT OFFICERS OF THIS EMBASSY HAD OFTEN TOLD AFGHAN AND SOVIET OFFICIALS THAT THE U.S. IS GIVING NO HELP TO THE REBEL SIDE, BUT WE CONTINUE TO SEE VEILED HINTS IN THE AFGHAN MEDIA ABOUT ALLEGED AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT.

11. THE CHARGE OBSERVED THAT HIS MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENT WAS ONE MORE SAD MOMENT IN THE RECENT HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN. HE RECALLED THAT TWO YEARS AGO, AFGHANISTAN HAD FRIENDLY, GOOD RELATIONS WITH ALMOST EVERY COUNTRY IN THE WORLD. NOW, FIFTEEN MONTHS AFTER THE KHALQI REVOLUTION, IT STILL HAS GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE USSR, BUT BAD RELATIONS WITH ITS THREE OTHER NEIGHBORS, CHINA, PAKISTAN, AND IRAN. FURTHERMORE, THE KHALQI REGIME IS WORSENING ITS RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. FOR THAT MATTER, HE OBSERVED, AFGHAN RELATIONS WITH THE REST OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES DO NOT SEEM TO BE ALL THAT GOOD EITHER. THE CHARGE TOLD PUZANOV THAT HE DID NOT KNOW WHERE ALL OF THIS WOULD END. HE WONDERED WHETHER
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INFO RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 9062
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 7132
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE 345
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 1773
RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 639
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EXDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 7/26/99 (FLATIN, BRUCE A.) OR-M

PRIME MINISTER HAFIZULLAH AMIN IS SOMEHOW TRYING TO DRIVE AMERICA INTO THE OPPOSITION. CERTAINLY, THE CHARGE DID NOT FIND AMIN'S REACTIONS ALL THAT RATIONAL OR UNDERSTANDABLE. THE CHARGE EXPLAINED THAT HE WAS BEING FRANK WITH PUZANOV, BECAUSE HE REGARDED HIM AS A COLLEAGUE AND ALSO BECAUSE HE WAS ADDRESSING HIM IN HIS CAPACITY AS DEAN OF THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS. HE STRESSED THAT THE VIEWS HE WAS EXPRESSING ON THE TOPICS OUTSIDE THE EVACUATION SITUATION WERE HIS OWN, AND WERE NOT BEING PRESENTED UNDER THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT.

12. PUZANOV, INTERESTINGLY ENOUGH, ELECTED AT THIS POINT TO RETURN TO THE QUESTION OF THE SIZE OF THE AMERICAN EMBASSY IN KABUL. HE OBSERVED THAT THE NUMBER OF U.S. EMPLOYEES APPEARED TO HAVE INCREASED SINCE THE REVOLUTION. THE CHARGE RESPONDED THAT THAT WAS NOT TRUE. HE STATED THAT IN REALITY THE SIZE OF THE AMERICAN EMBASSY WAS NOW SMALLER THAN IT EVER HAD BEEN OVER THE LAST TWENTY YEARS. HE OPINED THAT THE AFGHANS MAY HAVE GOTTEN THE IMPRESSION OF INCREASED NUMBERS BECAUSE THE EMBASSY HAD RECENTLY BEEN PLACING ALMOST ALL ADMINISTRATIVE AND STAFF EMPLOYEES ON THE DIPLOMATIC LIST IN ORDER TO ACCORD THEM THE DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY WHICH OTHERWISE THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT WAS DENYING IN VIOLATION OF ITS RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER THE "VIENNA CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS."

13. PUZANOV REPLIED THAT HE HAD "ONLY THE SLIGHTEST INTEREST" IN THE SIZE OF THE AMERICAN EMBASSY'S STAFF. HE EXPLAINED THAT, ALTHOUGH HIS OWN DIPLOMATIC STAFF HAD INCREASED CONSIDERABLY SINCE THE REVOLUTION TO MEET INCREASED ADVISORY SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS, THERE HAD BEEN NO INCREASE AT ALL IN THE SOVIET EMBASSY'S TECHNICAL AND SUPPORT STAFF. FOR EXAMPLE, EXPLAINED PUZANOV, HIS EMBASSY IS CURRENTLY RELYINGN UPON SOVIET ENGINEERS ASSIGNED TO KABUL MUNICIPALITY AS ADVISORS TO HELP BUILD AN APARTMENT HOUSE IN THE SOVIET COMPOUND DURING THEIR FREE TIME. AS ANOTHER EXAMPLE, HE STATED THAT ALTHOUGH THERE HAD BEEN AN INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF SOVIET CHILDREN AT KABUL, THE SOVIET SCHOOL STILL GOT ALONG WITH ONLY A PRINCIPAL AND TWO OR THREE TEACHERS ASSIGNED OFFICIAL FROM MOSCOW, DEPENDING FOR THE REST OF THEIR TEACHING STAFF ON LOCALLY HIRED WIVES OF SOVIET PERSONNEL. PUZANOV OBSERVED THAT THE SOVIET MINISTRIES OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND FINANCE WRE SO "STINGY" THAT IT TOOK A "TON OF PAPERWORK" TO GET ANYTHING EXTRA OUT OF THEM FOR ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT; THEREFORE, HE RARELY TRIED.

14. RETURNING AGAIN TO THE EVACUATION QUESTION, PUZANOV CHIDED THE USG FOR HAVING PROMISED THAT THERE WOULD BE NO PUBLICITY, AND NOTED THAT THE PUBLICITY HAD APPEARED ON THE VERY NEXT DAY. THE CHARGE REPLIED THAT HE HAD ALREADY EXPLAINED HOW THIS HAD HAPPENED.

15. PUZANOV THEN WENT ON TO ADDRESS THE CHARGE'S COMMENTS ON AFGHANISTAN'S WORSENING RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN, IRAN, AND CHINA. HE NOTED THAT ALL THREE COUNTRIES HAD BEEN FOLLOWING "POLICIES OF INTERVENTION AND AGGRESSION AGAINST AFGHANISTAN, MOUNTED FROM THEIR TERRITORIES." HE NOTED THAT, IN SPITE OF THESE PROVOCATIONS, AFGHANISTAN WAS TAKING "WIDE STEPS" TO IMPROVE ITS RELATIONS WITH ITS NEIGHBORS. PUZANOV CITED DOST'S RECENT TRIP TO ISLAMABAD, AND OBSERVED THAT THE AFGHANS AND PAKISTANIS STILL APPEAR TO BE PREPARING FOR THE TOP-LEVEL VISIT TO AFGHANISTAN OF PAKISTANI FOREIGN AFFAIRS ADVISOR AGHA SHAHI.

16. WITH REFERENCE TO IRAN, PUZANOV RECALLED THAT PRESIDENT TARAKI AND PRIME MINISTER AMIN HAD RECENTLY STATED THAT THEY WERE READY TO EXTEND A HAND OF FRIENDSHIP TO IRAN, IN SPITE OF THE LATTER'S INTERVENTION POLICIES.

17. PUZANOV THEN TURNED TO AFGHAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS, NOTING THAT THE AFGHANS HAD BEEN TRYING TO IMPROVE THIS RELATIONSHIP, IN SPITE OF APPARENT OPPOSITION ON THE AMERICAN SIDE, SUCH AS THE US DECISION TO CUT OFF AID. HE NOTED THAT THREE AFGHAN MINISTERS HAD ATTENDED THE AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE DAY CELEBRATION, OBSERVING THAT THAT SIGNIFIED A STRONG AFGHAN DESIRE TO DEMONSTRATE ITS DESIRE FOR GOOD RELATIONS WITH AMERICA. THE CHARGE REPLIED THAT WE HAD NOTED AND APPRECIATED HAVING THREE MINISTERS AT THE RECEPTION, BUT THAT THE USG LOOKS FOR MORE IMPORTANT, CONCRETE SIGNS THAT THE AFGHANS REALLY INTEND FRIENDLY RELATIONSHIP WITH THE U.S.

18. AS AN EXAMPLE OF AN IMPORTANT AREA IN WHICH THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT HAS NOT AT ALL BEEN HELPFUL, THE CHARGE CITED THE FRUSTRATING INVESTIGATION OF THE DEATH OF AMBASSADOR DUBS. NOTING THAT THERE WERE SEVERAL MYSTERIOUS ASPECTS OF THIS CASE WHICH NEEDED TO BE CLARIFIED, THE CHARGE REGRETTED THAT THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT HAD NOT EVEN BOTHERED TO REPLY TO OUR LAST FOUR DIPLOMATIC NOTES ON THIS SUBJECT. HE EXPLAINED THAT AMONG THE BASIC PROBLEMS IN THIS INVESTIGATION ARE SOME GRAVE QUESTIONS ABOUT THE WEAPONS INVOLVED. THE AMERICAN EMBASSY HAD ASKED TO SEE THE WEAPONS, BUT HAD BEEN REFUSED. THE EMBASSY SUBSEQUENTLY HAD ASKED FOR TEST-FIRED BULLETS FROM THE WEAPONS, BUT THAT REQUEST HAD BEEN IGNORED. A SO-CALLED "OFFICIAL REPORT" ABOUT THE INCIDENT LISTED FOUR WEAPONS FOUND BY THE AFGHAN AUTHORITIES AT THE SCENE. NONE OF THEM COULD HAVE PRODUCED THE .22 CALIBER BULLETS THAT KILLED AMBASSADOR DUBS. THE CHARGE TOLD PUZANOV THAT WE HAD ASKED THE DRA FOR AN EXPLANATION OF THIS DISCREPANCY, BUT HAD NEVER RECEIVED AN ANSWER.
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RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 7133
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE 346
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 1774
RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 640
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S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 3 KABUL 5648

26 Jul 79 09 27z

EXDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 7/26/99 (FLATIN, BRUCE A.) OR-M

19. AMBASSADOR PUZANOV MADE NO COMMENT ABOUT THE DUBS CASE, BUT OBSERVED THAT "SIGNS MUST BE SHOWN BY BOTH SIDES." IN THIS CONNECTION, HE ONCE AGAIN COMPLAINED ABOUT USG PUBLICITY ABOUT THE EVACUATION, OBSERVING THAT THE "FORTHCOMING" AFGHAN ATTITUDE TOWARD THE US DOES NOT DESERVE SUCH A REACTION. THE CHARGE REPLIED THAT THAT IS A MATTER FOR THE USG TO DECIDE. PUZANOV ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THAT WAS INDEED THE BUSINESS OF THE USG. HE WENT ON, HOWEVER, TO ADD THAT, ALTHOUGH HE WAS NOT GOING TO ADVISE US, IT WAS HIS OBSERVATION THAT IN DIPLOMATIC PRACTICE THERE MUST BE A MUTUAL APPROACH TOWARD GOOD RELATIONS. PUZANOV CITED THE SALT II PROCESS IN THIS CONNECTION. HE SAID THAT HE HAD SEEN A SOVIET PRESS REPORT OF SECRETARY VANCE'S MOST RECENT SPEECH ON SALT II, AND HAD FOUND IT "BRILLIANT AND CONVINCING."

20. RETURNING FINALLY TO THE BASIC SUBSTANCE OF THE DEMARCHE ITSELF, PUZANOV SAID, "WITH REFERENCE TO YOUR APPEAL TO US ABOUT THE EVACUATION SECURITY, IT'S MISPLACED." HE EXPRESSED HIS CONFIDENCE THAT THE AFGHANS WOULD MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO HELP. THE CHARGE EXPRESSED HOPE THAT THE EVACUATION WOULD RECEIVE AFGHAN ASSISTANCE AND UNDERSTANDING.

21. TURNING TO PUZANOV'S COMMENTS ABOUT IRANIAN AND PAKISTANI INTERVENTION IN AFGHAN AFFAIRS, THE CHARGE OBSERVED THAT SUCH ALLEGED AGREESSION HAS NOT YET BEEN PROVED. HE NOTED THAT IF THE DRA HAS ANY PROBLEM, IT'S WITH ITS OWN PEOPLE. PUZANOV DECLARED THAT THERE IS DEFINITE EVIDENCE OF FOREIGN INTERVENTION, DECLARING, "IF IT REALLY ONLY INVOLVED A PROBLEM WITH THE AFGHANPEOPLE, WHY SHOULD THE DRA SAY THAT THERE HAS BEEN INTERVENTION?" PUZANOV WENT ON TO STATE THAT PAKISTANI INTERVENTION IN PARTICULAR WAS "UNDENIABLY EVIDENT." HE OBSERVED, HOWEVER, THAT CURRENT HIGH-LEVEL MEETINGS BETWEEN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN ARE A GOOD IDEA, COMMENTING "LET THEM DECIDE IT." PUZANOV ALSO HOPED THAT THE AFGHANS AND IRANIANS COULD WORK OUT THEIR PROBLEMS, OBSERVING THAT THIS WOULD HELP MAINTAIN PEACE IN THIS REGION OF THE WORLD.

22. IN CONCLUSION, PUZANOV MENTIONED A FEW DETAILS OF THE CURRENT SOVIET ASSISTANCE PROGRAM IN AFGHANISTAN. HE STATED THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD NOW ALLOCATED $1.5 BILLION IN CREDITS FOR THE AFGHAN FIVE-YEAR PLAN. HE FURTHER CONFIRMED THAT APPROXIMATELY 1,500 AFGHAN STUDENTS ARE BEING TRAINED IN THE SOVIET UNION.

23. COMMENT: I FOUND IT NOTEWORTHY THAT PUZANOV, UNLIKE HIS COLLEAGUE IN MOSCOW (REFTEL A), DID NOT REJECT MY DEMARCHE AS UNDULY INVOLVING THE SOVIETS IN A BILATERAL US-AFGHAN MATTER. INDEED, PUZANOV APPEARED TO BE REMARKABLY INTERESTED IN SUBJECTS WHICH WOULD NOT ORDINARILY BE THE BUSINESS OF THE SOVIET EMBASSY, SUCH AS OUR PUBLCIZING THE EVACUATION OPERATION AND THE SIZE OF OUR EMBASSY STAFF. HE DOES NOT ALWAYS TAKE PAINS TO CONCEAL HIS ROLE AS SOVIET PROCONSUL HERE.

24. I ALSO FOUND IT INTERSTING THAT PUZANOV DID NOT ELECT TO ARGUE WITH ME THAT MY EVACUATION DECISION WAS WRONG.

25. FINALLY, I WOULD LIKE TO MENTION THAT ON THE BACK OF THE SOFA ON WHICH I WAS SEATED, THERE WAS PLACED PROMINETLY A 9-INCH "SPEAKER", ONE I HAD NEVER SEEN THERE ON MY PREVIOUS CALLS. I CAN ONLY WONDER WHETHER IT WAS SOME CRUDE KIND OF MICROPHONE.
AMSTUTZ
BT
#5648

29 Jul 79 [illegible] 4Z

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NNKNVV ESB224MJC127
OO RUQMFR
DE RUSBLK #5683 2091150
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O R 2811237 JUL 79
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUFRC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4915
INFO RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 3676
RUSRQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 9070
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1706
RUFRMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1777
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 7139
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3179
RUQMFR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 349
RUHQHQA/CINCPAC
RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 641
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L KABUL 5683

CINCPAC: ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12065: GDS 7-28-85 (TAYLOR, JAMES E.) OR-P
TAGS: PGOV, PINS, AF
SUBJECT: (LOU) AMIN GIVEN MORE DIRECT ROLE IN PROSECUTING COUNTERINSURGENCY

1. (C) SUMMARY: PRIME MINISTER AMIN HAS BEEN GIVEN A MORE DIRECT ROLE IN CARRYING OUT THE REGIME'S TRUGGLE AGAINST THE DOMESTIC INSURGENCY, AS WELL AS RESPONSIBILITY FOR DIRECTLY CONTROLLING AFFAIRS OF THE DEFENSE MINISTRY. THIS ENHANCED POSITION SUGGESTS HIS DEPARTURE FROM THE SCENE IS NOT YET IMMINENT, ALTHOUGH IT IS UNCLEAR WHERE THIS PARTICULAR DEVELOPMENT FITS IN THE STILL UNFOLDING POLITICAL DRAMA HERE. END OF SUMMARY.

2. (LOU) RADIO AFGHANISTAN, IN ITS EVENING NEWS BROADCAST ON JULY 27, CARRIED A "DECREE" FROM PRESIDENT NOOR MOHAMMAD TARAKI WHICH APPEARS TO ENHANCE THE ROLE OF PRIME MINISTER HAFIZULLAH AMIN IN COMBATTING THE DOMESTIC INSURGENCY. ACCORDING TO THE ANNOUNCEMENT, "THE CONTINUED AGGRESSION" AGAINST AFGHANISTAN BY "PAKISTANI AND IRANIAN MILITIAMEN" HAS REQUIRED TARAKI TO ASSUME PERSONAL LEADERSHIP OF THE COUNTRY'S DEFENSE AND COMMAND OF THE ARMED FORCES. TARAKI, HOWEVER, HAS "ENTRUSTED" AMIN, IN ADDITION TO HIS OTHER DUTIES, WITH THE EXECUTION OF TARAKI'S ORDERS, AND HAS INSTRUCTED THE PRIME MINISTER TO REPORT REGULARLY REGARDING PROGRESS IN THE COUNTER-INSURGENCY EFFORT. MOREOVER, AMIN HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO "TAKE OVER" THE AFFAIRS OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE UNDER TARAKI'S

OVERALL COMMAND AND GUIDANCE.

3. (C) COMMENT: WHERE THIS PARTICULAR DEVELOPMENT FITS IN THE CURRENTLY UNFOLDING POLITICAL DRAMA HERE IS STILL UNCLEAR. WHAT SEEMS FAIRLY CERTAIN, HOWEVER, IS THAT THE AUTHORITY AND, PERHAPS, POLITCIAL PRESTIGIE OF DEFENSE MINISTER MOHAMMAD ASLAM WATANJAR HAS BEEN DIMINISHED. MANY OBSERVERS BELIEVE THAT WATANJAR COULD PLAY A PROMINENT PART IN ANY EFFORT TO ESTABLISH A MORE BROADLY BASED REGIME -- BECAUSE HE IS CONSIDERED MORE NATIONALIST THAN THE TARAKI/AMIN TEAM -- AND HIS FATE MAY PROVIDE HINTS REGARDING DIRECTIONS POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS MAY TAKE.

4. (C) AT A MINIMUM, THE ANNOUNCEMENT POINTS TO A LARGER AND MORE DIRECT ROLE FOR AMIN IN THE DRA'S ANTI-INSURGENCY BATTLE, A POSITION WHICH SUGGESTS THAT AMIN'S DEPARTURE -- TO PAVE THE WAY FOR SOME SORT OF "NATIONAL FRONT" REGIME -- IS NOT YET IMMINENT. UNCERTAINTIES CONCERNING THE LOYALTY AND MORALE OF THE ARMED FORCES COULD HAVE PROMPTED THIS MOVE, SINCE THE DRA LEADERSHIP MAY HAVE FELT THAT AMIN, RATHER THAN PROFESSIONAL SOLDIER WATANJAR, WILL BE MORE CAPABLE OF INSTILLING PROPER REVOLUTIONARY ZEAL WITHIN THE WEARY AND HARD-PRESSED AFGHAN MILITARY FORCES. AT THE TIME OF THE 1978 REVOLUTION, AMIN HAD MANY DIRECT PERSONAL TIES TO MILITARY OFFICERS, MOST OF WHOM HE HAD PERSONALLY RECRUITED INTO THE PARTY. THE CURRENT STATE OF THOSE TIES AFTER MORE THAN ONE YEAR OF PURGES, INSURGENCY, AND INSTABILITY IS UNKNOWN. AMSTUTZ
BT
#5683

[redacted] ESA270TIA215
RR RUQMHR
DE RUQMTI #1185 2101210
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
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FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6992
INFO RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 084
RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 034
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 592
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 533
BT
S E C R E T TRIPOLI 1185

29 JUL 79 12 12Z

E.O. 12065: XDS-1 7/29/99 (HOOPER, JAMES R.) OR-P
TAGS: PEPR, LY, AF
SUBJECT: (S) LIBYAN SUPPORT FOR AFGHAN REVOLUTIONARIES

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. LIBYAN FOREIGN SECRETARIAT OFFICIAL HAS INFORMED US "CONFIDENTIALLY" THAT THE JAMAHIRIYAH IS PROVIDING SUPPORT TO MUSLIM REVOLUTIONARIES IN AFGHANISTAN. ASKED IF SUPPORT INCLUDED TRAINING FOR ANTI-TARAKI REBELS, SOURCE SAID THAT, WHILE LIBYANS HAVE CONTRIBUTED "QUARTER OF A MILLION DOLLARS" IN FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE, HE WAS UNAWARE THAT TRAINING FACILITIES WERE BEING OFFERED TO THE REBELS.

3. THE OFFICIAL RECALLED THAT LIBYAN DIPLOMATIC TIES WITH KABUL HAD BEEN "FROZEN" WHEN THE RED FLAGS WERE UNFURLED AFTER THE REVOLUTION AND THE NEW REGIME'S MARXIST ORIENTATION BECAME APPARENT. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT LIBYAN ASSISTANCE TO THE REBELS, FURTHERMORE, WAS A RATHER DELICATE SUBJECT IN CONTEXT OF TRIPOLI-MOSCOW RELATIONSHIP. THIS IN PART ACCOUNTED FOR RELATIVELY MODEST ATTENTION DEVOTED TO AFGHANISTAN BY LIBYAN MEDIA.

4. COMMENT: AT A TIME WHEN LIBYANS ARE PUBLICIZING THEIR SUPPORT FOR SANDANISTAS AND NEW NICARAGUAN GOVERNMENT, TRIPOLI'S COMMITMENT TO AFGHANI REBELS IS A USEFUL REMINDER THAT THE JAMAHIRIYAH'S REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES REFLECT SOME DEGREE OF CONSISTENCY. EVEN SOVIET CLIENT STATES ARE NOT EXEMPT FROM LIBYAN EFFORTS ON BEHALF OF NATIONAL LIBERATION GROUPS.

QUINLAN

BT
#1185

NNNNVV ESA201MJC240
PP RUQMHR
DE RUSBLK #5687 2100400
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FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4918
INFO RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 3677
RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 644
RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 9073
RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 351
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1707
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1779
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 7141
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1739
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 352
RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO 20
BT

29 Jul 79 05 25z

POL
CHG
ECON
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C O N F I D E N T I A L KABUL 5687

E.O. 12065: GDS 7-24-85 (TAYLOR, JAMES E.) OR-P
TAGS: PGOV, PINS, PINT, AF
SUBJECT: (LOU) FURTHER DATA ON NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR THE DEFENSE OF THE REVOLUTION

REF: KABUL 5463

1. (C) SUMMARY: FURTHER INFORMATION ON THE NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR THE DEFENSE OF THE REVOLUTION SUGGESTS THIS NEW BODY WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR BUILDING ENTHUSIASM FOR THE REGIME AMONG THE MASSES. THE ORGANIZATION WILL THEORETICALLY BE SEPARATE FROM STATE AND PARTY HIERARCHIES, BUT WE ANTICIPATE THERE WILL BE CONSIDERABLE OVERLAP AMONG THESE VARIOUS BODIES. THE NEW ORGANIZATION DOES NOT APPEAR TO CONSTITUTE ANY FORM OF "UNITED FRONT." E D OF SUMMARY

2. (LOU) AN ARTICLE IN THE LATEST EDITION OF "KHALQ" NEWSPAPER, THE WEEKLY ORGAN OF THE PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF AFGHANISTAN (PDPA), PROVIDES FURTHER INFORMATION ON THE RECENTLY ESTABLISHED "NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FO THE DEFENSE OF THE REVOLUTION" (REFTEL). ACCORDING TO THE REPORT, THE ORGANIZATION WAS FOUNDED IN ORDER, INTER ALIA, TO COMBAT INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL "REACTION," TO ESTABLISH A SOCIETY FREE OF EXPLOITATION OF MAN BY MAN, AND TO CREATE UNITY AMONG THE COUNTRY'S PROGRESSIVE FORCES. IN ADDITION, THE ORGANIZATION WILL OSTENSIBLY "UNIFY" THE EFFORTS OF ORGANIZATIONS, SUCH AS: THE PDPA; THE WORKERS' AND PEASANTS' UNIONS; LOCAL COMMITTEES FOR THE DEFENSE OF THE REVOLUTION; THE PARTY'S YOUTH AND WOMEN'S ORGANIZATIONS; AND, THE JOURNALISTS' AND EXPORT-IMPORT UNIONS.

3. (LOU) AN ORGANIZATIONAL CONGRESS (INFORMATION REGARDING THE SIZE AND PROPOSED DATE FOR THE FIRST MEETING OF THIS BODY IS NOT MENTIONED) WILL ELECT A CENTRAL COUNCIL OF ABOUT 35-45 MEMBERS. FROM AMONG THESE REPRESENTATIVES, 9-11 PERSONS WILL BE ELECTED TO AN EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, WHOSE CHAIRMAN WILL BE CHOSEN UPON THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE PDPA. THE OVERALL ORGANIZATION WILL HAVE UNITS ESTABLISHED ON THE PROVINCIAL, CITY, DISTRICT, AND SUB-DISTRICT LEVELS THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY, AND THEY WILL BE INDEPENDENT OF, BUT WILL WORK CLOSELY WITH, THEIR RESPECTIVE STATE AND PARTY COUNTERPARTS.

4. (LOU) A "WORKING GROUP" HAS BEEN SET UP TO PREPARE PROPOSALS FOR THE FIRST CONGRESS AND ITS MEMBERSHIP, AND TO SUBMIT THESE TO THE PDPA POLITBURO WITHIN 20 DAYS (WHEN THE CLOCK STARTED RUNNING IS NOT REVEALED). THIS GROUP IS HEADED BY ABDUL HAKIM SHARAEE JAUZJANI (MINISTER OF JUSTICE AND ATTORNEY GENERAL), AND HAS THE FOLLOWING MEMBERS: MOHAMMAD SEDIQ ALEMYAR (MINISTER OF PLANNING), KHEYAL MOHAMMAD KATAWAZI (MINISTER OF INFORMATION AND CULTURE), ASSADULLAH AMIN (SECOND DEPUTY MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS), AND SALEH MOHAMMAD PAIROZ (DEPUTY MINISTER OF PUBLIC WORKS).

5. (C) COMMENT: ALTHOUGH THE ORGANIZATION'S SPECIFIC RESPONSIBILITIES REMAIN VERY VAGUE, IT APPARENTLY WILL BE CHARGED WITH DRUMMING UP SUPPORT AMONG THE PEOPLE FOR THE REGIME'S OVERALL PROGRAMS, ESPECIALLY THE FIGHT AGANIST INSURGENTS. THE BODY APPARENTLY, HOWEVER, IS NOT CHARGED WITH DIRECTLY PROSECUTING THE REGIME'S ANTI-INSURGENCY EFFORTS, AS THIS RESONSIBILITY SEEMS TO REMAIN WITH THE HIGH COUNCIL FOR THE DEFENSE OF THE HOMELAND. WE ANTICIPATE THAT THERE WILL BE A GREAT DEAL OF OVERLAP AMONG THE HIERARCHIES OF THE STATE, PARTY, AND "DEFENSE OF THE REVOLUTION" ORGANIZATIONS, BUT THE REGIME APPARENTLY FELT COMPELLED TO SET UP YET ANOTHER BODY WITH THE SPECIFIC JOB OF BREATHING SOME LIFE INTO WHAT MAY HAVE BEEN JUDGED AS FLAGGING MORALE AMONG THE REGIME'S SUPPORTERS, ESPECIALLY OUTSIDE THE CAPITAL.

6. (C) WHILE THIS PARTICULAR REPORT DOES CALL FOR THE "UNITY" OF THOSE FORCES SUPPORTING THE REGIME, IN OUR VIEW THIS DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A CALL FOR ANY "UNITED FRONT" WHICH PRESUMABLY WOULD ENCOMPASS ELEMENTS NOT CONSIDERED "NATURAL" SUPPORTS OF THE DRA.

AMSTUTZ

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RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 9073
RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 351
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RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 7141
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1739
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 352
RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO 20
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L KABUL 5687

29 Jul 79 05 41Z

E.O. 12065: GDS 7-24-85 (TAYLOR, JAMES E.) OR-P
TAGS: PGOV, PINS, PINT, AF
SUBJECT: (LOU) FURTHER DATA ON NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR THE DEFENSE OF THE REVOLUTION

REF: KABUL 5463

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AMSTUTZ

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FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4948
INFO RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 0730
RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0647
RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 9080
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1711
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1782
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 7147
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3184
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 0354
RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0923
RUHQHQA/CINCPAC
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C O N F I D E N T I A L KABUL 5736

30 Jul 79 5 04z

CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12065: GDS 7/29/85 (TAYLOR, JAMES E.) OR-P
TAGS: PINR, PINS, PINT, AF
SUBJ: (LOU) CABINET RESHUFFLE UNLIKELY TO DEFUSE GROWING OPPOSITION

REF: KABUL 5683 (NOTAL)

1. (C) SUMMARY: THE POTENTIALLY MOST SIGNIFICANT OF THE NEW CABINET APPOINTMENTS IS HAFIZULLAH AMIN'S RELINQUISHMENT OF THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS PORTFOLIO AND HIS APPARENT FUTURE ROLE AS "ACTING" DEFENSE MINISTER. THE OTHER PLAYERS ARE OLD FACES, AND IF THESE CHANGES WERE DESIGNED TO PROVIDE A MEANINGFUL "NEW LOOK" TO THIS EMBATTLED REGIME, THEY ARE IN THEMSELVES INADEQUATE TO PACIFY THE GROWING DOMESTIC OPPOSITION. END SUMMARY.

2. (LOU) THE NEW COUNCIL OF MINISTER APPOINTMENTS ANNOUNCED JULY 28 ARE: DR. SHAH WALI (FORMER DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND MINISTER OF PUBLIC HEALTH) AS DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS; DR. SALEH MOHAMMAD ZIRI (FORMER MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE AND LAND REFORM) AS MINISTER OF PUBLIC HEALTH; DR. ABDUL RASHID JALILI (FORMER MINISTER OF EDUCATION) AS MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE AND LAND REFORM; MAJOR MOHAMMAD ASLAM WATANJAR (FORMER MINISTER OF DEFENSE) AS MINISTER OF INTERIOR; SHER JAN MAZDOORYAR (FORMER MINISTER OF INTERIOR) AS MINISTER OF FRONTIER AFFAIRS; SAHEB JAN SAHRAEE (FORMER MINISTER OF FRONTIER AFFAIRS) AS MINISTER WITHOUT PORTFOLIO; AND, MOHAMMAD SALEM MASSOODI (FORMER AMBASSADOR TO BULGARIA AND, VERY BRIEFLY, FRANCE) AS MINISTER OF EDUCATION.

3. (C) COMMENT: THE DRA'S PREVIOUS DAY'S ANNOUNCEMENT (REFTEL) THAT PRESIDENT NOOR MOHAMMAD TARAKI WAS TAKING OVER "PERSONAL CONTROL" OF THE AFGHAN MILITARY FORCES, BUT DELEGATING TO HAFIZULLAH AMIN RESPONSIBILITY FOR PROSECUTING THE REGIME'S COUNTERINSURGENCY CAMPAIGN AND AUTHORITY OVER THE DAILY AFFAIRS OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, CLEARLY INDICATED THAT THE CURRENT LEADERSHIP PERCEIVED THE BATTLE AGAINST THE DOMESTIC OPPOSITION AS ITS PRIMARY TASK. GIVING THE FOREIGN MINISTRY PORTFOLIO TO SHAH WALI -- THE THIRD-RANKING POLITICAL FIGURE IN THE COUNTRY -- DOES NOT REPRESENT ANY EROSION IN THE POLITICAL AUTHORITY OF AMIN, AND OBVIATES THE NEED FOR AMIN TO UNDERTAKE ANY FOREIGN TRAVEL AT THIS SENSITIVE JUNCTURE. ON THE CONTRARY, AMIN'S ENHANCED ROLE IN COMBATTING "FOREIGN AGGRESSION," COUPLED WITH SHAH WALI'S APPOINTMENT, SUGGESTS THAT AMIN WILL NOW HAVE EVEN MORE TIME TO DEVOTE TO THE DOMESTIC SCENE.

4. (C) ALTHOUGH IT WAS NOT OFFICIALLY ANNOUNCED THAT AMIN WILL CARRY THE TITLE OF DEFENSE MINISTER, WATANJAR'S DEPARTURE TO INTERIOR LEAVES LITTLE DOUBT THAT AMIN WILL AT LEAST SERVE AS "ACTING" MINISTER OF DEFENSE. IN THIS REGARD, SOME OBSERVERS HERE BELIEVE THAT THE TRANSFER OF PROFESSIONAL MILITARY OFFICER WATANJAR WAS MADE IN ORDER TO PRECLUDE ANY MOVE BY THE AFGHAN MILITARY TO SEIZE POLITICAL POWER WITH THE HOPE OF DEFUSING DOMESTIC STRIFE. (IN THIS CONNECTION, WATANJAR PLAYED A LEADING ROLE IN BOTH THE 1973 AND 1978 COUPS.) OTHERS, HOWEVER, FEEL THAT THE DETERIORATING SECURITY SITUATION HERE REPRESENTS PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE OF WATANJAR'S INABILITY TO ACHIEVE POSITIVE RESULTS, AND, ACCORDING TO THIS REASONING, AMIN HAD TO STEP IN IF THE REGIME WERE TO HAVE ANY REAL CHANCE OF REVERSING ITS FORTUNES.

5. (C) IF THESE PARTICULAR CABINET CHANGES WERE DESIGNED TO PROVIDE A "NEW LOOK" OR "BROADER BASE" TO THE REGIME, AND THEREBY "MOLLIFY" THE OPPOSITION IN SOME MANNER, THEY IN THEMSELVES ARE WOEFULLY INADEQUATE, AND WILL PROBABLY HAVE LITTLE, IF ANY, IMPACT ON THE COURSE OF DOMESTIC EVENTS. THE GOVERNMENT PLAYERS INVOLVED HAVE BEEN ON THE SCENE SINCE THE REVOLUTION FIFTEEN MONTHS AGO, AND WE ANTICIPATE THAT NO ONE WILL TAKE ANY COMFORT FROM THIS "OLD WINE IN NEW BOTTLES" APPROACH. IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN, OF COURSE, WHETHER AMIN'S DIRECT PARTICIPATION WILL PRODUCE SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS IN ELIMINATING THE INSURGENCY, BUT AT THE LEAST, HIS NEW RESPONSIBILITIES APPEAR TO PUT HIM IN CLOSER CONTACT WITH THE MILITARY FORCES WHICH CONSTITUTE THE INCREASINGLY CRUCIAL PROP KEEPING THE DRA HOUSE STANDING. AMSTUTZ
ET
#5736

CN 0068

POL
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VV ESA629MJC181
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DE RUSBQD #8629 2131116
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FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4172
INFO RUQMRA/A EMBASSY JIDDA 829
RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 9516
RUSBKR/AMCONSUL KARACHI 8451
ZEN/AMCONSUL LAHORE POUCH
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 4161
XUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1433
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1168
ZEN/AMVGNSUL PESHAWAR POUCH
RUQMONXAME
OASSY TEHRAN 5368
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L ISLAMABAD 8629;

3.0. 12065: GDS 08/01/85 (SHERMAN, R) OR-P
TAGS: PEPR PBOR SHUM PIAF
SUBJECT: (C) ZIA NASSERY RETURNS WITH NEW PROJECT

REF: (A) ISLAMABAD 7360 (B) ISLAMADYD6545 (C) PREVIOUS
I

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT.

2. AFGHAN-AMERICAN ZIA NASSERY CONTACTED EMBOFF AUGUST 1 BY TELEPHONE AS HE TRANSITTED ISLAMABAD ON RETURN FROM US. HE SAID HE SPENT PAST FEW WEEKS IN NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON BUT WAS UNABLE TO MAKE MANY USEFUL CALLS ON HILL DUE TO SUMMER TRAVEL BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS.

3. ZIA EXPLAINED THAT HIS RETURN TO PESHAWAR NOW IS TO INITIATE NEW PROJECT WHICH HE CALLS "PUSHTOON-AMERICAN CLINIC FOR AFGHAN REFUGEES." THE CLINIC, HE SAYS, WILL BE ESTABLISHED IN PESHAWAR CITY INITIALLY BUT EVENTUALLY MOVE TO LOCATION CLOSER TO AFGHAN/PAK FRONTIER.

4. ZIA CLAIMS TO HAVE PLEDGES OF SUPPORT FROM AMERICAN INDIVIDUALS AND CORPORATIONS FOR MEDICAL SUPPLIES, FUNDS AND PERSONNEL TO OPERATE THE CLINIC. HE SHIPPED HIS OWN VOLKSWAGEN VAN FROM NEW YORK TO SERVE AS AMBULANCE FOR PROJECT. HE PLANS TO HIRE LOCAL PAKISTANI DOCTORS TO MAN THE CLINIC UNTIL HE CAN GENERATE MORE SUPPORT AND RECRUIT AMERICAN DOCTORS.

5. WHILE STARTING AS OUT-PATIENT CLINIC, ZIA ENVISIONS THE OERATION EVENTUALLY GROWING INTO A REGULAR HOSPITAL. HE WAS NONCOMMITAL ABOUT GOP SANCTION FOR THIS PROJECT.

6. COMMENT: ZIA NASSERY TOLD EMBOFF THE CLINIC WILL BE HIS SOLE FOCUS ON THIS VISIT AND THAT HE WILL ONLY "WATCH AND LISTEN" TO DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN AFGHAN DISSIDENT GROUPS WITH WHICH HE HAS HAD PAST CONTACT. HE WILL REPORT CLINIC PROGRESS TO EMBOFF WHEN HE RETURNS TO ISLAMABAD IN A FEW WEEKS.

7. WHILE WE ADMIRE ZIA'S ALTRUISM (WHICH WE FEEL IS SINCERE), WE EXPECT HE WILL RUN INTO MAJOR STUMBLING BLOCKS ERECTED BY GOP DUE BOTH TO BURAUCRATIC INERTIA AND SENSITIVITIES ABOUT ZIA'S PAST ACTIVITIES.

HUMMEL

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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5000
INFO RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 652
RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 9092
RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 354
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1789
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 7164
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 362
BT
S E C R E T KABUL 5820

E.O. 12065: XDS-1 7-31-99 (FLATIN, BRUCE A.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, PINS, AF, LY
SUBJECT: (S) LIBYAN SUPPORT FOR AFGHAN INSURGENTS

REF: TRIPOLI 1185 (NOTAL)

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. LIBYA'S SUPPORT FOR THE AFGHAN INSURGENTS (REFTEL) IS CONSISTENT WITH THE ATTITUDE THE LOCAL LIBYAN EMBASSY HAS TAKEN TOWARD KABUL'S KHALQI REGIME SINCE THE REVOLUTION OF APRIL 27-28, 1978. SHORTLY AFTER THAT EVENT, THE KHALQIS MADE AN EFFORT TO DISGUISE THEIR MARXIST-LENINIST COLORATION BY SUCH PHRASES AS "WE SUPPORT ISLAM." WHEN HE FIRST HEARD THAT PHRASE, LIBYAN AMBASSADOR EL HADI OMAR EL HERIK ACIDLY OBSERVED TO THE THEN AMERICAN AMBASSADOR THAT "THERE IS A BIG DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A MAN'S SAYING THAT HE 'RESPECTS' ISLAM AND HIS SAYING THAT HE IS A MUSLIM."

3. WE HAVE FOUND LIBYAN DIPLOMATS AT KABUL WELL INFORMED AND REALISTIC ABOUT DEVELOPMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN. AMSTUTZ
BT
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5085
INFO RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 658
RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 9123
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1724
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 7192
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 1799
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN PRIORITY 375
RUSBKR/AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY 4308
RUHQHQA/CINCPAC PRIORITY
RUSNAAA/CINCEUR PRIORITY
RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 21
BT
S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 KABUL 5967

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KARACHI: FOR RSS

E.O. 12065: GDS 8-5-85 (FLATIN, BRUCE A.) OR-P
TAGS: ASEC, PINS, AF, PK, IR
SUBJECT: (LOU) AN INITIAL EVALUATION OF THE BALA HISSAR MUTINY

REF: KABUL 5942

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. SUMMARY: KABUL WAS AGAIN CALM ON AUGUST 6, FOLLOWING SEVERE FIGHTING THE PREVIOUS DAY BETWEEN MUTINOUS AFGHAN TROOPS AND FORCES LOYAL TO THE KHALQI REGIME. AFTER RESTORING ORDER, THE LATTER CLAIMED THAT THE TROUBLE HAD BEEN CAUSED BY "THE AGENTS OF PAKISTANI AND IRANIAN REACTION." THIS WAS AMONG THE MOST SERIOUS CHALLENGES THE KHALQI REGIME HAS YET FACED -- AND IT SHOWED ITSELF CAPABLE OF HANDLING IT. HOWEVER, THE EIISODE FORESHADOWED GROWING PROBLEMS FOR THE KHALQI REGIME AND ITS SOVIET MENTORS. END OF SUMMARY.

3. AS DAWN ROSE OVER KABUL ON AUGUG, THE CITY WAS SULLENLY QUIET, AND UNDER THE FIRM CONTROL OF THE KHALQI REGIME. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE CONTINUED CLOSURE OF A FEW STRATEGIC STREETS, TRAFFIC WAS ALLOWED TO FLOW FREELY -- OVER PAVEMENTS TORN BY SPEEDING TANK TREADS THE PREVIOUS AFTERNOON.

4. MOST OF THE AUGUST 5 FIGHTING APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN CENTERED AT AND NEAR KABUL'S ANCIENT BALA HISSAR FORTRESS, SCENE OF BATTLES OVER SEVERAL CENTURES. ESSENTIALLY, THE MAJOR CONFLICT APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN BETWEEN MUTINOUS TROOPS IN THAT AREA AND ARMORED UNITS, WHO REMAINED LOAYL TO THE KHALQI REGIME. EXACTLY WHAT INITIATED THE FIGHTING IS STILL UNCLEAR. SOME KNOWLEDGEABLE OBSERVERS THINK THAT A BALA HISSAR UNIT LAUNCHED THE MUTINY, BUT THAT THE BACKUP FORCES THE MUTINEERS HAD DEPENDED UPON SUBSEQUENTLY CHICKENED OUT. ALTHOUGH MUTINOUS TROOPS WERE FIGHTING INSIDE THE BALA HISSAR, THE RED KHALQI FLAG WAVED OVER THE FORTRESS DURING THE ENTIRE BATTLE. THIS INDICATES THAT THEY PROBABLY NEVER GAINED FULL CONTROL OVER THAT ENTIRE MILITARY COMPLEX. THE AUGUST 5 MUTINY, LIKE THE HAZARA SHI'A UPRISING OF JUNE 23, FAILED TO IGNITE ANY SIGNIFICANT SUPPPRTING ACTION ELSEWHERE IN THE CITY, ALTHOUGH THERE WERE ISOLATED FIRING INCIDENTS THROUGHOUT THE NIGHT AROUND KABUL.

5. ALTHOUGH IT IS DIFFICULT TO EVALUATE THE CASUALTIES AND PROPERTY DAMAGE AT THIS TIME BECAUSE SOME OF THE PRIMARY AFFECTED AREAS ARE STILL CORDONED OFF BY GOVERNMENT FORCES, EXTENSIVE TANK FIRE AND HELICOPTER GUNSHIP FIRE WAS PUMPED INTO THE BALA HISSAR NEIGHBORHOOD FOR OVER TWO HOURS IN A TYPICAL EXAMPLE OF KHALQI OVERKILL TACTICS. ONE AFGHAN SOURCE, WHO LATER WAS ABLE TO GET NEAR TO THE BATTLE SITE, REPORTS THAT LARGENUMBERS OF MUTINOUS TROOPS WERE SLAUGHTERED. ALTHOUGH WE HAVE NO WAY OF VERIFYING CASUALTY FIGURES, WE DID NOTE DURING THE BATTLE WHAT APPEARED TO BE GOVERNMENT FIRING AT TROOPS FLEEING OVER THE SHERDARWAZAH MOUNTAINSIDE THAT OVERLOOKS THE BALA HISSAR. WE ALSO NOTED HELICOPTER GUNSHIPS FIRING IN THE VICINITY OF THE KABUL-LOGAR ROAD. THIS MIGHT HAVE BEEN DIRECTED AT FLEEING MUTINEERS.

6. THE MODD IN KABUL TODAY IS SULLEN AND RESENTFUL. IT IS TYPIFIED BY AN AFGHAN WHO MUTTERED TO AN EMBASSY OFFICER: "IF ONLY THEY DID NOT HAVE THOSE PLANES, WE MUSLIMS WOULD TAKE CARE OF THEM" THIS COMMENT, INCIDENTALLY, ILLUSTRATES THE EFFICACY OF THE KHALQIS' HARDHITTING RETALIATORY TACTICS. THEY DO PRODUCE A SOBERING, INTIMIDATING EFFECT ON ANYONE WHO IS CONTEMPLATING ENTERING INTO THE FRAY.
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5086
INFO RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 659
RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 9124
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1725
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 7193
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 1800
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN PRIORITY 376
RUSBKR/AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY 4309
RUHQHQA/CINCPAC PRIORITY
RUSNAAA/CINCEUR PRIORITY
RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 22
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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 KABUL 5967

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KARACHI: FOR RSS

E.O. 12065: GDS 8-5-85 (FLATIN, BRUCE A.) OR-P

7. COMMENT: THE BALA HISSAR BATTLE OF AUGUST 5 ALSO ILLUSTRATED ONE OF THE MAIN WEAKENSSES OF THE KHALQI REGIME: THEM
E-
TERIORATING RELIABILITY OF ITS REGULAR TROOPS. IT ALSO ILLUSTRATED AT THE SAME TIME AN IMPORTANT COMPONENT OF THE CONTINUING STRENGTH OF THE TOUGH, TENACIOUS KHALQI LEADERSHIP: THE FIRM SUPPPORT OF THE COUNTRY'S KEY FORCES, SUCH AS COMMANDO UNITS, ARMORED BRIGADES, AND THE AIR FORCE. AS IN THE REVOLUTION OF APRIL 27-28, 1978, THE TANK AGAIN PROVED ITSELF TO BE A KEY WEAPON IN SECURING THE CONTROL OF KABUL. TO A LESSER DEGREE, THIS WAS ALSO TRUE OF THE HELICOPTER GUNSHIPS. AS WAS THE CASE DURING THE JUNE 23 UPRISING, THE KHALQIS AGAIN MADE QUICK USE OF THEIR PROPAGANDA ASSETS: DROPPING LEAFLETS FROM HELI-COPTERS, MAKING ANNOUNCEMENTS FROM SOUND TRUCKS, AND ISSUING BUSINESSLIKE RADIO AND TELEVISION BULLETINS.

8. THE AUGUST 5 BATTLE WAS A MUCH MORE SERIOUS CHALLENGE TO THE KHALQI REGIME THAN THE HAZARA SHI'A UPRISING OF JUNE 23 HAD BEEN. IN THIS LATTER CASE, THE GROWING PROBLEM OF DISAFFECTION WITHIN MILITARY RANKS DISPLAYED ITSELF IN THE CAPITAL -- IN FULL VIEW OF THE AFGHAN ELITE AND FOREIGN OBSERVERS. SINCE THE MILITARY AND POLICE DEFECTIONS OF THE HERAT UPRISING IN MARCH AND THE MUTINY AT THE JALALABAD ARMY BASE IN APRIL, THERE HAVE BEEN REPEATED REPORTS OF DESERTIONS AND DFECTIONS OF AFGHAN UNITS ENJ

GED AGAINST REBEL FORCES ALL OVER AFGHANISTAN. SOME OF THE UNITS INVOLVED HAVE BEEN LARGE, PERHAPS UP TO BATTALION AND REGIMENTAL SIZE. ALTHOUGH THE KEY UNITS AROUND KABUL REMAIN LOYAL AND EFFECTIVE -- AS THEY PROVED THEMSELVES AGAIN ON AUGUST 5, THIS HEMORRHAGING OF MANPOWER IS LIKELY TO CONFRONT THE KHALQIS AND THEIR SOVIET MENTORS WITH SOME TOUGH CHOICES. UNTIL NOW, THE USSR HAS BEEN ABLE TO KEEP THE TARAKI-AMIN OPERATION AFLOAT THROUGH GENEROUS INJECTIONS OF FINANCIAL SUPPORT, MILITARY MATERIEL, AND MILITARY ADVISORS. THE LATTER HAVE BECOME STEADILY MORE NUMEROUS -- PERHAPS NOW TOTALLING SOME 2,000 -- AND THEY HAVE BEEN ENTERING INTO DIREIQ

COMMAND ROLES IN SOME UNITS. THEREFORE, THE NATURE OF THE SOVIET COMMITMENT APPEARS TO BE EVOLVING THROUGH STAGES NOT TOO UNLIKE THOSE THE USG WENT THROUGH IN VIETNAM (E.G., THE GRADUAL SOVIET ASSUMPTION OF CONTROL OVER BAGRAM AIR BASE).

9. IN VIEW OF THE WORSENING MANPOWER SITUATION, THE KHALQIS COULD EVENTUALLY ASK THE SOVIETS TO UP THEIR ANTE HERE BY CONTRIBUTING SOME COMBWOSUNITS. ONE POSSIBLE SCENARIO THE SOVIETS MAY CONSIDER IS THE ASSIGNMENT OF SPECIAL COMBAT

RCES TO KABUL, JALALABAD, AND -634 (36 LOCATIONS "TO PROTECT SOVIET CIVILIANS" THERE. (NOTE: KABUL'S MIKROYAN HOUSING DISTRICT FOR SOVIETS HAD HEAVY MILITARY PROTECTION DURING THE AUGUST 5 FIGHTING.) END OF COMMENT.

10. SECURITY NOTE: NO AMERICANS WERE AFFECTED BY THE AUGUST 5 FIGHTING. THE U.S. MISSION IS CONDUCTING NORMAL OPERATIONS.

AMSTUTZ

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